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
BY  
AUGUSTUS H. STRONG.

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
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## PREFATORY NOTE.

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These Lectures are printed, not published. They are a first essay at the preparation of a general scheme of instruction in systematic theology. They constitute a mere outline, to be filled in by extemporaneous illustration. They will also be modified and expanded, as occasion arises, by the dictation of additional matter.

The references appended to the successive sections of the notes are not given as authorities. They are intended simply to facilitate further investigation on the part of the student, by directing him to other sources of information or suggestion. It has been the aim, in general, to mention not only the authors whose views are favored, but also those who best represent the views combated, in the text.

For these reasons, the success of the student will greatly depend upon the amount of private reading and thought devoted to the topics under review, and upon his consequent ability to enter into the discussions, and to appropriate whatever may be valuable in the more full expositions, of the class-room.

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# LECTURES ON THEOLOGY.

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## PART I.

### PROLEGOMENA.

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#### CHAPTER I.

##### IDEA OF THEOLOGY.

I. DEFINITION.—Theology is the science of God and of the relations between God and the universe.

Though the word 'theology' is sometimes employed in dogmatic writings to designate that single department of the science, which treats of the divine nature and attributes, prevailing usage, since Abelard (A. D. 1079–1142) entitled his general treatise "Theologia Christiana," has included under that term the whole range of Christian doctrine.

Theology, therefore, gives account not only of God, but of those relations between God and the material and spiritual universe, in view of which we speak of Creation, Providence, and Redemption.

Luthardt, *Compendium der Dogmatik*, 1, 2. Blunt, *Dictionary Doct. and Hist. Theology*, Art. Theology.

II. AIM.—In defining theology as a science, we indicate its aim. Science does not create; it discovers. Science is not only the observing, recording, verifying, and formulating of objective facts; it is also the recognition and explication of the relations between these facts, and the synthesis of both the facts and the rational principles which unite them, in a comprehensive, rightly proportioned, and organic system.

Theology answers to this description of a science. It discovers facts and relations, but does not create them. As it deals with objective facts and their relations, so its arrangement of these facts and relations is not optional, but determined by the nature of the material with which it deals. In fine,

The aim of theology may be stated as being the ascertainment of the facts respecting God and the relations between God and the universe, and the exhibition of these facts in their rational unity, as connected parts of a formulated and organic system of truth.

Dove, *Logic of the Christian Faith*, 14. Whewell, *History Inductive Sciences*, I., *Introd.*, 43.

III. POSSIBILITY.—A particular science is possible only when three conditions combine, namely, the actual existence of the object with which the science deals, the subjective capacity of the human mind to know that object, and the provision of definite means by which the object is brought into contact with the mind.

In like manner, the possibility of theology has a threefold ground: 1. in the existence of a God who has relations to the universe; 2. in the capacity of the human mind for knowing God and certain of these relations; and 3. in the provision of means by which God is brought into actual contact with the mind, or in other words, in the provision of a revelation.

1. *In the existence of a God who has relations to the universe.* It has been objected, indeed, that since God and these relations are objects apprehended only by faith, they are not proper objects of knowledge or subjects for science. We reply that faith is only a higher sort of knowledge. Physical science rests also upon faith—faith in human testimony and in our primitive cognitions—but is not invalidated thereby, because this faith, though unlike sense-perception or logical deduction, is yet a cognitive act of the reason, and may be defined as certitude with respect to matters in which verification is unattainable.

So the faith which assures us of theological facts is not to be confounded with opinion or imagination. It is simply certitude with regard to spiritual realities, upon the testimony of our own rational nature and upon the testimony of God. Its only peculiarity as a cognitive act of the reason is, that it is conditioned by holy affection. As the sciences of æsthetics and ethics respectively, are products of reason as including in the one case a power of recognizing beauty practically inseparable from a love for beauty, and in the other case a power of recognizing the morally right practically inseparable from a love for the morally right, so the science of theology is a product of reason, but of reason as including a power of recognizing God which is practically inseparable from a love for God.

This recognition of invisible realities upon God's testimony, and as conditioned upon a right state of the affections, is faith. As an operation of man's higher rational nature, though distinct from ocular vision or from reasoning, it is a kind of knowing, and so may furnish proper material for a scientific theology.

Foundations of our Faith, 12, 13. Murphy, Scientific Bases of Faith, 145. Sir Wm. Hamilton, *Metaph.*, 44. Shedd, *History of Doctrine*, 1:154-164. *Presb. Quarterly*, Oct., 1871; Oct., 1872; Oct., 1873. Calderwood, *Philos. Infinite*, 99, 117. Hopkins, *Outline Study of Man*, 77, 78. Philippi, *Glaubenslehre*, 1: 50. Van Oosterzee, *Dogmatics*, 2-8. *New Englander*, July, 1873, 481. *Princeton Review*, 1864, 122.

2. *In the capacity of the human mind for knowing God and certain of these relations.* But it has been urged that such knowledge is impossible,

A. Because we can know only phenomena. We reply:

(a) That we know mental as well as physical phenomena.

(b) That in knowing phenomena, whether mental or physical, we know substance as underlying the phenomena, and as manifested through them.

(c) That our minds bring to the observation of phenomena not only this knowledge of substance, but also the knowledge of time, space and cause, realities which are in no sense phenomenal. Since these objects of knowledge are not phenomenal, the fact that God is not phenomenal cannot prevent us from knowing him.

Martineau, *Essays Philos. and Theol.*, 1: 24-40, 207-217. *Bib. Sac.*, *Apl.*, 1874, 211. McCosh, *Intuitions*, 138-154. Porter, *Human Intellect*, 619-637. Alden, *Philosophy*, 44. Hopkins, *Outline Study of Man*, 87. Bowne, *Review of H. Spencer*, 47. Fleming, *Vocab. of Philosophy*, *Art. Phenomenon*.

B. Because we can know only that which bears analogy to our own nature or experience. We reply:

(a) That it is not essential to knowledge, that there be similarity of nature between the knower and the known. The mind knows matter, though mind and matter are opposite poles of existence.

(b) That our past experience is not the measure of our possible knowledge. Else all revelation of higher characters to lower would be precluded, as well as all progress to knowledge which surpassed our present attainments.

(c) That even if knowledge depended upon similarity of nature and experience, we might still know God, since we are made in God's image and there are important analogies between the divine nature and our own.

Murphy, *Scientific Bases of Faith*, 122. *Bib. Sac.*, *Oct.*, 1867, 624. McCosh, *Art. in International Review*, *Jan.*, 1875, 105.

C. Because we know only that of which we can conceive, in the sense of forming an adequate mental image. We reply:

(a) It is true that we know only that of which we can conceive, if by the term 'conceive,' we mean our distinguishing, in thought, the object known from all other objects. But,

(b) The objection confounds conception with that which is merely its occasional accompaniment and help, namely, the picturing of the object by the imagination. In this sense, conceivability is not a final test of truth.

(c) That the formation of a mental image is not essential to conception or knowledge, is plain when we remember that, as a matter of fact, we both conceive and know many things of which we cannot form a mental image of any sort that in the least corresponds to the reality; for example, force, space, our own minds. So we may know God, although we cannot form an adequate mental image of him.

McCosh, *Intuitions*, 186-189. Murphy, *Scientific Bases*, 133. Porter, *Human Intellect*, 392. Bowne, *Review of H. Spencer*, 30-34.

D. Because we can know truly only that which we know in whole and not in part. We reply:

(a) That the objection confounds partial knowledge with the knowledge of a part. We know the mind in part, but we do not know a part of the mind.

(b) That if the objection were valid, no real knowledge of anything would be possible, since we know no single thing in all its relations.

We conclude that although God is a being not composed of parts, we may yet have a partial knowledge of him, and this knowledge, though not exhaustive, may yet be real and adequate to the purposes of science.

Bowne, Review of H. Spencer, 72. Martineau, Essays, 1: 291.

E. Because all predicates of God are negative, and therefore furnish no real knowledge. We answer:

(a) That predicates derived from our own consciousness, such as spirit, love, and holiness, are positive.

(b) The terms infinite and absolute, moreover, express not merely negative, but positive ideas, since "negation of one thing is possible only by affirmation of another."

Since predicates of God, therefore, are not merely negative, the argument mentioned above furnishes no valid reason why we may not know him.

Calderwood, Moral Philosophy, 248; Philosophy of the Infinite, 272.

F. Because to know is to limit or define. Hence the Absolute as unlimited, and the Infinite as undefined, cannot be known. We answer:

(a) That God is absolute, not as existing in *no* relation, but as existing in no *necessary* relation; and,

(b) That God is infinite, not as excluding all co-existence of the finite with himself, but as being the ground of the finite, and so unfettered by it. God is therefore limited and defined in such a sense as to render knowledge of him possible.

Murphy, Scientific Bases of Faith, 130. Calderwood, Phil. of Inf., 158. McCosh, Intuitions, 186. Hickok, Rational Cosmology, 85.

G. Because all knowledge is relative to the knowing agent; that is, what we know, we know, not as it is objectively, but only as it is related to our own senses and faculties. In reply:

(a) We grant that we can know only that which has relation to our faculties. But this is only to say that we know only that which we come into mental contact with, that is, we know only what we know. But,

(b) We deny that what we come into mental contact with, is known by us as other than it is. So far as it is known at all, it is known as it is. In other words, the laws of our knowing are not merely arbitrary and regulative, but correspond to the nature of things.

We conclude that, in theology, we are equally warranted in assuming that the laws of our thought are laws of God's thought, and that the results of normally conducted thinking with regard to God correspond to the objective reality.

Alden, Intellectual Philosophy, 71-79. Porter, Human Intellect, 523. Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 1: 22. Murphy, Scientific Bases of Faith, 103. Mill, Examination of Sir William Hamilton, 1: 113-134. Bib. Sac., Apl., 1868, 341. McCosh, Intuitions, 139-146, 340, 341. Princeton Review, 1864, 122. Bowne, Review of H. Spencer, 76.

3. *In God's actual revelation of himself and certain of these relations.* As we do not in this place attempt a positive proof of God's existence or of man's capacity for the knowledge of God, so we do not now attempt to prove that God has brought himself into contact with man's mind by revelation. We consider the grounds of this belief hereafter. Our aim at present is simply to show that, granting the fact of revelation, a scientific theology is possible. This has been denied upon the ground:

A. That revelation, as a making known, is necessarily internal and subjective, and hence can furnish no objective facts such as constitute the proper material for science. We answer:

(a) That common usage does not warrant this restriction of the term revelation to a mode of intelligence or a quickening of man's cognitive powers. Although revelation in its widest sense may include, and as constituting the ground of the possibility of theology, does include, both insight and illumination, it may also be used to denote simply a provision of the means of knowledge.

Boston Lectures, 1871, 58. Luthardt, *Fundamental Truths*, 193. Auberlen, *Divine Revelation*, Introduction, 29. Martineau, *Essays*, 1: 171, 280. *Bib. Sac.*, 1867, 593; 1872, 428. Kalmis, *Dogmatik*, 3: 37-43. Nitzsch, *System of Christian Doctrine*, 72.

(b) Hence it may be, and as we shall hereafter see, it is, in great part, an external revelation in works and words. Theology has to do with inward revelations only as they are expressed in, or as they agree with, this objective standard.

B. That many of the truths thus revealed are too indefinite to constitute the material for science, either because they belong to the region of the feelings, or because they are beyond our full understanding. We reply:

(a) That theology has to do with subjective feelings only as they can be defined, and shown to be effects of objective truth upon the mind. These are not more obscure than the facts of morals or psychology, and the same objection which would exclude such feelings from theology, would make these latter sciences impossible. Moreover,

(b) Those facts of revelation which are beyond our full understanding, may, like the nebular hypothesis in astronomy or the atomic theory in chemistry, furnish a principle of union between great classes of other facts otherwise irreconcilable. We may define our concepts of God, and even of the Trinity, at least sufficiently to distinguish them from all other concepts, and whatever difficulty may encumber the putting of them into language only shows the importance of attempting it and the value of even an approximate success.

C. Because there is no orderly arrangement of these facts either in nature or in Scripture, and hence an accurate systematizing of them by the human mind is impossible. We reply that the like argument would equally show all physical science to be impossible. Though revelation does not present to us a dogmatic system ready-made, a dogmatic system is not only implicitly contained therein, but parts of the system are wrought out

in the epistles of the New Testament, as for example in Roman's 5: 12-19, and 1 Timothy, 3: 16.

Martineau, *Essays*, 1: 29, 40. *Am. Theol. Rev.*, 1859.

IV. NECESSITY.—The necessity of theology has its grounds: 1. in the organizing instinct of the human mind; 2. in the relation of systematic truth to the development of character; 3. in the importance to the preacher of definite and just views of doctrine; 4. in the intimate connection between correct doctrine and the safety and aggressive power of the church; 5. in the direct and indirect injunctions of Scripture.

1. *In the organizing instinct of the human mind.* This organizing principle is a part of our constitution. The mind cannot endure confusion or apparent contradiction in known facts. The tendency to harmonize and unify its knowledge appears so soon as the mind becomes reflective; just in proportion to its endowments and culture, does the impulse to systematize and formulate increase.

This is true of all departments of human inquiry, but it is peculiarly true of our knowledge of God. Since the truth with regard to God is the most important of all, theology meets the deepest want of man's rational nature. Theology is a rational necessity. If all existing theological systems were destroyed to-day, new systems would rise to-morrow.

So inevitable is the operation of this law that those who most decry theology, show nevertheless that they have made a theology for themselves, and often one sufficiently meagre and blundering. Hostility to theology, where it does not originate in mistaken fears for the corruption of God's truth, or in a naturally illogical structure of mind, often proceeds from a license of speculation which cannot brook the restraints of a complete Scriptural system.

Shedd, *Discourses and Essays*, 27-52.

2. *In the relation of systematic truth to the development of character.* Truth thoroughly digested, is essential to the growth of Christian character in the individual and in the church. All knowledge of God has its influence upon character, but most of all the knowledge of spiritual facts in their relations.

Theology cannot, as has sometimes been objected, deaden the religious affections, since it only draws out from their sources and puts into rational connection with each other, the truths which are best adapted to nourish the religious affections. On the other hand, the strongest Christians are those who have firmest grasp upon the great doctrines of Christianity; the heroic ages of the church have been those which have witnessed most consistently to them; the piety that can be injured by the systematic exhibition of them must be either weak or mystical or mistaken.

3. *In the importance to the preacher of definite and just views of doctrine.* The chief intellectual qualification must be his power clearly and comprehensively to conceive, and accurately and powerfully to express the truth. He can be the agent of the Holy Spirit in converting and sanctifying men, only as he can wield "the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God" (Eph. 6: 17), or in other language, only as he can impress truth upon the minds and consciences of his hearers.

Nothing more certainly nullifies his efforts, than confusion and inconsistency in his statements of doctrine. His object is to replace obscure and erroneous conceptions among his hearers, by those which are correct and vivid. He cannot do this without knowing the facts with regard to God in their relations—knowing them, in short, as parts of a system. With this truth he is put in trust. To mutilate it or misrepresent it, is not only sin against the Revealer of it—it may also prove the ruin of men's souls.

The best safeguard against such mutilation or misrepresentation, is the diligent study of the several doctrines of the faith in their relations to each other, and especially to the central theme of theology, the person and work of Jesus Christ.

4. *In the intimate connection between correct doctrine and the safety, and aggressive power of the church.* The safety and progress of the church is dependent upon her "holding the form of sound words" (2 Tim. 1: 13), and serving as "pillar and ground of the truth" (3: 15). Defective understanding of the truth results sooner or later in defects of organization, of operation, and of life.

Thorough comprehension of Christian truth as an organized system, furnishes on the other hand not only an invaluable defense against heresy and immorality, but also an indispensable stimulus and instrument in aggressive labor for the world's conversion.

5. *In the direct and indirect injunctions of Scripture.* The Scriptures urge upon us the thorough and comprehensive study of the truth (John 5: 39, "Search the Scriptures"), the comparing and harmonizing of its different parts (1 Cor. 2: 13, "comparing spiritual things with spiritual"), the gathering of all about the great central fact of revelation (Col. 1: 27, "which is Christ in you, the hope of glory"), the preaching of it in its wholeness as well as in its due proportions (2 Tim. 4: 2, "Preach the word").

The minister of the gospel is called "a scribe instructed unto the kingdom of heaven" (Matt. 13: 52); the pastors of the churches are at the same time to be teachers (Eph. 4: 11); the bishop must be "apt to teach" (1 Tim. 3: 2); "rightly dividing the word of truth" (2 Tim. 2: 15); "holding fast the faithful word as he hath been taught, that he may be able by sound doctrine both to exhort and to convince the gainsayers" (Tit. 1: 9).

V. *RELATION TO RELIGION.*—Theology and religion are related to each other as effects, in different spheres, of the same cause. As theology is an effect produced in the sphere of systematic thought by the facts respecting God and the relations between God and the universe, so religion is an effect which these facts produce in the sphere of individual or collective life. With regard to the term 'religion,' notice:

1. *Its derivation.* The derivation from religare, 'to bind,' or 'to bind back,' is negatived by the authority of Cicero, and of the best modern etymologists; by the difficulty on this hypothesis of explaining such forms as religio, religens; and by the necessity, in that case, of presupposing a knowledge of sin and redemption, which was foreign to the ancient heathen world.

The more correct derivation is from *relegère*, 'to go over again,' 'carefully to ponder.' Its original meaning is, therefore: 'reverent observance' (of duties due to the gods).

Andrews' Latin Lexicon, in voce. Nitzsch, System of Christian Doctrine, 7. Van Oosterzee, Dogmatics, 75-77. Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 1: 6. Kahnis, Dogmatik, 3: 18. For advocacy of the derivation from *religère*, see Lange, Dogmatik, 1: 185-196.

## 2. *False conceptions.*

A. Religion is not merely, as Hegel declared, a kind of knowing; for it would then be only an incomplete form of philosophy, and the measure of knowledge in each case would be the measure of piety.

B. Religion is not, as Schleiermacher held, the mere feeling of dependence; for such feeling is not religious unless exercised toward God and accompanied by moral effort. Finally:

C. Religion is not, as Kant maintained, morality or moral action; for morality is conformity to a law of right, while religion is essentially a relation to a person.

Ebrard, Dogmatik, 1: 14. Julius Müller, Doct. Sin, 1: 175. Hagenbach, Encyclopädie, 17-32. Fisher, Essays on Supernatural Origin of Christianity, 563-570. Shedd, Sermons to the Natural Man, 244-246. Liddon's Elements of Religion, Lecture I. Bib. Sac., 9: 375.

3. *Essential idea.* Religion in its essential idea is a life in God, or in other words, a life lived in recognition of God, in communion with God, and under control of the indwelling Spirit of God.

Since it is a life, it cannot be described as consisting solely in the exercise of either one of the powers of intellect, affection, or will. As physical life involves the unity and coöperation of all the organs of the body, so religion or spiritual life, involves the united working of all the powers of the soul.

To feeling, however, we must assign the logical priority, since holy affection toward God, imparted in regeneration, is the condition of truly knowing God and of truly serving him.

Van Oosterzee, Dogmatics, 81-85. Julius Müller, Doctrine of Sin, 2: 227. Nitzsch, System of Christian Doctrine, 10-28. Luthardt, Fund. Truths, 147. Twisten, Dogmatik, 1: 12.

## 4. *Inferences.* From this definition of religion it follows:

A. That in strictness there is but one religion. Man is a religious being, indeed, as having the capacity for this divine life. He is actually religious, however, only when he enters into this living relation to God. False religions are the caricatures which men given to sin, or the imaginations which men groping after light, form of this life of the soul in God.

Peabody, Christianity the Religion of Nature, 18. Van Oosterzee, Dogmatics, 88-93.

B. That the content of religion is greater than that of theology. The facts of religion come within the range of theology only so far as they can be definitely conceived, accurately expressed in language, and brought into rational relation to each other.

Blunt, Dict. Doct. and Hist. Theol., Art. Theology. Sir Wm. Hamilton, quoted in Calderwood's Phil. of Infinite, 499.



## CHAPTER II.

### MATERIAL OF THEOLOGY.

I. SOURCES OF THEOLOGY.—God himself, in the last analysis, must be the only source of knowledge with regard to his own being and relations. Theology is, therefore, a summary and explanation of the content of God's self-revelations. These are first, the revelation of God in nature; secondly and supremely, the revelation of God in the Scriptures.

1. *Nature.* By nature we mean not only physical facts, or facts with regard to the substances, properties, forces, and laws of the material world, but also spiritual facts, or facts with regard to the intellectual and moral constitution of man, and the orderly arrangement of human society and history.

2. *Natural Theology.* The Scriptures assert that God has revealed himself in nature. There is not only an outward witness to his existence and character in the constitution and government of the universe (Ps. 19; Acts 14: 17; 17: 24; Rom. 1: 20), but an inward witness to his existence and character in the heart of every man. (Rom. 1: 19, τὸ γνωστὸν—the known of God. Compare the ἀποκαλύπτεται, of the gospel, in 1: 17, with the ἀποκαλύπτεται, of wrath, in 1: 18. Rom. 1: 32, τὸ δίκαιωμα ἐπιγρόντες. Rom. 2: 15, ἔργον γραπτῶν. Therefore even the heathen are without excuse, Rom. 1: 20). The systematic exhibition of these facts, whether derived from observation, history, or science, constitutes natural theology.

Shedd, Homiletics, 11.

3. *Natural Theology supplemented.* The Scriptures declare, however, with equal plainness, that the revelation of God in nature does not supply all the knowledge which a sinner needs (Acts 17: 23; Eph. 3: 9). This revelation is therefore supplemented by another, in which divine attributes and merciful provisions only dimly shadowed forth in nature, are made known to men. This latter revelation consists of a series of supernatural events and communications, the record of which is preserved in the Scriptures.

There is, indeed, an internal work of the divine Spirit by which the outer word is made an inner word, and its truth and power are manifested to the heart. This teaching of the Spirit, however, is not a giving of new truth, but an illumination of the mind to perceive the truth already revealed. Christian experience is but a testing and proving of the truth objectively contained in Scripture.

While theology, therefore, depends upon the teaching of the Spirit to interpret, and upon Christian experience to illustrate the Scriptures, it looks to the Scriptures themselves as its chief source of material and its final standard of appeal. We use the word revelation, therefore, henceforth, to designate the objective truth made known in Scripture.

Twisten, Dogmatik, 1: 344. Calvin's Institutes, B. I., ch. 7. Hackett on Acts, 17: 23. Hodge on Romans, 1: 20. Hodge, Syst. Theology, 1: 15.

4. *The theology of Scripture not unnatural.* Though we speak of the systematized truths of nature as constituting natural theology, we are not to infer that Scriptural theology is unnatural. Since the Scriptures have the same author as nature, the same principles are illustrated in one as in the other. All the doctrines of the Bible have their reason in that same nature of God which constitutes the basis of all material things.

Christianity is a supplementary dispensation, not as contradicting, or correcting errors in, natural theology, but as more perfectly revealing the truth. Christianity, indeed, is the ground plan upon which the whole creation is built—the original and eternal truth of which natural theology is but a partial expression.

Hence the theology of nature and the theology of Scripture are mutually dependent. Natural theology not only prepares the way for, but it receives stimulus and aid from, Scriptural theology. Natural theology may now be a source of truth, which, before the Scriptures came, it could not furnish.

Peabody, *Christianity the Relig. of Nature*, Lecture 2. Dove, *Logic of the Christian Faith*, 318, 333. Bib. Sac, July, 1874, 436.

5. *Scripture and Rationalism.* Although the Scriptures make known much that is beyond the power of man's unaided reason to discover or fully to comprehend, they contain nothing which contradicts a reason conditioned in its activity by a holy affection, and enlightened by the Spirit of God. To reason in the large sense, as including the mind's power of cognizing God and moral relations—not in the narrow sense of mere reasoning, or the exercise of the purely logical faculty—the Scriptures continually appeal.

A. The proper office of reason, in this large sense, is:

(a) To furnish us with those primary ideas of space, time, cause, right, and God, which are the conditions of all subsequent knowledge.

(b) To judge with regard to man's need of a special and supernatural revelation.

(c) To examine the credentials of communications professing to be such a revelation.

(d) To receive and reduce to system the facts of revelation, when such an one has been properly attested.

(e) To deduce from these facts their natural and logical conclusions.

Thus reason itself prepares the way for a revelation above reason, and warrants an implicit trust in such revelation when once given.

B. Rationalism, on the other hand, holds reason to be the ultimate source of all religious truth, while Scripture is authoritative only so far as its revelations agree with previous conclusions of reason, or can be rationally demonstrated. Every form of rationalism, therefore, commits at least one of the following errors:

(a) That of confounding reason with mere reasoning, or the exercise of the logical intelligence.

(b) That of ignoring the necessity of a holy affection as the condition of all right reason in religious things, and the absence of this holy affection in man's natural state.

(c) That of regarding the unaided reason as capable, even in its normal and unbiased state, of discovering, comprehending and demonstrating all religious truth.

Mansell, *Limits of Religious Thought*, 96. Calderwood, *Philosophy of Infinite*, 126. Hodge, *Theology*, 1: 34, 39, 55. Luthardt, *Fundamental Truths*, Lecture VII. Miller, *Fetich in Theology*, 212. Twisten, *Dogmatik*, 1: 467-500.

#### 6. *Scripture and Mysticism.*

A. True mysticism. We have seen that there is an illumination of the minds of all believers by the Holy Spirit. The Spirit, however, makes no new revelation of truth, but uses for his instrument the truth already revealed. The illuminating work of the Spirit is, therefore, an opening of men's minds to understand the Scriptures.

As one thus initiated into the mysteries of Christianity, every true believer may be called a mystic. True mysticism is that higher knowledge and fellowship which the Holy Spirit gives through the use of the Scriptures as a means.

B. False mysticism. Mysticism, however, as the term is commonly used, errs in holding to the attainment of religious knowledge by direct communication from God, and by passive absorption of the human activities into the divine. It either partially or wholly loses sight of:

(a) The outward organ of revelation, the Scriptures.

(b) The activity of the human powers in the reception of all religious knowledge.

(c) The personality of man, and by consequence, the personality of God.

Nitzsch, *System of Doctrine*, 35. Herzog, *Encyclopædie*, Art. *Mystik*, by Lange. Vaughan, *Hours with the Mystics*. Morell, *History of Philosophy*, 58; 191-215; 556-625; 726. Hodge, *Syst. Theology*, 1: 61-69; 97-104. Fleming, *Vocab. of Philosophy*, in voce. Tholuck, *Introduction to Blüthensammlung aus der Morgenländischen Mystik*.

7. *Scripture and Romanism.* While the history of doctrine, as showing the progressive apprehension and unfolding by the church, of the truth implicitly contained in the Scriptures, is a subordinate source of theology, Protestantism recognizes the Bible as the only primary and absolute authority.

Romanism, on the other hand, commits the twofold error:

A. Of making the church, and not the Scriptures, the immediate and authoritative source of religious knowledge.

Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, 1: 61-69. E. G. Robinson, *Sermon in Madison Avenue Lectures*, 387.

B. Of making the relation of the individual to Christ dependent upon his relation to the church, instead of his relation to the church depending upon, following, and expressing his relation to Christ.

Schleiermacher, *Glaubenslehre*, 1: 6-38. Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, 30.

II. LIMITATIONS OF THEOLOGY.—Although theology derives its material from God's twofold revelation, it does not profess to give an exhaustive knowledge of God and of the relations between God and the universe. It has its limitations:

1. *In the finiteness of the human understanding.* This gives rise to a class of necessary mysteries, or mysteries connected with the infinity and incomprehensibility of the divine nature. (Job. 11: 7; Rom. 11: 33.)

Calderwood, Philos. Infinite, 491. Sir Wm. Hamilton, Discus. on Philosophy, 22.

2. *In the imperfect state of science, both natural and metaphysical.* This gives rise to a class of accidental mysteries, or mysteries which consist in the apparently irreconcilable nature of truths which, taken separately, are perfectly comprehensible.

3. *In the inadequacy of language.* Since language is the medium through which truth is expressed and formulated, the invention of a proper terminology in theology, as well as in every other science, is a condition and criterion of its progress. The Scriptures recognize a peculiar difficulty in putting spiritual truths into earthly language. (1 Cor. 2: 13. 2 Cor. 3: 6; 12: 4.)

4. *In the incompleteness of our knowledge of the Scriptures.* Since it is not the mere letter of the Scriptures that constitutes the truth, the progress of theology is dependent upon hermeneutics or the interpretation of the word of God.

5. *In the silence of written revelation.* For our discipline and probation, much is probably hidden from us, which we might even with our present powers comprehend.

6. *In the lack of spiritual discernment caused by sin.* Since holy affection is a condition of religious knowledge, all moral imperfection in the individual Christian and in the church, serves as a hindrance to the working out of a complete theology.

We do not, therefore, expect to construct a perfect system of theology. All science but reflects the present attainment of the human mind. No science is complete or finished. However it may be with the sciences of nature and man, the science of God will never amount to an exhaustive knowledge.

We must not expect, then, to demonstrate all Scripture doctrines upon rational grounds, or even in every case to see the principle of connection between them. Where we cannot do this, we must, as in every other science, set the revealed facts in their places and wait for further light, instead of ignoring or rejecting any of them because we cannot understand them or their relation to other parts of our system.

Though our knowledge may be imperfect, it will have great value still. Our success in constructing a theology will depend upon the proportion which clearly expressed facts of Scripture bear to mere inferences and assumptions, and upon the degree in which they all cohere about Christ, the central person and theme.

## CHAPTER III.

### METHOD OF THEOLOGY.

I. REQUISITES TO THE STUDY.—The requisites to the successful study of theology are:

1. *A disciplined mind.* Only such a mind can patiently collect the facts, hold in its grasp many facts at once, educe their connecting principles by continuous reflection, suspend final judgment until its conclusions are verified by Scripture and experience.

2. *An intuitional as distinguished from a merely logical habit of mind,*—or, trust in the mind's primitive cognitions, as well as in its processes of reasoning. The theologian must have insight as well as understanding. He must accustom himself to ponder spiritual facts as well as those which are sensible and material; to see things in their inner relations as well as their outward forms; to cherish confidence in the reality and the unity of truth.

Vinet, *Outlines of Philosophy*, 39, 40. Dove, *Logic of Christian Faith*, 1-29, and especially 25.

3. *An acquaintance with physical, mental and moral science.* The method of conceiving and expressing Scripture truth is so affected by our elementary notions of these sciences, and the weapons with which theology is defended and attacked are so commonly drawn from them as arsenals, that the student cannot afford to be ignorant of them.

Baptist Quarterly, 2: 393.

4. *A knowledge of the original languages of the Bible.* This is necessary to enable us not only to determine the meaning of the fundamental terms of Scripture, such as sin, righteousness, atonement, but also to interpret statements of doctrine by their connections with the context.

5. *A holy affection toward God.* Only the renewed heart can properly feel its need of divine revelation, or understand that revelation when given.

6. *The enlightening influence of the Holy Spirit.* As only the Spirit fathoms the things of God, so only he can illuminate our minds to apprehend them.

II. DIVISIONS OF THEOLOGY.—Theology is commonly divided into Biblical, Historical, Systematic and Practical.

1. *Biblical Theology* aims to arrange and classify the facts of revelation, confining itself to the Scriptures for its material, and treating of doctrine only so far as it was developed at the close of the apostolic age.

2. *Historical Theology* traces the development of the Biblical doctrines from the time of the apostles to the present day, and gives account of the

results of this development in the life of the church. By doctrinal development, we mean the progressive unfolding and apprehension by the church, of the truth explicitly or implicitly contained in Scripture.

As giving account of the shaping of the Christian faith into doctrinal statements, Historical Theology is called the History of Doctrine. As describing the resulting and accompanying changes in the life of the church, outward and inward, Historical Theology is called Church History.

3. *Systematic Theology* takes the material furnished by Biblical and Historical Theology, and with the aid of these seeks to build up into an organic and consistent whole all our knowledge of God and of the relations between God and the universe, whether this knowledge be originally derived from nature or from the Scriptures.

It is to be clearly distinguished from Dogmatic Theology. Dogmatic Theology is the systemization of the doctrines as expressed in the symbols of the church, together with a grounding of these in the Scriptures and an exhibition, so far as may be, of their rational necessity. Systematic Theology, on the contrary, begins not with the symbols, but with the Scriptures. It asks first, not what the church has believed, but what is the truth of God's revealed word. It examines that word with all the aids which nature and the Spirit have given it, using Biblical and Historical Theology as its servants and helpers, but not as its masters. Systematic Theology, in fine, is theology proper, of which Biblical and Historical Theology are the incomplete and preparatory stages.

4. *Practical Theology* is the system of truth considered as a means of renewing and sanctifying men, or in other words, theology in its publication and enforcement. To this department of theology belong Homiletics and Pastoral Theology, since these are but scientific presentations of the true methods of unfolding Christian truth, and of bringing it to bear upon men individually and in the church.

The application of the term Practical Theology to a systematic exhibition of the contents of the Christian consciousness, making it equivalent to the theology of Christian experience, is a misuse of the word 'practical' (*πράσσω*).

5. *Other departments of theology, so-called.* It has sometimes been asserted that there are other departments of theology not included in those above mentioned. But most of these, if not all, belong to other spheres of research and cannot properly be classed under theology at all.

Moral theology so-called, or the science of Christian morals (ethics, or theological ethics), is indeed the proper result of theology, but is not to be confounded with it.

Speculative theology so-called, respecting, as it does, such truth as is matter of opinion, is either extra-scriptural, and so belongs to the province of the philosophy of religion, or is an attempt to explain truth already revealed, and so falls under the province of Systematic Theology.

Bib. Sac., Apl., 1852, 375. Luthardt, *Compendium der Dogmatik*, 5. Hagenbach, *Encyclopædie*, 109.

## III. HISTORY OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

1. *In the Eastern Church* systematic theology may be said to have had its beginning and end in John of Damascus (700-760).

2. *In the Western Church* we may (with Hagenbach) distinguish three periods:

A. The period of Scholasticism, introduced by Peter Lombard (died 1164), and reaching its culmination in Thomas Aquinas (1221-1274) and Duns Scotus (1265-1308).

B. The period of Symbolism, represented by the Lutheran theology of Philip Melancthon (1497-1560), and the Reformed theology of John Calvin (1509-1564); the former connecting itself with the Analytic theology of Calixtus (1585-1656), and the latter with the Federal theology of Cocceius (1603-1669).

C. The period of Criticism and Speculation, in its three divisions: the rationalistic, represented by Semler (1721-1791); the transitional, by Schleiermacher (1768-1834); the evangelical, by Nitzsch, Müller and Tholuck.

3. Among the theologians of *views diverse from the prevailing Protestant faith* may be mentioned:

A. Bellarmine (1542-1621), the Roman Catholic;

B. Arminius (1560-1609), the opponent of predestination;

C. Laelius Socinus (1525-1562), and Faustus Socinus (1539-1604), the leaders of the modern Unitarian movement.

4. *British theology*, represented by:

A. The Baptist, John Bunyan (1628-1688), John Gill (1697-1771), and Andrew Fuller (1754-1815).

B. The Puritan, John Owen (1616-1683), Richard Baxter (1615-1691), John Howe (1630-1705), and Thomas Ridgely (1666-1734).

C. The Scotch Presbyterian, Thomas Boston (1676-1732), John Dick (1764-1833), and Thomas Chalmers (1780-1847).

D. The Methodist, John Wesley (1703-1791).

E. The English Churchmen, Richard Hooker (1553-1600), Gilbert Burnet (1643-1715), and John Pearson (1613-1686).

5. *American theology*, running in two lines:

A. The Reformed system of Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758), modified successively by Joseph Bellamy (1719-1790), Samuel Hopkins (1721-1803), Nathaniel Emmons (1745-1840), Leonard Woods (1774-1854), C. G. Finney (born 1792), and N. W. Taylor (1786-1858). Calvinism, as thus modified, is often called the New England, or New School theology.

B. The older Calvinism, represented by R. J. Breckinridge (born 1800), Charles Hodge (born 1797), E. J. Baird, and William G. T. Shedd; the two former favoring, and the two latter opposing, antecedent imputation. All these, however, as holding to views of human depravity and divine grace more nearly conformed to the doctrine of Augustine and Calvin, are distinguished from the New England theologians and their followers, by the popular title of Old School.

On the history of Systematic Theology, see Hagenbach and Shedd, *Hist. of Doctrine*; Ebrard, *Dogmatik*, 1: 44-100; Kahnis, *Dogmatik*, 1: 15-128; Hase, *Hutterus Redivivus*, 24-52.

## IV. ORDER OF TREATMENT.

1. *Various methods of arranging the topics of a theological system.*

A. The Analytic method of Calixtus begins with the assumed end of all things, blessedness, and thence passes to the means by which it is secured.

B. The Christological method of Hase, Thomasius and Andrew Fuller, treats of God, man, and sin as presuppositions of the person and work of Christ.

C. The Federal method of Cocceius, Witsius and Boston, treats theology under the two covenants.

D. The Trinitarian method of Leydecker and Martensen regards Christian doctrine as a manifestation successively of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit.

E. The Anthropological method of Chalmers and Rothe. The former begins with the Disease of Man and passes to the Remedy; the latter divides his Dogmatik into the Consciousness of Sin and the Consciousness of Redemption. Mention may also be made of the

F. Historical method adopted in Jonathan Edwards's History of Redemption; and

G. The Allegorical method of Dannhauer, in which man is described as a wanderer, life as a road, the Holy Spirit as a light, the church as the candlestick, God as the end, and heaven as the home.

2. We adopt the *Synthetic method*. This proceeds from causes to effects, or in the language of Hagenbach, "starts from the highest principle, God, and proceeds to man, Christ, redemption, and finally to the end of all things."

In such a treatment of theology we may best arrange our topics in the following order:

- 1st. The existence of God.
- 2d. The Scriptures a revelation from God.
- 3d. The nature, decrees and works of God.
- 4th. Man in his original likeness to God, and subsequent apostasy.
- 5th. Redemption through the work of Christ and of the Holy Spirit.
- 6th. The nature and laws of the Christian church.
- 7th. The end of the present system of things.

Hagenbach, *Hist. Doctrine*, 2: 152.

## V. TEXT-BOOKS IN THEOLOGY valuable for reference:

1. *Compendiums*. Hase, Hutterus Redivivus. Luthardt, *Compendium der Dogmatik*. Hodge, *Outlines of Theology*.

2. *Confessions*. Lutheran: Hase, *Libri Symbolici*. Reformed: Niemeyer, *Collectio Confessionum*. Comparison of both: Winer, *Comparative Darstellung*. English Church: *Thirty-nine Articles*. Presbyterian: Westminster Confession. Methodist: *Doctrines and Discipline of the Meth. Epis. Church*; Baptist: *New Hampshire Confession*.

3. *Extended treatises*. Turretin, Dick, Hodge, Van Oosterzee, Philippi, Luthardt (*Fundamental and Saving Truths*), Baird (*Elohim Revealed*).

4. *Monographs*. Müller, *Doctrine of Sin*. Dorner, *Hist. Doctrine Person of Christ*. Shedd, *Discourses and Essays*.



## PART II.

### THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

#### CHAPTER I.

##### ORIGIN OF OUR IDEA OF GOD'S EXISTENCE.

The existence of God is a first truth; in other words, the knowledge of God's existence is intuitive. Logically, it precedes and conditions all observation and reasoning. Chronologically, only reflection upon the phenomena of nature and of mind occasions its rise in consciousness.

With the great majority of German, and a constantly increasing number of English and American theologians, we regard the existence of God as the most important of those necessary truths, such as space, time, causality, substance, which are assumed as the foundations of all our other knowledge.

Calvin, *Institutes*, Book I., Chap. 3. Nitzsch, *System of Christian Doctrine*, 15-26, 134-140. Julius Müller, *Doctrine of Sin*, 1: 78-84. Ulrici, *Leib und Seele*, 688-725. Porter, *Human Intellect*, 497. Hickok, *Rational Cosmology*, 58-89. Farrar, *Science in Theology*, 27-29. *Bib. Sac.*, July, 1872, 553; and January, 1873, 204. Fetich in *Theology*, 110-122. Fisher, *Essays*, 565-572. Tulloch, *Theism*, 314, 336. Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, 1: 191-203.

Remark 1. *Derivation*. 'God' allied to Persian khoda=lord, ruler. *Θεός*, either from *τιθημι*=orderer, creator; or from (Sanskrit) *dyaus* (divus), =the bright heaven. *אלהים* from *אלה* (Arabic)=to fear, adore; plural, of many in one=one who combines in himself many reasons for adoration.

Webster's Dictionary, in voce. Kahnis, *Dogmatik*, 3: 175, 176.

Remark 2. *Definition*. God is the absolutely perfect being. All more extended definitions are but expansions of this one.

Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, 1: 366.

#### I. FIRST TRUTHS IN GENERAL.

##### 1. *Their nature.*

A. Negatively. A first truth is not,

(a) Truth written prior to consciousness upon the substance of the soul; for such passive knowledge implies a materialistic view of the soul;

(b) Actual knowledge of which the soul finds itself in possession at birth; for it cannot be proved that the soul has such knowledge;

(c) An idea, undeveloped at birth, but which has the power of self-development apart from observation and experience; for this is contrary to all we know of the laws of mental growth.

Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, 1: 17. Origen adv. *Celsum*, 1: 4. Calvin, *Institutes*, 1: 3: 3.

B. Positively. A first truth is a knowledge which, though developed upon occasion of observation and reflection, is not derived from observation and reflection,—a knowledge on the contrary which has such logical priority that it must be assumed or supposed, in order to make any observation or reflection possible.

Such truths are not, therefore, recognized first in order of time; some of them are assented to somewhat late in the mind's growth; by the great majority of men they are never consciously formulated at all. Yet they constitute the necessary assumptions upon which all other knowledge rests, and the mind has not only the inborn capacity to evolve them so soon as the proper occasions are presented, but the recognition of them is inevitable so soon as the mind begins to give account to itself of its own knowledge.

Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Introduction, 1. Cousin, *True Beautiful and Good*, 39-64; also, *History Philosophy*, 2: 199-245. Porter, *Human Intellect*, 501, 519. McCosh, *Intuitions*, 48, 49.

2. *Their criteria.* The criteria by which first truths are to be tested are three:

A. Their universality. By this we mean not that all men assent to them or understand them when propounded in scientific form, but that all men manifest a practical belief in them by their language, actions and expectations.

B. Their necessity. By this we mean not that it is impossible to deny these truths, but that the mind is compelled by its very constitution to recognize them upon the occurrence of the proper conditions, and to employ them in its arguments to prove their non-existence.

C. Their logical independence and priority. By this we mean that these truths can be resolved into no others, and proved by no others; that they are presupposed in the acquisition of all other knowledge, and can therefore be derived from no other source than an original cognitive power of the mind.

Porter, *Human Intellect*, 510.

## II. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD A FIRST TRUTH.

1. That *the knowledge of God's existence answers the first criterion of universality*, is evident from the following considerations:

A. It is an acknowledged fact that the vast majority of men have actually recognized the existence of a spiritual being or beings, upon whom they conceived themselves to be dependent.

B. Those races and nations which have at first seemed destitute of such knowledge, have uniformly, upon further investigation, been found to possess it, so that no tribe of men with which we have thorough acquaintance can be said to be without an object of worship. We may presume that further knowledge will show this to be true of all.

C. This conclusion is corroborated by the fact that those individuals in heathen or in Christian lands, who profess themselves to be without any knowledge of a spiritual power or powers above them, do yet indirectly manifest the existence of such an idea in their minds and its positive influence over them.

D. This agreement among individuals and nations so widely separated in time and place, can be most satisfactorily explained by supposing that it has its ground not in accidental circumstances, but in the nature of man as man. The diverse and imperfectly developed ideas of the Supreme Being which prevail among men, are best accounted for as misinterpretations and perversions of an intuitive conviction common to all.

Ulrici, Leib und Seele, 688. Tylor, Primitive Culture, 1: 377 sq. Alexander, Evidences of Christianity, 22. Calderwood, Philosophy of Infinite, 512. Liddon, Elements of Religion, 50. Methodist Quarterly Review, Jan., 1875, 1. Tholuck, Art. on Heathenism, its origin and nature, in Bib. Rep., 1832: 86. Pearson on Infidelity, 19.

2. That *the knowledge of God's existence answers the second criterion of necessity*, will be seen by considering:

A. That men, under circumstances fitted to call forth this knowledge, cannot avoid recognizing the existence of God. In contemplating finite existence there is inevitably suggested the idea of an infinite being as its correlative. In danger men instinctively cry to God for help. In the commands and reproaches of conscience the soul recognizes a Lawgiver and Judge whose voice conscience merely echoes.

Calderwood, Philosophy of Infinite, 46; and Moral Philosophy, 77. Hopkins, Outline Study of Man, 283-285.

B. That men, in virtue of their humanity, have a capacity for religion. This recognized capacity for religion is proof that the idea of God is a necessary one. If the mind upon proper occasion did not evolve this idea, there would be nothing in man to which religion could appeal.

C. That he who denies God's existence must tacitly assume that existence in his very argument, by employing logical processes whose validity rests upon the fact of God's existence. The full proof of this belongs under the next head.

3. That *the knowledge of God's existence answers the third criterion of logical independence and priority*, may be shown as follows:

A. It cannot be derived from any other source than an original cognitive power of the mind.

(a) Not from external revelation, whether communicated through the Scriptures or tradition; for unless man had from another source a previous knowledge of the existence of a God from whom such a revelation might come, the revelation itself could have no authority for him.

Gillespie, Necessary Existence of God, 10. Ebrard, Dogmatik, 1: 117.

(b) Not from experience, whether sense-perception or reflection; for the idea of God is not that of a sensible or material object, nor is it a combination of such ideas. Since the spiritual and infinite are direct opposites of the material and finite, no experience of the latter can account for our idea of the former.

Porter, Human Intellect, 86, quotation from Locke, Essay, 2: 1: 4. Cousin, True Beautiful and Good, 48, 49.

(c) Not from reasoning; because,

(c<sup>1</sup>) The actual rise of this knowledge in the great majority of minds is not the result of any conscious process of reasoning. On the other hand, upon occurrence of the proper conditions, it flashes upon the soul with the quickness and force of an immediate revelation.

(c<sup>2</sup>) The strength of men's faith in God's existence is not proportioned to the strength of the reasoning faculty. On the other hand, men of greatest logical power are often inveterate sceptics, while men of unwavering faith are found among those who cannot even understand the arguments for God's existence.

Dove, *Logic of the Christian Faith*, 21.

(c<sup>3</sup>) There is more in this knowledge than reasoning could ever have furnished. Men do not limit their belief in God to the just conclusions of argument. The arguments for the divine existence, valuable as they are for purposes to be shown hereafter, are not sufficient by themselves to warrant our conviction that there exists an infinite and absolute being.

It will appear upon examination that the a priori argument is capable of proving only an abstract and ideal proposition, but can never conduct us to the existence of a real being. It will appear that the a posteriori argument from merely finite existence, can never demonstrate the existence of the infinite. In the words of Sir Wm. Hamilton: "A demonstration of the absolute from the relative is logically absurd, as in such a syllogism we must collect in the conclusion what is not distributed in the premises." (*Discussions*, 23.)

Neither do men arrive at the knowledge of God's existence by inference; for inference is but condensed syllogism, and is equally open to the objection just mentioned.

Whately, *Logic*, 290-292. Jevons, *Lessons in Logic*, 81. Thompson, *Outline Laws of Thought*, sections 82-92. Calderwood, *Philosophy of the Infinite*, 60-69; *Moral Philosophy*, 238. Turnbull, *Baptist Quarterly*, July, 1872, 271. Van Oosterzee, *Dogmatics*, 239.

B. It is presupposed in all other knowledge as its logical condition and foundation. Not only does the validity of the simplest mental acts, as sense-perception, self-consciousness, and memory, depend upon the assumption that a God exists who has so constituted our minds that they give us knowledge of things as they are, but the more complex processes, such as induction and deduction, can be relied on only by presupposing a thinking Deity who has made the various parts of the universe to correspond to each other and to the investigating faculties of man. While we cannot demonstrate that God is, we can show that in order to the existence of any other knowledge, men must assume that God is.

Peabody, *Christianity the Religion of Nature*, 23: "Induction is syllogism, with the immutable attributes of God for a constant term." Porter, *Human Intellect*, 492: "Induction rests upon the assumption, as it demands for its ground, that a personal or thinking Deity exists." See also pages 486, 508, 509, 518, 519, 585, 616, 662. Whately, *Logic*, 270. *New Englander*, Oct., 1871; Art. on Grounds of Confidence in Inductive Reasoning. Fisher, *Essays on Supernatural Origin of Christianity*, 564. Trendelenburg, *Logische Untersuchungen*, Ch. 'Zweck.'

## III. CONTENTS OF THIS INTUITION.

1. In this fundamental knowledge *that* God is, it is necessarily implied that to some extent men know intuitively *what* God is, namely,

- (a) A power above them upon which they are dependent.
- (b) A perfection which imposes law upon their moral natures.
- (c) A personality which they may recognize in prayer and worship.

It is to be remembered, however, that the loss of love to God has greatly obscured this primitive knowledge, so that the revelation of nature and the Scriptures is needed to awaken, confirm and enlarge it, and the special work of the Spirit of Christ to make it the knowledge of friendship and communion.

Calderwood, *Moral Philosophy*, 232. Lowndes, *Philos. of Primary Beliefs*, 108–112.

2. The Scriptures, therefore, do not attempt to prove the existence of God, but on the other hand, both assume and declare that the knowledge that God is, is universal. (Rom. 1: 19–21, 28, 32; 2: 15.) God has inlaid the evidence of this fundamental truth in the very nature of man, so that nowhere is he without a witness. The preacher may confidently follow the example of Scripture by assuming it. But he must also explicitly declare it, as the Scripture does. “For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen” (*καθ’ ὁράται*); but then—and this forms the transition to our next division of the subject—they are “understood by the things that are made” (*τοῖς ποιήμασιν νοούμενα*, Rom. 1: 20).

Alford and Wordsworth on Rom. 1: 20. Schmid, *Biblische Theologie des N. T.*, 486. Hofmann, *Schriftbeweis*, 1: 62.

## CHAPTER II.

### CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCES OF GOD'S EXISTENCE.

Although the knowledge of God's existence is intuitive, it may be confirmed and explicated by arguments drawn from the actual universe and from the abstract ideas of the human mind.

Remark 1. These arguments are probable, not demonstrative. For this reason they supplement each other, and constitute a series of evidences which is cumulative in its nature. Though taken singly, none of them can be considered absolutely decisive, they together furnish a corroboration of our primitive conviction of God's existence, which is of great practical value, and is in itself sufficient to bind the moral action of men.

Butler, *Analogy*, Introduction, Bohn's Ed., 72. Andrew Fuller, *Part of System of Divinity*, 4: 283. Dove, *Logic of Christian Faith*, 24. Bacon, *Essay on Atheism*. Murphy, *Scientific Bases of Faith*, 221-223.

Remark 2. A consideration of these arguments may also serve to explicate the contents of an intuition which has remained obscure and only half conscious for lack of reflection. The arguments indeed are the efforts of the mind that already has a conviction of God's existence, to give to itself a formal account of its belief. An exact estimate of their logical value and of their relation to the intuition which they seek to express in syllogistic form, is essential to any proper refutation of the prevalent atheistic and pantheistic reasoning.

Nitzsch, *Christian Doctrine*, Translation, 140. Ebrard *Dogmatik*, 1: 119, 120. Fisher, *Essays on Supernatural Origin of Christianity*, 572, 573. Van Oosterzee, 238, 241.

Remark 3. The arguments for the divine existence may be reduced to four, namely: I. The Cosmological; II. The Teleological; III. The Moral; and IV. The Ontological. We shall examine these in order, seeking first to determine the precise conclusions to which they respectively lead, and then to ascertain in what manner the four may be combined.

#### I. THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT.

This is not properly an argument from effect to cause; for the proposition that every effect must have a cause is simply identical, and means only that every caused event must have a cause. It is rather an argument from the contingent to the necessary, and may be accurately stated as follows:

Every thing begun, whether substantial or phenomenal, owes its existence to some producing cause outside of itself. The universe is a thing begun,

and owes its existence to a cause outside of itself which is equal to its production. This mighty cause must be God.

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 370, Bohn's Translation. Gillespie, Necessary Existence of God, 3: 34-44. Bibliotheca Sacra, 1849: 613; and 1850: 613. Porter, Human Intellect, 570. Herbert Spencer, First Principles, 93.

1. *The defects of this argument.*

A. It is difficult to show that the universe, so far as its substance is concerned, has had a beginning. Many philosophers in Christian lands, and the prevailing opinion of ante-christian times, have held matter to be eternal.

Hume, Philosophical Works, 2: 411, sq. Martineau, Essays, 1: 206. McCosh, Intuitions, 225-241. Calderwood, Philosophy of Infinite, 61. Murphy, Scientific Bases of Faith, 49, 195; Habit and Intelligence, 1: 55-67.

B. Granting that the universe, so far as its phenomena are concerned, has had a beginning, it is difficult to show that any other cause is required than a cause within itself such as the pantheist supposes.

C. Granting that the universe must have had a cause outside of itself, it is difficult to show that this cause has not itself been caused, i. e., consists of an infinite series of dependent causes.

New Englander, Jan., 1874: 75. Alexander, Moral Science, 221. Whately, Logic, 270. Spencer, First Principles, 37. Calderwood, Moral Phil., 225.

D. Granting that the cause of the universe has not itself been caused, it is impossible to show that this cause is not finite like the universe itself.

2. *The value of the Cosmological argument*, then, is simply this,—it proves the existence of some cause of the universe indefinitely great. When we go beyond this and ask whether this cause is a cause of being, or merely a cause of change to the universe; whether it is a cause apart from the universe, or one with it; whether it is an eternal cause, or a cause dependent upon some other cause; whether it is intelligent or unintelligent, infinite or finite, one or many,—this argument cannot assure us.

II. THE TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT.

This is not properly an argument from design to a designer; for that design implies a designer is simply an identical proposition. It may be more correctly stated as follows:

Order and useful collocation pervading a system prove the existence of a contriving intelligence which is the author of this order and useful collocation. Since order and useful collocation pervade the universe, a mighty contriving intelligence must exist, and this intelligence must be God.

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Bohn's Translation, 381. Bibliotheca Sacra, Oct., 1867, 625.

1. *Further explanations.*

A. The major premise expresses a primitive conviction. It is not invalidated by the objections:

(a) That order and useful collocation may exist without being purposed ; for we are compelled by our very mental constitution to deny this in all cases where the order and collocation pervade a system.

(b) That order and useful collocation may result from the mere operation of physical forces and laws ; for the operation of these forces and laws does not exclude but implies an originating and superintending intelligence.

Sir Wm. Hamilton, *Metaphysics*, 22. Bowne, *Review of H. Spencer*, 231-247. Huxley, *Critiques and Addresses*, 274, 275. Martineau, *Essays*, 1: 144. Murphy, *Scientific Bases of Faith*, 208. Porter, *Human Intellect*, 592-618.

B. The minor premise expresses a working principle of all science, namely, that all things have their uses, that order pervades the universe and that the methods of nature are rational methods.

Evidences of this appear, in the correlation of the chemical elements to each other ; in the fitness of the inanimate world to be the basis and support of life ; in the typical forms and unity of plan apparent in the organic creation ; in the existence and coöperation of natural laws ; in cosmical order and compensations.

Bowne, *Review of H. Spencer*, 113, 115, 224-230. Whewell, *Hist. Inductive Sciences*, 2: 489-491. Tyndall, *Fragments of Science*, 153. Tulloch, *Theism*, 116, 120. Leconte, *Religion and Science*, *Lectures 2 and 3*. McCosh, *Typical Forms*, 81, 420. Agassiz, *Essay on Classification*, 9, 10. *Bib. Sac.*, 1849: 626 ; 1850: 613.

This minor premise is not invalidated by the objections:

(a) That we frequently misunderstand the end actually subserved by natural events and objects ; for the principle is not that we necessarily know the actual end, but that we necessarily believe that there is some end in every case of systematic order and collocation.

(b) That the order of the universe is manifestly imperfect ; for this, if granted, would argue, not absence of contrivance, but some special reason for imperfection either in the limitations of the contriving intelligence itself, or in the nature of the end sought (as, for example, correspondence with the moral state and probation of sinners).

Bowne, *Review of H. Spencer*, 264-265. McCosh, *Christianity and Positivism*, 82 sq. Martineau's *Essays*, 1: 50. Porter, *Human Intellect*, 599. J. S. Mill, *Essays on Religion*, chap. *Nature*.

2. *Defects of the argument.* These attach not to the premises, but to the conclusion sought to be drawn therefrom.

A. The argument cannot prove a personal God. The order and useful collocations of the universe may be only the changing phenomena of an impersonal and necessary intelligence such as pantheism supposes.

Hopkins, *Miscellanies*, 18-36. Fisher, *Essays on Supernatural Origin of Christianity*, 576-578. Calderwood, *Moral Philosophy*, 226. Ritter, *Hist. Ancient Philosophy*, Book 9, ch. 6. *Foundations of our Faith*, 38. Murphy, *Scientific Bases of Faith*, 215 ; *Habit and Intelligence*, 2: 6.



B. It cannot prove the unity of God. The collocations and order of the universe may be the result of oneness of counsel, instead of oneness of essence, in the contriving intelligence.

C. It cannot prove an eternal God, since fitness in God would argue that he was himself designed.

D. It cannot prove an infinite God, since all marks of order and collocation within our observation are simply finite.

3. *The value of the argument* is simply this: It proves from certain useful collocations and instances of order which have clearly had a beginning, or in other words, from the present harmony of the universe, that there exists an intelligence adequate to its contrivance. But whether this intelligence is creator or only fashioner, personal or impersonal, one or many, finite or infinite, eternal or owing its being to another, this argument cannot assure us.

In it, however, we take a step forward. The causative power which we have proved by the cosmological argument has now become an intelligent power.

Bib. Sac. 1849: 634. Murphy, *Scientific Bases of Faith*, 216.

### III. THE MORAL ARGUMENT.

This is an argument from the mental and moral constitution of man to the existence of a divine Author, Lawgiver, and End. The argument is a complex one and may be divided into three parts.

1. Man's intellectual and moral nature must have had for their author an intellectual and moral being. The elements of the proof are as follows:

A. Man, as an intellectual and moral being, has had a beginning upon the planet.

B. Material and unconscious forces do not afford a sufficient cause for man's reason, conscience and free will.

Thompson, *Christian Theism*, 75. Locke, *Essay*, Book 4, chap. 10.

C. Man as an effect can be referred only to a cause possessing self-consciousness and a moral nature, in other words, personality.

Julius Müller, *Doctrine of Sin*, 1: 76 sq.

2. Man's moral nature proves the existence of a holy Lawgiver and Judge. The elements of the proof are:

A. Conscience recognizes the existence of a moral law which has supreme authority.

B. Known violations of this moral law are followed by feelings of ill desert and fears of judgment.

C. This moral law, since it is not self-imposed, and these threats of judgment, since they are not self-executing, respectively argue the existence of a holy will that has imposed the law, and of a punitive power that will execute the threats of the moral nature.

Murphy, *Scientific Bases of Faith*, 218 sq. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 359-387. Porter, *Human Intellect*, 524.

3. Man's emotional and voluntary nature proves the existence of a Being who can furnish in himself a satisfying object of human affection and an end which will call forth man's highest activities and ensure his highest progress.

Only a Being of power, wisdom, holiness and goodness, and all these indefinitely greater than any that we know upon the earth, can meet this demand of the human soul. Such a Being must exist. Otherwise man's greatest need would be unsupplied and belief in a lie be more productive of virtue than belief in the truth.

Augustine, *Confessions*, 1: 1. Murphy, *Scientific Bases of Faith*, 370. Tyndall, *Belfast Address*.

4. *The defects of the moral argument are:*

A. It cannot prove a creator of the material universe.

B. It cannot prove the infinity of God, since man from whom we argue is finite.

C. It cannot prove the mercy of God. But,

5. *The value of the argument* is, that it assures us of the existence of a personal Being, who rules us in righteousness, and who is the proper object of supreme affection and service.

But whether this Being is the original creator of all things, or merely the author of our existence, whether he is infinite or finite, whether he is a Being of simple righteousness or also of mercy, this argument cannot assure us.

Among the arguments for the existence of God, however, we assign to this the chief place, since it adds to the ideas of causative power (which we derived from the cosmological argument) and of contriving intelligence (which we derived from the teleological argument), the far wider ideas of personality and righteous lordship.

Dove, *Logic of Christian Faith*, 211-236, 261-299.

#### IV. THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT.

This argument infers the existence of God from the abstract and necessary ideas of the human mind. It has three forms:

1. That of Samuel Clarke. Space and time are attributes of substance or being. But space and time are respectively infinite and eternal. There must therefore be an infinite and eternal substance or Being to whom these attributes belong.

Gillespie states the argument somewhat differently. Space and time are modes of existence. But space and time are respectively infinite and eternal. There must therefore be an infinite and eternal Being who subsists in these modes. But we reply:

Space and time are neither attributes of substance nor modes of existence. The argument, if valid, would prove that God is not mind but matter, for that could not be mind but only matter, of which space and time were either attributes or modes.

Samuel Clarke, *Works*, 2: 521. Gillespie, *Necessary Existence of God*. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 364. Dove, *Logic of the Christian Faith*, 127. Calderwood, *Moral Philosophy*, 226. Blunt, *Dictionary*, 740. Porter, *Human Intellect*, 567.

2. That of Descartes. We have the idea of an infinite and perfect Being.

This idea cannot be derived from imperfect and finite things. There must therefore be an infinite and perfect Being who is its cause.

But we reply that this argument confounds the idea of the infinite with an infinite idea. Man's idea of the infinite is not infinite but finite, and from a finite effect we cannot argue an infinite cause.

Descartes, Meditation 3. Blunt, Dictionary of Theology, Art. Theism, 739. Bibliotheca Sacra, 1849: 637. Saisset, Pantheism, 1: 54.

3. That of Anselm. We have the idea of an absolutely perfect Being. But existence is an attribute of perfection. An absolutely perfect Being must therefore exist.

But we reply that this argument confounds ideal existence with real existence. Our ideas are not the measure of external reality.

Anselm, Proslogion, 2; translated in Bib. Sac., 1851: 529, 699. Shedd, History of Doctrine, 1: 231. Kant, Critique, 368. Thompson, Christian Theism, 171. Fisher, Essays, 574. Dove, Logic of the Christian Faith, 146.

Although this last must be considered the most perfect form of the ontological argument, it is evident that it conducts us only to an ideal conclusion, not to real existence. In common with the two preceding forms of the argument, moreover, it tacitly assumes as already existing in the human mind, that very knowledge of God's existence which it would derive from logical demonstration. It has value therefore, simply as showing what God must be if he exists at all.

But the existence of a Being indefinitely great, a personal Cause, Contriver and Lawgiver, has been proved by the preceding arguments; for the law of parsimony requires us to apply the conclusions of the first three arguments to one Being, and not to many. To this one Being we may now ascribe the infinity and perfection, the idea of which lies at the basis of the ontological argument—ascibe them, not because they are demonstrably his, but because our mental constitution will not allow us to think otherwise. Thus clothing him with all perfections which the human mind can conceive, and these in illimitable fulness, we have one whom we may justly call God.

As a logical process this is indeed defective, since all logic as well as all observation depends for its validity upon the presupposed existence of God, and since this particular process, even granting the validity of logic in general, does not warrant the conclusion that God exists, except upon a second assumption that our abstract ideas of infinity and perfection are to be applied to the Being to whom argument has actually conducted us.

But although both ends of the logical bridge are confessedly wanting, the process may serve and does serve a more useful purpose than that of mere demonstration, namely, that of awakening, confirming and explicating a conviction which, though the most fundamental of all, may yet have been partially slumbering for lack of thought.

Cudworth, Intellectual System of the Universe, 3: 42. Dove, Logic of the Christian Faith, 241-261. Calderwood, Philosophy of the Infinite, 150 sq. Calderwood, Moral Philosophy, 226. Fisher, Essays on the Supernatural Origin of Christianity, 572.

## CHAPTER III.

### ERRONEOUS EXPLANATIONS OF THE FACTS.

Any correct explanation of the universe must postulate an intuitive knowledge of the existence of the external world, of self, and of God. The desire for scientific unity, however, has induced attempts to resolve these three factors into one, and according as one or another of the three has been regarded as the all-inclusive principle, the result has been Materialism, Idealism, or Pantheism.

#### I. MATERIALISM.

Materialism is that method of thought which gives priority to matter rather than to mind in its explanations of the universe. Upon this view, material atoms constitute the ultimate and fundamental reality of which all things rational and irrational are but combinations and phenomena. Force is regarded as a universal and inseparable property of matter.

The element of truth in materialism is the reality of second causes. Its error is in mistaking these second causes for first causes, and in supposing them able to account for their own existence, and for the existence of the universe.

Herzog, *Encyclopædie*, Art. Materialism. Janet, *Materialism*. Fabri, *Materialismus*.

We object to this system:

1. That in knowing matter, the mind necessarily judges itself to be a substance different in kind and higher in rank than the matter which it knows.

2. Since the mind's attributes of continuous identity, self-activity, unrelatedness to space, are different in kind and higher in rank than the attributes of matter, it is rational to conclude that the substance underlying mental phenomena is a substance different in kind and higher in rank than that which underlies material phenomena.

Hopkins, *Study of Man*, 53-56. McCosh, *Intuitions*, 140-145. Theolog. Eclectic, VI: 555. Hickok, *Rational Cosmology*, 403. Ulrici, *Leib und Seele*, 688-725; and synopsis in *Bap. Quar.*, July, 1873: 380. Porter, *Human Intellect*, 22 sq. Appleton, *Works*, 1: 151-154. McCosh, *Div. Gov't.*, 75-94. Calderwood, *Moral Philosophy*, 235. Morell, *Hist. Philosophy*, 318-334.

3. This common judgment that mind and matter are distinct substances must be regarded as conclusive, until it is scientifically demonstrated that mind is material in its origin and nature. But all attempts to explain the psychological from the physical, or the organic from the inorganic, are acknowl-

edged failures. The most that can be claimed is, that psychical are always accompanied by physical changes, and that the inorganic is the basis and support of the organic.

Bain, *Mind and Body*, 131. *British Quarterly*, Jan., 1874: Art. *Mind and the Science of Energy*. Spencer, *Principles of Psychology*, 1: 140. Review of Spencer's *Psychology* in *New Englander*, July, 1873. Talbot in *Bap. Quarterly*, Jan., 1871: 1. McCosh, *Intuitions*, 145.

4. The materialistic theory, denying as it does the priority of spirit, can furnish no sufficient cause of the existing universe, with its personal intelligences, intuitive ideas, beliefs in God and immortality.

Buchanan, *Modern Atheism*, 247, 248. McCosh in *International Review*, Jan., 1875. *Contemporary Review*, Jan., 1875: Art. *Man Transcorporeal*.

## II. MATERIALISTIC IDEALISM.

Idealism proper is that method of thought which regards all knowledge as conversant only with affections of the percipient mind.

Its element of truth is the fact that these affections of the percipient mind are the conditions of our knowledge. Its error is in denying that through these and in these we know that which exists independently of our consciousness.

The idealism of the present day is mainly a materialistic idealism. It defines matter and mind alike in terms of sensation, and regards both as opposite sides or successive manifestations of one underlying and unknowable force.

Porter, *Human Intellect*, 129, 232. Fiske, *Cosmic Philosophy*, 75, 2: 80. Martineau's *Essays*, 1: 63, 265. *Bap. Quarterly*, 1871: 1. Mill, *Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton*, 1: 234-250. Morell, *Hist. Philosophy*, 318-334. *Contemporary Review*, Oct., 1872: Art. on Huxley. Murphy, *Scientific Bases of Faith*, 13-15; 29-35; 42-52.

We object to this view.

1. That its definition of matter as a permanent possibility of sensation, contradicts our intuitive judgment that in knowing the phenomena of matter we have direct knowledge of substance as underlying phenomena, as distinct from our sensations, and as external to the mind which experiences these sensations.

2. That its definition of mind as a series of sensations aware of itself, contradicts our intuitive judgment that in knowing the phenomena of mind we have direct knowledge of a spiritual substance of which these phenomena are manifestations, which retains its identity independently of our consciousness, and which, in its knowing, instead of being the passive recipient of impressions from without, always acts from within by a power of its own.

3. That in so far as this theory regards mind as the obverse side of matter or as a later and higher development from matter, the mere reference of both mind and matter to an underlying force, does not save the theory from any of the difficulties of pure materialism already mentioned; since in this case equally with that, force is regarded as purely physical and the priority of spirit is denied.

4. That in so far as this theory holds the underlying force of which matter

and mind are manifestations, to be in any sense intelligent or voluntary, it leads to the conclusion that second causes, whether material or spiritual, have no proper existence, and that there is but one agent in the universe—a conclusion which involves all the difficulties of pantheism.

Porter, *Human Intellect*, 584–588. Martineau's *Essays*, 1: 121.

### III. PANTHEISM.

Pantheism is that method of thought which conceives of the universe as the development of one intelligent yet impersonal substance which reaches consciousness only in man. It therefore identifies God with the totality of things.

The element of truth in pantheism is the immanence of God in the universe; its error is in denying God's transcendence.

We object to this system:

1. That its idea of God is self-contradictory, since it makes him infinite, yet consisting only of the finite; absolute, yet existing in necessary relation to the universe; supreme, yet shut up to a process of self-evolution and dependent for self-consciousness on man; indeterminate, yet the cause of all that is.

Saisset, *Pantheism*, 1: 148. Calderwood, *Moral Philosophy*, 237, 245.

2. Its assumed unity of substance is not only without proof, but directly contradicts our intuitive judgments. These testify that we are not parts and particles of God, but distinct personal subsistences.

Fisher, *Essays on Sup. Orig. of Christianity*, 539. Martineau, *Essays*, 1: 158.

3. It assigns no sufficient cause for that fact of the universe which is highest in rank and therefore most needs explanation, namely, the existence of personal intelligences. A substance which is itself unconscious and under the law of necessity, cannot produce beings who are self-conscious and free.

Gess in *Foundations of our Faith*, 27–45. McCosh, *Intuitions*, 215, 393.

4. It therefore contradicts the affirmations of our moral and religious natures by denying man's freedom and responsibility; by making God to include in himself all evil as well as all good; and by precluding all prayer, worship and hope of immortality.

Bib. Sac., Oct., 1867: 603–615. Dix, *Pantheism*, Introduction, 12. Dove, *Logic of the Christian Faith*, 118. Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, 1: 299–334. Murphy, *Scientific Bases of Faith*, 202. Bayne's *Christian Life, Social and Individual*, 21–53.

5. Our intuitive conviction of the existence of a God of absolute perfection, compels us to conceive of God as possessed of every highest quality and attribute of men, and therefore especially of that which constitutes the chief dignity of the human spirit, its personality.

*British Quarterly*, January, 1874, 32, note.

## PART III.

### THE SCRIPTURES A REVELATION FROM GOD.

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#### CHAPTER I.

##### PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS.

###### I. REASONS A PRIORI FOR EXPECTING A REVELATION FROM GOD.

1. *Needs of man's nature.* Man's intellectual and moral nature requires, in order to preserve it from constant deterioration, and to ensure its moral growth and progress, an authoritative and helpful revelation of religious truth, of a higher and completer sort than any to which, in its present state of sin, it can attain by the use of its unaided powers. The proof of this proposition is partly psychological and partly historical.

###### A. Psychological proof.

(a) Neither reason nor intuition throw light upon certain religious questions whose solution is of the utmost importance to us.

Bremen Lectures, 72, 73. Plato, *Laws*, 9 : 854.

(b) Even the truth to which we may arrive by our natural powers, needs divine confirmation and authority when it addresses minds and wills perverted by sin.

Curtis, *Human Element in Inspiration*, 250. Emerson, *Essays*, 2 : 41.

Murphy, *Scientific Bases*, 172.

(c) To break this power of sin and to furnish encouragement to moral effort, we need a special revelation of the merciful and helpful aspect of the divine nature.

###### B. Historical proof.

(a) The knowledge of moral and religious truth possessed by nations and ages in which special revelation is unknown, is grossly and increasingly imperfect.

(b) Man's actual condition in ante-christian times and in modern heathen lands, is that of extreme moral depravity.

(c) With this depravity is found a general conviction of moral helplessness, and on the part of some nobler natures, a longing after and hope of aid from above.

Peabody, *Christianity the Religion of Nature*, 35.

2. *Presumption of supply.* What we know of God by nature, affords ground for hope that these wants of our intellectual and moral being will be met by a corresponding supply in the shape of a special divine revelation.

We argue this :

A. From our necessary conviction of God's wisdom. Having made man a spiritual being, for spiritual ends, it may be hoped that he will furnish the means needed to secure these ends.

B. From the actual, though incomplete, revelation already given in nature. Since God has actually undertaken to make himself known to men, we may hope that he will finish the work he has begun.

C. From the general connection of want and supply. The higher our needs, the more intricate and ingenious are in general the contrivances for meeting them. We may hope therefore that the highest want will be all the more surely met.

D. From analogies of nature and history. Signs of reparative goodness in nature and of forbearance in providential dealings lead us to hope that while justice is executed, God may still make known some way of restoration for sinners. (Rom. 3 : 25.)

## II. MARKS OF THE REVELATION MAN MAY EXPECT.

1. *As to its character.* We may expect it not to contradict, but to confirm and enlarge, the knowledge of God which we derive from nature, while it remedies the defects of natural religion, and throws light upon its problems.

2. *As to its method.* We may expect it to follow God's methods of procedure in other communications of truth, as for example :

A. That of continuous historical development,—that it will be given in germ to early ages, and will be more fully unfolded as the race is prepared to receive it.

Rogers, *Superhuman Origin of the Bible*, 374–384. *Essays and Reviews*, Sermon by Dr. Temple on Education of the World. Walker, *Philosophy of the Plan of Salvation*.

B. That of original delivery to a single nation and to single persons in that nation, that it may through them be communicated to mankind.

*British Quarterly*, January, 1874: Art. *Inductive Theology*.

C. That of preservation in written and accessible documents handed down from those to whom the revelation is first communicated.

*Eclipse of Faith*, chapters on book-revelation, 73–96 ; 281–304.

3. *As to its attestation.* We may expect that this revelation will be accompanied by evidence that its author is the same being whom we have previously recognized as God of nature. This evidence must constitute,

A. A manifestation of God himself ;

B. In the outward as well as the inward world ;

C. Such as only God's power or knowledge can make ; and,

D. Such as cannot be counterfeited by the evil or mistaken by the candid soul. In short, we may expect God to attest by miracles and by prophecy, the divine mission and authority of those to whom he communicates a revelation.

But in order that our positive proof of a divine revelation may not be embarrassed by the suspicion that the miraculous and prophetic elements in



the Scripture history create a presumption against its credibility, it will be desirable to take up at this point, the general subjects of miracles and prophecy.

### III. MIRACLES AS ATTESTING A DIVINE REVELATION.

1. *Definition of miracle.* A miracle is an event palpable to the senses, produced for a religious purpose by the immediate agency of God; an event therefore, which though not contravening any law of nature, the laws of nature, if fully known, would not be competent to explain.

Mozley, *Miracles*. Alexander, *Christ and Christianity*, 302. Hopkins, *Sermon on Prayer-guage*, 10; *Outline Study of Man*, 258, 259. Murphy, *Scientific Bases*, 147-167. Babbage, *Ninth Bridgewater Treatise*, Chap. VIII. Hovey, *Miracles of Christ*, Introduction. Trench, *Miracles*, Introduction.

This definition corrects several erroneous conceptions of the miracle :

A. A miracle is not a suspension or violation of natural law ; since natural law is in operation at the time of the miracle just as much as before.

B. A miracle is not a sudden product of natural agencies—a product merely foreseen by him who appears to work it; it is the effect of a will outside of nature.

C. A miracle is not an event without a cause, since it has for its cause a direct volition of God.

D. A miracle is not an irrational or capricious act of God, but an act of wisdom performed in accordance with the immutable laws of his being, so that in the same circumstances the same course would be again pursued.

E. A miracle is not contrary to experience, since it is not contrary to experience for a new cause to be followed by a new effect.

F. A miracle is not a matter of internal experience, like regeneration or illumination, but is an event palpable to the senses, which may serve as an objective proof to all, that the worker of it is divinely commissioned as a religious teacher.

Bushnell, *Nature and the Supernatural*, 333-366. Smith's *Dict. of the Bible*, Art. *Miracles*.

2. *Possibility of miracles.* An event in nature may be caused by an agent outside of and above nature. This is evident from the following considerations:

A. Lower forces and laws in nature are frequently counteracted and transcended by the higher (as mechanical forces and laws by chemical, and chemical by vital), while yet the lower forces and laws are not suspended or annihilated, but are merged in the higher, and made to assist in accomplishing purposes to which they are altogether unequal when left to themselves.

Murphy, *Habit and Intelligence*, 1: 88.

B. The human will acts upon its physical organism and so upon nature, and produces results which nature left to itself never could accomplish, while yet no law of nature is suspended or violated. Gravitation still operates upon the axe, even while man holds it at the surface of the water. (2 K. 6: 5-7.)

Aids to Faith, *Essay on Miracles*, 26, 27. Fisher, *Essays*, 471. Hamilton, *Autology*, 685-690.

C. What the human will, considered as a supernatural force, and what the chemical and vital forces of nature itself, are demonstrably able to accomplish, cannot be regarded as beyond the power of God, so long as God dwells in and controls the universe. In other words, if God be possible, miracles are possible. The contrary can be maintained, only upon principles of atheism or pantheism.

### 3. *Probability of miracles.*

A. We acknowledge that so long as we confine our attention to nature, there is a presumption against miracles. Experience testifies to the uniformity of natural law. A general uniformity is needful in order to make possible a rational calculation of the future, and a proper ordering of life.

F. W. Farrar, *Witness of History to Christ*, 3-45. *Modern Scepticism*, 1: 179-227. Chalmers, *Christian Revelation*, 1: 47.

B. But we deny that this uniformity is absolute and universal.

(a) It is not a truth of reason that can have no exceptions, like the axiom that a whole is greater than its parts.

Mozley, *Miracles*, 26. Huxley, *Lay Sermons*, 158.

(b) Experience could not warrant a belief in absolute and universal uniformity, unless experience were identical with absolute and universal knowledge. On the other hand,

(c) We know, from geology, that there have been breaks in this uniformity, such as the introduction of vegetable, animal and human life, which cannot be accounted for except by the coming down upon nature of a supernatural power.

C. Since the inworking of the moral law into the constitution and course of nature, shows that nature exists not for itself but for the contemplation and use of moral beings, it is probable that the God of nature will produce effects aside from those of natural law, whenever there are sufficiently important moral ends to be served thereby.

D. The existence of moral disorder consequent upon the free acts of man's will, therefore, changes the presumption against miracles into a presumption in their favor. The non-appearance of miracles, in this case, would be the greatest of miracles.

4. *The amount of testimony necessary to prove a miracle*—is no greater than that which is requisite to prove the occurrence of any other unusual but confessedly possible event.

Hume, indeed, argued that a miracle is so contradictory of all human experience that it is more reasonable to believe any amount of testimony false than to believe a miracle to be true.

Hume, *Philosophical Works*, 4: 124-150. *Bib. Sac.*, Oct., 1867: 615.

The argument is fallacious, because:

A. It is chargeable with a *petitio principii*, in making our own personal experience the measure of all human experience. The same principle would make the proof of any absolutely new fact impossible. Even though God should work a miracle, he could never prove it.

John Stuart Mill, *Essays on Theism*, 216-241.

B. It involves a self-contradiction, since it seeks to overthrow our faith in human testimony by adducing to the contrary the general experience of men, of which we know only from testimony. This general experience moreover is merely negative, and cannot neutralize that which is positive, except upon principles which would invalidate all testimony whatever.

C. It requires belief in a greater wonder than those which it would escape. That multitudes of intelligent and honest men should against all their interests unite in deliberate and persistent falsehood under the circumstances narrated in the New Testament record, involves a change in the sequences of nature far more incredible than the miracles of Christ and his apostles.

Chalmers, *Christian Rev.*, 3: 70. Hume, *Phil. Works*, 4: 146. Starkie, *Evidence*, 739.

##### 5. *Evidential force of miracles.*

A. Miracles are the natural accompaniments and attestations of new communications from God. The great epochs of miracles—represented by Moses, the prophets, the first and second comings of Christ—are coincident with the great epochs of revelation. Miracles serve to draw attention to new truth, and cease when this truth has gained currency and foothold.

B. Miracles, however, certify to the truth of doctrine, not directly, but indirectly. Otherwise, a new miracle must needs accompany each new doctrine taught. Miracles primarily and directly certify to the divine commission and authority of a religious teacher, and therefore warrant acceptance of his doctrines and obedience to his commands as the doctrines and commands of God, whether these be communicated at intervals or all together, orally or in written documents.

C. Miracles therefore do not stand alone as evidences. Power alone cannot prove a divine commission. Purity of life and doctrine must go with the miracles to assure us that a religious teacher has come from God. The miracles and the doctrine in this manner mutually support each other and form parts of one whole. The internal evidence may have greater power over certain minds and over certain ages than the external. Still it remains true that:

D. The Christian miracles do not lose their value as evidences in the process of ages. The loftier the structure of Christian life and doctrine, the greater need that its foundation be secure. The authority of Christ as a teacher of supernatural truth rests upon his miracles and specially upon the miracle of his resurrection. That one miracle to which the church looks back as the source of her life, carries with it irresistibly all the other miracles of the Scripture record; upon this one we may safely rest the proof that the Scriptures are an authoritative revelation from God.

Alexander, *Christ and Christianity*, 158-224. Mill, *Theism*, 216. Auberlen, *Divine Revelation*, 56.

##### 6. *Counterfeit miracles.*

Since only an act directly wrought by God can properly be called a miracle, it follows that surprising events brought about by evil spirits or by men, through the use of natural agencies beyond our knowledge, are not entitled

to this appellation. The Scriptures recognize the existence of such, but denominate them "lying wonders;" (2 Thess. 2:9).

These counterfeit miracles in various ages argue that the belief in miracles is natural to the race, and that somewhere there must exist the true. They serve to show that not all supernatural occurrences are divine, and to impress upon us the necessity of careful examination before we accept them as divine. False miracles may commonly be distinguished from the true by:

A. Their accompaniments of immoral conduct or of doctrine contradictory to truth already revealed; as in modern spiritualism.

B. Their internal characteristics of inanity or extravagance; as in the liquefaction of the blood of St. Januarius, or the miracles of the Apocryphal New Testament.

C. The insufficiency of the object which they are designed to further; as in the case of Apollonius of Tyana, or of the miracles said to accompany the publication of the doctrine of the immaculate conception.

D. Their lack of substantiating evidence; as in mediæval miracles, so seldom attested by contemporary and disinterested witnesses.

Mozley, *Miracles*, 15, 161. F. W. Farrar, *Witness of History to Christ*, 72. A. S. Farrar, *Science and Theology*, 208. Tholuck, *Vermischte Schriften*, 1:27. Hodge, *Syst. Theol.*, 1:630. Henderson, *Inspiration*, 443-490.

#### IV. PROPHECY AS ATTESTING A DIVINE REVELATION.

We here consider prophecy in its narrow sense of mere prediction.

1. *Definition.* Prophecy is the foretelling of future events by virtue of direct communication from God—a foretelling, therefore, which though not contravening any laws of the human mind, those laws, if fully known, would not be sufficient to explain.

Payne Smith, *Prophecy a Preparation for Christ*. Alexander, *Christ and Christianity*, 225. Newton on *Prophecy*. Fairbairn on *Prophecy*. Farrar, *Science and Theology*, 106.

#### 2. *Relation of prophecy to miracles.*

Miracles are attestations of revelation proceeding from divine power; prophecy is an attestation of revelation proceeding from divine knowledge. Only God can know the contingencies of the future. The possibility and probability of prophecy may be argued upon the same grounds upon which we argue the possibility and probability of miracles.

Wardlaw, *Systematic Theology*, 1:347.

#### 3. *Requirements in prophecy, considered as an evidence of revelation.*

(a) The utterance must be distant from the event.

(b) Nothing must exist to suggest the event to merely natural prescience.

(c) The utterance must be free from ambiguity.

(d) Yet it must not be so precise as to secure its own fulfilment.

(e) It must be followed in due time by the event predicted.

#### 4. *General features of prophecy in the Scriptures.*

(a) Its vast amount; occupying a large portion of the Bible from Genesis to Revelation, and extending over a period of four thousand years.

7. *On the double sense of prophecy.*

Certain prophecies apparently contain a fulness of meaning which is not exhausted by the event to which they most obviously and literally refer. A prophecy which had a partial fulfilment, at a time not remote from its utterance, may find its chief fulfilment in an event far distant.

So, too, prophecies which have already had a partial fulfilment may have whole cycles of fulfilment yet before them; (Is. 7: 14-16; cf. 9: 6, 7, and Matt. 1: 22, 23. Matt. 24 and 25, especially 24: 34, and 25: 31).

8. *Purpose of prophecy—so far as it is yet unfulfilled.* This is:

(a) Not to enable us to map out the details of the future; but rather

(b) To give general assurance of God's power and foreseeing wisdom, and of the certainty of his triumph; and

(c) To furnish, after fulfilment, the proof that God saw the end from the beginning; (Dan. 12: 8, 9. 1 Pet. 1: 11. 2 Pet. 1: 20).

9. *Evidential force of prophecy—so far as it is fulfilled.*

Prophecy, like miracles, does not stand alone as evidence of the divine commission of the Scripture writers and teachers. It is simply a corroborative attestation, which unites with miracles to prove that a religious teacher has come from God and speaks with divine authority.

We cannot, however, dispense with this portion of the evidences,—for unless the death and resurrection of Christ are events foreknown and foretold by himself as well as by the ancient prophets, we lose one main proof of his authority as a teacher sent from God.



(b) Its unity in diversity; finding its central point in Christ (Rev. 19: 10), and excluding all possibility of human fabrication.

(c) Its actual fulfilment as regards many of its predictions,—while all attempts have failed to show that any single one of these predictions has been falsified by the event.

5. *Different kinds of prophecy.*

(a) Direct predictions of events; as in Old Testament prophecies of Christ and of the fate of the Jewish nation.

(b) General prophecy of the kingdom in the Old Testament, and by Christ himself in the New.

(c) Historical types in the nation and in individuals, as Jonah and David.

(d) Prefigurations of the future in rites and ordinances; as in sacrifice, circumcision and the passover.

6. *Special prophecies uttered by Christ.*

(a) As to his own death and resurrection.

(b) As to events occurring between his death and the destruction of Jerusalem; (multitudes of impostors; wars and rumors of wars; famine and pestilence).

(c) As to the destruction of Jerusalem and the Jewish polity; (Jerusalem compassed with armies; abomination of desolation in the holy place; flight of Christians; misery; massacre; dispersion).

(d) As to the world-wide diffusion of his gospel; (the Bible already the most widely circulated book in the world).

Having thus removed the presumption originally existing against miracles and prophecy, we may now consider the ordinary laws of evidence and determine the rules to be followed in estimating the weight of the Scripture testimony.

V. PRINCIPLES OF HISTORICAL EVIDENCE APPLICABLE TO THE PROOF OF A DIVINE REVELATION;—(mainly derived from Greenleaf, Testimony of the Evangelists, and from Starkie on Evidence).

1. *As to documentary evidence.*

A. Documents apparently ancient, not bearing upon their face the marks of forgery, and found in proper custody, are presumed to be genuine until sufficient evidence is brought to the contrary. The New Testament documents, since they are found in the custody of the church, their natural and legitimate depository, must by this rule be presumed to be genuine.

Starkie on Evidence, 480 sq. Chalmers, Christian Revelation, Works, 3: 147-171.

B. Copies of ancient documents, made by those most interested in their faithfulness, are presumed to correspond with the originals, even although those originals no longer exist. Since it was the church's interest to have faithful copies, the burden of proof rests upon the objector to the Christian documents.

C. In determining matters of fact after the lapse of considerable time, documentary evidence is to be allowed greater weight than oral testimony. Neither memory nor tradition can long be trusted to give absolutely correct accounts of particular facts. The New Testament documents, therefore,

are of greater weight in evidence than tradition would be, even if only thirty years had elapsed since the death of the actors in the scenes they relate.

Starkie on Evidence, 51, 730.

2. *As to testimony in general.*

A. In questions as to matters of fact, the proper inquiry is not whether it is possible that the testimony may be false, but whether there is sufficient probability that it is true. It is unfair, therefore, to allow our examination of the Scripture witnesses to be prejudiced by suspicion, merely because their story is a sacred one.

B. A proposition of fact is proved when its truth is established by competent and satisfactory evidence. By competent evidence is meant such evidence as the nature of the thing to be proved admits. By satisfactory evidence is meant that amount of proof which ordinarily satisfies an unprejudiced mind beyond a reasonable doubt.

Scripture facts are therefore proved, when they are established by that kind and degree of evidence which would in the affairs of ordinary life satisfy the mind and conscience of a common man. When we have this kind and degree of evidence, it is unreasonable to require more.

C. In the absence of circumstances which generate suspicion, every witness is to be presumed credible, until the contrary is shown; the burden of impeaching his testimony lying upon the objector. The principle which leads men to give true witness to facts is stronger than that which leads them to give false witness.

It is therefore unjust to compel the Christian to establish the credibility of his witnesses before proceeding to adduce their testimony, and it is equally unjust to allow the uncorroborated testimony of a profane writer to outweigh that of a Christian writer.

D. "The credit due to the testimony of witnesses depends upon: first, their ability; secondly, their honesty; thirdly, their number and the consistency of their testimony; fourthly, the conformity of their testimony with experience; and fifthly, the coincidence of their testimony with collateral circumstances." We confidently submit the New Testament witnesses to each and all of these tests.

Starkie on Evidence, 726.



## CHAPTER II.

### POSITIVE PROOFS THAT THE SCRIPTURES ARE A DIVINE REVELATION.

I. THE GENUINENESS OF THE CHRISTIAN DOCUMENTS, or proof that the books of the Old and New Testaments were written at the age and by the men or class of men to whom they are ascribed.

1. *Genuineness of the books of the New Testament.*

A. All of these books, with the possible exception of 2 Peter, Jude, and 2 and 3 John, are quoted or alluded to by a continuous succession of writers reaching back from the present day to the age of the apostles.

(a) Irenæus (120–200) mentions and quotes the four gospels by name, and among them the gospel according to John;—“afterwards John, the disciple of the Lord, who also leaned upon his breast, he likewise published a gospel, while he dwelt in Ephesus in Asia.” And Irenæus was the disciple and friend of Polycarp (80–165), who was himself a personal acquaintance of the Apostle John. The testimony of Irenæus is virtually the evidence of Polycarp, the contemporary and friend of the apostle, that each of the gospels was written by the person whose name it bears.

(b) Justin Martyr (100–170) speaks of ‘memoirs (*ἀπομνημονεύματα*) of Jesus Christ,’ and his quotations, though sometimes made from memory, are evidently cited from our gospels.

(c) Papias (80–164), whom Irenæus calls a ‘hearer of John,’ testifies that Matthew “wrote in the Hebrew dialect the sacred oracles (*τὰ λόγια*),” and that “Mark, the interpreter of Peter, wrote after Peter (*ὑστερον Πέτρω*) or under Peter’s direction, an unsystematic account (*ὁὐ τάξει*)” of the same events and discourses.

(d) The Apostolic Fathers, Clemens Romanus (died 101), Ignatius of Antioch (martyred 115), and Polycarp (80–165), companions and friends of the apostles, have left to us in their writings over one hundred quotations or allusions to the New Testament writings, and among these every book, except the four minor epistles above mentioned, is represented.

(e) In the Acts of the Apostles, universally attributed to Luke, we have an allusion to ‘the former treatise,’ or the gospel by the same author, which must, therefore, have been written before the end of Paul’s first imprisonment at Rome, and probably with the help and sanction of that apostle.

Although these are single testimonies, we must remember that they are the testimonies of the chief men of the churches of their day, and that they express the opinion of the churches themselves. “Like banners of a hid-

den army or peaks of a distant mountain range, they represent and are sustained by compact, continuous bodies below."

Bleek, Introduction to the New Testament. Westcott, History of the New Testament Canon. McClintock and Strong's Encyclopædia, 1: 315-317. Apostolic Fathers, in Ante-Nicene Library of T. & T. Clark. Smith's Bible Dictionary, Art. Canon of the N. T. Boston Lectures for 1871, Essay by Prof. Thayer, 324. Norton, Genuineness of the Gospels. Alexander, McIlvaine, Chalmers, Dodge, Peabody, Evidences. Rawlinson, Historical Evidences, Lect. 6, 7, 8.

B. There is satisfactory evidence that all the books of the New Testament, with the possible exception of 2 Peter, Jude, and 2 and 3 John, were written before the close of the first century; and all, with the single exception of 2 Peter, were received as genuine before the year 170.

(a) Tertullian (160-230) appeals to the 'New Testament' as made up of the 'gospels' and 'apostles.' He vouches for the genuineness of the four gospels, the Acts, 1 Peter, 1 John, thirteen epistles of Paul, and the Apocalypse; in short, to twenty-one of the twenty-seven books of our canon.

(b) The Muratorian Fragment in the West and the Peshito in the East (having a common date of about 170), in their catalogues of the New Testament writings mutually complement each other's slight deficiencies, and together witness to the fact that at that time every book of our present New Testament, with the exception of 2 Peter, was received as genuine.

(c) The canon of Marcion (140) though rejecting all the gospels but that of Luke, and all of the epistles but ten of Paul's, shows, nevertheless, that at that early day "apostolic writings were regarded as a complete original rule of doctrine." Even Marcion, moreover, does not deny the genuineness of those writings which for doctrinal reasons he rejects.

Westcott, Art. Canon in Smith's Bible Dictionary, and History of N. T. Canon. British Quarterly Review, Oct., 1872: 216. Fisher, Genuineness of the Fourth Gospel, in Essays on the Supernat. Orig. of Christianity, 33.

C. There is sufficient evidence that the early churches took every care to assure themselves of the genuineness of the New Testament writings before they accepted them.

McIlvaine, Evidences of Christianity, 92. Lardner, Works, 2: 304, 305.

D. The style of the New Testament writings and their complete correspondence with all we know of the lands and times in which they profess to have been written, afford convincing proof of their genuineness.

Blunt's Scriptural Coincidences, 244-354.

E. The existence and general acceptance of the books of the New Testament at the end of the second century, cannot be accounted for upon any other hypothesis than that of their genuineness. If forgeries, they could not have secured general circulation, since the church at large could neither have been deceived as to their previous non-existence, nor have been induced unanimously to pretend that they were ancient documents.

Alexander, Christ and Christianity, 23-37.

F. As to 2 Peter, Jude, and 2 and 3 John, the epistles most frequently held to be spurious, we may say, that although we have no conclusive external evidence earlier than A. D. 170, and in the case of 2 Peter, none earlier than A. D. 230-250, we may fairly urge in favor of their genuineness, not only their internal characteristics of literary style and moral value, but also the general acceptance of them all since the third century, and the presumption that divine providence, presiding over the growth of the canon, would not suffer spurious material to be mingled with the true.

Alford on 2 Peter, 4: Prolegomena, 157. Westcott on Canon, Smith's Bib. Dict., 1: 370.

G. Rationalistic Theories as to the origin of the gospels. These are attempts to eliminate the miraculous element from the New Testament records, and to reconstruct the sacred history upon principles of naturalism.

Against them we urge the general objection that they are unscientific in their principle and method. To set out in an examination of the New Testament documents with the assumption that all history is a mere natural development, and that miracles are therefore impossible, is to make history a matter not of testimony, but of a priori speculation. It indeed renders any history of Christ and his apostles impossible, since the witnesses whose testimony with regard to miracles is discredited, can no longer be considered worthy of credence in their accounts of Christ's life or doctrine.

Three of these theories only require special notice :

1st. The Myth-theory of Strauss.

According to this view, the gospels are crystallizations into story of Messianic ideas which had for several generations filled the minds of imaginative men in Palestine. The myth is a narrative in which such ideas are unconsciously clothed, and from which the element of intentional and deliberate deception is absent.

We object to this view that:

(a) The time between the death of Christ and the publication of the gospels was far too short for the growth and consolidation of such mythical histories. Myths, on the contrary, are the slow growth of centuries.

(b) The first century was not a century when such formation of myths was possible. Instead of being a credulous and imaginative age, it was an age of historical inquiry and of Sadduceeism in matters of religion.

(c) The gospels cannot be a mythical outgrowth of Jewish ideas and expectations, because in their main features they run directly counter to these ideas and expectations. The sullen and exclusive nationalism of the Jews could not have given rise to a gospel for all nations, nor their expectations of a temporal monarch have led to the story of a suffering Messiah.

(d) The belief and propagation of such myths is inconsistent with what we know of the sober characters and self-sacrificing lives of the apostles.

(e) The mythical theory cannot account for the acceptance of the gospels among the Gentiles, who had none of these Jewish ideas and expectations.

(*f*) It cannot explain Christianity itself, with its belief in Christ's crucifixion and resurrection, and the ordinances which commemorate these facts.

Strauss, *Life of Jesus*; *New Life of Jesus*; *The Old Faith and the New*. Rogers, *Superhuman Origin of Bible*, 61. F. W. Farrar, *Witness of History to Christ*, 49-88. Bayne, *Review of Strauss's New Life*, in *Theol. Eclectic*, 4: 74. Row, in *Lectures on Modern Scepticism*, 305-360. *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Oct., 1871: Art. by Prof. W. A. Stevens. Burgess, *Antiquity and Unity of Man*, 263, 264. Curtis on *Inspiration*, 62-67. Alexander, *Christ and Christianity*, 92-126.

2nd. The Tendency-theory of Baur.

This maintains that the gospels originated in the latter half of the second century, and were written under assumed names as a means of reconciling opposing Jewish and Gentile tendencies in the church.

We object to this view that:

(*a*) The destructive criticism to which it subjects the gospels, if applied to secular documents, would deprive us of any certain knowledge of the past, and render all history impossible.

(*b*) The antagonistic doctrinal tendencies which it professes to find in the several gospels, are more satisfactorily explained as varied but consistent aspects of the one system of truth held by all the apostles.

(*c*) It is incredible that productions of such literary power and lofty religious teaching as the gospels, should have sprung up in the latter half of the second century, or that so springing up, they should have been published under assumed names and for covert ends.

(*d*) The theory requires us to believe in a moral anomaly, namely, that a faithful disciple of Christ in the second century could be guilty of fabricating a life of his master, and of claiming authority for it on the ground that the author had been a companion of Christ or his apostles.

(*e*) This theory cannot account for the universal acceptance of the gospels at the end of the second century among widely separated communities, where reverence for writings of the apostles was a mark of orthodoxy, and where the Gnostic heresies would have made new documents instantly liable to suspicion and searching examination.

(*f*) The acknowledgment by Baur that the epistles to the Romans, Galatians, and Corinthians were written by Paul in the first century, is fatal to his theory, since these epistles testify not only to miracles at the period at which they were written, but to the main events of Jesus' life, and to the miracle of his resurrection, as facts already long acknowledged in the christian church.

Baur, *Die kanonischen Evangelien*. *Theol. Eclectic*, 5: 1-42. Farrar, *Critical History of Free Thought*, 277, 278. Clarke, translation of Hase's *Life of Jesus*, 34-36. F. W. Farrar, *Witness of History to Christ*, 61. Herzog, *Encyclopædie*, 20: 762, Art. Baur und die Tübinger Schule. Auberlen, *Divine Revelation*. *Bib. Sac.*, 19: 75. *Supernatural Religion*; and answers thereto in Westcott, *Hist. N. T. Canon*, 4th ed., *Intro.*; Lightfoot, *Contemporary Rev.*, Dec., 1874, and Jan., 1875.

3rd. The Romance-theory of Renan.

This theory admits a basis of truth in the gospels, but holds that the facts of Jesus' life were so sublimated by enthusiasm and so overlaid with pious fraud, that the gospels in their present form cannot be accepted as genuine—in short, the gospels are to be regarded as historical romances which have only a foundation in fact.

To this view we object that:

(a) It involves an arbitrary and partial treatment of the Christian documents. The claim that one writer not only borrowed from others, but interpolated *ad libitum*, is contradicted by the essential agreement of the manuscripts as quoted by the fathers, and as now extant.

(b) It attributes to Christ and to the apostles an alternate fervor of romantic enthusiasm and a false pretense of miraculous power, which are utterly irreconcilable with the manifest sobriety and holiness of their lives and teachings.

(c) It fails to account for the power and progress of the gospel as a system directly opposed to men's natural tastes and prepossessions—substituting truth for romance, and law for impulse.

Renan, *Life of Jesus*. Pressensé, *Examination of Renan in Theol. Eclectic*, 1: 199. Uhlhorn, *Modern Representations of the Life of Jesus*, 1-33. *Bib. Sac.*, 22: 207; 23: 353, 529.

2. *Genuineness of the books of the Old Testament.* We show this:

A. From the witness of the New Testament, in which all but six books of the Old Testament are either quoted or alluded to as genuine.

B. From the testimony of Jewish authorities ancient and modern, who declare the same books to be sacred, and only the same books, that are now comprised in our Old Testament Scriptures.

C. From the testimony of the Septuagint translation, dating from the first half of the third century, or from 280 to 180 B. C.

D. From the testimony of the Samaritan Pentateuch, dating from the time of the exile, or 600 B. C.

*Smith's Bible Dictionary*, Art. Samaritan Pentateuch. Leathes, *Structure of the O. T.*, 1-41.

E. From indications that the books of the Old Testament were collected by competent authority so early as the time of Ezra, and were thenceforth preserved with the utmost care.

*Bib. Sac.*, 1863: pp. 381, 660, 799. *Smith's Bible Dictionary*, Art. Pentateuch. *Theological Eclectic*, 6: 215.

F. From the impossibility, on any hypothesis of forgery, of accounting for the internal characteristics of works which combine so manifest antiquity with a moral and religious teaching so sublime.

## II. CREDIBILITY OF THE WRITERS OF THE SCRIPTURES.

We shall attempt to prove this only of the writers of the gospels; for if they are credible witnesses, the credibility of the Old Testament to which they bore testimony follows as a matter of course.

1. *They are able or competent witnesses*,—that is, they possessed actual knowledge with regard to the facts they professed to relate.

(a) They had opportunities of observation and inquiry.

(b) They were men of sobriety and discernment, and could not have been themselves deceived.

(c) Their circumstances were such as to impress deeply upon their minds the events of which they were witnesses.

2. *They are honest witnesses*. This is evident when we consider that :

(a) Their testimony imperilled all their worldly interests.

(b) The moral elevation of their writings and their manifest reverence for truth and constant inculcation of it, show that they were not wilful deceivers, but good men.

(c) There are minor indications of the honesty of these writers, in the circumstantiality of their story ; in the absence of any expectation that their narratives would be questioned ; in their freedom from all disposition to screen themselves or the apostles from censure.

3. *The writings of the evangelists mutually support each other*. We argue their credibility upon the ground of their number, and of the consistency of their testimony. While there is enough of discrepancy to show that there has been no collusion between them, there is concurrence enough to make the falsehood of them all infinitely improbable.

Four points under this head deserve mention :

(a) The evangelists are independent witnesses. This is sufficiently shown by the futility of the attempts to prove that either of them has abridged or transcribed another.

(b) The discrepancies between them are none of them irreconcilable with the truth of the recorded facts, but only present those facts in new lights, or with additional detail.

(c) That these witnesses were friends of Christ does not lessen the value of their united testimony, since they followed Christ only because they were convinced that these facts were true.

(d) While one witness to the facts of Christianity might establish its truth, the combined evidence of four witnesses gives us a warrant for faith in the facts of the gospels such as we possess for no other facts in ancient history whatsoever. The same rule which would refuse belief in the events recorded in the gospels, “would throw doubt on any event in history.”

Ebrard, *Wissenschaftliche Kritik der evang. Geschichte*. Haley, *Examination of Alleged Discrepancies*. Whately, *Historic Doubts as to Napoleon Bonaparte*.

4. *The conformity of the gospel testimony with experience*.

We have already shown that, granting the fact of sin and the need of an attested revelation from God, miracles can furnish no presumption against the testimony of those who record such a revelation, but as essentially belonging to such a revelation, miracles may be proved by the same kind and degree of evidence as is required in proof of any other extraordinary facts.

We may assert, then, that in the New Testament histories there is no record of facts contrary to experience, but only a record of facts not wit-

nessed in ordinary experience—of facts, therefore, in which we may believe, if the evidence in other respects is sufficient.

5. *Coincidence of their testimony with collateral facts and circumstances.*

Under this head we may refer to:

(a) The numberless correspondences between the narratives of the evangelists and contemporary secular history.

(b) The failure of every attempt thus far to show that the sacred history is contradicted by any single fact derived from other reliable sources.

(c) The infinite improbability that this minute and complete harmony should ever have been secured in fictitious narratives.

6. *Conclusion from the argument for the credibility of the writers of the gospels.*

These writers having been proved to be credible witnesses, their narratives, including the accounts of the miracles and prophecies of Christ and his apostles, must be accepted as true. But God would not work miracles or reveal the future to attest the claims of false teachers. Christ and his apostles must therefore have been what they claimed to be, teachers sent from God, and their doctrine must be what they claimed it to be, a revelation from God to men.

### III. THE SUPERNATURAL CHARACTER OF THE SCRIPTURE TEACHING.

#### 1. *Scripture teaching in general.*

A. The Bible is the work of one mind.

(a) In spite of its variety of authorship, and the vast separation of its writers from one another in point of time, there is a unity of subject, spirit, and aim throughout the whole.

(b) Not one moral or religious utterance of all these writers has been contradicted or superseded by the utterances of those who have come later, but all together constitute a consistent system.

(c) Each of these writings, whether early or late, has represented moral and religious ideas greatly in advance of the age in which it has appeared, and these ideas still lead the world.

(d) It is impossible to account for this unity without supposing such a supernatural suggestion and control, that the Bible while in its various parts written by human agents, is yet equally the work of a superhuman intelligence.

Garbett, *God's Word Written*, 3-56. Luthardt, *Saving Truths*, 210.

Lee on *Inspiration*, 26-32. Rogers, *Supernatural Origin of the Bible*, 155-181. W. L. Alexander, *Connection and Harmony of O. T. and N. T. Leathes*, *Structure of the O. T.*

B. This one mind that made the Bible is the same mind that made the soul, for the Bible is divinely adapted to the soul.

(a) It shows complete acquaintance with the soul.

(b) It judges the soul—contradicting its passions, revealing its guilt and humbling its pride.

(c) It meets the deepest needs of the soul—by solutions of its problems, disclosures of God's character, presentations of the way of pardon, consolations and promises for life and death.

(d) Yet it is silent upon many questions for which writings of merely human origin seek first to provide solutions.

(e) There are infinite depths and inexhaustible reaches of meaning in Scripture, which difference it from all other books, and which compel us to believe that its author must be divine.

## 2. *Moral system of the New Testament.*

The perfection of this system is generally conceded. All will admit that it greatly surpasses any other system known among men. Among its distinguishing characteristics may be mentioned :

A. Its comprehensiveness,—including all human duties in its code, even those most generally misunderstood and neglected, while it permits no vice whatsoever.

B. Its spirituality,—accepting no merely external conformity to right precepts, but judging all action by the thoughts and motives from which it springs.

C. Its simplicity,—inculcating principles rather than imposing rules ; reducing these principles to an organic system ; and connecting this system with religion by summing up all human duty in the one command of love to God and man.

D. Its practicality,—exemplifying its precepts in the life of Jesus Christ ; and while it declares man's depravity and inability in his own strength to keep the law, furnishing motives to obedience, and divine aid to make this obedience possible.

We may justly argue that a moral system so pure and perfect, since it surpasses all human powers of invention and runs counter to men's natural tastes and passions, must have had a supernatural, and if a supernatural, then a divine origin.

Curtis, on Inspiration, 288. Farrar, *Witness of History to Christ*, 134 ; *Seekers after God*, 181, 182, 320. Blackie, *Four Phases of Morals*. Garbett, *Dogmatic Faith*. Wuttke, *Christian Ethics*.

## 3. *The person and character of Christ.*

A. The conception of Christ's person as presenting Deity and humanity indissolubly united, and the conception of Christ's character, with its faultless and all-comprehending excellence, cannot be accounted for upon any other hypothesis than that they were historical realities.

F. W. Farrar, *Witness of History to Christ*. Bushnell, *Nature and the Supernatural*, 276-332. Alexander, *Christ and Christianity*, 129-157. Ullmann, *Sinlessness of Jesus*. Schaff, *Person of Christ*.

(a) No sources can be assigned from which the evangelists could have derived such a conception. The Hindoo avatars were only temporary unions of deity with humanity. The Greeks had men half-deified, but no unions of God and man. The monotheism of the Jews found the person of Christ a perpetual stumbling-block. The Essenes were in principle more opposed to Christianity than the Rabbins.

Donner, *Hist. Doct. Person of Christ*, Introduction. On the Essenes, see Herzog, *Encyclopædie*, Art. Essener ; Pressensé, *Jesus Christ*, *Life, Times and Work*, 84-87.



(b) No mere human genius, and much less the genius of Jewish fishermen, could have originated this conception. Bad men invent only such characters as they sympathize with. But Christ's character condemns badness. Such a portrait could not have been drawn without supernatural aid. But such aid would not have been given to fabrication. The conception can be explained only by granting that Christ's person and character were historical realities.

B. The acceptance and belief in the New Testament descriptions of Jesus Christ cannot be accounted for except upon the ground that the person and character described had an actual existence.

(a) If these descriptions were false, there were witnesses still living who had known Christ and who would have contradicted them.

(b) There was no motive to induce acceptance of such false accounts, but every motive to the contrary.

(c) The success of such falsehoods could be explained only by supernatural aid, but God would never have thus aided falsehood. This person and character therefore must have been not fictitious but real; and if real, then Christ's words are true, and the system of which his person and character are a part, is a revelation from God.

4. *The testimony of Christ to himself*—as being a messenger from God and as being one with God.

Only one personage in history has claimed to teach absolute truth, to be one with God, and to attest his divine mission by works such as only God could perform.

This testimony cannot be accounted for upon the hypothesis:

A. That Jesus was an intentional deceiver; for,

(a) The perfectly consistent holiness of his life;

(b) The unwavering confidence with which he challenged investigation of his claims, and staked all upon the result;

(c) The vast improbability of a lifelong lie, in the avowed interests of truth; and

(d) The impossibility that deception should have wrought such blessing to the world,—all show that Jesus was no conscious impostor.

Nor can Jesus' testimony to himself be explained upon the hypothesis:

B. That he was self-deceived; for this would argue:

(a) A weakness and folly which amount to positive insanity. But his whole character and life exhibit a calmness, dignity, equipoise, insight, self-mastery, utterly inconsistent with such a theory.

Theol. Eclectic, 4: 137, Art. Character of Jesus Christ. Rogers, Superhuman Origin of Bible, 39.

Or it would argue:

(b) A self-ignorance and self-exaggeration which could spring only from the deepest moral perversion. But the absolute purity of his conscience, the humility of his spirit, the self-denying beneficence of his life, show this hypothesis to be incredible.

If Jesus then cannot be charged with either mental or moral unsoundness; his testimony must be true and he himself must be one with God and the revealer of God to men.

Liddon, *Our Lord's Divinity*, 153. Young, *Christ of History*. J. S. Mill, *Essays on Religion*, 253. Fisher, *Essays*, 515-538.

#### IV. THE HISTORICAL RESULTS OF THE PROPAGATION OF SCRIPTURE DOCTRINE.

1. *The rapid progress of the gospel in the first centuries of our era shows its divine origin.*

A. That Paganism should have been in three centuries supplanted by Christianity, is an acknowledged wonder of history.

B. The wonder is the greater when we consider the obstacles to its progress:

- (a) The scepticism of the cultivated classes;
- (b) The prejudice and hatred of the common people;
- (c) The persecutions set on foot by government.

C. The wonder becomes yet greater when we consider the insufficiency of the means used to secure this progress:

(a) The proclaimers of the gospel were in general unlearned men, belonging to a despised nation.

(b) The gospel which they proclaimed was a gospel of salvation through faith in a Jew who had been put to an ignominious death.

(c) This gospel was one which excited natural repugnance, by humbling men's pride, striking at the root of their sins and demanding a life of labor and self-sacrifice.

(d) The gospel, moreover, was an exclusive one, suffering no rival and declaring itself to be the universal and only religion.

Gibbon, *Dec. and Fall of Rom. Emp.*, 1: ch. 15. Perrone, *Prelectiones Theologicæ*, 1: 133.

D. The progress of a religion so unprepossessing and uncompromising to outward acceptance and dominion, within the space of three hundred years, cannot be explained without supposing that divine power attended its promulgation, and therefore that the gospel is a revelation from God.

F. W. Farrar, *Witness of History to Christ*, 91.

2. *The beneficent influence of the Scripture doctrines and precepts wherever they have had sway, shows their divine origin.* Notice:

A. Their influence upon civilization in general, securing a recognition of principles which heathenism ignored, as for example:

- (a) The importance of the individual;
- (b) The law of mutual love;
- (c) The sacredness of human life;
- (d) The doctrine of internal holiness;
- (e) The sanctity of home;
- (f) Monogamy, and the religious equality of the sexes;
- (g) Identification of belief and practice.

Quoted from Garbett, *Dogmatic Faith*, 177-186.

The continued corruption of heathen lands shows that this change is not due to any laws of merely natural progress. The confessions of ancient writers show that it is not due to philosophy. Its only explanation is that the gospel is the power of God.

B. Their influence upon individual character and happiness, wherever they have been tested in practice. This influence is seen:

(a) In the moral transformations they have wrought ; as in the case of Paul the apostle, and of persons in every Christian community.

(b) In the self-denying labors for human welfare to which they have led; as in the cases of Wilberforce and Judson.

(c) In the hopes they have inspired in time of sorrow and death.

These beneficent fruits cannot have their source in merely natural causes apart from the truth and divinity of the Scriptures; for in that case the contrary beliefs should be accompanied by the same blessings. But since we find these blessings only in connection with Christian teaching, we may justly consider this as their cause. This teaching must then be true, and the Scriptures must be a divine revelation. Else God has made a lie to be the greatest blessing to the race.

## CHAPTER III.

### INSPIRATION OF THE SCRIPTURES.

#### I. DEFINITION OF INSPIRATION.

By the inspiration of the Scriptures, we mean that special divine influence upon the minds of the Scripture writers, in virtue of which their productions, apart from errors of transcription, and when rightly interpreted, together constitute an infallible and sufficient rule of faith and practice.

For works on the general subject of Inspiration, see Lee, Henderson, Bannermann, Jamieson, McNaught. Garbett, *God's Word Written. Aids to Faith, Essay on Inspiration.* Also, Philippi, *Glaubenslehre*, 1: 205. Westcott, *Int. to Study of the Gospels*, 27-65. *Bib. Sac.*, 1: 97; 4: 154; 12: 217; 15: 29, 314; 25: 192-198. Also, Dr. Barrows, in *Bib. Sac.*, 1867: 593; 1872: 428. Farrar, *Science in Theology*, 208.

(a) Inspiration is therefore to be defined not by its method but by its result. It is a general term including all those kinds and degrees of the Holy Spirit's influence which were brought to bear upon the minds of the Scripture writers, in order to secure the putting into permanent and written form of the truth best adapted to man's moral and religious needs.

(b) Inspiration may often include revelation, or the direct communication from God of truth to which man could not attain by his unaided powers. It may include illumination or the quickening of man's cognitive powers to understand truth already revealed. Inspiration however does not necessarily and always include either revelation or illumination. It is simply the divine influence which secures a correct transmission of the truth to the future, and according to the nature of the truth to be transmitted, it may be only an inspiration of superintendence, or it may be also and at the same time, an inspiration of illumination or revelation.

(c) It is not denied but affirmed, that inspiration may qualify for oral utterance of infallible truth, or for wise leadership and daring deeds. We are now concerned with inspiration, however, only as it pertains to the authorship of Scripture.

Henderson, *Inspiration*, 58.

#### II. PROOF OF INSPIRATION.

1. Since we have shown that God has made a revelation of himself to man, the presumption becomes doubly strong that he will not trust this revelation to human tradition and misrepresentation, but will also provide a correct and authoritative record of it.

2. Jesus, who has been proved to be not only a credible witness, but a messenger from God, vouches for the inspiration of the Old Testament, by

quoting it with the formula: "it is written;" by declaring that "not one jot or tittle of it shall fail;" and by calling it "the word of God which cannot be broken," and in which we "have eternal life." (Matt. 4: 4, 6, 7; 5: 17; 11: 10. Mark 14: 27. Luke 4: 4-12; 11: 49. John 5: 39; 10: 35).

Henderson, Inspiration, 254.

3. Jesus commissioned his disciples as teachers, and promised them in their teaching a supernatural aid of the Holy Spirit, similar to that which was granted to the Old Testament prophets. (Mat. 10: 7, 19; 28: 19, 20. Luke 24: 49. John 14: 26; 15: 27; 16: 13; 17: 8; 20: 21, 22. Acts 1: 4. Cf. Ex. 3: 12. Is. 44: 3. Jer. 1: 5-8. Ez. 2 and 3. Joel 2: 28).

Henderson, Inspiration, 247, 248.

4. The apostles claim to have received this promised Spirit, and under his influence to speak with divine authority, putting their writings upon a level with the Old Testament Scriptures. We have not only direct statements that both the matter and the form of their teaching were directed by the Holy Spirit, but we have indirect evidence that this was the case in the tone of authority which pervades their addresses and epistles. (Statements: 1. Cor. 2: 10-13; 11: 23; 12: 8; 14: 37, 38. Gal. 1: 12. 1 Thess. 4: 8. 2 Tim. 3: 16; cf. Ex. 7: 1; 4: 14-16. 1 Pet. 1: 11, 12. 2 Pet. 1: 21; 3: 2, 16. Implications: 1 Cor. 5: 3-5. Gal. 1: 1. 1 John 5: 10, 11).

Kahnis, Dogmatik, 3: 122. Henderson on Inspiration, 34, 234. Conant, Genesis, Introd. xiii, note.

### III. THEORIES OF INSPIRATION.

#### 1. *The Intuition-theory.*

This holds that inspiration is but a higher development of that natural insight into truth which all men possess to some degree; a mode of intelligence in matters of morals and religion which gives rise to sacred books, as a corresponding mode of intelligence in matters of secular truth gives rise to great works of philosophy or art.

We object to this theory:

(a) That it involves a self-contradiction;—if it were true, one man would be inspired to utter what a second is inspired to pronounce false. The Vedas, the Koran and the Bible cannot be inspired to contradict each other.

(b) That it makes moral and religious truth to be a purely subjective thing—a matter of private opinion—having no objective reality independently of men's opinions regarding it.

(c) That it logically involves the denial of a personal God who is truth and reveals truth, and so makes man to be the highest intelligence in the universe.

(d) That it explains inspiration only by denying its existence; since, if there be no personal God, inspiration is but a figure of speech for a purely natural fact.

Morell, Philosophy of Religion, 127-179. F. W. Newman, Phases of Faith. Theodore Parker, Discourses of Religion; Experiences as a Minister. Henderson, Inspiration, 443-469, 481-490. Rogers, Eclipse of Faith, 73 sq. and 283 sq.

## 2. *The Illumination-theory.*

This regards inspiration as merely an intensifying and elevating of the religious perceptions of the Christian, the same in kind, though greater in degree, than the illumination of every believer by the Holy Spirit. It holds not that the Bible is, but that it contains, the word of God, and that not the writings but only the writers were inspired.

We object to this theory that:

(a) It is insufficient to account for the facts. Since the illumination of the Holy Spirit gives us no new truth, but only a vivid apprehension of the truth already revealed, the original communication of this truth must have required a work of the Spirit different not in degree but in kind.

(b) Such illumination could not secure the Scripture writers from frequent and grievous error. The spiritual perception of the Christian is always rendered to some extent imperfect and deceptive by remaining depravity. The subjective element so predominates in this theory, that no part of the Scriptures can be absolutely depended on.

(c) An inspiration of this sort, therefore, still leaves us destitute of any authoritative standard of truth and duty. An additional revelation would, upon this theory, still be needed to tell us what parts of that which we have are true and binding.

(d) Since no such additional revelation is given us, the individual reason must determine what parts of Scripture it is to receive, and what to reject. The theory in effect makes reason and not the Scriptures the ultimate authority in morals and religion.

Herzog, Encyclopædie, Art. Inspiration by Tholuck. Noyes, Theological Essays, Essay by Tholuck. Coleridge, Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit, Works, 5: 569. F. W. Robertson, Sermon I; Life and Letters, 1: 270. Curtis, Human Element in Inspiration. Farrar, Critical History of Free Thought, 473. Aids to Faith, 343. On Swedenborg, see Pond, Swedenborg and his Doctrine; Hours with the Mystics, 2: 230; Möhler, Symbolism, 436-466; and New Englander, Jan. 1874: 195.

## 3. *The Dictation-theory,*

This theory holds that inspiration consisted in such a possession of the minds and bodies of the Scripture writers by the Holy Spirit, that they became passive instruments or amanuenses—pens, not penmen, of God.

Of this view we may remark:

(a) That it rests upon a partial induction of Scripture facts,—unwarrantably assuming that occasional instances of direct dictation reveal the invariable method of God's communications of truth to the writers of the Bible.

(b) That it cannot account for the manifestly human element in the Scriptures. There are peculiarities of style which distinguish the productions of each writer from those of every other, and there are variations in accounts of the same transaction which are inconsistent with the theory of a solely divine authorship.

(c) It is inconsistent with a wise economy of means, to suppose that the Scripture writers should have had dictated to them what they knew already, or what they could inform themselves of by the use of their natural powers.

(d) It contradicts what we know of the law of God's working in the soul. The higher and nobler God's communications, the more fully is man in possession and use of his own faculties. We cannot suppose that this highest work of man under the influence of the Spirit was purely mechanical.

Quenstedt, *Theol. Didact.*, 1: 76. Hooker, *Works*, 2: 383. Gaussen, *Theopneusty*. Haldane, *Inspiration of the Old and New Testament*. Henderson, *Inspiration*, 333, 349.

#### 4. *The Dynamical theory.*

The true view holds in opposition to the first of these theories, that inspiration is not a natural but a supernatural fact, and that it is the immediate work of a personal God in the soul of man.

It holds in opposition to the second, that inspiration belongs not only to the men who wrote the Scriptures, but to the Scriptures which they wrote, and to every part of them, so that they are in every part the word of God.

It holds in opposition to the third theory, that the Scriptures contain a human as well as a divine element, so that while they constitute a body of infallible truth, this truth is shaped in human moulds and adapted to ordinary human intelligence.

In short, inspiration is neither natural, partial, nor mechanical, but supernatural, plenary and dynamical. Further explanations will be grouped under the following head:

### IV. THE UNION OF THE DIVINE AND HUMAN ELEMENTS IN INSPIRATION.

1. The Scriptures are the production equally of God and of man, and therefore are never to be regarded as merely human or merely divine.

The mystery of inspiration consists in neither of these terms separately, but in the union of the two. Of this however there are analogies in the interpenetration of human powers by the divine efficiency in regeneration and sanctification, and in the union of the divine and human natures in the person of Jesus Christ.

2. This union of the divine and human agencies in inspiration is not to be conceived of as one of external impartation and reception.

On the other hand those whom God raised up and providentially qualified to do this work, when inspired, spoke and wrote the words of God, not as from without but as from within, and that not passively, but in the most conscious possession and the most exalted exercise of their own powers of intellect, emotion and will.

3. Inspiration did not therefore remove, but rather pressed into its own service all the personal peculiarities of the writers, together with their defects of culture and literary style.

Every imperfection not inconsistent with truth in a human composition, may exist in inspired Scripture. The Bible is God's word, in the sense that it presents to us divine truth in human forms, and is a revelation not for a select class but for the common mind. Rightly understood, this very humanity of the Bible is a proof of its divinity.

4. Inspiration went no further than to secure an infallible transmission by the sacred writers of the special truth which they were commissioned to deliver.

Inspiration was not omniscience. It was *πολυτρόπως* (Heb. 1: 1),—a bestowment of various kinds and degrees of knowledge and aid according to need—sometimes suggesting new truth, sometimes presiding over the collection of preëxisting material, though always guarding from error in the final elaboration.

As inspiration was not omniscience, so it was not complete sanctification. It involved neither personal infallibility nor entire freedom from sin.

Henderson, *Inspiration*, 114.

5. Inspiration did not always or even generally involve a direct communication to the Scripture writers, of the words they wrote.

Thought is possible without words and in the order of nature precedes words. The Scripture writers appear to have been so influenced by the Holy Spirit that they perceived and felt even the new truths they were to publish, as discoveries of their own minds, and were left to the action of their own minds, in the expression of these truths, with the single exception that they were supernaturally held back from the selection of wrong words, and when needful were provided with right ones. Inspiration is therefore verbal as to its result, but not verbal as to its method.

Henderson, *Inspiration*, 102. *Bib. Sac.*, 1872: 428, 640.

6. Yet the all-pervading inspiration of the Scriptures, notwithstanding the ever-present human element, constitutes these various writings an organic whole.

Since the Bible is in all its parts the work of God, each part is to be judged not by itself alone, but in its connection with every other part. The Scriptures are not to be interpreted as so many merely human productions by different authors, but as also the work of one divine mind. Seemingly trivial things are to be explained from their connection with the whole. One history is to be built up from the several accounts of the life of Christ. One doctrine must supplement another. The Old Testament is part of a progressive system, whose culmination and key is to be found in the New. The central subject and thought which binds all parts of the Bible together and in the light of which they are to be interpreted, is the person and work of Jesus Christ.

Ebrard, *Dogmatik*, 1: 40. Bernard, *Progress of Doctrine in the N. T.*  
Stanley Leathes, *Structure of the Old Testament*. Rainy, *Delivery and Development of Doctrine*.

## V. OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF INSPIRATION.

In connection with a divine-human work like the Bible, insoluble difficulties may be expected to present themselves. So long, however, as its inspiration is sustained by competent and sufficient evidence, these difficulties cannot justly prevent our full acceptance of the doctrine, any more than disorder and mystery in nature warrant us in setting aside the proofs of its divine authorship. These difficulties are lessened with time; some have



already disappeared; many may be due to ignorance and may be removed hereafter; those which are permanent may be intended to stimulate inquiry and to discipline faith.

It is noticeable that the common objections to inspiration are urged not so much against the religious teaching of the Scriptures, as against certain errors in secular matters, which are supposed to be interwoven with it. But if these were proved to be errors indeed, it would not necessarily overthrow the doctrine of inspiration; it would only compel us to give a larger place to the human element in the composition of the Scriptures, and to regard them more exclusively as a text-book of religion. As a rule of religious faith and practice, they might still be the infallible word of God.

But we deny that such errors have as yet been proved to exist. While we are never to forget that the Bible is to be judged as a book whose one great aim is man's rescue from sin and reconciliation to God, we still hold that it is, not only in religious respects, but in all respects, a record of substantial truth. This will more fully appear from an examination of the objections in detail.

Luthardt, *Saving Truths*, 205.

1. *Errors in matters of Science.*

Upon this objection we remark:

(a) We do not admit the existence of scientific error in the scripture. What is charged as such is simply truth presented in popular and impressive forms.

The common mind receives a more correct idea of unfamiliar facts when these are narrated in phenomenal language and in summary form, than when they are described in the abstract terms and in the exact detail of science; (Joshua 10: 12, 13. Ps. 78: 69).

(b) It is not necessary to a proper view of inspiration to suppose that the human authors of Scripture had in mind the proper scientific interpretation of the natural events they recorded.

It is enough that this was in the mind of the inspiring Spirit. Through the comparatively narrow conceptions and inadequate language of the Scripture writers, the Spirit of inspiration may have secured the expression of the truth in such germinal form as to be intelligible to the times in which it was first published, and yet capable of indefinite expansion as science should advance; (Genesis 1., and 7: 19).

(c) It may safely be said that science has not yet shown any fairly interpreted passage of Scripture to be untrue.

In the miniature picture of creation in the first chapter of Genesis, and in its power of adjusting itself to every advance of scientific investigation, we have a strong proof of inspiration.

With regard to the antiquity of the race, we may say that owing to the differences of reading between the Septuagint and the Hebrew, there is room for doubt whether either of the received chronologies can be considered as having the sanction of inspiration. If science should prove the existence of man upon the earth at a period preceding the dates hitherto

assigned, no statement of the Scriptures would necessarily be proved false. But such antiquity cannot as yet be considered a matter of demonstration.

Guyot, in *Bib. Sac.*, 1855: 324. Dana, *Manual of Geology*, 741-746. Taylor Lewis, *Six Days of Creation*. Hugh Miller, *Testimony of the Rocks*. Conant, *Genesis*, Introduction. *British Quarterly*, Jan., 1874. Leconte, *Religion and Science*, 270. Burgess, *Antiquity and Unity of the Race*. Nisbet, *Baptist Quarterly*, 1871: 460. Rogers, *Superhuman Origin of the Bible*, 445 sq. *Faith and Free Thought*, 133.

## 2. *Errors in matters of History.*

To this objection we reply:

(a) What are charged as such, are often mere mistakes in transcription, and have no force as arguments against inspiration, unless it can first be shown that inspired documents are by the very fact of their inspiration exempt from the operation of those laws which affect the transmission of other ancient documents; (2 Chron. 13: 3. Acts 7: 16).

(b) Other so-called errors are to be explained as a permissible use of round numbers, which cannot be denied to the sacred writers except upon the principle that mathematical accuracy was more important than the general impression to be secured by the narrative; (Num. 25: 9; cf. 1 Cor. 10: 8).

(c) Diversities of statement in accounts of the same event, so long as they touch no substantial truth, may be due to the meagreness of the narrative, and might be fully explained if some single fact now unrecorded were only known. To explain these apparent discrepancies would not only be beside the purpose of the record, but would destroy one valuable evidence of the independence of the several writers or witnesses; (Mat. 20: 30; cf. Luke 18: 35. Mat. 5: 1; cf. Luke 6: 17).

(d) Every advance in historical and archæological discovery goes to sustain the correctness of the Scripture narratives, while the objector may be confidently challenged to point out a single statement really belonging to the inspired record, which has been proved to be false.

On Christ's last Passover, see Robinson, *Harmony*, 212. On Cyrenius, see Pres. Woolsey, *Art. in New Englander*, 1870. On Genealogies, see Lord Hervey, *Genealogies of our Lord*; and *Art. in Smith's Bible Dictionary*. Also, on the general subject, see Rawlinson, *Historical Evidences*; and *Christianity and Modern Scepticism*, 1: 265. Haley, *Alleged Discrepancies*.

## 3. *Errors in Morality.*

(a) What are charged as such are sometimes evil acts and words of good men—acts and words not sanctioned by God. These are narrated by the inspired writers as simple matters of history, and subsequent results or the story itself is left to point the moral of the tale; (Noah's drunkenness; Lot's incest; Jacob's falsehood; David's adultery; Peter's denial).

Lee, *Inspiration*, 265, note.

(b) Where evil acts appear at first sight to be sanctioned, it is frequently some right intent or accompanying virtue, rather than the act itself, upon which commendation is bestowed; (as Rahab's faith, not her duplicity; Jael's patriotism, not her treachery).

(c) Certain commands and deeds are sanctioned as relatively just—expressions of justice such as the age could comprehend, and are to be judged as parts of a progressively unfolding system of morality, whose key and culmination we have in Jesus Christ; (as Moses' permission of divorce and retaliation; Deut. 24: 1; Ex. 21: 24; cf. Mat. 5: 31-39; 19: 8. See also 2 K. 1: 10-12; cf. Luke 9: 52-56).

Peabody, *Christianity the Religion of Nature*, 45.

(d) God's righteous sovereignty affords the key to other events. He has the right to do what he will with his own, and to punish the transgressor when and where he will. And he may justly make men the foretellers or executioners of his purposes; (as in the destruction of the Canaanites, and in the imprecatory Psalms).

Dr. Thos. Arnold, *Essay on Right Interpretation of Scripture*. Cowles, Com. on Psalm 137. Bib. Sac., 1862: 165.

(e) Other apparent immoralities are due to unwarranted interpretations. Symbol is sometimes taken for literal fact (as in Hosea 1: 2, 3); the language of irony is understood as sober affirmation (as in 2. K. 6: 19); the glow and freedom of Oriental description are judged by the unimpassioned style of western literature (as in Canticles).

Butler's Analogy, Part 2, Chap. 3. Rogers' Eclipse of Faith. Perowne on Psalms, Introduction, 61. *Essay on Moral Difficulties of O. T.*, in Faith and Free Thought, Lectures by Ch'n Ev. Soc., 2: 173.

#### 4. *Errors of Reasoning.*

(a) What are charged as such are generally to be explained as valid argument expressed in highly condensed form. The appearance of error may be due to the suppression of one or more links in the reasoning.

(b) Where we cannot see the propriety of the conclusions drawn from given premises, there is greater reason to attribute our failure to ignorance of divine logic on our part than to accommodation or ad hominem arguments on the part of the Scripture writers.

(c) The adoption of Jewish methods of reasoning, where it could be proved, would not indicate error on the part of the Scripture writers, but rather an inspired sanction of the method as applied to that particular case; (Gal. 3: 16. Heb. 7: 9, 10).

#### 5. *Errors in quoting or interpreting the Old Testament.*

(a) What are charged as such are commonly interpretations of the meaning of the original Scripture by the same Spirit who first inspired it.

(b) Where an apparently false translation is quoted from the Septuagint, the sanction of inspiration is given to it, as expressing a part at least of the fulness of meaning contained in the divine original—a fulness of meaning which two varying translations do not in some cases exhaust; (Ps. 40: 6, 8; cf. Heb. 10: 5-7).

(c) The freedom of these inspired interpretations, however, does not warrant us in like freedom of interpretation in the case of other passages whose meaning has not been authoritatively made known.

6. *Errors in Prophecy.*

(a) What are charged as such may frequently be explained by remembering that much of prophecy is unfulfilled; (as in the book of Revelation).

(b) The personal surmises of the prophets as to the meaning of the prophecies they recorded, may have been incorrect, while yet the prophecies themselves are inspired; (1 Pet. 1: 10-11).

(c) The prophet's earlier utterances are not to be severed from the later utterances which elucidate them, nor from the whole revelation of which they form a part. It is unjust to forbid the prophet to explain his own meaning; (1 Thess. 4: 15-17; 5: 2, 3; cf. 2. Thess. 2: 1-6).

(d) The character of prophecy as a rough general sketch of the future, in highly figurative language, and without historical perspective, renders it peculiarly probable that what at first sight seem to be errors, are due to a misinterpretation on our part, which confounds the drapery with the substance, or applies its language to events to which it had no reference.

7. *Certain books unworthy of a place in inspired Scripture.*

(a) This charge may be shown, in each single case, to rest upon a misapprehension of the aim and method of the book, and its connection with the remainder of the Bible, together with a narrowness of nature or of doctrinal view, which prevents the critic from appreciating the wants of the peculiar class of men to which the book is especially serviceable.

(b) The testimony of church history and of general Christian experience to the profitableness and divinity of the disputed books, is of greater weight than the personal impressions of the few who criticise them.

(c) Such testimony can be adduced in favor of the value of each one of the books to which exception is taken; (as Esther, Job, Song of Solomon, Ecclesiastes, James, Revelation).

8. *Portions of the Scripture books written by others than the persons to whom they are ascribed.*

The objection rests upon a misunderstanding of the nature and object of inspiration. It may be removed by considering that:

(a) In the case of books made up from preëxisting documents, inspiration simply preserved the compilers of them from selecting inadequate or false material. The fact of such compilation does not impugn their truthfulness or value; (Genesis and Chronicles).

(b) In the case of additions to Scripture books by later writers, it is reasonable to suppose that the additions, as well as the originals, were made by inspiration, and no essential truth is sacrificed by allowing the whole to go under the name of the chief author; (Deuteronomy, and perhaps Isaiah).

(c) It is unjust to deny to inspired Scripture the right exercised by all historians, of introducing certain documents and sayings as simply historical, while their complete truthfulness is neither vouched for nor denied; (as the letter of Claudias Lysias in Acts 23: 26-30).

9. *Sceptical or fictitious Narratives.*

(a) Descriptions of human experience may be embraced in Scripture, not as models for imitation, but as illustrations of the doubts, struggles, and needs of the soul.

In these cases, inspiration may vouch, not for the correctness of the views expressed by those who thus describe their mental history, but only for the correspondence of the description with actual fact, and for its usefulness as indirectly teaching important moral lessons; (Ecclesiastes).

(b) Moral truth may be put by Scripture writers into parabolic or dramatic form, and the sayings of Satan and of perverse men may form parts of such a production.

In such cases, inspiration may vouch, not for the historical truth, much less for the moral truth of each separate statement, but only for the correspondence of the whole with ideal fact; in other words, inspiration may guarantee that the story is true to nature, and is valuable as conveying divine instruction; (Book of Job; Parable of the Prodigal Son).

(c) In none of these cases ought the difficulty of distinguishing man's words from God's words, or ideal truth from actual truth, to prevent our acceptance of the fact of inspiration, for in this very variety of the Bible, with the stimulus it gives to inquiry, and yet the general plainness of its lessons, we have the very characteristics we should expect in a book whose authorship was divine.

10. *Acknowledgment of the non-inspiration of Scripture teachers and their writings.*

This charge rests mainly upon the misinterpretation of two particular passages :

(a) Acts 23 : 5, ("I wist not, brethren, that he was the high priest"), may be explained either as the language of indignant irony : "I would not recognize such a man as high priest;" or more naturally, as an actual confession of personal ignorance and fallibility, which does not affect the inspiration of any of Paul's final teachings or writings.

(b) 1 Cor. 7 : 10, 12, ("I not the Lord; not I, but the Lord"). Here the contrast is, not between the apostle inspired and the apostle uninspired, but between the apostle's words and an actual saying of our Lord, as in Matt. 5 : 32; 19 : 3-10; Mark 10 : 11; Luke 16 : 18; (Stanley on Corinthians).

The expressions may be paraphrased:—"With regard to this matter no express command was given by Christ before his ascension. As one inspired by Christ, however, I give you my command."

## PART IV.

### THE NATURE, DECREES AND WORKS OF GOD.

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#### CHAPTER I.

##### THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

In contemplating the words and acts of God, as in contemplating the words and acts of individual men, we are compelled to assign uniform and permanent effects to uniform and permanent causes. Holy acts and words, we argue, must have their source in a principle of holiness; truthful acts and words in a settled proclivity to truth; benevolent acts and words in a benevolent disposition.

Moreover, these permanent and uniform sources of expression and action to which we have applied the terms principle, proclivity, disposition, since they exist harmoniously in the same person, must themselves inhere, and find their unity, in an underlying spiritual substance or reality of which they are the inseparable characteristics and partial manifestations.

Thus we are led naturally from the works to the attributes, and from the attributes to the essence of God.

##### I. DEFINITION OF THE TERM ATTRIBUTES.

The attributes of God are those distinguishing characteristics of the divine nature which are inseparable from the idea of God and which constitute the basis and ground for his various manifestations to his creatures.

We call them attributes because we are compelled to attribute them to God as fundamental qualities or powers of his being, in order to give rational account of certain constant facts in God's self-revelations.

Shedd, *History of Doctrine*, 1 : 240. Kahnis, *Dogmatik*, 3 : 172-188.

##### II. RELATION OF THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES TO THE DIVINE ESSENCE.

1. *The attributes have an objective existence.* They are not mere names for human conceptions of God—conceptions which have their only ground in the imperfection of the finite mind. They are qualities objectively distinguishable from the divine essence and from each other.

The nominalistic notion that God is a being of absolute simplicity, and that in his nature there is no internal distinction of qualities or powers, tends directly to pantheism; denies all reality to the divine perfections; or if these in any sense still exist, precludes all knowledge of them on the part of finite beings. To say that knowledge and power, eternity and holiness, are identical with the essence of God and with each other, is to deny that we can know God at all.

The Scripture declarations of the possibility of knowing God, together with the manifestation of distinct attributes of his nature, are conclusive against this false notion of the divine simplicity; (Jer. 9 : 23, 24. John 17 : 3. Ps. 85 : 10, 11).

Julius Müller, *Doctrine of Sin*, 2 : 116 sq. Schweizer, *Glaubenslehre*, 1 : 229-235. Thomasius, *Christi Person und Werk*, 1 : 43. Martensen, *Dogmatics*, 91.

2. *The attributes inhere in the divine essence.* They are not separate existences. They are attributes of God.

While we oppose the nominalistic view which holds them to be mere names with which, by the necessity of our thinking, we clothe the one simple divine essence, we need equally to avoid the opposite realistic extreme of making them separate parts of a composite God.

We cannot conceive of attributes except as belonging to an underlying essence which furnishes their ground of unity. In representing God as a compound of attributes, realism endangers the living unity of the Godhead.

Luthardt, *Compendium der Dogmatik*, 70.

3. *The attributes belong to the divine essence as such.* They are to be distinguished from those other powers or relations which do not appertain to the divine essence universally.

The personal distinctions (proprietary) in the nature of the one God are not to be denominated attributes, since each of these personal distinctions belongs not to the divine essence as such and universally, but only to the particular person of the Trinity who bears its name, while on the contrary all of the attributes belong to each of the persons.

The relations which God sustains to the world (predicata), moreover—such as creation, preservation, government—are not to be denominated attributes, since these are accidental, not necessary or inseparable from the idea of God. God would be God, if he had never created.

4. *The attributes manifest the divine essence.* The essence is revealed only through the attributes. Apart from its attributes it is unknown and unknowable.

But though we can know God only as he reveals to us his attributes, we do, notwithstanding, in knowing these attributes, know the being to whom these attributes belong. That this knowledge is partial does not prevent its corresponding, so far as it goes, to objective reality in the nature of God.

All God's revelations are therefore revelations of himself in and through his attributes. Our aim must therefore be to determine from God's works and words what qualities, dispositions, determinations, powers of his otherwise unseen and unsearchable essence, he has actually made known to us, or in other words, what are the revealed attributes of God.

### III. METHODS OF DETERMINING THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

We have seen that the existence of God is a first truth. It is presupposed in all human thinking and is more or less consciously recognized by all men.

This intuitive knowledge of God we have seen to be corroborated and explicated by arguments drawn from nature and from mind. Reason leads

us to a causative and personal Intelligence upon whom we depend. This Being of infinite greatness we clothe, by a necessity of our thinking, with all the attributes of perfection.

The two great methods of determining what these attributes are, are the rational and the Biblical.

1. *The Rational method.* This is threefold:

A. The *via negationis*, which consists in denying to God all imperfections observed in created beings;

B. The *via eminentiæ*, which consists in attributing to God in infinite degree all the perfections found in creatures; and

C. The *via causalitatis*, which consists in predicating of God those attributes which are required in him to explain the world of nature and of mind.

Kahnis, Dogmatik, 3: 181.

This rational method explains God's nature from that of his creation, whereas the creation itself can be fully explained only from the nature of God.

Though the method is valuable, it has insuperable limitations and its place is a subordinate one. While we use it continually to confirm and supplement results otherwise obtained, our chief means of determining the divine attributes must be:

2. *The Biblical method.* This is simply the inductive method applied to the facts with regard to God revealed in the Scriptures. Now that we have proved the Scriptures to be a revelation from God, inspired in every part, we may properly look to them as decisive authority with regard to God's attributes.

#### IV. CLASSIFICATION OF THE ATTRIBUTES.

The attributes may be divided into two great classes: Absolute or Immanent, and Relative or Transitive.

By Absolute or Immanent Attributes we mean attributes which respect the inner being of God, which are involved in God's relations to himself, and which belong to his nature independently of his connection with the universe.

By Relative or Transitive Attributes we mean attributes which respect the outward revelation of God's being, which are involved in God's relations to the creation, and which are exercised in consequence of the existence of the universe and its dependence upon him.

Under the head of Absolute or Immanent Attributes we make a twofold division into Spirituality, with the attributes therein involved, namely, Holiness, Love and Truth; and Infinity, with the attributes therein involved, namely, Self-existence, Immutability and Unity.

Under the head of Relative or Transitive Attributes we make a threefold division, according to the order of their revelation into Attributes having relation to Time and Space, as Eternity and Immensity; Attributes having relation to Creation, as Omnipresence, Omniscience and Omnipotence; and Attributes having relation to Moral Beings, as Justice or Transitive Holiness; and Goodness and Mercy, or Transitive Love.



This classification may be better understood from the following schedule:

1. Absolute or Immanent Attributes :

- A. Spirituality, involving  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} (a) \text{ Holiness,} \\ (b) \text{ Love,} \\ (c) \text{ Truth.} \end{array} \right.$
- B. Infinity, involving  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} (a) \text{ Self-existence,} \\ (b) \text{ Immutability,} \\ (c) \text{ Unity.} \end{array} \right.$

2. Relative or Transitive Attributes :

- A. Related to Time and Space  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} (a) \text{ Eternity,} \\ (b) \text{ Immensity.} \end{array} \right.$
- B. Related to Creation  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} (a) \text{ Omnipresence,} \\ (b) \text{ Omniscience,} \\ (c) \text{ Omnipotence.} \end{array} \right.$
- C. Related to Moral Beings  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} (a) \text{ Justice, or Transitive Holiness,} \\ (b) \text{ Goodness and Mercy, or Transitive Love.} \end{array} \right.$

On classification of attributes, see Luthardt, *Compendium*, 71. Rothe, *Dogmatik*, 71. Kahnis, *Dogmatik*, 3:162. Thomasius, *Christi Person und Werk*, 1:47, 52, 136. On the general subject, see Charnock, *Attributes*.

V. ABSOLUTE OR IMMANENT ATTRIBUTES.

*First Division.—Spirituality, and Attributes therein involved.*

In calling spirituality an attribute of God, we mean not that we are justified in applying to the divine nature the adjective "spiritual," but that the substantive "spirit" describes that nature; (John 4: 24. Rom. 1: 20. 1 Tim. 1: 17. Col. 1: 15). This implies:

A. Negatively, that,

(a) God is not matter. Spirit is not a refined form of matter, but an immaterial substance, invisible, uncompounded, indestructible.

(b) God is not dependent upon matter. It cannot be shown that the human mind, in any other state than the present, is dependent for consciousness upon its connection with a physical organism. Much less is it true that God is dependent upon the material universe as his sensorium.

God is not only spirit, but he is pure spirit. He is not only not matter, but he has no necessary connection with matter.

Those passages of Scripture which seem to ascribe to God the possession of bodily parts and organs, as eyes and hands, are to be regarded as anthropomorphic and symbolic.

When God is spoken of as appearing to the patriarchs and walking with them, the passages are to be explained as referring to God's temporary manifestations of himself in human form—manifestations which prefigured the final tabernacling of the Son of God in human flesh.

Side by side with these anthropomorphic expressions and manifestations, moreover, were specific declarations which repressed any materializing conceptions of God; as for example, that heaven was his throne and the earth

his footstool (Is. 66: 1), and that the heaven of heavens could not contain him (1 K. 8: 27).

B. Positively, that :

(a) God is life, or living essence ; (Jer. 10: 10).

(b) That God is personality, or personal existence—with its two constituent powers or manifestations, self-consciousness and self-determination ; (1 Cor. 2: 10 ; Eph. 3: 11).

British Quarterly Review, Jan., 1874: 32.

Of the attributes involved in spirituality we mention :

1. Holiness.

Holiness is self-affirming purity. In virtue of this attribute of his nature, God eternally loves and wills his own moral excellence ; (Is. 6: 3 ; Rev. 4: 8).

Holiness, therefore, is not to be conceived of :

(a) As a mere quality of the divine substance ; for none of God's moral attributes are passive, but all are penetrated and pervaded by will. God is holy, in that his own purity is the supreme object of his regard and maintenance.

Thomasius, *Christi Person und Werk*, 1: 141.

(b) Nor as being God's self-love, in the sense of supreme regard for his own interest and happiness. It is rather God's infinite moral excellence affirming and asserting itself as the highest possible motive and end.

Buddeus, *Theologia Dogmatica*, 2: 1: 36. Per contra, see Thomasius, *Christi Person und Werk*, 1: 137.

(c) Nor as being identical with, or a manifestation of, love ; for holiness, the self-affirming attribute, can in no way be resolved into love, the self-communicating.

Hovey, *God with Us*, 187-221. Philippi, *Glaubenslehre*, 2: 80-82. Thomasius, *Christi Person und Werk*, 1: 154, 155.

(d) Nor as a complex term designating the aggregate of the divine perfections ; since the notion of holiness is, both in Scripture and in Christian experience, perfectly simple and distinct from that of other attributes.

Nitzsch, *System of Christ. Doct.*, Trans., 166. Dick, *Theology*, 1: 275. Wardlaw, *Theology*, 1: 618-634.

(e) Nor as purity demanding purity from creatures ; for this includes the transitive attribute of justice, which is indeed the manifestation and expression of the immanent attribute of holiness, but is not to be confounded with it.

Quenstedt, *Theol.*, 8: 1: 34. Tholuck on Romans, 5th Ed., 151. Thomasius, *Christi Person und Werk*, 1: 137.

2. Love.

By love we mean that attribute of the divine nature in virtue of which God is eternally moved to self-communication ; (1 John 4: 8).

(a) The immanent love of God is not to be confounded with goodness and mercy toward creatures. These are its manifestations and are to be denominated transitive love.

Thomasius, *Christi Person und Werk*, 1: 138, 139.

(b) The immanent love of God, therefore, requires and finds a personal object in the image of his own infinite perfections. It is to be understood only in the light of the doctrine of the Trinity; (John 17 : 24).

(c) The immanent love of God constitutes a ground of the divine blessedness. Since there is an infinite and perfect object of love as well as of knowledge and will, in God's own nature, the existence of the universe is not necessary to his serenity and joy; (1 Tim. 1 : 11 ; 6 : 15. Eph. 4 : 30. Gen. 6 : 6 ; 22 : 16. Is. 63 : 9).

Martensen, Christian Dogmatics, 101. Shedd, Essays and Addresses, 279. Thomasius, 1 : 156.

### 3. Truth.

By this we mean that attribute of the divine nature in virtue of which God's being and God's knowledge eternally conform to each other; (1 John 5 : 20, *γνωσκομεν τον αληθινον*. John 17 : 3, *τον μονον αληθινον θεον*. 14 : 6 *ειμι η αληθεια*; cf. 1 Cor. 2 : 11).

Thomasius, 1 : 137. Gerhard, Loc. II, 152. Kahnis, 3 : 193; also 2 : 272, 279.

(a) The immanent truth of God is to be distinguished from that veracity and faithfulness which partially manifest it to creatures; (Ps. 31 : 5).

(b) All truth among men, whether mathematical, moral or religious, is to be regarded as having its foundation in this immanent truth of the divine nature, and as disclosing facts in the being of God.

(c) This attribute, therefore, constitutes the principle and guarantee of all revelation, while it shows the possibility of an eternal divine self-contemplation apart from and before all creation.

#### *Second Division.—Infinity, and Attributes therein involved.*

By infinity we mean not that the divine nature has no known limits or bounds, but that it has no limits or bounds; (Ps. 145 : 3. Job. 11 : 7). That which has simply no known limits, is the indefinite. In explanation of this term we may notice :

(a) That the infinity of God is not a negative but a positive idea. It does not take its rise from an impotence of thought, but is an intuitive conviction, which constitutes the basis of all other knowledge.

(b) That the infinity of God does not involve his identity with 'the all' or the sum of existence, nor prevent the coëxistence of derived and finite beings to which he bears relation.

Infinity implies simply that God exists in no necessary relation to finite things or beings, and that whatever limitation of the divine nature results from their existence is, on the part of God, a self-limitation; (Ps. 113 : 5, 6).

(c) That the infinity of God is to be conceived of as intensive rather than as extensive. We do not attribute to him infinite extension, but rather infinite energy of spiritual life.

That which acts up to the measure of its power is simply natural and physical force. Man rises above nature by virtue of his reserves of power. But in God the reserve is infinite. There is a transcendent element in him which no self-revelation exhausts, whether creation or redemption, whether

law or promise ; (Mal. 2 : 15. Acts 7 : 2. Ex. 33 : 18. Matt. 6 : 13. Is. 6 : 3. 1 Pet. 4 : 14. Heb. 1 : 3. Ps. 19 : 1. Rom. 1 : 23 ; 9 : 23. Rev. 21 : 23).

Porter, Human Intellect, 647-662.

Of the attributes involved in infinity we mention :

1. Self-existence.

This is implied in the names 'Jehovah,' 'I am' (Ex. 3 : 14 ; 6 : 3), and in declarations that God is the inexhaustible source of life ; (Ps. 36 : 9. Rom. 11 : 36).

By self-existence we mean :

(a) That God is *causa sui*, having the ground of his existence in himself.

Every being must have the ground of its existence either in, or out of itself. We have the ground of our existence outside of us. God is not thus dependent. He is 'a se'; hence we speak of the aseity of God. But lest this by itself should be misconstrued, we add,

(c) That God exists by necessity of his own being.

It is God's will to exist indeed, but God's will is the expression of his nature. It is his nature to be. Hence the existence of God is not a contingent but a necessary existence. It is grounded not in his volitions, but in his nature.

Julius Müller, Doctrine of Sin, 2 ; 126. Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 2 : 63.

2. Immutability.

By this we mean that the nature, attributes, and will of God are exempt from all change ; (Ps. 102 : 27. Mal. 3 : 6. James 1 : 17).

Reason teaches that no change is possible in God, whether of increase or decrease, progress or deterioration, contraction or development. All change must be to better or worse. But God is absolute perfection, and no change to better is possible. Change to worse would be equally inconsistent with perfection. No cause for such change exists either outside of God or in God himself.

Spenser, Faerie Queen, Cantos of Mutability, 8 : 2.

The passages of Scripture which seem at first sight to ascribe change to God, are to be explained in one of two ways:

(a) As anthropomorphic representations of the revelation of God's unchanging attributes in the changing circumstances and varying moral conditions of creatures ; (Gen. 6 : 6 ; cf. Num. 23 : 19, and 1 Sam. 15 : 11, 29. Jonah 3 : 4, 10).

(b) As describing executions in time, of purposes eternally existing in the mind of God.

Immutability must not be confounded with immobility. This would deny all those imperative volitions on the part of God by which he enters into history. The Scriptures assure us that creation, miracles, incarnation, regeneration, are immediate acts of God. Immutability is consistent with constant activity and perfect freedom ; (John 5 : 17. Job 23 : 13, 14. Gen. 8 : 1).

3. Unity.

By this we mean :

(a) That the divine nature is undivided and indivisible ; and

(b) That there is but one infinite and perfect Spirit; (Deut. 6: 4. John 17: 3. Is. 44: 6. 1 Cor. 8: 4-6. Gal. 3: 20. Eph. 4: 6. 1 Tim. 2: 5.)

Against polytheism, dualism and tritheism, we may urge that the notion of two or more Gods is self-contradictory; since each limits the other and destroys his Godhead. In the nature of things, infinity and absolute perfection are possible only to one. It is unphilosophical moreover, to assume the existence of two or more Gods when one will explain all the facts.

The unity of God is, however, in no way inconsistent with the doctrine of the Trinity, for while this doctrine holds to the existence of hypostatical distinctions in the divine nature, it also holds that this divine nature is numerically and eternally one.

On the origin of polytheism, see *Biblical Repository*, 2: 84, 246, 441.

## VI. RELATIVE OR TRANSITIVE ATTRIBUTES.

*First Division.—Attributes having relation to Time and Space.*

### 1. Eternity.

By this we mean that God's nature:

(a) Is without beginning or end;

(b) Is free from all succession of time; and

(c) Contains in itself the cause of time; (Ps. 90: 2; 102: 27. Is. 41: 4.

1 Tim. 1: 17; 6: 16. Rev. 1: 8. 1 Cor. 2: 7. Eph. 1: 4).

Porter, *Human Intellect*, 564-566.

Eternity is infinity in its relation to time. It implies that God's nature is not subject to the law of time. God is not in time, but time is in God. Although there is logical succession in God's thoughts, there is no chronological succession.

Yet we are far from saying that time, now that it exists, has no objective reality to God. To him, past, present, and future are "one eternal now," not in the sense that there is no distinction between them, but only in the sense that he sees past and future as vividly as the present. With creation time began, and since the successions of history are veritable successions, he who sees according to truth must recognize them.

Murphy, *Scientific Bases*, 90. Reid, *Intellectual Powers*, Essay 3, chap. 2. *New Englander*, April, 1875: Art. *The Metaphysical Idea of Eternity*.

### 2. Immensity.

By this we mean that God's nature:

(a) Is without extension;

(b) Is subject to no limitations of space; and

(c) Contains in itself the cause of space; (1 K. 8: 27).

Immensity is infinity in its relation to space. God's nature is not subject to the law of space. God is not in space, but space is in God.

Yet space has an objective reality to God. With creation, space began to be, and since God sees according to truth, he recognizes relations of space in his creation.

Reid, *Intellectual Powers*, Essay 2, ch. 9. Porter, *Human Intellect*, 662.

*Second Division.—Attributes having relation to Creation.*

## 1. Omnipresence.

By this we mean that God, in the totality of his essence, without diffusion or expansion, multiplication or division, penetrates and fills the universe in all its parts; (Ps. 139, 7 sq. Jer. 23: 23, 24. Acts 17: 27).

In explanation of this attribute we may say:

(a) God's omnipresence is not potential but essential.

We reject the Socinian representation that God's essence is in heaven, only his power on earth. When God is said to dwell in the heavens (Ps. 123: 1; 113: 5. Is. 57: 15), we are to understand the language either as a symbolic expression of his exaltation above earthly things, or as a declaration that his most special and glorious self-manifestations are to the spirits of heaven.

(b) God's omnipresence is not the presence of a part but of the whole of God in every place.

This follows from the conception of God as incorporeal. We reject the materialistic representation that God is composed of material elements which can be divided or sundered. There is no multiplication or diffusion of his substance to correspond with the parts of his dominions. The one essence of God is present at the same moment in all; (1 K. 8: 27).

(c) God's omnipresence is not necessary but free.

We reject the pantheistic notion that God is bound to the universe as the universe is bound to God. God is immanent in the universe not by compulsion, but by the free act of his own will, and this immanence is qualified by his transcendence.

## 2. Omniscience.

By this we mean God's perfect and eternal knowledge of all things which are objects of knowledge, whether they be actual or possible, past, present or future; (Ps. 147: 4. Mat. 10: 29. Ps. 33: 13-15. Prov. 15: 3. 1 John 3: 20. Acts 15: 8. Heb. 4: 13. Ps. 139: 2. Mat. 6: 8; 10: 30. Is. 46: 9, 10. Mal. 3: 16. Acts 15: 18. 1 Cor. 2: 7; Ps. 139: 6. Rom. 11: 13).

(a) The omniscience of God may be argued from his omnipresence as well as from his truth or self-knowledge, in which the plan of creation has its eternal ground.

(b) As free from all imperfections, God's knowledge is:

(b<sup>1</sup>) Immediate,—as distinguished from the knowledge that comes through sense or imagination;

(b<sup>2</sup>) Simultaneous,—as not acquired by successive observations, or built up by processes of reasoning;

(b<sup>3</sup>) Distinct,—as free from all vagueness or confusion;

(b<sup>4</sup>) True,—as perfectly corresponding to the reality of things;

(b<sup>5</sup>) Eternal,—as comprehended in one timeless act of the divine mind.

(c) Since God knows things as they are, he knows the necessary sequences of his creation as necessary, the free acts of his creatures as free, the ideally possible as ideally possible; (1 Sam. 23: 11, 12, Matt. 11: 21).

(d) The fact that there is nothing in the present condition of things from which the future actions of free creatures necessarily follow by natural

law, does not prevent God from foreseeing such actions, since his knowledge is not mediate but immediate.

Hill, *Divinity*, 517.

(e) Prescience is not itself causative. It is not to be confounded with the predetermining will of God. Free actions do not take place because they are foreseen, but they are foreseen because they are to take place.

(f) Omniscience embraces the actual and the possible, but it does not embrace the self-contradictory and impossible, because these are not objects of knowledge.

(g) Omniscience, as qualified by holy will, is in Scripture denominated 'wisdom.' In virtue of his wisdom God chooses the highest ends, and uses the fittest means to accomplish them; (Ps. 104: 24. Job 12: 13. Rom. 11: 33, 34. Eph. 3: 10).

### 3. Omnipotence.

By this we mean the power of God to do all things which are objects of power, whether with or without the use of means; (2 Cor. 6: 18. Gen. 1: 1-3. Is. 44: 24. Heb. 1: 3. 2 Cor. 4: 6. Eph. 1: 19; 3: 20. Matt. 3: 9. Rom. 4: 17. Ps. 115: 3. Eph. 1: 11. Gen. 18: 14. Luke 1: 37. Matt. 19: 26).

(a) Omnipotence does not imply power to do that which is not an object of power; as for example, that which is self-contradictory, or contradictory to the nature of God.

(b) Omnipotence does not imply the exercise of all his power on the part of God. He has power over his power; in other words, his power is under the control of wise and holy will. God can do all he will, but he will not do all he can. Else his power is mere force necessarily acting, and God is the slave of his own omnipotence; (Job. 26: 14).

Rogers, *Super. Orig. of the Bible*, 10. Philippi, *Glaubenslehre*, 2: 62-66.

(c) Omnipotence in God does not exclude but implies the power of self-limitation. Since all such limitation is free, proceeding from neither external nor internal compulsion, it is the act and manifestation of God's power. Human freedom is not rendered impossible by the divine omnipotence, but exists by virtue of it. It is an act of omnipotence that God humbles himself to the taking of human flesh in the person of Jesus Christ.

### *Third Division.—Attributes having relation to Moral Beings.*

#### 1. Justice.

By this we mean that principle of the divine nature which demands in all moral creatures conformity to the moral perfection of God, and which rewards or punishes them according to their moral character; (Matt. 5: 48. 1 Pet. 1: 16. Gen. 18: 25. Ps. 7: 9-12. Rom. 2: 6. 2 Cor. 5: 10).

Cremer, *N. T. Lexicon*, on *δικαιοσ*.

(a) Justice (or righteousness, with which it is synonymous) is to be viewed simply as transitive holiness, or holiness in its relations to moral beings.

Hence justice cannot be merely a manifestation of benevolence or God's disposition to secure the highest happiness of his creatures. Nor can it be

grounded in the nature of things, considered as something apart from and above God.

(b) The divine justice, in its actual exercise, has been divided into two kinds:

(b<sup>1</sup>) Legislative,—as it imposes law in conscience or in Scripture.

(b<sup>2</sup>) Judicial (or distributive),—as it bestows the rewards or executes the penalties of law.

We may accept this division, provided we remember that neither legislative nor judicial justice are matters of mere arbitrary will. Both are revelations of the inmost nature of God in the form of moral requirement.

## 2. Goodness and Mercy.

By these we mean the transitive love of God in its twofold relation to the unfallen and to the fallen portions of his creatures; (Tit. 3: 4, *φιλανθρωπία*. Rom. 2: 4, goodness of God).

(a) Goodness is the eternal principle of God's nature which leads him to communicate of his own life and blessedness to those who are like him in moral character; (2 Pet. 1: 3-4).

(b) Mercy is the eternal principle of God's nature which leads him to seek the temporal good and eternal salvation of those who have opposed themselves to his will, even at the cost of infinite self-sacrifice; (Matt. 5: 45). Goodness, therefore, is nearly identical with the love of complacency, spoken of by the old theologians; mercy, with the love of benevolence; (1 Pet. 4: 19).

## VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS.

### 1. *Each of the Attributes qualified by all the others.*

None are to be conceived of as exercised separately from the rest. God's love is immutable, wise, holy. Infinity belongs to God's knowledge, power, justice.

### 2. *Holiness the fundamental Attribute.*

This is evident:

(a) From Scripture,—in which God's holiness is not only most constantly and powerfully pressed upon the attention of man, but is declared to be the chief subject of rejoicing and adoration in heaven; (Heb. 12: 14. Is. 6: 3. Rev. 4: 8).

(b) From our own moral constitution,—in which conscience asserts its supremacy over every other impulse and affection of our nature. As we may be kind, but must be righteous, so God, in whose image we are made, may be merciful, but must be holy.

Bishop Butler's Sermons upon Human Nature, Bohn's ed., 385-414.

(c) From the actual dealings of God,—in which holiness conditions and limits the exercise of other attributes.

Thus, for example, in Christ's redeeming work, though love makes the atonement, it is violated holiness that requires it; and in the eternal punishment of the wicked, the demand of holiness for self-vindication overbears the pleading of love for the sufferers.

Shedd, Discourses and Essays, 280, 291, 292. Also Sermons to the Natural Man: sermon on "Mercy optional with God."



### 3. *The Reconciliation of Justice and Mercy.*

Since these attributes are both exercised toward sinners of the human race, the otherwise inevitable antagonism between them is removed only by the atoning death of the God-man. Their opposing claims do not impair the divine blessedness, because the reconciliation exists in the eternal counsels of God. Christ is "the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world;" Rev. 13: 8).

Shedd, Discourses and Essays, 277, 279.

### 4. *The Holiness of God the Ground of Moral Obligation.*

#### A. Erroneous views.

The ground of moral obligation is not:

- (a) In power,—whether
- (a<sup>1</sup>) Of civil law (Hobbes, Gassendi); or
- (a<sup>2</sup>) Of divine will (Occam, Descartes).

We are not bound to obey either of these except upon the ground that they are right.

#### (b) Not in utility,—whether

(b<sup>1</sup>) Our own happiness or advantage, present or eternal (Paley); for supreme regard for our own interest is not virtuous; or

(b<sup>2</sup>) The greatest happiness or advantage of others (Edwards); for we judge conduct to be useful because it is right,—not right because it is useful.

#### (c) Not in the nature of things (Price); whether by this we mean their

- (c<sup>1</sup>) Fitness (Clarke);
- (c<sup>2</sup>) Truth (Wollaston);
- (c<sup>3</sup>) Order (Jouffroy);
- (c<sup>4</sup>) Relations (Wayland);
- (c<sup>5</sup>) Worthiness (Hickok); or
- (c<sup>6</sup>) Abstract right (Haven and Alexander); for this nature of things is

not ultimate but has its ground in the nature of God.

#### B. The Scripture view.

According to the Scriptures, the ground of moral obligation is the holiness of God, or the moral perfection of the divine nature, conformity to which is the law of our moral being; (Chalmers, Calderwood, Wuttke). We show this:

(a) From the command: "Be ye holy," where the ground of obligation assigned is simply and only: "for I am holy;" (1 Pet. 1: 16).

(b) From the nature of the love in which the whole law is summed up. This is not regard for abstract right or the happiness of being, much less for one's own interest, but regard for God as the fountain and standard of moral excellence.

(c) From the example of Christ, whose life was essentially an exhibition of supreme regard for God and supreme devotion to his holy will.

For classifications of the different systems of morals, see Chalmers, *Moral Philosophy*; Calderwood, *Moral Philosophy*; Wuttke, *Christian Ethics*; Alexander, *Moral Science*, 159–198; Hickok, *Moral Science*, 27–34; Haven, *Moral Philosophy*, 27–50; Hopkins, *Law of Love*, 7–28. Wayland, *Moral Science*. Fairchild, *Moral Philosophy*. Butler, *Nature of Virtue in Works*, Bohn's ee., 334.

## CHAPTER II.

### DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY.

In the nature of the one God there are three eternal distinctions which are represented to us under the figure of persons. This tripersonality of the Godhead is exclusively a truth of revelation. It is clearly, though not formally, made known in the New Testament, and intimations of it may be found in the Old.

Twisten, Dogmatik; and translation in Bib. Sac., 3: 502. Ebrard, Dogmatik, 1: 145-199. Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk, 1: 57-135. Kahnis, Dogmatik, 3: 203-229. Shedd, History of Doctrine, 1: 246-385. Farrar, Science and Theology, 138. Norton, Statement of Reasons. Schaff, Nicene Doctrine of the Holy Trinity, in Theol. Eclectic, 4: 209.

#### I. IN SCRIPTURE THERE ARE THREE WHO ARE RECOGNIZED AS GOD.

##### 1. *Proofs from the New Testament.*

A. The Father is recognized as God; (John 6: 27. James 3: 9. 1 Pet. 1: 2).

B. Jesus Christ is recognized as God.

Shedd, History of Doctrine, 1: 262. Liddon, Bampton Lectures on our Lord's Divinity, 207. Hovey, God with Us, 20. Thomasius, 1: 61-64.

(a) He is expressly called God.

In John 1: 1, Θεός ἦν ὁ λόγος, the absence of the article shows Θεός to be the predicate; (cf. 4: 24, πνεῦμα ὁ Θεός). This predicate precedes the verb by way of emphasis, to indicate progress in the thought—'the Logos was not only with God, but was God'; (see Meyer and Luthardt, Com. in loco.)

In Rom. 9: 5, the clause ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων Θεός εὐλογητὸς cannot be translated 'blessed be the God over all,' for "ὢν is superfluous if the clause is a doxology; εὐλογητὸς precedes the name of God in a doxology, but follows it, as here, in a description;" (Hovey). The clause, therefore, can justly be interpreted only as a description of the higher nature of the Christ who had just been said, τὸ κατὰ σάρκα, or according to his lower nature, to have had his origin from Israel; (see Tholuck, Com. in loco).

In Titus 2: 13, ἐπιφάνειαν τῆς δόξης τοῦ μεγάλου Θεοῦ καὶ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ we regard (with Ellicott) as "a direct, definite and even studied declaration of Christ's divinity"—'the glorious appearing of our great God and Savior, Jesus Christ.' Ἐπιφάνεια is a term applied specially to the Son and never to the Father, and μεγάλου is uncalled for, if used of the Father, but peculiarly appropriate if used of Christ. Upon the same principles we must interpret the similar text 2 Pet. 1: 1; (see Huther, in Meyer's Com.).

In 1 John 5 : 20,—*ἔσμεν ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ, ἐν τῷ νίῳ αὐτοῦ Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ. οὐτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀληθινὸς Θεός*,—“it would be a flat repetition, after the Father had been twice called *ὁ ἀληθινός*, to say now again : ‘this is *ὁ ἀληθινός Θεός*.’ Our being in God has its basis in Christ his Son, and this also makes it more natural that *οὗτος* should be referred to *νίῳ*. But ought not *ὁ ἀληθινός* then to be without the article (as in John 1 : 1, *Θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος*)? No, for it is John’s purpose in 1 John 5 : 20 to say, not what Christ is, but who he is. In declaring what one is, the predicate must have no article; in declaring who one is, the predicate must have the article. St. John here says that this Son, on whom our being in the true God rests, is this true God himself;” (see Ebrard, Com. in loco).

Other passages might be here adduced, as John 20 : 28, ‘My Lord and my God’; Col. 2 : 9, ‘In him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily’; Phil. 2 : 6, ‘Being in the form of God’; but we prefer to consider these under other heads as indirectly proving Christ’s divinity.

Still other passages once relied upon as direct statements of the doctrine must be given up for textual reasons. Such are Acts 20 : 28, where the correct reading is in all probability not *ἐκκλησίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ*, but *ἐκκλησίαν τοῦ Κυρίου*,—(so A C D E Tregelles and Tischendorf; B and N however have *τοῦ Θεοῦ*); and 1 Tim. 3 : 16, where *ὅς* is unquestionably to be substituted for *Θεός*. But even here *ἐφανερώθη* intimates preëxistence.

It is sometimes objected that the ascription of the name God to Christ proves nothing as to his absolute deity, since angels and even human judges are called gods, as representing God’s authority and executing his will; (Ex. 4 : 16; 7 : 1; 22 : 28. Ps. 82 : 5, 6, 7. cf. John 10 : 34–36. Heb. 1 : 6).

But we reply that while it is true that the name is sometimes so applied, it is always with adjuncts and in connections, which leave no doubt of its figurative and secondary meaning. When the name is applied to Christ however, it is, on the contrary, with adjuncts and in connections which leave no doubt that it signifies absolute Godhead; (Ps. 82 : 6; cf. 7; 97 : 7; cf. Heb. 1 : 6).

Dick, Lectures on Theology, 1 : 314. Liddon, Our Lord’s Divinity, 10. Annotated Paragraph Bible on Heb. 1 : 6; Ps. 97 : 7; John 10 : 34, 36.

(b) Old Testament descriptions of God are applied to him; (Matt. 3 : 3; cf. Is. 40 : 3. John 12 : 40, 41; cf. Is. 6 : 1. Eph. 4 : 8; cf. Ps. 68 : 18. Heb. 1 : 6; cf. Ps. 97 : 7. Heb. 1 : 8; cf. Ps. 45 : 6, 7. Heb. 1 : 10–12; cf. Ps. 102 : 25. Heb. 1 : 13; cf. Ps. 110 : 1).

This application to Christ of titles and names exclusively appropriated to God, is inexplicable, if Christ was not regarded as being himself God. The peculiar awe with which the term Jehovah was set apart by a nation of strenuous monotheists, as the sacred and incommunicable name of the one self-existent and covenant-keeping God, forbids the belief that the Scripture writers could have used it as the designation of a subordinate and created being.

Liddon, Our Lord’s Divinity, 93.

- (*c*) He possesses the attributes of God:
- (*c*<sup>1</sup>) Holiness; (Luke 1: 35. John 6: 69. Heb. 7: 26).
- (*c*<sup>2</sup>) Love; (1 John 3: 16).
- (*c*<sup>3</sup>) Truth; (John 1: 14; 14: 6. 1 John 5: 20. Rev. 3: 7).
- (*c*<sup>4</sup>) Self-existence; (John 1: 4; 5: 26; 10: 18. Heb. 7: 16).
- (*c*<sup>5</sup>) Immutability; (Heb. 13: 8).
- (*c*<sup>6</sup>) Eternity; (John 1: 1; cf. Gen. 1: 1. John 8: 58. Col. 1: 17. Heb. 1: 11. Rev. 1: 8, 11).
- (*c*<sup>7</sup>) Omnipresence; (Matt. 28: 20. Eph. 1: 23).
- (*c*<sup>8</sup>) Omniscience; (Matt. 9: 4. John 2: 24, 25; 16: 30; 21: 17. 1 Cor. 4: 5. Col. 2: 3).
- (*c*<sup>9</sup>) Omnipotence; (John 10: 28-30. Matt. 28: 18. Rev. 1: 8).

All these attributes are ascribed to Christ in connections which show that they are used in no secondary sense, nor in any sense predicable of a creature.

(*d*) The works of God are ascribed to him. We do not here speak of miracles, which may be wrought by communicated power; but of such works as the

- (*d*<sup>1</sup>) Creation of the world; (John 1: 3. 1 Cor. 8: 6. Col. 1: 16. Heb. 1: 2, 10).
- (*d*<sup>2</sup>) Upholding all things; (Col. 1: 17. Heb. 1: 3; 2: 10; cf. Rom. 11: 36. 1 Cor. 8: 6).
- (*d*<sup>3</sup>) Raising the dead and judging the world; (Matt. 25: 31. John 5: 21, 28, 29).

Power to perform these works cannot be delegated. Christ's work in the world as Revealer of God and Redeemer from sin, is also to the believer, a proof of his divinity. We do not here urge this argument, for the reason that opponents of the doctrine in question, having low views of the nature of that work, assume that it could have been wrought, as they believe that Jesus' miracles were wrought, by communicated power.

Liddon, *Our Lord's Divinity*, 153. Per contra, see *Examination of Liddon's Bampton Lectures*, 72.

(*e*) He receives honor and worship due only to God; (John 5: 23; 20: 28. Acts 1: 24; 7: 59; cf. Luke 23: 46. Rom. 10: 13; cf. Gen. 4: 26. 1 Cor. 1: 2; 11: 24, 25. Heb. 1: 6-8. Rev. 5: 12-14. Phil. 2: 10, 11).

The exclamation of Thomas (John 20: 28) cannot be interpreted as a sudden appeal to God in surprise and admiration, without charging the apostle with profanity. Nor can it be considered a mere exhibition of overwrought enthusiasm, since it was accepted by Christ. As addressed directly to Christ, and as unrebuked by Christ, it can be regarded only as a just acknowledgment on the part of Thomas, that Christ was his Lord and his God.

Liddon, *Our Lord's Divinity*, 266, 366.

(*f*) His name is associated with that of God upon a footing of equality. We do not here allude to 1 John 5: 7—for this is unquestionably spurious—but to

- (*f*<sup>1</sup>) The formula of baptism; (Mat. 28: 19).
- (*f*<sup>2</sup>) The apostolic benedictions; (1 Cor. 1: 3. 2 Cor. 13: 14).

(*f*<sup>3</sup>) Those passages in which eternal life is said to be dependent equally upon Christ and upon God; (John 17: 3. Mat. 11: 27).

(*g*) Equality with God is expressly claimed.

Here we may refer to Jesus' testimony to himself, already treated of among the proofs of the supernatural character of the Scripture teaching. Equality with God is not only claimed for himself by Jesus, but it is claimed for him by his apostles; (John 5: 17-20. Phil. 2: 6).

(*h*) Further proofs of the deity of Christ may be found:

(*h*<sup>1</sup>) In the application to him of the phrases: 'Son of God,' 'Image of God'; (Mat. 26: 63, 64. Col. 1: 15. Heb. 1: 3).

(*h*<sup>2</sup>) In the declarations of his oneness with God; (John 10: 30; 14: 19; 17: 11, 22).

(*h*<sup>3</sup>) In the attribution to him of the fulness of the Godhead; (Col. 2: 9; cf. 1: 19. John 16: 15; 17: 10).

These proofs of Christ's deity from Scripture are corroborated by Christian experience.

Although this experience cannot be regarded as an independent witness to Jesus' claims, since it only tests the truth already made known in the Bible, still the irresistible impulse of every person whom Christ has saved, to lift his Redeemer to the highest place, and bow before him in the lowliest worship, is strong evidence that only that interpretation of Scripture passages can be true which recognizes Christ's absolute Godhead.

It is the church's consciousness of her Lord's divinity, indeed, and not mere speculation upon the relations of Father, Son and Holy Ghost, that has compelled the formulation of the Scripture doctrine of the Trinity.

In contemplating passages apparently inconsistent with those now cited, in that they impute weakness and ignorance to Christ, we are to remember:

First, that our Lord was truly man as well as truly God, and that this ignorance or weakness may be predicated of his human nature alone; and

Secondly, that the divine nature itself was in some way limited and humbled during our Savior's earthly life, and that these passages may describe him as he was in his estate of humiliation, rather than in his original and present glory; (Mark 13: 32. John 4: 6; 10: 29; 14: 28. 1 Cor. 15: 28).

Shedd, *History of Doctrine*, 1: 351. Liddon, *Our Lord's Divinity*, 127, 458. Per contra, see *Examination of Liddon*, 252, 294.

### C. The Holy Spirit is recognized as God.

Parker, *The Paraclete*. Walker, *Doctrine of the Holy Spirit*. Hare, *Mission of the Comforter*. Cardinal Manning, *Temporal Mission of the Holy Ghost*.

(*a*) He is spoken of as God; (Acts 5: 3, 4. 1 Cor. 6: 19; cf. 3: 16; 12: 6, 11).

(*b*) The attributes of God are ascribed to him:

(*b*<sup>1</sup>) Omniscience; (1 Cor. 2: 10. 1 Pet. 1: 11).

(*b*<sup>2</sup>) Omnipotence; (1 Cor. 12: 8-13).

(c) He does the works of God,—such as creation, regeneration, resurrection; (Gen. 1: 2. Mat. 12: 28. John 3: 6; 16: 8. Rom. 8: 11).

(d) He receives honor due only to God; (1 Cor. 3: 16. Mat. 12: 31).

(e) He is associated with God upon a footing of equality, both in

(e<sup>1</sup>) The formula of baptism (Mat. 28: 19); and in

(e<sup>2</sup>) The apostolic benedictions; (2 Cor. 13: 14; cf. 1 Pet. 1: 2).

Since spirit is nothing less than the inmost principle of life, the Spirit of God must be himself God. Christian consciousness, moreover, expressed as it is in the hymns and prayers of the church, furnishes an argument for the deity of the Holy Spirit, similar to that for the deity of Christ.

Passages like John 7: 39 (*ὁπῶ γὰρ ἦν Πνεῦμα ἅγιον*), are to be interpreted in the light of other Scriptures which assert the agency of the Spirit under the old dispensation (Ps. 51: 11), and which describe his peculiar office under the New; (John 16: 14, 15). John 7: 39 simply declares that the Spirit could not fulfil his office as Revealer of Christ, until the atoning work of Christ himself should be accomplished; (John 16: 7).

Dick, Lectures on Theology, 1: 341–350.

## 2. *Intimations of the Old Testament.*

The passages which seem to show that even in the Old Testament there are three who are implicitly recognized as God, may be classed under four heads:

A. Passages which seem to teach plurality of some sort in the Godhead.

(a) The plural noun אֱלֹהִים is employed, and that with a plural verb—a use remarkable, when we consider that the singular אֱלֹהִים was also in existence; (Gen. 20: 13; 35: 7).

(b) God uses plural pronouns in speaking of himself; (Gen. 1: 26; 3: 22; 11: 7. Is. 6: 8).

(c) Jehovah distinguishes himself from Jehovah; (Gen. 19: 24. Hos. 1: 7).

(d) A Son is ascribed to Jehovah; (Ps. 2: 7. Prov. 30: 4. Dan. 3: 25).

(e) The Spirit of God is distinguished from God; (Gen. 1: 1, 2. Ps. 33: 6. Is. 48: 16; 63: 1–10).

(f) We have a threefold ascription and a threefold benediction; (Is. 6: 3. Num. 6: 24–26).

The fact that אֱלֹהִים is sometimes used in a narrower sense as applicable to the Son (Ps. 45: 6; cf. Heb. 1: 8), need not prevent us from believing that the term was originally chosen as containing an allusion to a certain plurality in the divine nature. Nor is it sufficient to call this plural a simple ‘pluralis majestaticus;’ since it is easier to derive this common figure from divine usage, than to derive the divine usage from this common figure—especially when we consider the constant tendency of Israel to polytheism.

Conant, Gesenius’ Hebrew Grammar, 198. Green, Hebrew Grammar, 306. Girdlestone, O. T. Synonyms, 38, 53. Alexander on Psalm 11: 7; 29: 1; 58: 12. But see Ps. 45: 6, 7; cf. Heb. 1: 8.

## B. Passages relating to the Angel of Jehovah.

(a) The angel of Jehovah identifies himself with Jehovah; (Gen. 22: 11, 16; 31: 11-13).

(b) He is identified with Jehovah by others; (Gen. 16: 9, 13; 48: 16).

(c) He accepts worship due only to God; (Ex. 3: 1-6. Judges 13: 21-23).

Though the phrase 'angel of Jehovah' is sometimes used in the later Scriptures to denote a merely human messenger or created angel (Haggai 1: 13. Matt. 1: 20. Acts 8: 26; 12: 7), it seems in the Old Testament, with hardly more than the single exception just mentioned (Haggai 1: 13), to designate the preincarnate Logos, whose manifestations in angelic or human form foreshadowed his final coming in the flesh; (Gen. 18: 2, 13. Dan. 3: 25, 28).

Hengstenberg, *Christology*, 1: 107-123. J. Pye Smith, *Scripture Testimony to the Messiah*. Hofmann, *Schriftbeweis*, 1: 329, 378. Kurtz, *History of Old Covenant*, 1: 181.

## C. The descriptions of the divine Wisdom and Word.

(a) Wisdom is represented as distinct from God, and as eternally existing with God; (Prov. 8: 1; cf. Matt. 11: 19; Luke 11: 49. Prov. 8: 22, 30; cf. 3: 19).

(b) The Word of God is distinguished from God, as executor of his will from everlasting; (Ps. 107: 20; 119: 89; cf. Prov. 8: 23. Ps. 147: 15-18).

It must be acknowledged that in none of these descriptions is the idea of personality clearly developed. Still less is it true that John the apostle derived his doctrine of the Logos from the interpretations of these descriptions, in Philo Judaeus. John's doctrine (John 1: 1-18) is radically different from the Alexandrian Logos-idea of Philo.

This last is a Platonizing speculation upon the mediating principle between God and the world. Philo seems, indeed, at times, to verge towards a recognition of personality in the Logos. But John is the first to present to us a consistent view of this personality, to identify the Logos with the Messiah, and to distinguish the Word from the Spirit of God.

Dorner, *Hist. Doct. Person of Christ*, 1: 13-45. Cudworth, *Intellectual System*, 2: 320-333. Pressensé, *Life of Jesus Christ*, 83. Hagenbach, *Hist. Doct.*, 1: 114-117. Liddon, *Our Lord's Divinity*, 59-71.

## D. Descriptions of the Messiah.

(a) He is one with Jehovah; (Is. 9: 6. Micah 5: 2).

(b) Yet he is in some sense distinct from Jehovah; (Ps. 45: 6, 7. Mal. 3: 1).

It is to be remembered in considering this, as well as other classes of passages previously cited, that no Jewish writer before Christ's coming had succeeded in constructing from them a doctrine of the Trinity. Only to those who bring to them the light of New Testament revelation, do they show their real meaning.

Our general conclusion with regard to the Old Testament intimations must therefore be, that while they do not by themselves furnish a sufficient basis for the doctrine of the Trinity, they contain the germ of it, and may be used in confirmation of it, when its truth is substantially proved from the New Testament.

II. THESE THREE ARE SO DESCRIBED IN SCRIPTURE THAT WE ARE COMPELLED TO CONCEIVE OF THEM AS DISTINCT PERSONS.

1. *The Father and the Son are persons distinct from each other.*

(a) Christ distinguishes the Father from himself as 'another;' (John 5: 32, 37).

(b) The Father and the Son are distinguished as the begetter and the begotten; (Ps. 2: 7. John 1: 14, 18; 3: 16).

(c) The Father and the Son are distinguished as the sender and the sent; (John 10: 36. Gal. 4: 4).

2. *The Father and the Son are persons distinct from the Spirit.*

(a) Jesus distinguishes the Spirit from himself and from the Father; (John 14: 16, 17).

(b) The Spirit proceeds from the Father; (John 15: 26).

(c) The Spirit is sent by the Father and by the Son; (John 14: 26; 15: 26).

3. *The Holy Spirit is a person.*

A. Designations proper to personality are given to him:

(a) The masculine pronoun *ἐκεῖνος*, though *Πνεῦμα* is neuter; (John 16: 14).

(b) The name *Παράκλητος*, which cannot be translated by 'comfort,' or be taken as the name of any abstract influence; (John 16: 7, 'The Comforter.')

The Comforter, Instructor, Patron, Guide, Advocate, whom this term brings before us, must be a person. This is evident from its application to Christ in 1 John 2: 1; ('we have an advocate—*Παράκλητον*—with the Father, even Jesus Christ the righteous').

B. His name is mentioned in immediate connection with other persons and in such a way as to imply his own personality:

(a) In connection with Christians; (Acts 15: 28).

(b) In connection with Christ; (John 16: 14; cf. 17: 4).

(c) In connection with the Father and the Son; (Matt. 28: 19. 2 Cor. 13, 14. Jude 20, 21. 1 Pet. 1: 2).

These passages make it plain that if the Father and the Son are persons, the Spirit must be a person also.

C. He performs acts proper only to personality; (Gen. 1: 2; 6: 3. Luke 12: 12. John 3: 5; 16: 8-13. Acts 2: 4; 8: 29; 10: 19; 13: 2; 16: 7. Rom. 8: 26; 15: 19. 1 Cor. 2: 11; 12: 8. 2 Pet. 1: 21).

That which searches, knows, speaks, testifies, reveals, convinces, commands, strives, moves, helps, guides, creates, recreates, sanctifies, inspires, makes intercession, orders the affairs of the church, performs miracles, raises the dead—cannot be a mere power, influence, efflux, or attribute of God, but must be a person.

D. He is affected as a person by the acts of others; (Is. 63: 10. Matt. 12: 31. Acts 5: 4; 7: 51. Eph. 4: 30).

That which can be thus resisted, grieved, vexed, blasphemed, must be a person; for only a person can perceive insult and be offended.

The blasphemy against the Holy Ghost cannot be merely blasphemy against a power or attribute of God,—since in that case blasphemy against God would be a less crime than blasphemy against his power. That against which the unpardonable sin can be committed must be a person.



E. He manifests himself in visible form as distinct from the Father and the Son, yet in direct connection with personal acts performed by them; (Matt. 3: 16, 17—'descending as a dove').

F. This ascription to the Spirit, of a personal subsistence distinct from that of the Father and of the Son cannot be explained as personification; for:

(a) This would be to interpret sober prose by the canons of poetry. Such sustained personification is contrary to the genius of even Hebrew poetry, in which Wisdom itself is most naturally interpreted as designating a personal existence.

(b) Such an interpretation would render a multitude of passages either tautological, meaningless, or absurd,—as can be easily seen by substituting for the name Holy Ghost, the terms which are wrongly held to be its equivalents—such as the power, or influence, or efflux, or attribute of God; (Acts 10: 38. Rom. 15: 13, 19. 1 Cor. 2: 4).

### III. THIS TRIPERSONALITY OF THE DIVINE NATURE IS NOT MERELY ECONOMIC AND TEMPORAL, BUT IS IMMANENT AND ETERNAL.

#### 1. *Scripture proof that these distinctions of personality are eternal.*

(a) From those passages which speak of the existence of the Word from eternity with the Father; (John 1: 1, 2; cf. Phil. 2: 6; Gen. 1: 1).

(b) From Christ's own declarations of his preëxistence; (John 8: 56).

(c) From passages implying intercourse between the Father and the Son before the foundation of the world; (John 17: 5, 24).

(d) From passages asserting the creation of the world by Christ; (John 1: 3. 1 Cor. 8: 6. Col. 1: 16, 17. Heb. 1: 2-10).

(e) From passages asserting or implying the eternity of the Holy Spirit; (Gen. 1: 2. Ps. 33: 6. Heb. 9: 14).

#### 2. *Errors refuted by the foregoing passages.*

##### A. The Sabellian.

Sabellius (of Ptolemais in Pentapolis, 250-260) held that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are mere developments or revelations to creatures, in time, of the otherwise concealed Godhead—developments which, since creatures will always exist, are not transitory, but which at the same time are not eternal a parte ante.

God as united to the creation is Father; God as united to Jesus Christ is Son; God as united to the church is Holy Spirit. The Trinity of Sabellius is therefore an economic and not an immanent Trinity—a Trinity of forms or manifestations, but not a necessary and eternal Trinity in the divine nature.

Moses Stuart, Translation of Schleiermacher's Interpretation of Sabellius, in Bib. Repository, 6: 1-116. Similar doctrine in Bushnell, God in Christ, and Christ in Theology.

Some have interpreted Sabellius as denying that the Trinity is eternal a parte post as well as a parte ante, and as holding that when the purpose of these temporary manifestations is accomplished the Triad is resolved into

the Monad. This view easily merges in another, which makes the persons of the Trinity mere names for the ever-shifting phases of the divine activity.

Shedd, *History of Doctrine*, 1: 259. Dorner, *History Doct. Person of Christ*, 2: 152-169. Baur, *Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit*, 1: 256-305. Thomasius, *Christi Person und Werk*, 1: 83.

It is evident that this theory, in whatever form it may be held, is far from satisfying the demands of Scripture. That speaks of the second person of the Trinity as existing and acting before the birth of Jesus Christ, and of the Holy Spirit as existing and acting before the formation of the church. Both have a personal existence eternal in the past, as well as in the future, —which this theory expressly denies.

#### B. The Arian.

Arius (of Alexandria; condemned by council of Nice, 325) held that the Father is the only divine being absolutely without beginning; the Son and the Holy Spirit, through whom God creates and recreates, having been themselves created out of nothing before the world was; and Christ being called God, because he is next in rank to God, and is endowed by God with divine power to create.

Blunt, *Dictionary of Heretical Sects*, Art. Arius. Guericke, *History of Doctrine*, 1: 313, 319.

The followers of Arius have differed as to the precise rank and claims of Christ. While Socinus held with Arius that worship of Christ was obligatory, the later Unitarians have perceived the impropriety of worshipping even the highest of created beings, and have constantly tended to a view of the Redeemer which regards him as a mere man, standing in a peculiarly intimate relation to God.

It is evident that the theory of Arius does not satisfy the demands of Scripture. A created God, a God whose existence had a beginning and therefore may come to an end, a God made of a substance which once was not, and therefore a substance different from that of the Father, is not God but a finite creature. But the Scriptures speak of Christ as being in the beginning God, with God, and equal with God.

IV. THIS TRIPERSONALITY IS NOT TRITHEISM; FOR WHILE THERE ARE THREE HYPOSTATICAL DISTINCTIONS, OR MODES OF SUBSISTING, THERE IS BUT ONE ESSENCE COMMON TO THEM ALL.

1. The term 'person' only approximately represents the truth. Although this word, more nearly than any other single word, expresses the conception which the Scriptures give us of the relation between the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, it is not itself used in this connection in Scripture, and we employ it in a qualified sense, not in the ordinary sense in which we apply the term 'person' to Peter, Paul, and John. The necessary qualification is, that:

2. While three persons among men have only a specific unity of nature or essence (that is, have the same *species* of nature or essence), the persons of the Godhead have a numerical unity of nature or essence (that is, have

the *same* nature or essence). The undivided essence of the Godhead belongs equally to each of the persons,—Father, Son, and Holy Ghost each and alike possesses all the substance and all the attributes of deity.

The plurality of the Godhead, therefore, is not a plurality of essence, but a plurality of hypostatical or personal distinctions. God is not three and one, but three in one. The one indivisible essence has three modes of subsistence. This oneness of essence explains the fact that,

3. While Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are distinct subsistences, as respects their personality, there is an intercommunion of persons and an immanence of one divine person in another, which permits the peculiar work of one to be ascribed, with a single limitation, to either of the others, and the manifestation of one to be recognized in the manifestation of another.

The limitation is simply this, that although the Son is sent by the Father, and the Spirit by the Father and the Son, it cannot be said vice versa that the Father is sent either by the Son or by the Spirit. The Scripture representations of this intercommunion prevent us from conceiving of the distinctions called Father, Son and Holy Spirit, as involving separation between them; (Gen. 1: 1, 2; cf. Heb. 1: 2. John 1: 18; 5: 17, 19; 10: 28–30; 14: 9, 18, 26; 17: 21. 2 Cor. 5: 19. Titus 2: 10. Jude 1. Heb. 12: 23; cf. John 5: 22. 1 Cor. 8: 6. Eph. 4: 6).

Hagenbach, on the Athanasian creed, so-called, Hist. Doct. 1: 270.

V. THE NAMES FATHER, SON, AND HOLY GHOST, AS DESIGNATING NOT THE ESSENCE BUT THE ETERNAL DISTINCTIONS OF THE GODHEAD, ARE USED IN A SPECIAL SENSE, FROM WHICH ALL NOTION OF INEQUALITY BETWEEN THE PERSONS OF THE TRINITY IS EXCLUDED.

In explanation notice that :

1. *These titles belong to the Persons.*

A. The Father is not God as such; for God is not only Father but also Son and Holy Ghost. The term 'Father' designates that hypostatical distinction in the divine nature, in virtue of which God is related to the Son, and through the Son and the Spirit to the church and the world.

As author of the believer's spiritual as well as natural life, God is doubly his Father; but this relation which God sustains to creatures is not the ground of his title. God is Father primarily in virtue of the relation which he sustains to the eternal Son;—only as we are spiritually united to Jesus Christ do we become children of God; (Gal. 3: 26; 4: 4–6).

B. The Son is not God as such; for God is not only Son, but Father and Holy Spirit. 'The Son' designates that distinction in virtue of which God is related to the Father, is sent by the Father to redeem the world, and with the Father sends the Holy Spirit.

C. The Holy Spirit is not God as such; for God is not only Holy Spirit, but also Father and Son. 'The Holy Spirit' designates that distinction in virtue of which God is related to the Father and the Son, and is sent by them to accomplish the work of renewing the ungodly and of sanctifying the church.

## 2. *Qualified sense of these titles.*

Like the word 'person', the names Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not to be confined within the precise limitations of meaning which would be required if they were applied to men.

The Scriptures enlarge our conceptions of Christ's sonship by giving to him in his preëxistent state the titles of the 'Logos' (*λόγος*=thought + word; or divine reason + divine expression, John 1 : 1), and of the 'Image' and 'Brightness' of God; (*εἰκὼν*=copy, Col. 1: 15; *ἀπαύσῃμα*= 'flashing-forth'; *χαρακτῆρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ*= 'counterpart of his essence'; Heb. 1: 3).

While the Logos as divine reason is one with God, the Logos as divine expression is distinguishable from God. Words are the means by which personal beings express or reveal themselves. Since Jesus Christ was 'the Word' before there were any creatures to whom revelations could be made, it would seem to be only a necessary inference from this title, that in Christ, God must be from eternity expressed or revealed to himself.

As the radiance of the sun manifests the sun's nature, which otherwise would be unrevealed, yet is inseparable from the sun and ever one with it, so Christ reveals God but is eternally one with God; (Heb. 1: 2).

In the Holy Spirit the movement is completed, and the divine activity and thought returns into itself. True religion in reuniting us to God, reproduces in us, in our limited measure, this eternal process of the divine mind. Christian experience witnesses that God in himself is unknown; (John 1: 18). Christ is the organ of external revelation; (*εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου*, Col. 1: 15). But only the Holy Spirit can give us an inward apprehension or realization of the truth. It is 'through the eternal Spirit' (Heb. 9: 14) that Christ 'offered himself to God,' and it is only through the Holy Spirit that the church has access to the Father (Eph. 2: 18. Rom. 8: 26), or fallen creatures return to God; (John 4: 24; 16: 8-11).

Ebrard, Dogmatik, 1: 173. Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk, 1: 111.

## 3. *Generation and procession consistent with equality.*

The Scripture terms 'generation' and 'procession', as applied to the Son and to the Holy Spirit, are to be interpreted in accordance with the principle already intimated. They are but approximate expressions of the truth, and we are to correct by other declarations of Scripture, any imperfect impressions we might derive solely from them.

We use these terms, therefore, in a special sense, which we explicitly state and define as excluding all notion of inequality between the persons of the Trinity. The generation to which we hold is

A. Not creation, but the Father's communication of himself to the Son. Since the names Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are not applicable to the divine essence, but are only applicable to its hypostatical distinctions, they imply no derivation of the essence of the Son from the essence of the Father.

B. Not a commencement of existence, but an eternal relation to the Father,—there never having been a time when the Son began to be, or when the Son did not exist as God with the Father.

C. Not an act of the Father's will, but an internal necessity of the divine nature,—so that the Son is no more dependent upon the Father than the Father is dependent upon the Son. If it be consistent with deity to be Father, it is equally consistent with deity to be Son.

Versus Thomasius, *Christi Person and Werk*, 1: 115.

D. Not a relation in any way analogous to physical derivation, but a life-movement of the divine nature, in virtue of which Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, while equal in essence and dignity, stand to each other in an order of personality, office and operation, and in virtue of which the Father works through the Son, and the Father and the Son through the Spirit.

Eternal sonship is intimated in Ps. 2: 7. Here 'this day have I begotten thee' is most naturally interpreted as the declaration of an eternal fact in the divine nature; (see Alexander, *Psalms*, in loco; also, *Com. on Acts*, 13: 33: "'To-day' refers to the date of the decree itself; but this, as a divine act, was eternal,—and so must be the Sonship which it affirms."

Neither the incarnation (Heb. 1: 5, 6), the baptism (Matt. 3: 17), the transfiguration (Mat. 17: 5), or the resurrection (Acts 13: 33, 34), mark the beginning of Christ's sonship or constitute him Son of God. These are but recognitions or manifestations of a preëxisting Sonship inseparable from his Godhood. Proof-texts for this eternal generation are Rom. 1: 4 (*ὁρισθέντος* = 'manifested to be the mighty Son of God' *κατὰ Πνεῦμα ἁγιοσύνης* = 'according to his divine nature'; see Philippi and Alford); and Col. 1: 15 (*πρωτόκοκος πάσης κτίσεως* = 'begotten first before all creation,' Julius Müller, *Proof-texts*, 14; 'born before every creature, while yet no created thing existed,' Meyer, *Com. in loco*; 'first born before every creature, i. e. begotten, and that antecedently to everything that was created,' Ellicott, in loco).

This sonship is unique,—not predicable of, or shared with any creature; (John 1: 14, 18: Rom. 8: 32; Gal. 4: 4; cf. Prov. 8: 22-31; 30: 4).

Weisz, *Lehrbuch der Bib. Theol. N. T.*, 424, note. Luthardt, *Compendium der Dogmatik*, 81. Watson, *Institutes*, 1: 530-577. *Bib. Sac.*, 27: 268.

The same principles upon which we interpret the declaration of Christ's eternal sonship, apply to the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, and show this to be not inconsistent with the Spirit's equal dignity and glory; (John 14: 26; 15: 26).

Shedd, *History of Doctrine*, 1: 317. Dick, *Lectures on Theology*, 1: 347-350.

We therefore only formulate truth which is concretely expressed in Scripture, and which is recognized by all ages of the church in hymns and prayers addressed to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, when we assert that in the nature of the one God there are three eternal distinctions, which are best described as persons, and each of which is the proper and equal object of Christian worship.

We are alike warranted in declaring that, in virtue of these personal distinctions or modes of subsistence, God exists in the relations respectively,—first, of Source, Origin, Authority; secondly, of Expression, Medium, Revelation; thirdly, of Apprehension, Accomplishment, Realization.

VI. WHILE THE MODE OF THIS TRIUNE EXISTENCE IS UNREVEALED AND INSCRUTABLE, THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY CONTAINS NO ELEMENT OF SELF-CONTRADICTION, BUT ON THE OTHER HAND IS VITALLY CONNECTED WITH, AND FURNISHES A PRINCIPLE OF UNION BETWEEN, ALL THE OTHER DOCTRINES OF THE CHRISTIAN SCHEME.

1. *The mode of this triune existence is inscrutable.*

It is inscrutable because there are no analogies to it in our finite experience. For this reason all attempts are vain adequately to illustrate it:

A. From inanimate things; as

(a) The fountain, the stream, and the rivulet trickling from it (Athanasius);

(b) The cloud, the rain, and the rising mist (Boardman);

(c) Color, shape, and size (F. W. Robertson);

(d) The actinic, luminiferous, and calorific principles in the ray of light; (Solar Hieroglyphics, 34).

B. From the constitution or processes of our own minds; as

(a) The psychological unity of intellect, affection, and will (substantially held by Augustine);

(b) The logical unity of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis (Hegel);

(c) The metaphysical unity of subject, object, and subject-object (Melancthon, Olshausen, Shedd).

Shedd, *History of Doctrine*, 1: 365, note 2. Olshausen on John 1: 1. Boardman, *Higher Life*. F. W. Robertson, *Sermons*, 3: 58.

Neither of these furnishes any proper analogue of the Trinity, since in neither of them is there found the essential element of tripersonality. Such illustrations may sometimes be used to disarm objection, but they furnish no positive explanation of the mystery of the Trinity, and unless carefully guarded, may lead to grievous error.

2. *The doctrine of the Trinity is not self-contradictory.*

This it would be only if it declared God to be three in the same numerical sense in which he is said to be one. This we do not assert. We assert simply that the same God who is one with respect to his essence, is three with respect to the internal distinctions of that essence, or with respect to the modes of his being. The possibility of this cannot be denied, except by assuming that the human mind is in all respects the measure of the divine.

3. *The doctrine of the Trinity has important relations to other doctrines.*

A. It is essential to any proper theism.

Neither God's independence nor God's blessedness can be maintained upon grounds of absolute unity. Anti-trinitarianism almost necessarily makes creation indispensable to God's perfection, tends to a belief in the eternity of matter, and ultimately leads, as in Mohammedanism and in modern Judaism and Unitarianism, to pantheism.

For pantheistic view, see Strauss, *Glaubenslehre*, 1: 462-524. Twisten, translated in *Bib. Sac.* 3: 502. Thomasius, *Christi Person und Werk*, 1: 105, 156.

B. It is essential to any proper revelation.

If there be no Trinity, Christ is not God, and cannot perfectly know or reveal God. Christianity is no longer the one, all-inclusive, and final revelation, but only one of many conflicting and competing systems, each of which has its portion of truth, but also its portion of error.

So too with the Holy Spirit. "As God can be revealed only through God, so also can he be appropriated only through God. If the Holy Spirit be not God, then the love and self-communication of God to the human soul are not a reality."

In other words, without the doctrine of the Trinity we go back to mere natural religion and the far-off God of deism—and this is ultimately exchanged for pantheism in the way already mentioned.

Martensen, *Dogmatics*, 104. Thomasius, *Christi Person und Werk*, 1: 156.

C. It is essential to any proper redemption.

If God be absolutely and simply one, there can be no mediation or atonement, since between God and the most exalted creature the gulf is infinite. Only one who is God can reconcile us to God. So too, only one who is God can purify our souls. A God who is only unity, but in whom is no plurality, may be our Judge, but so far as we can see, cannot be our Savior or our Sanctifier.

Twisten, translated in *Bib. Sac.* 3: 510.

## CHAPTER III.

### THE DECREES OF GOD.

#### I. DEFINITION OF DECREES.

By the decrees of God we mean that eternal plan by which God has rendered certain all the events of the universe, past, present and future. Notice in explanation, that

1. The decrees are many only to our finite comprehension; in their own nature they are but one plan which embraces not only the ends to be secured but also the means needful to secure them.

Hodge, *Outlines of Theology*, 165.

2. The decrees, as the eternal act of an infinitely perfect will, though they have logical relation to each other, have no chronological relation. They are not therefore the result of deliberation, in any sense that implies short-sightedness or hesitancy.

3. Since the will in which the decrees have their origin is a free will, the decrees are not to be regarded as a merely instinctive or necessary exercise of the divine intelligence or volition.

Dick, *Lectures on Theology*, 1 : 355 ; lec. 34.

4. The decrees are an internal exercise and manifestation of the divine attributes, and therefore are not to be confounded with that execution of the decrees which we call Creation, Providence, and Redemption.

5. The decrees are therefore not addressed to creatures ; are not of the nature of statute law ; and lay neither compulsion nor obligation upon the wills of men.

#### II. PROOF OF THE DOCTRINE OF DECREES.

##### 1. *From Scripture.*

A. All things are included in the divine decrees ; (Is. 14 : 26 ; 46 : 10, 11. Dan. 4 : 34, 35. Eph. 1 : 11).

B. Special things and events are decreed :

(a) The stability of the physical universe ; (Ps. 119 : 91).

(b) The outward circumstances of nations ; (Acts 17 : 26).

(c) The saving work of Christ ; (Eph. 3 : 11. 1 Pet. 1 : 19, 20).

(d) The length of human life ; (Job. 14 : 5).

(e) The mode of our death ; (John 21 : 19).

(f) The free acts of men :

(f<sup>1</sup>) Good acts ; (Is. 44 : 28. Eph. 2 : 10).

(f<sup>2</sup>) Evil acts ; (Gen. 50 : 20. Luke 22 : 22. Acts 2 : 23 ; 4 : 27, 28. Rom. 9 : 17. Rev. 17 : 17).



2. *From Reason.*

## A. From the divine omniscience.

(a) From eternity God foresaw all the events of the universe as fixed and certain. This fixity and certainty could not have had its ground either in blind fate or in the variable wills of men, since neither of these had an existence. It could have had its ground in nothing outside of the divine mind, for in eternity nothing existed besides the divine mind.

But for this fixity there must have been a cause,—if anything in the future was fixed, something must have fixed it. This fixity could have had its ground only in the plan and purpose of God.

In fine, if God foresaw the future as certain, it must have been because there was something in himself which made it certain,—or in other words, because he had decreed it.

To meet the objection that God might have foreseen the events of the universe, not because he had decreed each one, but only because he had decreed to create the universe and institute its laws, we may put the argument in another form :

(b) In eternity there could have been no cause of the future existence of the universe, outside of God himself, since no being existed but God himself. In eternity God foresaw that the creation of the world and the institution of its laws would make certain its actual history even to the most insignificant details.

But God decreed to create and to institute these laws. In so decreeing, he necessarily decreed all that was to come. In fine, God foresaw the future events of the universe as certain because he had decreed to create ; but this determination to create involved also a determination of all the actual results of that creation,—or in other words, God decreed those results.

Hill, *Divinity*, 512–532. For Arminian view, see *Watson, Institutes*, 2: 422–448.

There is therefore no such thing in God as *scientia media*, or knowledge of an event that is to be, though it does not enter into the divine plan ; for to say that God foresees an undecreed event, is to say that he views as future an event that is merely possible,—or in other words, that he views an event not as it is.

God therefore foresees creation, causes, laws, events, consequences, only because he has decreed creation, causes, laws, events, consequences.

Hill, *Divinity*, 528. *Watson, Institutes*, 1: 375–398.

## B. From the divine wisdom.

It is the part of wisdom to proceed in every undertaking according to a plan. The greater the undertaking, the more needful a plan.

Wisdom, moreover, shows itself in a careful provision for all possible circumstances and emergencies that can arise in the execution of its plan. That many such circumstances and emergencies are un contemplated and unprovided for in the plans of men, is due only to the limitations of human wisdom.

It belongs to infinite wisdom, therefore, not only to have a plan, but to embrace all, even the minutest details, in the plan of the universe.

C. From the divine immutability.

What God does, he always purposed to do. Since with him there is no increase of knowledge or power, such as characterizes finite beings, it follows that what under any given circumstances he permits or does, he must have eternally decreed to permit or do.

To suppose that God has a multitude of plans, and that he changes his plan with the exigencies of the situation, is to make him infinitely dependent upon the varying wills of his creatures, and to deny to him one necessary element of perfection, namely, immutability; (James 1: 17).

D. From the divine benevolence.

The events of the universe, if not determined by the divine decrees, must be determined either by chance or by the wills of creatures.

It is contrary to any proper conception of the divine benevolence to suppose that God permits the course of nature and of history, and the ends to which both these are moving, to be determined for myriads of sentient beings by any other force or will than his own.

Both reason and revelation, therefore, compel us to accept the doctrine of the Westminster Confession, that "God did from all eternity, by the most just and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass."

Emmons, Works, 4: 273-401.

### III. OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF DECREES.

1. *That they are inconsistent with the free agency of man.*

To this we reply that:

A. The objection confounds the decrees with the execution of the decrees.

The decrees are, like foreknowledge, an act internal to the divine nature, and are no more inconsistent with free agency than foreknowledge is.

Even foreknowledge of events implies that those events are fixed. If this absolute fixity and foreknowledge is not inconsistent with free agency, much less can that which is more remote from man's action, namely, the hidden cause of this fixity and foreknowledge—God's decrees—be inconsistent with free agency.

If anything be inconsistent with man's free agency, it must be not the decrees themselves, but the execution of the decrees in creation and providence.

B. The objection rests upon a false theory of free agency,—namely, that free agency consists in indeterminateness or uncertainty; in other words, in the power of the will to decide, in any given case, against its own character and all the motives brought to bear upon it.

Free agency, on the contrary, is simply the power of the agent to act out his character in the circumstances which environ him,—and since this character and these circumstances are not beyond the influence of God, it follows that a decree fixing the event is not inconsistent with free agency. If

man, influenced by man, may still be free, then man, influenced by divinely appointed circumstances, may still be free.

It may aid us, in estimating the force of this objection, to note the four senses in which the term freedom may be used. It may be used as equivalent to:

- (a) An absence of outward constraint;
- (b) A state of moral indeterminateness;
- (c) Power to manifest character in action;
- (d) Ability to conform to the divine standard.

With the first of these we are not now concerned, since all agree that the decrees lay no constraint upon men. Freedom in the second sense has no existence, since all men have character. Free agency, or freedom in the third sense, has just been shown to be consistent with the decrees. Freedom in the fourth sense, or true moral freedom, is the special gift of God, and is not to be confounded with free agency.

The objection mentioned rests wholly upon a false definition of free agency, and with this falls to the ground.

- Alexander, *Moral Science*, 107. Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, 2: 278.
- Calderwood, *Moral Philosophy*, 253, 258. Edwards, Tappan, Whedon, Hazard, on the Will. *Bib. Sac.*, 4: 77; 19: 400.

C. The objection ignores the logical relation between the decree of the end and the decree of the means to secure it.

The decrees of God not only ensure human action, but they ensure free agency as logically prior thereto. All conflict between them must therefore be apparent and not real.

Since consciousness and Scripture assure us that free agency exists, it must exist by divine decree, and though we may be ignorant of the method in which the decrees are executed, we have no right to doubt either the decrees or the freedom. They must be held to be consistent, until one of them is proved to be a delusion.

D. The objection confounds the decrees of God with fate.

But it is to be observed that:

(a) Fate is unintelligent,—while the decrees of God are framed in infinite wisdom.

(b) Fate is undistinguishable from material causation and leaves no room for human freedom,—while the decrees of God exclude all notion of physical necessity.

(c) Fate embraces no moral ideas or ends,—while the decrees of God make these controlling in the universe.

2. *That they take away all motive for human exertion.*

To this we reply that:

A. They cannot thus influence men, since they are not addressed to men, are not the rule of human action, and become known only after the event. This objection is therefore the mere excuse of indolence.

B. Since the decrees connect means and ends together, and ends are decreed only as the result of means, they encourage effort instead of discouraging it.

Belief in God's plan that success shall reward toil, incites to courageous and persevering effort. Upon the very ground of God's decree, the Scripture urges us to the diligent use of means; (Acts 27: 24, 31. Phil. 2: 12, 13. Eph. 2: 10. Deut. 29: 29).

3. *That they make God the author of sin.*

To this we reply that:

A. They make God, not the author of sin, but the author of free beings who are themselves the authors of sin.

God does not decree efficiently to work evil desires or choices in men. He decrees sin only in the sense of decreeing to create and preserve those who will sin,—in other words, he decrees to create and preserve human wills which, in their own self-chosen courses, will be and do evil.

In all this, man attributes sin to himself and not to God, and God hates, denounces, and punishes sin.

B. The decree to permit sin, is therefore a permissive decree, or a decree to permit, in distinction from a decree to produce by his own efficiency.

No difficulty attaches to such a decree to permit sin, which does not attach to the actual permission of it. But God does actually permit sin and it must be right for him to permit it. It must therefore be right for him to decree to permit it.

If God's holiness and wisdom and power are not impugned by the actual existence of moral evil, they are not impugned by the original decree that it should exist.

C. The difficulty is therefore one which in substance clings to all theistic systems alike—the question why moral evil is permitted under the government of a God infinitely holy, wise, powerful, and good.

This problem is, to our finite powers, incapable of full solution, and must remain to a great degree shrouded in mystery. With regard to it we can only say:

(a) Negatively,—that God does not permit moral evil

(a<sup>1</sup>) Because he is not unalterably opposed to sin; nor

(a<sup>2</sup>) Because moral evil was unforeseen and independent of his will; nor

(a<sup>3</sup>) Because he could not have prevented it in a moral system.

Both observation and experience, which testify to multiplied instances of deliverance from sin without violation of the laws of man's being, forbid us so to limit the power of God.

Birks, *Difficulties of Belief*, 17. Young, *The Mystery, or Evil not from God*. Bledsoe, *Theodicy*.

(b) Positively,—we seem constrained to say that God permits moral evil

(b<sup>1</sup>) Because moral evil, though in itself abhorrent to his nature, is yet the incident of a system adapted to his purpose of self-revelation; and further,

(b<sup>2</sup>) Because it is his wise and sovereign will to institute and maintain this system of which moral evil is an incident, rather than to withhold his

self-revelation or to reveal himself through another system in which moral evil should be continually prevented by the exercise of divine power.

Edwards, 2: 545. Hill, *System of Divinity*, 528-559. Butler, *Analogy, on the Government of God and Christianity*, as schemes imperfectly comprehended; Bohn's Ed., 177, 232. Dr. John Brown, on Arthur H. Hallam's *Theodicea Novissima*, in *Spare Hours*, 273. *Bib. Sac.*, 20: 471-488.

#### IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS.

##### 1. *Practical uses of the doctrine of decrees.*

A. It inspires humility by its representation of God's unsearchable counsels and absolute sovereignty.

B. It teaches confidence in him who has wisely ordered our birth, our death and our surroundings even to the minutest particulars, and has made all things work together for the triumph of his kingdom and the good of those who love him.

C. It shows the enemies of God, that as their sins have been foreseen and provided for in God's plan, so they can never, while remaining in their sins, hope to escape their decreed and threatened penalty.

D. It urges the sinner to avail himself of the appointed means of grace, if he would be counted among the number of those for whom God has decreed salvation.

##### 2. *True method of preaching the doctrine.*

A. We should most carefully avoid exaggeration or unnecessarily obnoxious statement.

B. We should emphasize the fact that the decrees are not grounded in arbitrary will, but in infinite wisdom.

C. We should make it plain that whatever God does or will do, he must from eternity have purposed to do.

D. We should illustrate the doctrine so far as possible by instances of completeness and far sightedness in human plans of great enterprises.

E. We may then make extended application of the truth to the encouragement of the Christian and the admonition of the unbeliever.

Bushnell, *Sermons for the New Life*, sermon entitled: 'Every Man's Life a Plan of God.' Nehemiah Adams, *Evenings with the Doctrines*, 243.

## CHAPTER IV.

### THE WORKS OF GOD; OR THE EXECUTION OF THE DECREES.

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#### SECTION I.—CREATION.

##### I. DEFINITION OF CREATION.

By creation we mean that free act of the triune God, by which, in the beginning, for his own glory, he made out of nothing the whole visible and invisible universe. In explanation we notice:

1. Creation is not a fashioning of preëxisting materials, nor an emanation from the substance of Deity, but is a making of that to exist which once did not exist either in form or substance.
2. Creation is not an instinctive or necessary process of the divine nature, but is the free act of a rational will, put forth for a definite and sufficient end.
3. Creation is the act of the triune God, in the sense that all the persons of the Trinity, themselves uncreated, have a part in it—the Father as the originating, the Son as the mediating, the Spirit as the realizing cause.

Shedd, *History of Doctrine*, 1: 11.

##### II. PROOF OF THE DOCTRINE.

Creation is a truth of which mere science or reason cannot fully assure us. Physical science can observe and record changes but it knows nothing of origins. Reason cannot absolutely disprove the eternity of matter.

Hopkins, *Yale Lectures on the Scriptural View of Man*. Martineau, *Essays*, 1: 157–169. Wardlaw, *Systematic Theology*, 2: 65.

For proof of the doctrine of creation, therefore, we rely wholly upon Scripture.

##### 1. *Direct Scripture statements.*

A. Genesis 1: 1, 'In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.' To this it has been objected that the verb  $\text{בָּרָא}$  does not necessarily denote production out of nothing; (see Gen. 1: 27, 'God created man in his own image;' cf. 2: 7, 'the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground;,' also Ps. 51: 10, 'create in me a clean heart'). But we reply:

(a) While we acknowledge that the verb  $\text{בָּרָא}$  "does not necessarily or invariably denote production out of nothing, we still maintain that it signifies the production of an effect for which no natural antecedent existed before, and which can be only the result of divine agency." For this reason, in the Kal species it is used only of God, and is never accompanied by an accusative denoting material.

Green, *Hebrew Chrestomathy*, 67.

(b) In the account of the creation,  $\text{פָּרָא}$  is accurately distinguished from  $\text{לַעֲשֶׂה}$ , 'to make' either from nothing or from already existing material ( $\text{לַעֲשֶׂה}$ );  $\text{פָּרָא}$ , 'created in making' or made by creation,' in 2: 3; and  $\text{שָׂרַף}$ , of the firmament, in 1: 7), and from  $\text{יָצַר}$ , 'to form' out of such material. (See  $\text{יָצַר}$ , of man regarded as a spiritual being, in 1: 27; but  $\text{יָצַר}$ , of man regarded as a physical being, in 2: 7).

Conant, Genesis, 1.

(c) The context shows that the meaning here is creation out of nothing. Since the earth in its rude, unformed, chaotic condition is still called 'the earth' in verse 2, the word  $\text{פָּרָא}$  in verse 1 cannot refer to any shaping or fashioning of the elements, but must signify the calling of them into being.

(d) The fact that  $\text{פָּרָא}$  may have had an original signification of 'cutting,' 'forming,' and that it retains this meaning in the Piel conjugation, need not prejudice the conclusion thus reached, since terms expressive of the most spiritual processes are derived from sensuous roots.

If  $\text{פָּרָא}$  does not signify absolute creation, no word exists in the Hebrew language that can express this idea.

The Bible Commentary, on Gen. 1: 1.

(e) But this idea of production out of nothing unquestionably existed among the Hebrews. The later Scriptures show that it had become natural to the Hebrew mind. An idea, so distinguishing them from the heathen nations, can be best explained by supposing that it was derived from this early revelation; (Ex. 34: 10. Num. 16: 30; cf. Jer. 31: 22. Is. 4: 5; 41: 20; 45: 7, 8; 48: 6, 7; 57: 19; 65: 17, 18).

B. Hebrews 11: 3. 'Through faith we perceive that the worlds were framed by the word of God, so that what is seen has not arisen out of things which appear' (Bible Union version), = the world was made not out of sensible and preëxisting material, but by the direct fiat of omnipotence. This implies the creation of the world out of nothing; (see Alford, and Lüdemann in Meyer's Com., in loco. Cf. 2 Maccabees 7: 28,  $\epsilon\lambda\kappa\sigma\iota\varsigma\ \delta\epsilon\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omega\upsilon\ \epsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\alpha\sigma\epsilon\upsilon\varsigma\ \alpha\iota\tau\alpha\ \delta\epsilon\ \theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$ —Vulgate: quia ex nihilo fecit illa Deus; Ps. 33: 6–9; Rom. 4: 17; 1 Cor. 1: 28).

## 2. Indirect evidence from Scripture.

A. The past duration of the world is limited; (Mark 13: 19,  $\alpha\rho\chi\eta\ \kappa\tau\iota\sigma\epsilon\omega\varsigma\ \eta\varsigma\ \epsilon\kappa\tau\iota\sigma\epsilon\upsilon\varsigma\ \delta\epsilon\ \theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$ ; John 17: 5,  $\pi\rho\delta\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \kappa\acute{o}\sigma\mu\omicron\upsilon\ \epsilon\iota\upsilon\alpha\iota$ ; Eph. 1: 4,  $\pi\rho\delta\ \kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\beta\omicron\lambda\eta\varsigma\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \kappa\acute{o}\sigma\mu\omicron\upsilon$ ).

B. Before the world began to be, each of the persons of the Godhead already existed; (Ps. 90: 2; Prov. 8: 22, 23. John 1: 1,  $\epsilon\upsilon\ \alpha\rho\chi\eta\ \eta\upsilon\ \delta\ \lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ . Col. 1: 17,  $\alpha\iota\tau\omicron\varsigma\ \epsilon\varsigma\tau\iota\ \pi\rho\delta\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\omega\upsilon$ . Heb. 9: 14,  $\delta\iota\alpha\ \text{I}\nu\epsilon\mu\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma\ \alpha\iota\omega\iota\omicron\upsilon\iota\omicron\upsilon$ ; see Tholuck, Com. in loco).

C. The origin of the universe is ascribed to God and to each of the persons of the Godhead; (Eph. 3: 9; Rom. 11: 36; 1 Cor. 8: 6,  $\epsilon\lambda\kappa\sigma\iota\varsigma\ \omicron\upsilon\ \tau\alpha\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha$ . John 1: 3,  $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha\ \delta\epsilon\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \epsilon\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\tau\omicron$ . Col. 1: 16,  $\tau\alpha\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha\ \delta\epsilon\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \epsilon\iota\varsigma\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \epsilon\kappa\tau\iota\sigma\tau\alpha\iota$ . Heb. 1: 2. Gen. 1: 2).

Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 2: 232.

These representations of Scripture are not only most consistent with the view that the universe was created out of nothing by God, but they are inexplicable upon any other hypothesis. Since other views, however, have been held to be more rational, we proceed to the examination of :

### III. OPPOSING THEORIES.

#### 1. *Dualism.*

Of dualism, there are two forms :

A. That which holds to two self-existent principles, God and matter. These are distinct from and coëternal with each other. Matter, however, is an unconscious, negative and imperfect substance, which is subordinate to God, and is made the instrument of his will.

This was the view of the Alexandrian Gnostics. It was essentially an attempt to combine with Christianity the Platonic conception of the *ὕλη*. In this way it thought to account for the existence of evil, and to escape the difficulty of imagining a creation out of nothing.

Guericke, Church History, 1: 161.

With regard to this view we remark:

(a) The maxim 'ex nihilo nihil fit,' upon which it rests, is true only in so far as it asserts that no event takes place without a cause. It is false, if it mean that nothing can ever be made except out of material previously existing.

The maxim is therefore applicable only to the realm of second causes, and does not bar the creative power of the great first Cause. The doctrine of creation does not dispense with a cause; on the other hand it assigns to the universe a sufficient cause in God.

Martensen, Dogmatics, 116. Cudworth, Intellectual System, 3: 81, sq.

(b) It is unphilosophical to postulate two eternal substances, when one self-existent Cause of all things will account for the facts.

(c) It contradicts our fundamental notion of God as absolute Sovereign, to suppose the existence of any other substance to be independent of his will.

(d) This second substance with which God must of necessity work, since it is, according to the theory, inherently evil and the source of evil, not only limits God's power but destroys his blessedness.

Martensen, Dogmatics, 121.

(e) The theory does not answer its purpose of accounting for moral evil, —unless it be also assumed that spirit is material, —in which case dualism gives place to materialism.

The other form of dualism is:

B. That which holds to the eternal existence of two antagonistic spirits, one evil and the other good. In this view, matter is not a negative and imperfect substance which nevertheless has self-existence, but is either the work or the instrument of a positively malignant intelligence, who wages war against all good.

This was the view of the Manichaeans. Manichaeism is a compound of Christianity and the Persian doctrine of two eternal and opposite intelli-



gences. Zoroaster, however, held matter to be pure and to be the creation of the good Being. Mani apparently regarded matter as captive to the evil spirit, if not absolutely his creation.

Hagenbach, *Hist. Doct.* 1: 470. Guericke, *Church History*, 1: 185, 187. Gieseler, *Church History*, 1: 203. Baur, *das manichäische Religions-system*.

Of this view we need only say that it is refuted:

(a) By all the arguments for the unity, omnipotence, sovereignty and blessedness of God.

(b) By the Scripture representations of the prince of evil as the creature of God, and as subject to God's control; (Col. 1: 16. Eph. 6: 12. 2 Pet. 2: 4. Rev. 20: 2-10).

Blunt, *Dict. Doct. and Hist. Theology: Art. Dualism*. Herzog, *Encyclopædie: Art. Mani und die Manichäer*. Neander, *Ch. Hist.*, 1: 478-505.

## 2. *Emanation.*

This theory holds that the universe is of the same substance with God, and is the product of successive evolutions from his being.

This was the view of the Syrian Gnostics. Their system was an attempt to interpret Christianity in the forms of oriental theosophy.

We object to it upon the following grounds:

A. It virtually denies the infinity and transcendence of God,—by applying to him a principle of evolution, growth, and progress, which belongs only to the finite and imperfect.

B. It contradicts the divine holiness,—since man, who by the theory is of the substance of God, is nevertheless morally evil.

C. It leads logically to pantheism,—since the claim that human personality is illusory, cannot be maintained without also surrendering belief in the personality of God.

Neander, *Church History*, 1: 372-374. Shedd, *Hist. Doct.*, 1: 318; also 1: 11-13. Guericke, *Church History*, 1: 160.

A theory which seeks to avoid this pantheistic conclusion is that of:

## 3. *Creation from eternity.*

The necessity of supposing such creation from eternity has been argued upon the grounds:

A. That it is a necessary result of God's omnipotence. But we reply that omnipotence does not necessarily imply actual creation; it implies only power to create.

Creation moreover is, in the nature of the case, a thing begun. Creation from eternity is a contradiction in terms, and that which is self-contradictory is not an object of power.

B. That it is impossible to conceive of time as having had a beginning, and since the universe and time are coëxistent, creation must have been from eternity.

But we reply that the argument confounds time with duration. Time is duration measured by successions, and in this sense time can be conceived

of as having had a beginning,—indeed it is impossible to conceive of its not having had a beginning.

Birks, *Difficulties of Belief*, 81, 82. Julius Müller, *Doctrine of Sin*, 1: 220-225.

C. That the immutability of God requires creation from eternity.

But we reply that God's immutability requires not an eternal creation but only an eternal plan of creation. The opposite principle would compel us to deny the possibility of miracles, incarnation and regeneration. Like creation, these too must be eternal.

D. That God's love renders necessary a creation from eternity.

But we reply, on the one hand, that a finite creation cannot furnish satisfaction to the infinite love of God; and on the other hand, that God has from eternity an object of love infinitely superior to any possible creation, in the person of his Son.

Martensen, *Dogmatics*, 114.

Although this theory claims that creation is an act, in eternity past, of God's free will, yet its conceptions of God's omnipotence and love, as necessitating creation, are difficult to reconcile with the divine independence or personality.

Since God's power and love are infinite, their demands cannot be satisfied without a creation infinite in extent as well as eternal in past duration,—in other words, a creation equal to God.

But a God thus dependent upon external creation, is neither free nor sovereign. A God existing in necessary relations to the universe, if different in substance from the universe, must be the God of dualism; if of the same substance with the universe, must be the God of pantheism.

#### 4. *Spontaneous generation.*

This theory holds that creation is but the name for a natural process still going on,—matter itself having in it the power, under proper conditions, of taking on new functions, and of developing into organic forms. We object to this view that:

A. It is a pure hypothesis, not only unverified, but contrary to all known facts.

No credible instance of the production of living forms from inorganic material has yet been adduced. So far as science can at present teach us, the law of nature is 'omne vivum ex vivo,' or 'ex ovo.'

B. If such instances could be authenticated, they would prove nothing as against a proper doctrine of creation,—for there would still exist an impossibility of accounting for these vivific properties of matter, except upon the Scriptural view of an intelligent Contriver and Originator of matter and its laws.

In short, evolution implies previous involution,—if anything comes out of matter, it must first have been put in.

C. This theory therefore, if true only supplements the doctrine of original, absolute, immediate creation, with another doctrine of mediate and derivative creation, or the development of the materials and forces origin-

ated at the beginning. This development, however, cannot proceed to any valuable end without the guidance of the same intelligence which initiated it.

The Scriptures, although they do not sanction the doctrine of spontaneous generation, do recognize processes of development as supplementing the divine fiat which first called the elements into being.

Owen, *Comparative Anatomy of the Vertebrates*, 3: 814-818. Bastian, *Modes of Origin of the Lowest Organizations; Beginnings of Life*; and articles on *Heterogeneous Evolution of Living Things*, in 'Nature,' 2: 170, 193, 219, 410, 431. Huxley's Address before the British Association, and Reply to Bastian, in 'Nature,' 2: 400, 473; also, *Origin of Species*, 69-79; and *Physical Basis of Life*, in *Lay Sermons*, 132. Answers to this last by Stirling, in *Half-hours with Modern Scientists*; and by Beale, *Protoplasm, or Life, Matter and Mind*, 73-75. Hodge on *Hylozoism*, *Syst. Theol.*, 1: 552, 606. Flint, *Physiology of Man*, 1: 263-265.

#### IV. THE MOSAIC ACCOUNT OF CREATION.

##### 1. *Its twofold nature*,—as uniting the ideas of creation and cosmogony.

All nature-worship, whether it take the form of ancient polytheism or modern materialism, looks upon the universe only as a birth or a growth. This view has a basis of truth, inasmuch as it regards natural forces as having a real existence. It is false in regarding these forces as needing no originator or upholder.

##### A. Development recognized.

The Mosaic account represents the present order of things as the result not simply of original creation, but also of subsequent arrangement and development.

(a) A fashioning of inorganic materials is described, and also a use of these materials in providing the conditions of organized existence; (Gen. 1: 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 16—שָׁמַיִם, 17—אֲדָמָה; 2: 6, 7, 8).

(b) Life is described as reproducing itself after its first introduction, according to its own laws and by virtue of its own inner energy; (Gen. 1: 11, 22, 24, 28).

##### B. Creation asserted.

The Mosaic narrative, however, avoids the error of making the universe the result of an eternal process. The cosmogony of Genesis, unlike the cosmogonies of the heathen, is prefaced by the originating act of God (Gen. 1: 1, בָּרָא), and is supplemented by successive manifestations of creative power, as in the introduction of brute and of human life; (Gen. 1: 21 and 27—וַיִּבְרָא).

If science, however, should ultimately render it certain that all the present species of living creatures were derived by natural descent from a few original germs, and that these germs were themselves an evolution of inorganic forces and materials, the Mosaic account would not therefore be proved untrue. We should only be required to revise our interpretation of the word בָּרָא in Gen. 1: 21 and 27, and to give it here the meaning of mediate creation. Such a meaning might almost seem to be favored by Gen. 1: 11, 20, and 2: 7, 9.

This derivation of all living creatures, by successive modifications, from a few original germs, and much more, the theory of spontaneous generation already alluded to, are yet so far from being demonstrated, that we see no sufficient reason for departing from the conclusions previously reached, that the narrative describes the introduction of brute and of human life as acts of absolute origination. While the physical material was already at hand, as in the dust from which man's body was formed, the principle of life was apparently a new creation of God.

Herzog, *Encyclopädie*, Art. Schöpfung, 20: 718. Martensen, *Dogmatics*, 117.

## 2. *Its proper interpretation.*

There are three common interpretations which seem manifestly untenable:

A. The allegorical or mythical,—which represents the Mosaic account as embodying, like the Indian and Greek cosmogonies, the poetic speculations of an early race as to the origin of the present system.

We object to this interpretation upon the ground that the narrative of creation is inseparably connected with the succeeding history, and is therefore most naturally regarded as itself historical.

This connection of the narrative of creation with the subsequent history, moreover, prevents us from believing it to be the description of a vision granted to Moses. It is more probably the record of an original revelation to the first man, handed down to Moses' time, and used by Moses as a proper introduction to his history.

Blackie, *Comparison of Biblical with heathen Cosmogonies*, in *Theol. Eclectic*, 1: 77-87. For the theory of 'prophetic vision,' see Kurtz, *History of the Old Covenant*, Introduction, i-xxxvii, civ-cxxx; and Hugh Miller, *Testimony of the Rocks*, 179-210.

B. The hyper-literal,—which would withdraw the narrative from all comparison with the conclusions of science, by putting the ages of geological history between the first and second verses of Gen. 1, and by making the remainder of the chapter an account of the fitting up of the earth, or of some limited portion of it, in six days of twenty-four hours each.

Chalmers, *Natural Theology*, Works, 1: 228-258. John Pye Smith, *Mosaic Account of Creation*; and *Scripture and Geology*.

To this view it may be objected that:

(a) There is no indication, in the Mosaic narrative, of so vast an interval between the first and the second verses.

(b) There is no indication, in the geological history, of any such break between the ages of preparation and the present time.

Hugh Miller, *Testimony of the Rocks*, 141-178.

(c) There are indications, in the Mosaic record itself, that the word 'day' is not used in its literal sense; while the other Scriptures unquestionably employ it to designate a period of indefinite duration; (Gen. 1: 5, 8, 13; 2: 2; cf. Heb. 4: 3-10. Gen. 2: 4; cf. Is. 2: 12; Zech. 14: 7; 2 Pet. 3: 8).

Dana, *Manual of Geology*, 744. Leconte, *Religion and Science*, 262.

C. The hyper-scientific,—which would find in the narrative a minute and precise correspondence with the geological record.

This is not to be expected, since it is foreign to the purpose of revelation to teach science. Although a general concord between the Mosaic and the geological histories may be pointed out, it is a needless embarrassment to compel ourselves to find in every detail of the former, an accurate statement of some scientific fact. The true interpretation is more probably :

D. The pictorial-summary interpretation,—which holds that the Mosaic account is a rough sketch of the history of creation, true in all its essential features, but presented in a graphic form suited to the common mind and to earlier as well as later ages.

While conveying to primitive man as accurate an idea of God's work as man was able to comprehend, the revelation was yet given in pregnant language, so that it could expand to all the ascertained results of subsequent physical research. This general correspondence of the narrative with the teachings of science, and its power to adapt itself to every advance in human knowledge, differences it from every other cosmogony current among men.

The view here presented does not compel us, either now or at any time in the future, to hold as a finality any definite scheme of reconciling Genesis and geology. Such a settlement of all the questions involved, presupposes not only a perfected science of the physical universe, but also a perfected science of hermeneutics. It is enough if we can offer tentative solutions which represent the present state of thought upon the subject.

Remembering that any such scheme of reconciliation may speedily be outgrown without prejudice to the truth of the Scripture record, we may present the following as an approximate account of the coincidences between the Mosaic and the geological records. The scheme here given is a combination of the conclusions of Dana and of Guyot, and assumes the substantial truth of the nebular hypothesis.

(a) The earth, if originally in the condition of a gaseous fluid, must have been void and formless,—as described in Genesis 1: 2.

(b) The beginning of activity in matter would manifest itself by the production of light,—since light is a resultant of molecular activity. This corresponds to the statement in verse 3.

(c) The development of the earth into an independent sphere, and its separation from the fluid around it, answers to the dividing of the waters below, from the waters above the earth, in verse 7.

(d) The production of the earth's physical features, by the partial condensation of the vapors which enveloped the igneous sphere, and by the consequent outlining of the continents and oceans, is described, in verse 9, as the gathering together of the waters into one place.

(e) The expression of the idea of life in the lowest plants, since it was, in type and effect, the creation of the vegetable kingdom, is next described in verse 11, as a bringing into existence of the characteristic forms of that kingdom. This precedes all mention of animal life, since the vegetable kingdom is the natural basis of the animal.

(f) The vapors which have hitherto shrouded the planet are now cleared away as preliminary to the introduction of life in its higher animal forms.

The consequent appearance of solar light is described, in verses 16 and 17, as a making of the sun, moon and stars, and a giving of them as luminaries to the earth.

(g) The exhibition of the four grand types of the animal kingdom (radiate, molluscan, articulate, vertebrate), which characterizes the next stage of geological progress, is represented, in verses 20 and 21, as a creation of the lower animals—those that swarm in the waters, and the creeping and flying species of the land.

(h) The introduction of mammals (viviparous species, which are eminent above all other vertebrates for a quality prophetic of a high moral purpose—that of suckling their young), is indicated in verses 24 and 25, by the creation of cattle and beasts of prey.

(i) Man, the first being of moral and intellectual qualities, and the first in whom the unity of the great design has full expression, forms in both the Mosaic and the geologic record, the last step of progress in creation; (see verses 26–31). With Prof. Dana, we may say that “in this succession we observe not merely an order of events like that deduced from science; there is a system in the arrangement, and a far reaching prophecy, to which philosophy could not have attained, however instructed.”

Dana, *Manual of Geology*, 741–746. Guyot, in *Bib. Sac.*, 12: 123, 324; 14: 94. Tayler Lewis, *Six Days of Creation*. Thompson, *Man in Genesis and in Geology*. Agassiz, in *Atlantic Monthly*, January, 1874. Lesley, *Lowell Lectures on Man's Origin and Destiny*. Dawson, *Story of the Earth and Man*, 32. Henslow, *Evolution and Religion*, 184. Leconte, *Science and Religion*, 264. Rogers, *Superhuman Origin of the Bible*, 445. Hill, in *Bib. Sac.*, April, 1875.

#### V. GOD'S END IN CREATION.

Infinite wisdom must, in creating, propose to itself the most comprehensive and the most valuable of ends,—the end most worthy of God and the end most fruitful in good. Only in the light of the end proposed can we properly judge of God's work, or of God's character as revealed therein.

In determining this end, we turn first to

##### 1. *The testimony of Scripture.*

This may be summed up in four statements:

A. God finds his end in himself; (Rom. 11: 36. Col. 1: 15. Rev. 22: 13; cf. 1 Cor. 15: 28, and Is. 48: 11. Prov. 16: 4=not ‘the Lord hath made all things for himself’, but ‘the Lord hath made everything for its purpose’; see Conant, *in loco*).

B. God finds his end in his own will and pleasure; (Eph. 1: 5, 9. Rev. 4: 11).

C. God finds his end in his own glory; (Is. 48: 11; 60: 21; 61: 3. Luke 2: 14).

D. God finds his end in the making known of his power, his wisdom, his holy name; (Ps. 143: 11. Ez. 36: 21, 22; 39: 7. Rom. 9: 17, 22, 23. Eph. 3: 9, 10).

All these statements may be combined in the following, namely, that God's supreme end in creation is nothing outside of himself, but is his own glory—in the revelation, in and through creatures, of the infinite perfections of his own being.

Since holiness is the fundamental attribute in God, to make himself, his own pleasure, his own glory, his own manifestation, to be his end in creation, is nothing else than to find his end in his own holiness, its maintainance, expression and communication.

Hodge, *Syst. Theol.*, 1: 436, 535, 565-568. Per contra, see Miller, *Fetich in Theology*, 19, 39-45, 88-98, 143-146.

2. *The testimony of reason.*

That his own glory, in the sense just mentioned, is God's supreme end in creation, is evident from the following considerations:

A. God's own glory is the only end actually and perfectly attained in the universe.

Wisdom and omnipotence cannot choose an end which is destined to be forever unattained; for "what his soul desireth even that he doeth"; (Job 23: 13).

God's supreme end cannot be the happiness of creatures, since many are miserable here and will be miserable forever. God's supreme end cannot be the holiness of creatures, for many are unholy here and will be unholy forever.

But while neither the holiness nor happiness of creatures is actually and perfectly attained, God's glory is made known and will be made known in both the saved and the lost. This then must be God's supreme end in creation.

B. God's glory is the end intrinsically most valuable.

The good of creatures is of insignificant importance compared with this. Wisdom dictates that the greater interest should have precedence of the less. Because God can choose no greater end, he must choose for his end himself. But this is to choose his holiness, and his glory in the manifestation of that holiness; (Is. 40: 15, 16. Hebrews 6: 13. Psalm 89: 35).

C. His own glory is the only end which consists with God's independence and sovereignty.

Every being is dependent upon whomsoever or whatsoever he makes his ultimate end. If anything in the creature is the last end of God, God is dependent upon the creature. But since God is dependent only on himself, he must find in himself his end.

D. His own glory is an end which comprehends and secures all other possible good.

The interests of the universe are bound up in the interests of God. There is no holiness or happiness for creatures except as God is absolute sovereign, and is recognized as such. It is not selfishness, therefore, but benevolence, for God to make his own glory the supreme object of creation.

Abp. Leighton, 20th Theological Lecture, Works, 695.

E. God's glory is the end which in a right moral system is proposed to creatures. This must therefore be the end which he in whose image they are made, proposes to himself.

This principle of moral philosophy, and the conclusion drawn from it, are both confirmed by Scripture; (Ps. 25: 11; 115: 1. 1 Cor. 10: 31. 1 Peter, 2: 9; 4: 11).

Edwards, Works, 2: 193-257. Murphy, Scientific Bases of Faith, 358-362.

## VI. RELATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF CREATION TO OTHER DOCTRINES.

### 1. *To the holiness and benevolence of God.*

Creation, as the work of God, manifests of necessity God's moral attributes. But the existence of physical and moral evil in the universe appears, at first sight, to impugn these attributes, and to contradict the Scripture declaration that the work of God's hand was "very good"; (Gen. 1: 31). This difficulty may be in great part removed by considering that:

A. As first created, the world was good in two senses:

(a) As free from moral evil. Sin is a later addition,—the work, not of God, but of created spirits.

(b) As adapted to beneficent ends,—for example, the revelation of God's perfections, and the probation and happiness of intelligent and obedient creatures.

B. Physical pain and imperfection, so far as they existed before the introduction of moral evil, are to be regarded:

(a) As congruous parts of a system of which sin was foreseen to be an incident; and

(b) As constituting, in part, the means of future discipline and redemption for the fallen; (Rom. 8: 17-23. 2 Cor. 4: 17).

Bushnell, Nature and the Supernatural, Chapter on 'Anticipative Consequences,' 194-219. McCosh, Divine Government, 26-35; 249-261. Farrar, Science and Theology, 82-105.

### 2. *To the wisdom and free-will of God.*

Though the completed creation, as illustrating God's attributes, was 'very good,' we are not warranted in asserting with the optimists, that the actual creation was the best possible, or the only possible creation.

Since the resources of God's wisdom are infinite, there may have been in the divine mind many possible systems, equally adapted to manifest his glory. We must therefore regard the present creation simply as the act of God's free and sovereign will.

For optimistic view, see Leibnitz, Opera Philos., 468, 624; Chalmers, Works, 2: 286. Per contra, see Watson, Theological Institutes, 1: 419; Baird, Elohim Revealed, 397-409, and esp., 402; Hovey, God with us, 205-208.

### 3. *To providence and redemption.*

Christianity is essentially a scheme of supernatural love and power. It conceives of God as above the world, as well as in it,—able to manifest himself, and actually manifesting himself, in ways unknown to mere nature.

But this absolute sovereignty and transcendence, which are manifested in providence and in redemption, are inseparable from creatorship. If the



world be eternal, like God, it must be an efflux from the substance of God and must be absolutely equal with God. Only a proper doctrine of creation can secure God's absolute distinctness from the world and his sovereignty over it.

The logical alternative of creation is therefore a system of pantheism, in which God is an impersonal and necessary force. Hence the pantheistic dicta of Fichte: "The assumption of a creation is the fundamental error of all false metaphysics and false theology"; of Hegel: "God evolves the world out of himself in order to take it back into himself again in the Spirit"; and of Strauss: "Trinity and creation, speculatively viewed, are one and the same,—only the one is viewed absolutely, the other empirically."

We perceive from this point of view, moreover, the importance and value of the Sabbath, as commemorating God's act of creation, and thus God's personality, sovereignty and transcendence.

Luthardt, *Compendium der Dogmatik*, 97. Hesse, *Bampton Lectures on "The Sunday."*

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## SECTION II.—PRESERVATION.

### I. DEFINITION OF PRESERVATION.

Preservation is that continuous agency of God by which he maintains in existence the things he has created, together with the properties and powers with which he has endowed them.

In explanation we remark:

1. Preservation is not a mere negation of action, or a refraining to destroy, on the part of God. It is a positive agency by which, at every moment, he sustains the substances and forces of the universe.

2. Preservation is not merely the maintenance of latent powers and properties in matter and mind. It is the upholding of these properties and powers in their actual exercise as well.

3. Preservation recognizes the properties and powers of nature as having objective reality. Although matter and mind retain their existence and endowments only by the constant energy of God, second causes are not mere names for the great first cause.

4. Preservation, however, implies a natural concurrence of God in all operations of matter and mind. Though God's will is not the sole force, it is still true that, without his concurrence, no being or substance in the universe can continue to exist or act.

### II. PROOF OF THE DOCTRINE OF PRESERVATION.

#### 1. *From Scripture;*

Nehemiah 9: 6. Job 7: 20. Ps. 36: 6; 104: 28, 29. Acts 17: 28, *ἐν αὐτοῖς ζῶμεν καὶ κινούμεθα καὶ ἔσμεν*. Col. 1: 17, *τὰ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ συνέστηκε*. Heb. 1: 3, *φέρων τὰ πάντα τῷ ῥήματι τῆς ὀνόματός αὐτοῦ*. John 5: 17, "my Father worketh hitherto and I work," most naturally refers to preservation, since creation is a work completed; (cf. Gen. 2: 2, 3). See Perowne on Psalm 104.

In several of these passages, preservation is expressly distinguished from creation. Though God rested from his work of creation and established an order of natural forces, a special and continuous divine activity is declared to be put forth in the upholding of the universe and its powers.

2. *From reason.*

We may argue the preserving agency of God from the following considerations :

A. Matter and mind are not self-existent. Since they have not the cause of their being in themselves, their continuance as well as their origin must be due to a superior power.

B. Force implies a will of which it is the direct or indirect expression. While we cannot identify the forces of the universe with the will of God, or regard God as the sole agent in the universe, what we know of force as exerted by our own wills, leads us to believe that force and will are correlative terms; in other words, that force has a continuous existence, only by virtue of the continuous sustaining agency of the divine will.

C. God's sovereignty requires a belief in his special preserving agency,—since this sovereignty would not be absolute, if anything occurred or existed independently of his will.

For modern theories identifying force with divine will, see Herschell, *Popular Lectures on Scientific Subjects*, 460; Murphy, *Scientific Bases*, 13-15; 29-36; 42-52; Duke of Argyll, *Reign of Law*, 121-127; Wallace, on *Natural Selection*, 363-371; Martineau, *Essays*, 1: 63, 265. Per contra, see Porter, *Human Intellect*, 582-588. Hodge, *Syst. Theol.*, 1: 596.

III. THEORIES WHICH VIRTUALLY DENY THE DOCTRINE OF PRESERVATION.

1. *Deism.*

This view represents the universe as a self-sustained mechanism, from which God withdrew as soon as he had created it, and which he left to a process of self-development.

Lord Herbert of Cherbury, *De Veritate*. Per contra, see Leslie and Leland, *Method with the Deists*. Blunt, *Dict.: Art. Deism*.

We object to this view that :

A. It rests upon a false analogy.

Man is able to construct a self-moving watch only because he employs preëxisting forces, such as gravity, elasticity, cohesion. But in a theory which likens the universe to a machine, these forces are the very things to be accounted for.

Woods, *Works*, 2: 40.

B. It is a system of anthropomorphism, while it professes to exclude anthropomorphism.

Because the upholding of all things would involve a multiplicity of minute cares if man were the agent, it conceives of the upholding of the universe

as involving such burdens in the case of God. Thus it saves the dignity of God, by virtually denying his omnipresence, omniscience, and omnipotence.

Chalmers, *Astronomical Discourses*, Works, 7: 68. Kurtz, *The Bible and Astronomy*, in introduction to *Hist. of Old Covenant*, lxxxii-xcviii.

C. It cannot be maintained without denying all providential interference, in the history of creation, and in the subsequent history of the world.

But the introduction of life, the creation of man, incarnation, regeneration, the communion of intelligent creatures with a present God, and interpositions of God in secular history are matters of fact.

Pearson on Infidelity, 97.

## 2. *Continuous creation.*

This view regards the universe as from moment to moment the result of a new creation.

Edwards, Works, 2: 486-490. Hopkins, Works, 1: 164-167. Emmons, Works, 4: 363-389, and especially, 381. Rothe, *Dogmatik*, 1: 126-160, especially 150; and *Theologische Ethik*, 1: 186-190. See statement of Rothe's view in *Bib. Sac.*, Jan., 1875: 144.

To this view we object upon the following grounds:

A. It contradicts our intuitive beliefs in substance and causality, by denying the existence and efficiency of second causes, and declaring these to be merely occasions for the exercise of divine energy.

B. It exaggerates God's power only by sacrificing his truth, love, and holiness;—for if the substances and powers of nature are not what they seem—namely, objective existences—God's veracity is impugned; if the human soul have no real freedom and life, God's love has made no self-communication to creatures; if God's will is the only force in the universe, God's holiness can no longer be asserted, for the divine will must in that case be regarded as the author of human sin.

C. As deism tends to atheism, so the doctrine of continuous creation tends to pantheism. Arguing that because we get our notion of force from the action of our own wills, therefore all force must be will and divine will, it is compelled to merge the human will in this all-comprehending will of God. Mind and matter alike become phenomena of one force which has the attributes of both, and with the distinct existence and personality of the human soul, we lose the distinct existence and personality of God.

Julius Müller, *Doctrine of Sin*, 1: 220-225. Philippi, *Glaubenslehre*, 2: 258-272. Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, 1: 577-581, 595. Baird, *Elohim Revealed*, 50.

## IV. REMARKS UPON THE DIVINE CONCURRENCE.

1. The divine efficiency interpenetrates that of nature and that of man without destroying or absorbing them. The influx of God's sustaining energy is such that all things retain their natural properties and powers. God does not work all, but "all in all"; (1 Cor. 12: 6; cf. Eph. 1: 23).

2. Though God preserves mind and body in their working, we are ever to remember that God concurs with the evil acts of his creatures only as they are natural acts, and not as they are evil; (Jer. 44: 4. Hab. 1: 13. James 1: 13).

On the importance of the idea of preservation in Christian doctrine, see Calvin, *Institutes*, 1: 182; (Chapter 16).

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### SECTION III.—PROVIDENCE.

#### I. DEFINITION OF PROVIDENCE.

Providence is that continuous agency of God by which he makes all the events of the physical and moral universe fulfil the original design with which he created it.

In explanation notice:

1. Providence is not to be taken merely in its etymological sense of foreseeing. It is foreseeing also, or a positive agency in connection with all the events of history.

2. Providence is to be distinguished from preservation. While preservation is a maintenance of the existence and powers of created things, providence is an actual care and control of them.

3. Since the original plan of God is all comprehending, the providence which executes the plan is all-comprehending also, embracing within its scope things small and great, and exercising care over individuals as well as over classes.

4. Providence is therefore various in its methods, and in its relation to free human action, is by turns preventive, permissive, directive, and determinative.

On the general subject of providence, see Philippi, *Glaubenslehre*, 2: 272-284. Calvin, *Institutes*, 1: 182-219. Dick, *Theology*, 1: 416-446. Hodge, *Syst. Theology*, 1: 581-616. *Bib. Sac.*, 12: 179; 21: 584; 26: 315; 30: 593.

#### II. PROOF OF THE DOCTRINE OF PROVIDENCE.

##### 1. *Scriptural proof.*

The Scripture witnesses to

A. A general providential government and control:

(a) Over the universe at large; (Ps. 103: 19. Dan. 4: 35. Eph. 1: 11—*τοῦ τὰ πάντα ἐνεργούντος*).

(b) Over the physical world; (Job 37: 5, 10. Ps. 104: 14; 135: 6, 7. Mat. 5: 45).

(c) Over the brute creation; (Ps. 104: 21, 27. Mat. 6: 26; 10: 29).

(d) Over the affairs of nations; (Job 12: 23. Ps. 22: 28; 66: 7. Acts 17: 26).

(e) Over man's birth and lot in life; (1 Sam. 16: 1. Ps. 139: 15, 16. Is. 45: 5. Jer. 1: 5. Gal. 1: 15).

(f) Over the outward successes and failures of men's lives; (Ps. 75: 6, 7. Luke 1: 52).

(g) Over things seemingly accidental or insignificant; (Proverbs 16: 33. Matt. 10: 30).

(h) In the protection of the righteous; (Ps. 4: 8; 5: 12; 63: 8; 121: 4. Rom. 8: 28).

(i) In the supply of the wants of God's people; (Gen. 22: 8, 14. Deut. 8: 3. Phil. 4: 19).

(j) In the arrangement of answers to prayer; (Ps. 68: 10. Is. 64: 4. Mat. 6: 8, 32, 33; cf. Rom. 8: 27. 1 Pet. 3: 12).

(k) In the exposure and punishment of the wicked; (Ps. 7 and 11).

B. A government and control extending to the free actions of men:

(a) To men's free acts in general; (Ex. 12: 36. 1 Sam. 24: 18. Ps. 33: 14, 15. Prov. 16: 1; 19: 21; 20: 24; 21: 1. Jer. 10: 23. Phil. 2: 13. Eph. 2: 10. James 4: 13-15).

(b) To the sinful acts of men; (Ex. 4: 21; 7: 13; cf. 8: 15. 2 Sam. 16: 10; 24: 1. Rom. 11: 32. 2 Thess. 2: 11).

God's providence with respect to men's evil acts is described in Scripture as of four sorts:

(b<sup>1</sup>) Preventive,—God by his providence prevents sin, which would otherwise be committed; (Gen. 20: 6; 31: 24. Num. 22: 12. Ps. 19: 13).

That he thus prevents sin is to be regarded as matter not of obligation, but of grace.

(b<sup>2</sup>) Permissive,—God permits men to cherish and to manifest the evil dispositions of their hearts; (Ps. 81: 12, 13. Hosea 4: 17. Acts 14: 16. Rom. 1: 24, 28; 3: 25).

God's permissive providence is simply the negative act of withholding impediments from the path of the sinner, instead of preventing his sin by the exercise of divine power. It implies no ignorance, passivity or indulgence, but consists with hatred of the sin and determination to punish it.

(b<sup>3</sup>) Directive,—God directs the evil acts of men to ends unforeseen and unintended by the agents; (Gen. 50: 20. Ps. 76: 10. Is. 10: 5. Acts 4: 27, 28).

When evil is in the heart and must come out, God orders its flow in one direction rather than in another, so that its course can be best controlled and least harm may result. This is sometimes called overruling providence.

(b<sup>4</sup>) Determinative,—God determines the bounds reached by the evil passions of his creatures, and the measure of their effects; (Job 1: 12; 2: 6. Ps. 124: 2. Rom. 9: 18. 2 Thess. 2: 7. Rev. 20: 2, 3).

Since moral evil is a germ capable of indefinite expansion, God's determining the measure of its growth does not alter its character or involve God's complicity with the perverse wills which cherish it.

## 2. *Rational proof.*

A. Arguments a priori from the divine attributes.

(a) From the immutability of God.

This makes it certain that he will execute his eternal plan of the universe and its history. But the execution of this plan involves not only creation and preservation, but also providence.

(b) From the benevolence of God.

This renders it certain that he will care for the intelligent universe he has created. What it was worth his while to create, it is worth his while to care for. But this care is providence.

For heathen ideas of providence, see Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, 2: 30. Epictetus, *Enchiridion*, sec. 41; also *Bib. Sac.*, 16: 374; *Appleton, Works*, 1: 146.

(c) From the justice of God.

As the source of moral law, God must assure the vindication of law, by administering justice in the universe,—rewarding the obedient and punishing the rebellious. But this administration of justice is providence.

B. Arguments a posteriori from the facts of nature and of history.

(a) The outward lot of individuals and nations is not wholly in their own hands, but is in many acknowledged respects subject to the disposal of a higher power:

Sermon on 'Providence in Political Revolutions,' in Farrar, *Science and Theology*, 228.

(b) The observed moral order of the world, although imperfect, cannot be accounted for without recognition of a divine providence.

Vice is discouraged and virtue rewarded, in ways which are beyond the power of mere nature. There must be a governing mind and will, and this mind and will must be the mind and will of God.

Bishop Butler, *Analogy*, Bohn's ed., 98.

### III. OPPOSING THEORIES.

#### 1. *Fatalism.*

Fatalism maintains the certainty but denies the freedom of human self-determination,—thus substituting fate for providence.

To this view we object that:

A. It contradicts consciousness, which testifies that we are free.

B. It exalts the divine power at the expense of God's truth, wisdom, holiness, love.

C. It destroys all evidence of the personality and freedom of God.

D. It practically makes necessity the only God, and leaves the imperatives of our moral nature without present validity or future vindication.

McCosh, *Intuitions*, 266. Kant, *Metaphysics of Ethics*, 52-74; 93-108. Mill, *Autobiography*, 168-170; *System of Logic*, 521-526. Hamilton, *Metaphysics*, 692. Stewart, *Active and Moral Powers of Man*, edited by Walker, 268-324.

#### 2. *Casualism.*

Casualism transfers the freedom of mind to nature, as fatalism transfers the fixity of nature to mind. It thus exchanges providence for chance.

Upon this view we remark that:

A. If chance be only another name for human ignorance—a name for the fact that there are trivial occurrences in life which have no meaning or relation to us,—we may acknowledge this, and still hold that providence arranges every so-called chance, for purposes beyond our knowledge. Chance in this sense is providential coincidence which we cannot understand, and do not need to trouble ourselves about.

B. If chance be taken in the sense of utter absence of all causal connections in the phenomena of matter and mind,—we oppose to this notion the fact that the causal judgment is formed in accordance with a fundamental and necessary law of human thought, and that no science or knowledge is possible without the assumption of its validity.

C. If chance be used in the sense of undesigning cause,—it is evidently insufficient to explain the regular and uniform sequences of nature, or the moral progress of the human race. These things argue a superintending and designing mind—in other words, a providence. Since reason demands not only a cause, but a sufficient cause, for the order of the physical and moral world, casualism must be ruled out.

### 3. *Theory of a merely general providence.*

Many who acknowledge God's control over the movements of planets and the destinies of nations, deny any divine arrangement of particular events.

Most of the arguments against deism are equally valid against the view just mentioned. This view is indeed only a form of deism which holds that God has not wholly withdrawn himself from the universe, but that his activity within it is limited to the maintenance of general laws.

Blunt, *Dict. Doct. and Hist. Theol.*, Art. Deism. Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, 2: 7, 66. Baden Powell, *Order of Nature*.

In addition to the arguments above alluded to, we may urge against this theory, that

A. General control over the course of nature and of history is impossible without control over the smallest particulars which affect the course of nature and of history.

Incidents so slight as well nigh to escape observation at the time of their occurrence, are frequently found to determine the whole future of a human life, and through that life, the fortunes of a whole empire and of a whole age.

Instances in point, are the sleeplessness of King Ahasuerus, and the seeming chance that led to the reading of the record of Mordecai's service, and to the salvation of the Jews in Persia; the storm which dispersed the Spanish armada and saved England from the papacy, and the storm that dispersed the French fleet gathered for the conquest of New England; the settling of New England by Puritans rather than by French Jesuits; the order of Council restraining Cromwell and his friends from sailing to America; Major Andre's lack of self-possession in presence of his captors; the fatal shot at Fort Sumter.

Appleton, *Works*, 1; 149, sq.

B. The love of God which prompts a general care for the universe, must also prompt a particular care for the smallest events which affect the happiness of his creatures.

It belongs to love to regard nothing as trifling or beneath its notice, which has to do with the interests of the object of its affection. Infinite love may therefore be expected to provide for all, even the minutest things in the creation.

Without belief in this particular care, men cannot long believe in God's general care. Faith in a particular providence is indispensable to the very existence of practical religion,—for men will not worship or recognize a God who has no direct relation to them.

C. In times of personal danger and in remarkable conjunctures of public affairs, men instinctively attribute to God a control of the events which take place around them.

The prayers which such startling emergencies force from men's lips, are proof that God is present and active in human affairs. This testimony of our mental constitution must be regarded as virtually the testimony of him who framed this constitution.

D. Christian experience confirms the declarations of Scripture that particular events are brought about by God with special reference to the good or ill of the individual. Such events occur at times in such direct connection with the Christian's prayers, that no doubt remains with regard to the providential arrangement of them.

The possibility of such divine agency in natural events cannot be questioned by one who, like the Christian, has had experience of the greater wonders of regeneration and daily intercourse with God, and who believes in the reality of creation, incarnation and miracles.

#### IV. RELATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE OF PROVIDENCE.

##### 1. *To miracles and works of grace.*

Particular providence is the agency of God in what seem to us the minor affairs of nature and of human life. Special providence is only an instance of God's particular providence, which has special relation to us or makes peculiar impression upon us. It is special, not as respects the means which God makes use of, but as respects the effect produced upon us.

In both particular and special providence, God apparently makes use of ordinary laws of nature to accomplish his purposes. In special providences we have only more impressive manifestations of the control which God always exercises over nature's laws.

But while providence, both general and special, works in the realm of nature and through the natural laws of matter and of mind, miracles and works of grace like regeneration, are supernatural acts, not to be explained from antecedent natural causes. While God can use natural forces for the accomplishment of his will, he is not, as man is, confined to these, but by his simple volition he can accomplish results far beyond the power of mere nature.

Miracles and special providences therefore are not to be confounded with each other, since the latter belong to the nature, the former to the realm



above nature. Certain of the wonders of Scripture, such as the destruction of Sennacherib's army and the dividing of the Red Sea, may possibly belong to the class of special providences rather than to the class of miracles.

Trench, *Miracles*, 19. Mozley, *Miracles*, 117-120. For the naturalistic view, see Tyndall on *Miracles and Special Providences*, in *Fragments of Science*, 45, 418. Per contra, see Farrar, on *Divine Providence and General Laws*, in *Science and Theology*, 54-80.

2. *To prayer and its answer.*

What has been said with regard to God's connection with nature, suggests the question how God can answer prayer consistently with the fixity of natural law. In reply we would remark,

A. Negatively, that the true solution is not to be reached :

(a) By making the sole effect of prayer to be its reflex influence upon the petitioner.

Prayer presupposes a God who hears and answers. It will not be offered, unless it is believed to accomplish objective as well as subjective results.

Tyndall, on *Prayer and Natural Law*, in *Fragments of Science*, 35.

(b) Nor, by holding that God answers prayer simply by spiritual means, such as the action of the Holy Spirit upon the spirit of man.

The realm of spirit is no less subject to law than the realm of matter. Scripture and experience, moreover, alike testify that in answer to prayer, events take place in the outward world which would not have taken place if prayer had not gone before ; (1 K. 18 : 42-45).

Versus Baden Powell, in *Essays and Reviews*, 106-162.

(c) Nor by maintaining that God suspends or breaks in upon the order of nature, in answering every prayer that is offered.

This view does not take account of natural laws as having objective existence, and as revealing the order of God's being. Omnipotence might thus suspend natural law, but wisdom, so far as we can see, would not.

(d) Nor by considering prayer as a physical force, linked in each case to its answer, as physical cause is linked to physical effect.

Prayer is not a force acting directly upon nature ; else there would be no discretion as to its answer. It can accomplish results in nature, only as it influences God.

It seems more in accordance with both Scripture and reason to say that :

B. God may answer prayer, even when that answer involves changes in the sequences of nature,

(a) By new combinations of natural forces, in regions withdrawn from our observation, so that effects are produced which these same forces left to themselves would never have accomplished.

As man combines the laws of chemical attraction and of combustion, to fire the gunpowder and split the rock asunder, so God may combine the laws of nature to bring about answers to prayer. In all this there may be no suspension or violation of law, but a use of law unknown to us.

See this view elaborated in Chalmers, *Works*, 2 : 314 ; 7 : 234. Hopkins, *Sermon on Prayer* Gauge, 16. Duke of Argyll, *Reign of Law*, 81-127.

Since prayer is nothing more or less than appeal to a personal and present God, whose granting or withholding of the requested blessing is believed to be determined by the prayer itself, we must conclude that prayer moves God, or in other words, induces the putting forth on his part of an imperative volition. But lest this should seem to imply mutability in God or inconstancy in nature, we remark, in addition, that :

(b) God may have so prearranged the laws of the material universe and the events of history, that while the answer to prayer is an expression of his will, it is granted through the working of natural agencies, and in perfect accordance with the general principle that results, both temporal and spiritual, are to be attained by intelligent creatures through the use of the appropriate and appointed means.

Since God is immanent in nature, an answer to prayer coming about through the intervention of natural law, may be as real a revelation of God's personal care, as if the laws of nature were suspended, and God interposed by an exercise of his creative power. Prayer and its answer, though having God's immediate volition as their connecting bond, may yet be provided for in the original plan of the universe.

McCosh, *Divine Government*, 215. Liddon, *Elements of Religion*, 178-203. Hamilton, *Autology*, 690-694.

(c) If asked whether this relation between prayer and its providential answer can be scientifically tested, we reply that it may be tested just as a father's love may be tested by a dutiful son.

(c<sup>1</sup>) There is a general proof of it in the past experience of the Christian, and in the past history of the church ; (Ps. 116: 1-8).

(c<sup>2</sup>) In condescension to human blindness, God may sometimes submit to a formal test of his faithfulness and power,—as in the case of Elijah and the priests of Baal ; (1 K. 18: 36-38).

(c<sup>3</sup>) When proof sufficient to convince the candid inquirer has been already given, it may not consist with the divine majesty to abide a test imposed by mere curiosity or scepticism,—as in the case of the Jews who sought a sign from heaven ; (Matt. 12: 39).

(c<sup>4</sup>) Since God's will is the link between prayer and its answer, there can be no such thing as a physical demonstration of its efficacy in any proposed case. Scientific tests have no application to things into which free will enters as a constitutive element.

Hopkins, *Prayer and the Prayer-gauge*, 22. Upham, *Interior Life*, 356.

### 3. *To Christian activity.*

Here the truth lies between the two extremes of quietism and naturalism.

A. In opposition to the false abnegation of human reason and will which quietism demands, we hold that God guides us, not by continual miracle, but by his natural providence and the energizing of our own faculties by his Spirit, so that we rationally and freely do our own work, and work out our salvation.

B. In opposition to naturalism, we hold that God is continually near the human spirit by his providential working, and that this providential working is so adjusted to the Christian's nature and necessities, as to furnish instruction with regard to duty, discipline of religious character, and needed help and comfort in trial.

In interpreting God's providences, as in interpreting Scripture, we are dependent upon the Holy Spirit. The work of the Spirit is indeed, in great part, an application of Scripture truth to present circumstances. While we never allow ourselves to act blindly and irrationally, but accustom ourselves to weigh evidence with regard to duty, we are to expect as the gift of the Spirit, an understanding of circumstances—a fine sense of God's providential purposes with regard to us, which shall make our true course plain to ourselves, although we may not always be able to explain it to others; (Ps. 32: 8. Prov. 3: 6. Phil. 1: 9—*αἰσθησεῖς*. James 1: 5).

4. *To the evil acts of free agents.*

A. Here we must distinguish between the natural agency and the moral agency of God, or between acts of permissive providence and acts of efficient causation. We are ever to remember that God neither works evil, nor causes his creatures to work evil. All sin is chargeable to the self-will and perversity of the creature;—to declare God the author of it, is the greatest of blasphemies.

B. But while man makes up his evil decision independently of God, God does by his natural agency, order the method in which this inward evil shall express itself, by limiting it in time, place and measure, or by guiding it to the end which his wisdom and love, and not man's intent, has set. In all this, however, God only allows sin to develop itself after its own nature, so that it may be known, abhorred, and if possible, overcome and forsaken.

C. In cases of persistent iniquity, God's providence still compels the sinner to accomplish the design with which he and all things have been created, namely, the manifestation of God's holiness. Even though he struggle against God's plan, yet he must by his very resistance serve it. His sin is made its own detector, judge and tormentor. His character and doom are made a warning to others. Refusing to glorify God in his salvation, he is made to glorify God in his destruction.

Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 2: 272-284. Edwards, Works, 4: 300-312.

## SECTION IV.—GOOD AND EVIL ANGELS.

As ministers of divine providence there is a class of finite beings, greater in intelligence and power than man in his present state, some of whom positively serve God's purpose by holiness and voluntary execution of his will, some negatively, by giving examples to the universe of defeated and punished rebellion, and by illustrating God's distinguishing grace in man's salvation.

Whately, *Good and Evil Angels*. Twisten, translation in *Bib. Sac.*, 1: 768; 2: 108. Philippi, *Glaubenslehre*, 2: 287-337; 3: 251-354. Birks, *Difficulties of Belief*, 78, sq. Herzog, *Encyclopädie, Arts.*: Engel; Teufel. Scott, *Existence of Evil Spirits*.

The scholastic subtleties which encumbered this doctrine in the middle ages, and the exaggerated representations of the power of evil spirits which then prevailed, have led, by a natural reaction, to an undue depreciation of it in more recent times.

For scholastic representations, see Thomas Aquinas, *Summa*, Migne's ed., 1: 833-993. Rosetti, *Shadow of Dante*, 14, 15.

There is, however, an antecedent probability that the ascending scale of created intelligences does not reach its topmost point in man. As the distance between man and the lowest forms of life, is filled in with numberless gradations of being, so it is probable that between man and God, there exist creatures of higher than human intelligence.

Quenstedt, *Theol.*, 1: 629.

This probability is turned to certainty by the express declarations of Scripture. The doctrine is interwoven with the later as well as with the earlier books of revelation.

We first consider the

## I. SCRIPTURE STATEMENTS AND INTIMATIONS.

1. *As to the nature and attributes of angels.*

A. They are created beings; (Col. 1: 16; cf. 1 Pet. 3: 22).

B. They are incorporeal beings; (Hebrews 1: 14—*πνεύματα*. In Gen. 6:2, 'sons of God'—not angels, but descendants of Seth and worshippers of the true God; see Murphy, *Com. in loco*. Ps. 78: 25, 'Angels' food'—bread coming from heaven where angels dwell; see Perowne, *in loco*. In Mat. 22: 30 *ὡς ἄγγελοι*, and in Luke 20: 36 *ισάγγελοι*, imply only that angels are without distinctions of sex).

C. They are personal—that is, intelligent and voluntary—agents; (2 Sam. 14: 20. Rev. 22: 9. Luke 4: 34. 2 Tim. 2: 26).

D. They are possessed of superhuman intelligence and power, yet an intelligence and power that has its fixed limits; (Mat. 24: 36. 1 Pet. 1: 12. Psalm 103: 20. 2 Thess. 1: 7. 2 Pet. 2: 11. Rev. 20: 2, 10; cf. Ps. 72: 18).

E. They are an order of intelligences, distinct from man, and older than man; (Gen. 3: 1; cf. Rev. 20: 2. Job. 38: 7. 1 Cor. 6: 3. Heb. 1: 14—*λειτονοργικὰ*; 12: 22, 23. In Rev. 22: 9, *σύνδουλος* intimates likeness to men not in nature, but in service and subordination to God, the only proper object of worship.

The constant representation of angels as personal beings in Scripture, cannot be explained as a personification of abstract good and evil, in accommodation to Jewish superstitions, without wresting many narrative passages from their obvious sense; implying on the part of Christ either dissimulation or ignorance as to an important point of doctrine; and surrendering belief in the inspiration of the Old Testament from which these Jewish views of angelic beings were derived.

The same remark applies to the view which regards Satan as but a collective term for all evil beings, human or superhuman. The Scripture representations of the progressive rage of the great adversary, from his first assault on human virtue in Genesis to his final overthrow in Revelation, join with the testimony of Christ just mentioned, to forbid any other conclusion than this, that there is a personal being of great power, who carries on organized opposition to the divine government.

Versus Bushnell, *Nature and the Supernatural*, 123-139. Per contra, see Smith's *Bible Dictionary*, Arts.: Angels, Demons, Dæmoniæ, Satan. Trench, *Studies in the Gospels*, 16-26.

## 2. *As to their number and organization.*

A. They are of great multitude; (Deut. 33: 2. Ps. 68: 17. Daniel 7: 10. Rev. 5: 11).

B. They constitute a company as distinguished from a race; (Mat. 22: 30. Luke 20: 36).

C. They are of various ranks and endowments; (Col. 1: 16. 1 Thess. 4: 16. Jude 9).

D. They have an organization; (1 Sam. 1: 11. 1 K. 22: 19. Mat. 26 53; 25: 41. Eph. 2: 2).

With regard to the cherubim (Gen. 3: 24; Ex. 37: 6-9; Ez. 1 and 10),—or the 'seraphim' of Isaiah (6: 1-8) and 'living creatures' of the book of Revelation (4: 6-8—*ξῶα*), with which the cherubim are to be identified,—the most probable interpretation is that which regards them not as actual beings of higher rank than man, but as symbolic appearances, intended to illustrate truths pertaining to the divine government in nature or in the church.

The view that the cherubim are symbols of nature, as pervaded by the divine energy and subordinated to the divine purposes, is not so satisfactory as the view that they represent redeemed humanity, endowed with all the creature perfections lost by the fall, and made to be the dwelling place of God. The latter view, however, rests largely upon the reading in Rev. 5: 9

—ἡγόρασας τῶ Θεῷ ἡμᾶς ἐν τῶ αἵματι σου. Here A and Tischendorf omit ἡμᾶς. B, V and Tregelles, however, still retain it.

For the former view, see Smith's Bible Dictionary, Art.: Cherub; Alford, Com. on Rev. 4: 6-8, and Hulsean Lectures for 1841, vol. 1, lecture 2; Ebrard, Dogmatik, 1: 278. For the latter view, see Fairbairn, Typology, 1: 185-208; Elliott, Horæ Apocalypticæ, 1: 87.

3. *As to their moral character.*

A. They were all created holy; (Gen. 1: 31).

B. They had a probation. (This we infer from 1 Tim. 5: 21—τῶν ἐκλεκτῶν ἀγγέλων; cf. 1 Pet. 1: 1, 2—ἐκλεκτοῖς εἰς ὑπακοήν).

C. Some preserved their integrity; (Ps. 89: 7. Matt. 25: 31).

D. Some fell from their estate of innocence; (John 8: 44. 2 Pet. 2: 4. Jude 6).

E. The good are confirmed in good; (Mat. 6: 10; 18: 10. 2 Cor. 11: 14).

F. The evil are confirmed in evil; (Mat. 13: 19. 1 John 5: 18, 19—ὁ πονηρὸς; cf. John 8: 44).

4. *As to their employments.*

A. The employments of good angels.

(a) They stand in the presence of God and worship him; (Ps. 29: 1, 2; 89: 5, 7; see Perowne, in loco. Mat. 18: 10; see Lange, in loco).

(b) They rejoice in God's works; (Job 38: 7).

(c) They execute God's will; (Ps. 103: 20, 21).

(c<sup>1</sup>) By working in nature; (Ps. 104: 4; see Alford on Heb. 1: 7).

(c<sup>2</sup>) By guiding the affairs of nations; (Dan. 10: 13, 21; 11: 1; 12: 1).

(c<sup>3</sup>) By watching over the interests of particular churches; (Rev. 1: 20; see Alford, Com. in loco; cf. 1 Cor. 11: 10; Eph. 3: 10; Col. 2: 18; 1 Tim. 5: 21).

(c<sup>4</sup>) By assisting and protecting individual believers; (1 K. 19: 5. Ps. 91: 11. Dan. 6: 22. Mat. 4: 11; 18: 10; cf. 6. See Meyer, Com. in loco. Luke 16: 22; cf. Acts 12: 15, and Hackett, Com. in loco. Heb. 1: 14).

(c<sup>5</sup>) By punishing God's enemies; (2 K. 19: 35. Acts 12: 23).

A general survey of this Scripture testimony as to the employments of good angels, leads us to the following conclusions:

First,—that good angels are not to be considered as the mediating agents of God's regular and common providence, but as the ministers of his special providence in the affairs of his church. He 'makes his angels winds and flames of fire' not in his ordinary procedure, but in connection with special displays of his power for moral ends; (Deut. 33: 2. Acts 7: 53. Gal. 3: 19. Heb. 2: 2).

Their intervention is apparently occasional and exceptional—not at their own option, but only as it is permitted or commanded by God. Hence we are not to conceive of angels as coming between us and God, nor are we, without special revelation of the fact, to attribute to them in any particular case, the effects which the Scriptures generally ascribe to divine providence.

Like miracles, therefore, angelic appearances mark God's entrance upon new epochs in the unfolding of his plans. Hence we read of angels at the completion of creation (Job 38: 7); at the giving of the law (Gal. 3: 19); at the birth of Christ (Luke 2: 13); at the two temptations in the wilderness and in Gethsemane (Mat. 4: 11, Luke 22: 43); at the resurrection (Matt. 28: 2); at the ascension (Acts 1: 10); at the final judgment (Mat. 25: 31).

Secondly,—that their power, as being in its nature dependent and derived, is exercised in accordance with the laws of the spiritual and natural world.

They cannot like God, create, perform miracles, act without means, search the heart. Unlike the Holy Spirit, who can influence the human mind directly, they can influence men only in ways analogous to those by which men influence each other. As evil angels may tempt men to sin, so it is probable that good angels may attract men to holiness.

The substance of these remarks may be found in Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, 1: 637-645.

B. The employments of evil angels.

(*a*) They oppose God and strive to defeat his will. This is indicated

(*a*<sup>1</sup>) In the names applied to their chief; (Satan=adversary, primarily to God; Job 1: 6. Devil=slanderer, of God to men, Gen 3: 4, 5; of men to God, Job 1: 9, 11; 2: 4, 5; Rev. 12: 10).

(*a*<sup>2</sup>) In the description of the man of sin, (2 Thess. 2: 4, ὁ ἀντικείμενος; cf. verse 9, κατ' ἐνέργειαν τοῦ Σατανᾶ).

(*b*) They hinder man's temporal and eternal welfare :

(*b*<sup>1</sup>) By exercising a certain control over natural phenomena; (Job 1: 12, 16, 19; 2: 7. Luke 13: 16. Acts 10: 38. 2 Cor. 12: 7. 1 Thess. 2: 18. Heb. 2: 14).

(*b*<sup>2</sup>) By temptation; (Gen. 3: 1, sq.; cf. Rev. 20: 2. Mat. 4: 3. John 13: 27. Acts 5: 3; 13: 10. Eph. 2: 2. 1 Thess. 3: 5. 1 Pet. 5: 8).

Satan's temptations are represented as both negative (Mark 4: 15, he takes away the word sown), and positive (Mat. 13: 39, he sows tares). He controls many subordinate evil spirits (Mat. 25: 41, one διάβολος—many ἄγγελοι or δαίμονες; cf. Mark 5: 9, 12; Eph. 2: 2; 6: 12), and through their agency he may accomplish his purposes.

(*b*<sup>3</sup>) By possession,—either physical (Mark 5: 2-4), or spiritual (Acts 16: 16).

Possession is distinguished from bodily or mental disease, though such disease often accompanies or results from the possession; (Mat. 17: 15, 18; Mark 9: 25). The demons speak in their own persons, with supernatural knowledge, and are directly addressed by Christ; (Mark 3: 11, 12; Luke 8: 30). Jesus recognizes Satanic agency in these cases of possession, and rejoices in the casting out of demons, as a sign of Satan's downfall; (Luke 10: 17, 18).

These facts render it impossible to interpret the narratives of demoniac possession as popular descriptions of abnormal physical or mental conditions.

Trench, *Miracles*, 125-136. Smith's *Bible Dict.*, 1: 586.

(c) Yet, in spite of themselves, they execute God's plans :

(c<sup>1</sup>) Of punishing the ungodly ; (Ps. 78 : 49. 1 K. 22 : 21).

(c<sup>2</sup>) Of chastening the good ; (Job 1 and 2. 1 Cor. 5 : 5. 1 Tim. 1 : 20).

(c<sup>3</sup>) Of illustrating the nature and fate of moral evil ; (Mat. 8 : 29 ; 25 : 41. 2 Thess. 2 : 6. James 2 : 19. Rev. 12 : 9, 12 ; 20 : 10).

A survey of the Scripture testimony with regard to the employments of evil spirits, leads to the following general conclusions :

First,—the power of evil spirits over men is not independent of the human will. This power cannot be exercised without at least the original consent of the human will, and may be resisted and shaken off through prayer and faith in God ; (Luke 22 : 31, 40. Eph. 6 : 16. James 4 : 7. 1 Pet. 5 : 9).

Secondly,—their power is limited, both in time and in extent, by the permissive will of God. Evil spirits are neither omnipotent, omniscient, nor omnipresent. We are to attribute disease and natural calamity to their agency, only when this is matter of special revelation. Opposed to God as evil spirits are, God compels them to serve his purposes. Their power for harm lasts but for a season, and ultimate judgment and punishment will vindicate God's permission of their evil agency ; (1 Cor. 10 : 13. Jude 6).

## II. OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF ANGELS.

### 1. *To the doctrine of angels in general.*

A. That it is opposed to the modern scientific view of the world, as a system of definite forces and laws.

We reply that whatever truth there may be in this modern view, it does not exclude the play of divine or human free agency. It does not therefore exclude the possibility of angelic agency.

B. That it is opposed to the modern doctrine of infinite space above and beneath us—a space peopled with worlds. With the surrender of the old conception of the firmament, as a boundary separating this world from the regions beyond, it is claimed that we must give up all belief in a heaven of the angels.

We reply that the notions of an infinite universe, of heaven as a definite place, and of spirits as confined to fixed locality, are mere hypotheses, without warrant either in reason or in Scripture. We know nothing of the modes of existence of pure spirits.

For rationalistic view, see Strauss, *Glaubenslehre*, 1 : 670–675. Per contra, see Van Oosterzee, *Christian Dogmatics*, 1 : 308–317 ; Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, 127–136.

### 2. *To the doctrine of evil angels in particular.*

It is objected that :

A. The idea of the fall of angels is self contradictory, since a fall determined by pride, presupposes pride,—that is, a fall before the fall.

We reply that the objection ignores the relation between inward apostasy and its outward manifestation. Pride was itself the fall. How an unholy disposition could have originated in spirits created pure, is an insoluble problem. Our faith in God's holiness, however, compels us to attribute the origin of this evil disposition, not to the Creator, but to the creature.



B. It is irrational to suppose that Satan should have been able to change his whole nature by a single act, so that he thenceforth willed only evil.

But we reply that the circumstances of that decision are unknown to us, while the power of single acts permanently to change character, is matter of observation among men.

C. It is impossible that so wise a being should enter upon a hopeless rebellion.

We answer that no amount of mere knowledge ensures right moral action. If men gratify present passion, in spite of their knowledge that the sin involves present misery and future perdition, it is not impossible that Satan may have done the same.

D. It is inconsistent with the benevolence of God to create and uphold spirits, whom he knows will be and do evil.

We reply that this is no more inconsistent with God's benevolence, than the creation and preservation of men, whose action God overrules for the furtherance of his purposes, and whose iniquity he finally brings to light and punishes.

E. The notion of organization among evil spirits is self-contradictory, since the nature of evil is to sunder and divide.

We reply that such organization of evil spirits is no more impossible, than the organization of wicked men, for the purpose of furthering their selfish ends. Common hatred to God may constitute a principle of union among them, as among men.

F. The doctrine is morally pernicious, as transferring the blame of human sin to the being or beings who tempt men thereto.

We reply that neither conscience nor Scripture allow temptation to be an excuse for sin, or regard Satan as having power to compel the human will. The objection, moreover, contradicts our observation,—for only where the personal existence of Satan is recognized, do we find sin recognized in its true nature.

G. The doctrine degrades man, by representing him as the tool and slave of Satan.

We reply that it does indeed show his actual state to be degraded, but only with the result of exalting our idea of his original dignity, and of his possible glory in Christ. It is not improbable, moreover, that the fact that man's sin was suggested from without and not from within, may be the one mitigating circumstance which renders possible his redemption.

Trench, *Studies in the Gospels*, 17. Birks, *Difficulties of Belief*, 78-100. For fuller statement of these objections and answers, see Philippi, *Glaubenslehre*, 3: 251-284. Ebrard, *Dogmatik*, 1: 291-293.

### III. PRACTICAL USES OF THE DOCTRINE OF ANGELS.

#### 1. *Uses of the doctrine of good angels.*

A. It gives us a new sense of the greatness of the divine resources, and of God's grace in our creation, to think of the multitude of unfallen intelligences who executed the divine purposes before man appeared.

B. It strengthens our faith in God's providential care, to know that spirits of so high rank are deputed to minister to creatures who are environed with temptations and are conscious of sin.

C. It teaches us humility, that beings of so much greater knowledge and power than ours should gladly perform these unnoticed services, in behalf of those whose only claim upon them is that they are children of the same common Father.

D. It helps us in the struggle against sin, to learn that these messengers of God are near, to mark our wrong doing if we fall, and to sustain us if we resist temptation.

E. It enlarges our conceptions of the dignity of our own being, and of the boundless possibilities of our future existence, to remember these forms of typical innocence and love, that praise and serve God unceasingly in heaven.

2. *Uses of the doctrine of evil angels.*

A. It illustrates the real nature of sin, and the depth of the ruin to which it may bring the soul, to reflect upon the present moral condition and eternal wretchedness to which these spirits, so highly endowed, have brought themselves by their rebellion against God.

B. It inspires a salutary fear and hatred of the first subtle approaches of evil from within or from without, to remember that these may be the covert advances of a personal and malignant being, who seeks to overcome our virtue, and to involve us in his own apostasy and destruction.

C. It shuts us up to Christ, as the only Being who is able to deliver us or others from the enemy of all good.

Van Oosterzee, *Christian Dogmatics*, 1: 316. Brooks, *Satan's Devices*. Robert Hall, *Works*, 3: 35-51.

## PART V.

### ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN.

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#### CHAPTER I.

##### PRELIMINARY.

###### I. MAN A CREATION OF GOD.

The fact of man's creation is declared in Gen. 1: 27; 2: 7. A consideration of these passages in the light of modern science enables us to draw the following conclusions:

1. The Scriptures, on the one hand, negative the idea that man is the mere product of unreasoning natural forces. They refer his existence to a cause outside of nature, namely, to the creative act of God.

2. But, on the other hand, the Scriptures do not disclose the method of man's creation. Whether man's physical system is, or is not, derived by natural descent, from the lower animals, the record of creation does not inform us. As the command "let the earth bring forth the living creature" (Gen. 1: 24) does not exclude the idea of mediate creation through natural generation, so the "forming of man from the dust of the ground" (Gen. 2: 7) does not in itself determine whether the creation of man's body was mediate or immediate.

3. Psychology, however, comes in to help our interpretation of Scripture. The radical differences between man's soul and the principle of intelligence in the lower animals, especially man's possession of general ideas, the moral sense and the power of self-determination, show that that which chiefly constitutes him man could not have been derived by any natural process of development from the inferior creatures. We are compelled, then, to believe that God's "breathing into man's nostrils the breath of life" (Gen. 2: 7) was an act of immediate creation, like the first introduction of life upon the planet.

Porter, *Human Intellect*, 384, 386, 397. Hopkins, *Outline Study of Man*, 8-23. Chadbourne, *Instinct*, 187-211. *Bib. Sac.*, 29: 275-282.

Max Müller, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Language*, Nos. 1, 2, 3.

4. Comparative physiology, moreover, has up to the present time, done nothing to prevent the extension of this doctrine to man's body. No single instance has yet been adduced of the transformation of one animal species into another, either by natural or by artificial selection—much less has it been demonstrated that the body of the brute has ever been developed into that of man. Until this shall be done, the view that man's physical system is descended by natural generation from some ancestral simian form,

can be regarded only as an unproved hypothesis. Since the soul, then, is an immediate creation of God, and the forming of man's body is mentioned by the Scripture writer in direct connection with this creation of the spirit, we prefer to believe that man's body was an immediate creation also.

For the theory of natural selection, see Darwin, *Origin of Species*, 398-424; *Descent of Man*, 2:368-387. Huxley, *Critiques and Addresses*, 241-269; *Man's place in Nature*, 71-138; *Lay Sermons*, 323. Per contra, see Wallace, *Natural Selection*, 338-360. Mivart, *Genesis of Species*, 202-222; 259-307; *Man and Apes*, 88, 149-192. Quatrefages, *Natural History of Man*, 64-87. Dawson, *Story of the Earth and Man*, 321-329. Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, 136. Duke of Argyll, *Primeval Man*, 38-75.

The truth that man is the offspring of God, implies the correlative truth of a common divine Fatherhood. God is Father of all men, in that he originates and sustains them as personal beings like in nature to himself. Even toward sinners God holds this natural relation of Father. It is his fatherly love indeed which provides the atonement. Thus the demands of holiness are met and the prodigal is restored to the privileges of sonship which have been forfeited by transgression; (Mal. 2: 10. Luke 3: 38; 15: 11-32. John 3: 16. Heb. 12: 9). This natural Fatherhood, therefore, does not exclude, but prepares the way for, God's special Fatherhood toward those who have been regenerated by his Spirit and who have believed on his Son; (John 1: 12, 13. Rom. 8: 14, 15, 17. 2 Cor. 6: 17, 18. Gal. 3: 26; 4: 6. 1 John 3: 1, 2).

On the common Fatherhood of God, see Crawford, *Fatherhood of God*, 9-26; 138-159. Per contra, see Candlish, *Fatherhood of God*; Wright, *Fatherhood of God*.

## II. UNITY OF THE RACE.

The Scriptures teach that the whole human race is descended from a single pair; (Gen. 1: 27, 28; 2: 7, 22; 3: 20; 9: 19).

This truth lies at the foundation of Paul's doctrine of the organic unity of mankind in the transgression, and of the provision of salvation for the race in Christ, (Rom. 5: 12, 19; cf. Heb. 2: 16); it also constitutes the ground of man's obligation of natural brotherhood to every member of the race; (Acts 17: 26).

The Scripture statements may be corroborated by considerations drawn from history and science.

### 1. *Argument from History.*

So far as the history of nations and tribes in both hemispheres can be traced, the evidence points to a common origin and ancestry in Central Asia.

Sir Henry Rawlinson, quoted in Burgess, *Antiquity and Unity of the Race*, 156, 157. Quatrefages, *Natural History of Man*; *Unité de l'Espèce Humaine*. Godron, *Unité de l'Espèce Humaine*, 2: 412, sq. Guyot, *Earth and Man*, 298-334. Pickering, *Races of Man*, 283-305. Bunsen, *Philos. Univ. Hist.*, 2: 112. Smyth, *Unity of Human Races*, 223-236.

## 2. *Argument from Language.*

Comparative philology points to a common origin of all the more important languages, and furnishes no evidence that the less important are not also so derived.

On Sanscrit as connecting link between the Indo-Germanic languages, see Max Müller, *Science of Language*, 1: 146-165; 326-342. On Egyptian, as connecting Indo-European and Semitic tongues, see Bunsen, *Egypt's Place*, 1: Preface, 10. Smith, *Bible Dict.*, art. : *Confusion of Tongues*. Whitney, *Study of Language*, 307, 308; *Life and Growth of Language*, 269. *Bib. Sac.* 1870: 162. Smyth, *Unity of Human Races*, 199-222.

## 3. *Argument from Psychology.*

The existence, among all families of mankind, of common mental and moral characteristics, as evinced in common maxims, capacities and tendencies, in the prevalence of similar traditions, and in the universal applicability of one philosophy and religion, is most easily and naturally explained upon the theory of a common origin.

Zöckler, in *Jahrbuch für deutsche Theologie*, 8: 71-90. Hodge, *Syst. Theol.*, 2: 77-91. Smyth, *Unity of Human Races*, 236-240. Prichard, *Nat. Hist. of Man*, 2: 657-714. Max Müller, *Science of Language*, 2: 444-455.

## 4. *Argument from Physiology.*

A. It is the common judgment of comparative physiologists that man constitutes but a single species. The differences which exist between the various families of mankind are to be regarded as varieties of this species. In proof of these statements we urge:

(a) The numberless intermediate gradations which connect the so-called races with each other.

(b) The essential identity of all races in cranial, osteological and dental characteristics.

(c) The fertility of unions between individuals of the most diverse types, and the continuous fertility of the offspring of such unions.

Owen, quoted in Burgess, *Ant. and Unity of Race*, 185. Huxley *Critiques and Addresses*, 163; *Origin of Species*, 113.

B. Unity of species is presumptive evidence of unity of origin. Oneness of origin furnishes the simplest explanation of specific uniformity, if indeed the very conception of species does not imply the repetition and reproduction of a primordial type-idea impressed at its creation upon an individual empowered to transmit this type-idea to its successors.

Dana, quoted in Burgess, 186-194, and *Bib. Sac.*, Oct., 1857: 862-866.

(a) To this view is opposed the theory propounded by Agassiz, of different centres of creation, and of different types of humanity corresponding to the varying fauna and flora of each. But this theory makes the plural origin of man an exception in creation. Science points rather to a single

origin of each species, whether vegetable or animal. If man be, as this theory grants, a single species, he should be, by the same rule, restricted to one continent in his origin. This theory, moreover, applies an unproved hypothesis with regard to the distribution of organized beings in general, to the very being whose whole nature and history show conclusively that he is an exception to such a general rule, if one exists. Since man can adapt himself to all climes and conditions, the theory of separate centres of creation is, in his case, gratuitous and unnecessary.

Agassiz, *Essay on Provinces of the Animal World*, in Nott and Gliddon's *Types of Mankind*. Per contra, see *Bib. Sac.*, 19: 607-632. *Princeton Review*, 1862: 435-464.

(b) It is objected, moreover, that the diversities of size, color and physical conformation, among the various families of mankind, are inconsistent with the theory of a common origin. But we reply that these diversities are of a superficial character, and can be accounted for by corresponding diversities of condition and environment. Changes which have been observed and recorded within historic times, show that the differences alluded to may be the result of slowly accumulated divergences from one and the same original and ancestral type.

Burgess, *Antiquity and Unity of Race*, 195-202. Dawson, *Story of Earth and Man*, 360. Morris, *Conflict of Science and Religion*, 325-385. Keil and Delitzsch, *Com. on Pentateuch*, 1: 116. Zöckler, in *Jahrbuch für deutsche Theologie*, 8: 51-71. Prichard, *Researches*, 5: 547-552; *Nat. Hist. of Man*, 2: 644-656. Smyth, *Unity of Human Races*, 255-283. Duke of Argyll, *Primeval Man*, 96-108.

### III. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF HUMAN NATURE.

#### 1. *The Dichotomous Theory.*

Man has a twofold nature, on the one hand material, on the other hand immaterial. He consists of body, and of spirit or soul. That there are two and only two elements in man's being is a fact to which consciousness testifies. This testimony is confirmed by Scripture, in which the prevailing representation of man's constitution is that of dichotomy. This will appear by considering:

A. The record of man's creation (Gen. 2: 7), in which, as the result of the inbreathing of the divine Spirit, the body becomes possessed and vitalized by a single principle—the living soul; (cf. Job 27: 3; 32: 8; 33: 4).

B. Passages in which the human soul or spirit is distinguished from the divine Spirit from whom it proceeded, and from the body which it inhabits; (Num. 16: 22. Zech. 12: 1. 1 Cor. 2: 11. Heb. 12: 9. Gen. 35: 18. 1 K. 17: 21. Eccl. 12: 7. James 2: 26).

C. The interchangeable use of the terms 'soul' and 'spirit'; (Gen. 41: 8—רוּחַ אֱלֹהִים, cf. Ps. 42: 6—רוּחַ יְהוָה צְרַף כֶּסֶף. Mat. 20: 28—δοῦναι τὴν ψυχὴν; cf. Mat. 27: 50—ἀφῆκε τὸ πνεῦμα. Heb. 12: 23—πνεύμασι δικαίων τετελειωμένων, cf. Rev. 6: 9—ψυχὰς τῶν ἐσφαγμένων).

D. The mention of body and soul (or spirit) as together constituting the whole man; (Mat. 10: 28; 1 Cor. 5: 3; 6: 20. 3 John, 2).

For the dichotomous theory see Hahn, Bib. Theology N. T., 390, sq. Schmid, Bib. Theology N. T., 503. Weiss, Bib. Theology N. T., 214. Luthardt, Compendium der Dogmatik, 112, 113. Hofmann, Schriftbeweis, 1: 294-298, Kahnis, Dogmatik, 1: 549; 3: 249. Nitzsch, Christian Doctrine, 202. Harless, on Eph. 4: 23, and Christian Ethics, 22. Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk, 1: 164-168. Tholuck, Ebrard (in Olshausen's Com.), and Lünemann (in Meyer's Com.), on Heb. 4: 12. Hodge, in Princeton Review, 1865: 116; Systematic Theol., 2: 47-51. Ebrard, Dogmatik 1: 261-263.

## 2. *The Trichotomous Theory.*

Side by side with this common representation of human nature as consisting of two parts, are found passages which at first sight appear to favor trichotomy. It must be acknowledged that *πνεῦμα* and *ψυχή*, although often used interchangeably and always designating the same indivisible substance, are sometimes employed as contrasted terms; (1 Thess. 5: 23; Heb. 4: 12; cf. 1 Cor. 2: 14; 15: 44; Eph. 4: 23; Jude 19).

In this more accurate use, *ψυχή* denotes man's immaterial part in its inferior powers and activities,—as *ψυχή*, man is a conscious individual, and in common with the brute creation, has an animal life, together with appetite, imagination, memory, understanding. *Πνεῦμα*, on the other hand, denotes man's immaterial part in its higher capacities and faculties,—as *πνεῦμα*, man is a being related to God and possessing powers of reason, conscience and free-will, which difference him from the brute creation and constitute him responsible and immortal. The truth in trichotomy is simply this, that man has a triplicity of endowment, in virtue of which the single soul has relations respectively to matter, to self and to God.

The trichotomous theory, however, as it is ordinarily defined, endangers the unity and immateriality of our higher nature, by holding that man consists of three *substances* or three component *parts*,—body, soul and spirit,—and that soul and spirit are as distinct from each other as soul and body. The advocates of this view differ among themselves as to the nature of the *ψυχή* and its relation to the other elements of our being, some (as Delitzsch) holding that the *ψυχή* is an efflux of the *πνεῦμα*, distinct in substance, but not in essence, even as the divine Word is distinct from God, while yet he is God; others (as Göschel) regarding the *ψυχή*, not as a distinct substance, but as a resultant of the union of the *πνεῦμα* and the *σῶμα*. Still others (as Cremer) hold the *ψυχή* to be the subject of the personal life whose principle is the *πνεῦμα*.

But this theory of a tripartite nature in man appears untenable in all its forms, not only for the reasons already urged in proof of the dichotomous theory, but from the following additional considerations:

A. *Πνεῦμα* as well as *ψυχή* belongs to the brute creation; (Eccl. 3: 21—*הַבְּהֵמָה וְהַבְּחַיָּה וְהַבְּרֵמֶשׂה וְהַבְּעוֹף הַשָּׁמַיִם*. Rev. 16: 3—*πᾶσα ψυχή ἀπέθανεν ἐν τῇ θαλάσῃ*).

B. *Ψυχή* is ascribed to Jehovah; (Amos 6: 8. Is. 42: 1. Heb. 10: 38).

C. The disembodied dead are called *ψυχαί*; (Rev. 6: 9; cf. 20: 4.)

D. The highest exercises of religion are attributed to the *ψυχή*; (Mark 12: 30. Luke 1: 47. Heb. 6: 19. James 1: 21).

E. To lose this *ψυχή* is to lose all; (Mark 8: 36, 37).

F. The passages chiefly relied upon as supporting trichotomy may better be explained upon the view already indicated, that soul and spirit are not two distinct substances or parts, but that they designate the same immaterial principle from different points of view; (1 Thess. 5: 23—τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ ἡ ψυχή καὶ τὸ σῶμα—not a scientific enumeration of the constituent parts of human nature, but a comprehensive sketch of that nature in its chief relations; cf. Mark 12: 30. Heb. 4: 12—ἄχρη μερισμοῦ ψυχῆς καὶ πνεύματος, ἀρμῶν τε καὶ μυελῶν—not the dividing of soul *from* spirit, but the piercing of the soul and of the spirit, even to their very joints and marrow, i. e., to the very depths of the spiritual nature.

For trichotomous theory, see Olshausen, *Opuscula*, 134; Com. on 1 Thess. 5: 23. Beck, *Biblische Seelenlehre*, 31. Delitzsch, *Biblical Psychology*, 117, 118. Göschel, in Herzog, *Realencyclopädie*, art.: Seele; also, art. by Auberlen: Geist des Menschen. Cremer, N. T. Lexicon, on πνεῦμα and ψυχή. Usteri, Paulin. Lehrbegriff, 384, sq. Neander, *Planting and Training*, 394. Van Oosterzee, *Christian Dogmatics*, 365, 366. Boardman, in *Bap. Quarterly*, 1: 177, 325, 428. Heard, *Tripartite Nature of Man*, 62–114.

We conclude that the immaterial part of man, viewed as an individual and conscious life, capable of possessing and animating a physical organism, is called *ψυχή*; viewed as a rational and moral agent, susceptible of divine influence and indwelling, this same immaterial part is called πνεῦμα. The πνεῦμα, then, is man's nature looking Godward, and capable of receiving and manifesting the Πνεῦμα ἅγιον. The ψυχή is man's nature looking earthward, and touching the world of sense. We say with Porter, that "the spirit of man, in addition to its higher endowments, may also possess the lower powers which vitalize dead matter into a human body." Man's being is therefore not trichotomous, but dichotomous, and his immaterial part, while possessing duality of powers, has unity of substance.

Porter, *Human Intellect*, 39.

This view of the soul and spirit as different aspects of the same spiritual principle, furnishes a refutation of three important errors:

(a) That of the Gnostics, who held that the πνεῦμα is part of the divine essence, and therefore incapable of sin.

(b) That of the Apollinarians, who taught that Christ's humanity embraced only σῶμα and ψυχή, while his divine nature furnished the πνεῦμα.

(c) That of the Semi-pelagians, who excepted the human πνεῦμα from the dominion of original sin.

The doctrine, moreover, in contrast with the heathen view, puts honor upon man's body:



(a) As proceeding from the hand of God, and as therefore originally pure; (Gen. 1: 31).

(b) As intended to be the dwelling place of the divine Spirit; (1 Cor. 6: 19).

(c) As containing the germ of the heavenly body; (1 Cor. 15: 44. Rom. 8: 11—*διὰ τὸ ἐνοικοῦν Πνεῦμα*—Tregelles).

#### IV. ORIGIN OF THE SOUL.

Three theories with regard to this subject have divided opinion:

##### 1. *The Theory of Preëxistence.*

This view was held by Plato, Philo and Origen; by the first in order to explain the soul's possession of ideas not derived from sense; by the second to account for its imprisonment in the body; by the third to justify the disparity of conditions in which men enter the world.

We concern ourselves, however, only with the forms which the view has assumed in modern times. Kant and Julius Müller in Germany, and Edward Beecher in America, have advocated it, upon the ground that the inborn depravity of the human will can be explained only by supposing a personal act of self-determination in a previous or timeless state of being.

Kant, Religion in. d. Grenzen der bl. Vernunft, 26, 27. Julius Müller, Doctrine of Sin, 2: 357-401. Edward Beecher, Conflict of Ages. Cf. Wordsworth, Intimations of Immortality; Tennyson, Two Voices.

To this theory we urge the following objections:

A. It is not only wholly without support from Scripture, but it directly contradicts the Mosaic account of man's creation in the image of God, and Paul's description of all evil and death in the human race as the result of Adam's sin; (Gen. 1: 27, 31. Rom. 5: 12).

B. If the soul in this preëxistent state was conscious and personal, it is inexplicable that we should have no remembrance of such preëxistence and of so important a decision in that previous condition of being;—if the soul was yet unconscious, the theory fails to show how a moral act involving consequences so vast could have been performed at all.

C. The view sheds no light either upon the origin of sin or upon God's justice in dealing with it, since it throws back the first transgression to a state of being in which neither the flesh nor evil example existed to tempt, and then represents God as putting the fallen into sensuous conditions in the highest degree unfavorable to their restoration.

D. While this theory accounts for inherited spiritual sin, such as pride and enmity to God, it gives no explanation of inherited sensual sin, which it holds to have come from Adam, and the guilt of which must logically be denied.

Ernesti, Ursprung der Sünde 2: 1-247. Bruch, Lehre der Präexistenz, translated in Bib. Sac., 20: 681. Also, Bib. Sac., 11: 186-191; 12: 156; 17: 419-427; 20: 447. Frohschammer, Ursprung der Seele.

### 2. *The Creation Theory.*

This view was held by Aristotle, Jerome and Pelagius, and in modern times has been advocated by most of the Roman Catholic and Reformed theologians.

It regards the soul of each human being as immediately created by God and joined to the body either at conception, at birth, or at some time between these two.

The advocates of the theory urge in its favor certain texts of Scripture (as Eccl. 12: 7; Isa. 57: 16; Zech. 12: 1; Heb. 12: 9), together with the fact that there is a marked individuality in the child which cannot be explained as a mere reproduction of the qualities existing in the parents.

Turretin, *Inst.*, Locus 5, Quæstio 13. Rothé, *Dogmatik*, 1: 249-251. Herzog, *Realencyclopædie*, art.: Seele. Hodge, *Syst. Theol.*, 2: 65-76. Liddon, *Elements of Religion*, 99-106. Martensen, *Dogmatics*, 141-148.

Creationism is untenable for the following reasons:

A. The passages adduced in its support may be with equal propriety regarded as expressing God's mediate agency in the origination of human souls, while the general tenor of Scripture, as we shall see, favors this latter interpretation.

B. The individuality of the child, even in the most extreme cases, as in the sudden rise from obscure families and surroundings of marked men like Luther, may be better explained by supposing a law of variation impressed upon the species at its beginning—a law whose operation is foreseen and supervised by God.

C. This theory, if it allows that the soul is originally possessed of depraved tendencies, makes God the direct author of moral evil; if it holds the soul to have been created pure, it makes God indirectly the author of moral evil by teaching that he puts this pure soul into a body which will inevitably corrupt it.

Kahnis, *Dogmatik*, 3: 250, 251. Alger, *Doctrine of a Future Life*, 1-17.

### 3. *The Traducian Theory.*

This view was propounded by Tertullian, and implicitly held by Augustine. In modern times it has been the prevailing opinion of the Lutheran Church.

It holds that the human race was immediately created in Adam and both in body and soul propagated from him by natural generation—all souls since Adam being only mediately created by God, as the upholder of the laws of the laws of propagation which were originally established by him.

With regard to this view we remark:

A. It seems to accord best with Scripture, which represents God as creating the species in Adam (Gen. 1: 27), and as increasing and perpetuating it through secondary agencies; (1: 28; cf. 22). Only once is breathed into man's nostrils the breath of life, (2: 17; cf. 22; 1 Cor. 11: 8—*πνεῦμα ἕξ ἀνθρώπου*. Gen. 4: 1; 5: 3; 46: 26; cf. Acts 17: 24-26; Heb. 7: 10) and after man's formation, God ceases from his work of creation; (Gen. 2: 2).

B. It is favored by the analogy of vegetable and animal life, in which increase of numbers is secured, not by a multiplicity of immediate creations, but by the natural derivation of new individuals from a parent stock. A derivation of the human soul from its parents no more implies a materialistic view of the soul and its endless division and subdivision, than the similar derivation of the brute proves the principle of intelligence in the lower animals to be wholly material.

C. The observed transmission not merely of physical, but of mental and spiritual characteristics in families and races, and especially the uniformly evil moral tendencies and dispositions which all men possess from their birth, are proof that in soul as well as in body we derive our being from our human ancestry.

D. The traducian doctrine embraces and acknowledges the element of truth which gives plausibility to the creatian view. Traducianism, properly defined, admits a divine concurrence throughout the whole development of the human species, and allows, under the guidance of a superintending Providence, special improvements in type at the birth of marked men, similar to those which we may suppose to have occurred in the introduction of new varieties in the animal creation.

Ebrard, *Dogmatik*, 1: 327-332. Birks, *Difficulties of Belief*, 161.  
Baird, *Elohim Revealed*, 137-151; 335-384. Edwards, *Works*, 2: 483.  
Hopkins, *Works*, 1: 289. Shedd, *Hist. Doct.*, 2: 1-26.

## CHAPTER II.

### THE ORIGINAL STATE OF MAN.

In determining man's original state, we are wholly dependent upon Scriptures. This represents human nature as coming from God's hand and therefore "very good;" (Gen. 1: 31). It moreover draws a parallel between man's first state and that of his restoration; (Col. 3: 9, 10; Eph. 4: 24). In interpreting these passages, however, we are to remember the twofold danger, on the one hand of putting man so high that no progress is conceivable, on the other hand of putting him so low that he could not fall. We shall the more easily avoid these dangers by distinguishing between the essentials and the incidents of man's original state.

On the general subject, see Philippi, *Glaubenslehre*, 2: 337-399. Van Oosterzee, *Dogmatics*, 374-385. Thomasius, *Christi Person und Werk*, 1: 215-243. Ebrard, *Dogmatik*, 1: 267-276. Kalnis, *Dogmatik*, 3: 283-290. Hodge, *Syst. Theol.*, 2: 92-116.

#### I. ESSENTIALS OF MAN'S ORIGINAL STATE.

These are summed up in the phrase "the image of God." In God's image man is said to have been created; (Gen. 1: 26, 27). In what did this image of God consist? We reply that it consisted in:—

##### 1. *Natural likeness to God, or personality.*

Man was created a personal being and was by this personality distinguished from the brute. By personality we mean the two-fold power to know self as related to the world and to God, and to determine self in view of moral ends.

By virtue of this personality, man could at his creation choose which of the objects of his knowledge, self, the world or God, should be the norm and centre of his development. This natural likeness to God is inalienable, and as constituting a capacity for redemption, gives value to the life even of the unregenerate; (Gen. 9: 6. 1 Cor. 11: 7. James 3: 9).

Porter, *Human Intellect*, 393, 394, 401. Wuttke, *Christian Ethics*, 2: 42. Philippi, *Glaubenslehre*, 2: 343.

##### 2. *Moral likeness to God, or holiness.*

In addition to the powers of self-consciousness and self-determination just mentioned, man was created with such a direction of the affections and will, as constituted God the supreme end of man's being, and constituted man a finite reflection of God's moral attributes.

Since holiness is the fundamental attribute of God, this must of necessity be the chief attribute of his image in the moral beings whom he creates. That original righteousness was essential to this image is also distinctly taught in Scripture; (Eccl. 7: 29. Eph. 4: 24—*τὸν κατὰ Θεὸν κτισθέντα ἐν*

δικαιοσύνη καὶ ὁσιότητι τῆς ἀληθείας, Col. 3: 9, 10—τὸν ἀνακατανόημενον εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν κατ' εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος αὐτόν, where ἐπίγνωσις=that knowledge of God which is the source of all virtue. On these two passages, see Commentaries of De Wette, Rückert, Ellicott; compare also Gen. 5: 3; 2 Cor. 4: 4; Heb. 1: 3).

This original righteousness in which the image of God chiefly consisted is to be viewed:—

(a) Not as constituting the substance or essence of human nature,—for in this case, human nature would have ceased to exist as soon as man sinned;

Möhler, Symbolism, 58, 59.

(b) Nor as a gift from without, foreign to human nature, and added to it after man's creation,—for man is said to have possessed the divine image by the fact of creation, and not by subsequent bestowal;

(c) But rather, as an original direction, condition or tendency of man's affections and will, still accompanied by the power of contrary choice, and so, differing from the perfected holiness of the saints, as instinctive affection and childlike innocence differ from the holiness that has been developed and confirmed by experience of temptation;

(d) As a moral disposition, moreover, which was propagable to Adam's descendants, if it continued, and which, though lost to him and to them, if Adam sinned, would still leave man possessed of a natural likeness to God which made him susceptible of God's redeeming grace.

Edwards, Works, 2: 19, 20, 381-390; 3: 102-103. Hopkins, Works, 1: 162. Shedd, Hist. Doct., 2: 50-66.

In the light of the preceding investigation we may properly estimate two theories of man's original state which claim to be more Scriptural and reasonable:—

A. The image of God as including only personality.

This view is held by Nitzsch, Julius Müller and Hofmann.

Nitzsch, System of Christ. Doct., 201. Julius Müller, Doctrine of Sin, 2: 113-133. Hofmann, Schriftbeweis, 1: 287-291. Bib. Sac., 7: 409-425.

In addition to what has already been said in support of the opposite view we may urge against this theory the following objections:—

(a) It is contrary to analogy, in making man the author of his own holiness; our sinful condition is not the product of our individual wills, nor is our subsequent condition of holiness the product of anything but God's regenerating power.

(b) The knowledge of God in which man was originally created logically presupposes a direction toward God of man's affections and will.

(c) A likeness to God in mere personality, such as Satan also possesses, comes far short of answering the demands of the Scripture, in which the ethical conception of the divine nature so overshadows the merely natural. The image of God must be not simply ability to be like God, but actual likeness.

For substance of these objections, see Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 2: 347. See also, Delitzsch, Bib. Psychol., 31, 78-87.

B. The image of God as consisting simply in man's natural capacity for religion.

This view, first elaborated by the Scholastics, is the doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church. It distinguishes between the image and the likeness of God. The former (דְּמֻטֵּי—Gen. 1: 27) alone belonged to man's nature at its creation. The latter (תְּצַלְתֵּן) was the product of his own acts of obedience. In order that this obedience might be made easier and the consequent likeness to God more sure, a third element was added—an element not belonging to man's nature—namely, a supernatural gift of special grace, which acted as a curb upon the sensuous impulses, and brought them under the control of reason.

Möhler, Symbolism, 21–35.

Many of the considerations already adduced apply equally as arguments against this view. We may say however with reference to certain features peculiar to the theory:—

(a) No such distinction can justly be drawn between the words דְּמֻטֵּי and תְּצַלְתֵּן. The addition of the synonym simply strengthens the expression and both together signify: 'the very image.'

(b) Whatever is denoted by either or both of these words, was bestowed upon man in and by the fact of creation, and the additional hypothesis of a supernatural gift not originally belonging to man's nature but subsequently conferred, has no foundation either here or elsewhere in Scripture.

(c) The natural opposition between sense and reason which this theory supposes, is inconsistent with the Scripture declaration that the work of God's hands 'was very good,' and transfers the blame of temptation and sin from man to God.

(d) This theory directly contradicts Scripture by making the effect of the first sin to have been a weakening but not a perversion of human nature, and the work of regeneration to be not a renewal of the will but a strengthening of the natural powers.

## II. INCIDENTS OF MAN'S ORIGINAL STATE.

### 1. *Results of man's possession of the divine image.*

#### A. Reflection of this divine image in man's physical form.

Even in man's body were typified those higher attributes which chiefly constituted his likeness to God. A gross perversion of this truth, however, is the view which holds upon the ground of Gen. 2: 7; 3: 8, that the image of God consists in bodily resemblance to the Creator. In the first of these passages, it is not the divine image, but the body, that is formed of dust, and into this body the soul that possesses the divine image is breathed. The second of these passages is to be interpreted by those other portions of the Pentateuch in which God is represented as free from all limitations of matter; (Gen. 11: 5; 18: 25).

For this view see Bretschneider, Dogmatik, 1: 682. Strauss, Glaubenslehre, 1: 687. Per contra, see Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 2: 364.

B. Subjection of the sensuous impulses to the control of the spirit.

Here we are to hold a middle ground between two extremes. On the one hand, the first man possessed a body and a spirit so fitted to each other that no conflict was felt between their several claims. On the other hand, this physical perfection was not final and absolute, but relative and provisional. There was still room for progress to a higher state of being; (Gen. 3: 22).

C. Dominion over the lower creation.

Adam possessed an insight into nature analogous to that of susceptible childhood, and therefore was able to name and to rule the brute creation; (Gen. 2: 19). Yet this native insight was capable of development into the higher knowledge of culture and science.

From Gen. 1: 26 (cf. Ps. 8: 5-8), it has been erroneously inferred that the image of God in man consists in dominion over the brute creation and the natural world. But in this verse, the words "let them have dominion" do not define the image of God, but indicate the result of possessing that image. To make the image of God consist in this dominion, would imply that only the divine omnipotence was shadowed forth in man.

For this view, see Socinian writers generally, and especially Racovian Catechism, 21. Held also by the Arminian Limborch, Theol. Christ., II, 24: 2, 3, 11.

D. Communion with God.

Our first parents enjoyed the divine presence and teaching; (Gen. 2: 16). It would seem that God manifested himself to them in visible form; (Gen. 3: 8). This companionship was both in kind and degree suited to their spiritual capacity, and by no means necessarily involved that perfected vision of God which is possible to beings of confirmed and unchangeable holiness; (Mat. 5: 8; 1 John 3: 2).

2. *Concomitants of man's possession of the divine image.*

A. Surroundings and society fitted to yield happiness and to assist a holy development of human nature; (Eden and Eve).

B. Provision for the trying of man's virtue.

Since man was not yet in a state of confirmed holiness, but rather of simple child-like innocence, he could be made perfect only through temptation. Hence the 'tree of the knowledge of good and evil;' (Gen. 2: 9). The one slight command best tested the spirit of obedience. Temptation did not necessitate a fall. If resisted, it would strengthen virtue. In that case the *posse non peccare* would have become the *non posse peccare*.

C. Opportunity of securing physical immortality.

The body of the first man was in itself mortal; (1 Cor. 15: 44). Science shows that physical life involves decay and loss. But means were apparently provided for checking this decay and preserving the body's youth. This means was the 'tree of life;' (Gen. 2: 9). If Adam had maintained his integrity, the body might have been developed and transfigured, without intervention of death. In other words, the *posse non mori* might have become a *non posse mori*.

The conclusions we have thus reached with regard to the incidents of man's original state are combated upon two distinct grounds:

1st. That facts bearing upon man's prehistoric condition point to a development from primitive savagery to civilization. Among these facts may be mentioned the succession of implements and weapons from stone to bronze and iron, the polyandry and communal marriage systems of the lowest tribes, the relics of barbarous customs still prevailing among the most civilized.

Sir John Lubbock, *Prehistoric Times; Origin of Civilization*.

With regard to this view we remark:

(a) It is based upon an insufficient induction of facts. History shows a law of degeneration supplementing and often counteracting the tendency to development. In the earliest times of which we have any record we find nations in a high state of civilization, but in the case of every nation whose history runs back of the Christian era, as for example, the Roman, the Greek, the Egyptian, the subsequent progress has been downward, and no nation is known to have recovered from barbarism except as the result of influences from without.

Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, 1: 48. Whately, *Origin of Civilization*.  
Bib. Sac., 6: 715; 29: 282.

(b) Later investigations have rendered it probable that the stone age of some localities was contemporaneous with the bronze and iron ages of others, while certain tribes and nations instead of progressing from one to the other, were never, so far back as we can trace them, without the knowledge and use of the metals. It is to be observed, moreover, that even without such knowledge and use, man is not necessarily a barbarian, though he may be a child.

Southall, *Recent Origin of Man*, 386-449. Schliemann, *Troy and her Remains*, 274.

(c) The barbarous customs to which this view looks for support, may better be explained as marks of broken-down civilization than as relics of a primitive and universal savagery. Even if they indicated a former state of barbarism, that state might have been itself preceded by a condition of comparative culture.

Duke of Argyll, *Primeval Man*, 129, 133.

(d) The well-nigh universal tradition of a golden age of virtue and happiness may be most easily explained upon the Scripture view of an actual creation of the race in holiness and its subsequent apostasy.

For references in classic writers to a golden age, see Luthardt, *Dogmatik*, 115.

2nd. That the religious history of mankind warrants us in inferring a necessary and universal law of progress, in accordance with which man passes from fetichism to polytheism and monotheism,—this first theological stage, of which fetichism, polytheism and monotheism are parts, being succeeded by the metaphysical and that in turn by the positive.

Comte, *Positive Philosophy*, 25, 26; 515-636.



This assumed law of progress, however, is contradicted by the following facts:

(a) Not only did the monotheism of the Hebrews precede the great polytheistic systems of antiquity, but these very heathen religions are purer from polytheistic elements the further back we trace them, so that the facts point to an original monotheistic basis for them all.

Martineau, *Essays*, 1: 24, 61. Max Müller, *Chips*, 1: 337. *Jahrbuch für deutsche Theol.*, 5: 669. Philip Smith, *Anc. Hist. of East*, 65, 195.

(b) "There is no proof that the Indogermanic or Semitic stocks ever practised fetich worship, or were ever enslaved by the lowest types of mythological religion or ascended from them to somewhat higher."

Quoted from Fisher, *Essays on Supernatural Origin of Christianity*, 545.

(c) Some of the earliest remains of man yet found, show by the burial of food and weapons with the dead, that there already existed the idea of spiritual beings and a future state, and therefore a religion of a higher sort than fetichism.

Lyell, *Antiquity of Man*, quoted in Dawson, *Story of Earth and Man*, 384; see also, 368, 372, 386.

(d) The theory in question, in making theological thought a merely transient stage of mental evolution, ignores the fact that religion has its root in the intuitions and yearnings of the human soul, and that therefore, no philosophical or scientific progress can ever abolish it. While the terms theological, metaphysical and positive may properly mark the order in which the ideas of the individual and the race are acquired, positivism errs in holding that these three phases of thought are mutually exclusive and that upon the rise of the later the earlier must of necessity become extinct.

On the fundamental principles of Positivism, see *New Englander*, 1873; 323-386.

CHAPTER III.  
SIN, OR MAN'S STATE OF APOSTASY.

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SECTION I.—THE LAW OF GOD.

As preliminary to a treatment of man's state of apostasy, it becomes necessary to consider the nature of that law of God, the transgression of which is sin. We may best approach the subject by inquiring what is the true conception of

I. LAW IN GENERAL.

The essential idea of law is that of a general expression of will enforced by power. It implies :—

- (a) A lawgiver, or authoritative will.
- (b) Subjects, or beings upon whom this will terminates.
- (c) A general command, or expression of this will.
- (d) A power, enforcing the command.

These elements are found even in what we call natural law. The phrase 'law of nature' involves a self-contradiction when used to denote a mode of action or an order of sequence, behind which there is conceived to be no intelligent and ordaining will.

Science derives the term law from the relations of voluntary agents, not vice versa. In her very use of the word she implicitly confesses that a supreme Will has set general rules which control the processes of the physical and organic universe.

The characteristic of law is generality. It is addressed to substances or persons in classes. Special legislation is contrary to the true theory of law. It is moreover essential to the existence of law, that there be power to enforce. Otherwise law becomes the expression of mere wish or desire. Since physical substances and forces have no intelligence and no power to resist, the four elements already mentioned exhaust the implications of the term law as applied to nature. In the case of rational and free agents, however, law implies in addition :—

- (e) Duty, or obligation to obey; and
- (f) Sanctions, or pains and penalties for disobedience.

Rewards are motives, but they are not sanctions. Since public opinion may be conceived of as inflicting penalties for violation of her will, we speak figuratively of the laws of society, of fashion, of etiquette, of honor. Only so far as the community of nations can and does by sanctions compel obedience, can we with propriety assert the existence of international law.

But the will which thus binds its subjects by commands and penalties is an expression of the nature of the governing power, and reveals the normal relations of the subjects to that power. Law is therefore, finally,

- g) An expression of the nature of the lawgiver; and
- h) Sets forth the condition or conduct in the subjects which is requisite for harmony with that nature.

On the nature and definition of law, see Pomeroy, in Johnson's Encyclopedia, art.: 'Law.' Ahrens, Cours de Droit Naturel, bk. 1, sec. 14. Austin, Province of Jurisprudence, 1: 88-93; 220-223. Amos, Science of Law, 33, 34, 48. Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws, bk. 1, ch. 1. Wayland, Moral Science, 1. Paley, Nat. Theol., chap. 1. Kant, Metaphysic of Ethics, 169, 170, 172. Duke of Argyll, Reign of Law, 64. J. S. Mill, quoted in Webster's Dict., at the word 'Law.'

## II. THE LAW OF GOD IN PARTICULAR.

The law of God is a general expression of the divine will enforced by power. It has two forms: Elemental Law and Positive Enactment.

1. *Elemental Law*, or law inwrought into the substances and forces of the rational and irrational creation. This is twofold:

A. The expression of the divine will in the constitution of the material universe;—this we call physical, or natural law.

B. The expression of the divine will in the constitution of rational and free agents;—this we call moral law. This elemental law of our moral nature with which only we are now concerned, has all the characteristics mentioned as belonging to law in general. It implies:—

(a) A divine Lawgiver, or ordaining will.

(b) Subjects, or moral beings upon whom the law terminates.

(c) General command, or expression of this will in the moral constitution of the subjects.

(d) Power, enforcing the command.

(e) Duty, or obligation to obey.

(f) Sanctions, or pains and penalties for disobedience.

All these are of a loftier sort than are found in human law. But we need specially to emphasize the fact that this law is an

(g) Expression of the moral nature of God, and therefore of God's holiness, the fundamental attribute of that nature; and that it

(h) Sets forth absolute conformity to that holiness, as the normal condition of man. This law is inwrought into man's rational and moral being. Man fulfils it only when in his moral as well as his rational being he is the image of God.

To the existence of this law all men bear witness. The consciences even of the heathen testify to it; (Rom. 2: 14, 15—*τὸ ἔργον τοῦ νόμου γραπτὸν ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις αὐτῶν*). Those who have the written law recognize this elemental law as of greater compass and penetration; (Rom. 7: 14—*νόμος πνευματικὸς ἐστίν*. 8: 4—*ἐκκαίωμα τοῦ νόμου—κατὰ Πνεῦμα*). The perfect embodiment and fulfilment of this law is seen only in Christ; (Rom. 10: 4; Phil. 3: 8, 9).

See on the passages from Romans, the Commentary of Philippi.

Since the law of God is a transcript of the divine nature, certain conceptions of it are excluded. It is

(a) Not arbitrary; since there is no constraint, rashness or unwisdom on the part of God.

(b) Not temporary, or ordained simply to meet an exigency; since its chief end is to manifest God.

(c) Not local; since no moral creature can escape from God or from his own being.

(d) Not capable of change, or consisting in a sliding-scale of requirements adapted to the ability of the subjects; since God himself is unchangeable.

A law thus identical with the eternal and necessary relations of the creature to the Creator, and demanding of the creature nothing less than perfect holiness as the condition of harmony with the infinite holiness of God, is adapted:

(a) To man's finite nature, as needing law.

(b) To man's free nature, as needing moral law.

(c) To man's progressive nature, as needing ideal law.

The law of God is therefore *all-comprehensive*. It is over us at all times; it respects our past, our present, our future. It forbids every conceivable sin; it requires every conceivable virtue; omissions as well as commissions are condemned; (Ps. 119: 96; Rom. 3: 23; James 4: 17). It is *spiritual*, demanding not only right acts and words, but also right dispositions and states. Perfect obedience requires not only the intense and unremitting reign of love toward God and man, but conformity of the whole inward and outward nature of man to the holiness of God; (Mark 12: 30, 31; 1 Pet. 1: 16).

Only to the first man, then, was the law proposed as a method of salvation. With the first sin all hope of attaining the divine favor by perfect obedience is lost. To sinners, the law remains as a means of discovering and developing sin in its true nature, and of compelling a recourse to the mercy provided in Jesus Christ; (Rom. 3: 20; Gal. 3: 24—*παιδαγωγὸς εἰς Χριστόν*).

2. *Positive Enactment*, or the expression of the will of God in published ordinances. This is also twofold:—

A. General moral precepts. These are written summaries of the elemental law (Mat. 5: 48; 22: 36-40), or authorized applications of it to special human conditions (Ex. 20: 1-17; Mat. 5-8).

B. Ceremonial or special injunctions. These are illustrations of the elemental law or approximate revelations of it suited to lower degrees of capacity and to earlier stages of spiritual training. Though temporary, only God can say when they cease to be binding upon us in their outward form.

All positive enactments, therefore, whether they be moral or ceremonial, are republications of elemental law. Their forms may change, but the substance is eternal. Certain modes of expression, like the Mosaic system, may be abolished, but the essential demands are unchanging; (Mat. 5: 17, 18). From the imperfection of human language, no positive enactments are able to express in themselves the whole content and meaning of the elemental law. "It is not the purpose of revelation to disclose the whole of our duties." Scripture is not a complete code of rules for practical action, but an enunciation of principles, with occasional precepts by way of illustration. Hence we must supplement the positive enactment by the law of being—the moral ideal found in the nature of God.

On the Law of God, see Fairbairn, *Revelation of Law in Scripture*. Baird, *Elohim Revealed*, 187-242. Hovey, *God with us*, 187-210. Wuttke, *Christian Ethics*, 2: 82-92. Julius Müller, *Doctrine of Sin*, 1: 45-50. Whewell, *Elements of Morality*, 2: 35. Murphy, *Scientific Bases*, 53-71.

## III. RELATION OF THE LAW TO THE GRACE OF GOD.

In human government, while law is an expression of the will of the governing power and so of the nature lying behind the will, it is by no means an exhaustive expression of that will and nature, since it consists only of general ordinances, and leaves room for particular acts of command through the executive, as well as for "the institution of equity, the faculty of discretionary punishment, and the prerogative of pardon."

Amos, Science of Law, 29-46,

Applying this illustration to the subject under consideration, we remark:

1. The law of God is a *general* expression of God's will, applicable to all moral beings. It therefore does not exclude the possibility of special injunctions to individuals and special acts of wisdom and power in creation and providence. The very specialty of these latter expressions of will prevents us from classing them under the category of law.

2. The law of God, accordingly, is a *partial*, not an exhaustive expression of God's nature. It constitutes, indeed, a manifestation of that attribute of holiness which is fundamental in God, and which man must possess in order to be in harmony with God. But it does not fully express God's nature in its aspects of personality, sovereignty, helpfulness, mercy.

3. Mere law, therefore, leaves God's nature in these aspects of personality, sovereignty, helpfulness, mercy, to be expressed toward sinners in another way, namely through the atoning, regenerating, pardoning, sanctifying work of the gospel of Christ. As creation does not exclude miracles, so law does not exclude grace; (Rom. 8: 3—τὸ γὰρ ἀδύνατον τοῦ νόμου, ὁ Θεὸς [sc. ἐποίησεν]).

4. Grace is to be regarded, however, not as abrogating law but as republishing and enforcing it; (Rom. 3: 31—νόμον ἰστώμεν). By removing obstacles to pardon in the mind of God and by enabling man to obey, grace secures the perfect fulfilment of law; (Rom. 8: 4—ἵνα τὸ δίκαιωμα τοῦ νόμου πληρωθῇ). Even grace has its law (Rom. 8: 2—νόμος τοῦ Πνεύματος τῆς ζωῆς); another higher law of grace, the operation of individualizing mercy, overbears the 'law of sin and death,'—this last, as in the case of the miracle, not being suspended, annulled or violated, but being merged in, while it is transcended by, the exertion of personal divine will.

5. Thus the revelation of grace, while it takes up and includes in itself the revelation of law, adds something different in kind, namely, the manifestation of the personal love of the Lawgiver. Without grace, law has only a demanding aspect. Only in connection with grace does it become "the perfect law of liberty;" (James 1: 25). In fine, grace is that larger and completer manifestation of the divine nature, of which law constitutes the necessary but preparatory stage.

Dorner, Hist. Doct. Person of Christ, 1: 64, 78, 79. Hooker, Eccl. Polity, 1: 155, 185, 194. Lord Bacon, Confession of Faith. Farrar, Science and Theology, 184. Salmon, Reign of Law. Murphy, Scientific Bases, 303-327. Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 1: 31. Versus Strauss, Glaubenslehre, 1: 229; Baden Powell, Law and Gospel, in Noyes' Theological Essays, 27; Greg, Creed of Christendom, 2: 217-228.

## SECTION II.—NATURE OF SIN.

## I. DEFINITION OF SIN.

Sin is lack of conformity to the moral law of God, either in act, disposition or state.

1. *Explanations.*

A. This definition regards sin as predicable only of rational and voluntary agents.

B. It assumes, however, that man has a rational nature below consciousness, and a voluntary nature apart from actual volition.

C. It holds that the divine law requires moral likeness to God in the affections and tendencies of the nature as well as in its outward activities.

D. It therefore considers lack of conformity to the divine holiness in disposition or state, as a violation of law equally with the outward act of transgression.

2. *Proof.*

As it is readily admitted that the outward act of transgression is properly denominated sin, we here attempt to show only that lack of conformity to the law of God in disposition or state is also and equally to be so denominated.

## A. From Scripture.

(a) The words ordinarily translated 'sin,' or used as synonyms for it, are as applicable to dispositions and states as to acts; (ἁμαρτία and *ἀμαρτία* = a missing, failure, coming short [sc. of God's will]; see Num. 15: 28, Ps. 51: 2, Rom. 3: 23; cf. Judges 20: 16. *יָשַׁב* [LXX. *ἀσέβεια*] = separation from, rebellion against [sc. God]; see Lev. 16: 16, 21; cf. Delitzsch on Ps. 32: 1. *יָשַׁב* [LXX. *ἀδικία*] = bending, perversion [sc. of what is right], iniquity; see Lev. 5: 17; cf. John 7: 18. So also the Hebrew *יָשַׁב*, *יָשַׁב*, [= ruin, confusion], and the Greek *ἀποστασία*, *ἐπιθυμία*, *ἔχθρα*, *κακία*, *πονηρία*, *σάρξ*.

On the words mentioned, see Girdlestone, O. T. Synonyms, and Cremer, Lexicon N. T. Greek.

(b) The New Testament descriptions of sin bring more distinctly to view the states and dispositions than the outward acts of the soul; (1 John 3: 4—*ἡ ἀμαρτία ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνομία*, where *ἀνομία* = not 'transgression of the law,' but, as both context and etymology show, 'lack of conformity to law.' 5: 17—*πᾶσα ἀδικία ἀμαρτία ἐστίν*. Rom. 3: 23—*ἡμαρτον—ὕστεροῦνται τῆς δόξης τοῦ Θεοῦ*. 14: 23—*πάν ὃ ἐκ πίστεως, ἀμαρτία ἐστίν*. James 4: 17—*εἰδότε ὅν καλὸν ποιεῖν, καὶ οὐ ποιῶντι, ἀμαρτία αὐτῶ ἐστίν*).

(c) Moral evil is ascribed not only to the thoughts and affections, but to the heart from which they spring; (Matt. 5: 22, 28; 15: 19—*διαλογισμοὶ πονηροὶ*. Luke 6: 45—*ἐκ τοῦ πονηροῦ [sc. *θησανροῦ τῆς καρδίας]**. Heb. 3: 12—*καρδία πονηρὰ ἀπιστίας*. Cf. Is. 1: 5; Jer. 17: 9).

(d) The state or condition of the soul which gives rise to wrong desires and acts is expressly called sin; (John 8: 34—*δοῦλος ἐστὶ τῆς ἀμαρτίας*. Rom. 7: 8—*ἡ ἀμαρτία κατελογάσατο ἐν ἐμοὶ πᾶσαν ἐπιθυμίαν*. Cf. verses 11, 13, 14, 17, 20).

(e) Sin is represented as existing in the soul, prior to the consciousness of it, and as only discovered and awakened by the law; (Rom. 8: 9, 10—*ἐλθοῦσης δὲ τῆς ἐντολῆς, ἡ ἁμαρτία ἀνέζησεν*).

(f) The allusions to sin as a permanent power or reigning principle, not only in the individual, but in humanity at large, forbid us to define it as a momentary act, and compel us to regard it as being primarily a settled depravity of nature, of which individual sins or acts of transgression are only the workings and fruits; (Rom. 5: 21—*ἐβασίλευσεν ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐν τῷ θανάτῳ*. 6: 12—*μὴ οὖν βασιλευέτω ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐν τῷ θνήσκῳ ὑμῶν σώματι*).

Edwards, Works, 3: 16-18. Schmid, Bib. Theol. N. T., 194, 381, 442, 488, 492, 604. Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 3: 210-217. Julius Müller, Doct. Sin, 2: 259-306.

B. From the common judgment of mankind.

(a) Men universally attribute vice as well as virtue not only to conscious and deliberate acts, but also to dispositions and states. Belief in something more permanently evil than acts of transgression is indicated in the common phrases: 'hateful temper,' 'wicked pride,' 'bad character.'

(b) Outward acts indeed are condemned, only when they are regarded as originating in, and as symptomatic of, evil dispositions. Civil law proceeds upon this principle in holding crime to consist not alone in the external act but also in the evil motive or intent with which it is performed.

(c) The stronger an evil disposition, or in other words, the more it connects itself with, or resolves itself into, a settled state or condition of the soul, the more blameworthy it is felt to be. This is shown by the distinction drawn between crimes of passion and crimes of deliberation.

(d) This condemning sentence remains the same whatever the origin of the evil disposition or state may be. Neither the general sense of mankind, nor the law in which this general sense is expressed, goes behind the fact of an existing evil will,—whether inherited or resulting from personal transgression, this evil will is the man himself, and upon him terminates the blame.

(e) When any evil disposition has such strength in itself, or is so combined with others, as to indicate a settled moral corruption in which no power to do good remains, this state is regarded with the deepest disapprobation of all. Sin weakens man's power of obedience, but the can-not is a will-not, and is therefore condemnable. The opposite principle would lead to the conclusion that the more a man weakened his powers by transgression, the less guilty he would be, until absolute depravity became absolute innocence.

Shedd, Hist. Doct., 2: 79-92, 152-157. Richards, Lectures on Theology, 256-301. Edwards, Works, 2: 134. Baird, Elohim Revealed, 243-262. Princeton Essays, 2: 224-239. Van Oosterzee, Dogmatics, 394.

C. From the experience of the Christian.

Christian experience is a testing of Scripture truth and therefore is not an independent source of knowledge. It may however corroborate conclusions

drawn from the word of God. Since the judgment of the Christian is formed under the influence of the Holy Spirit, we may trust this more implicitly than the general sense of the world. We affirm, then, that just in proportion to his spiritual enlightenment and self-knowledge, the Christian

(a) Regards his outward deviations from God's law, and his evil inclinations and desires, as outgrowths and revelations of a depravity of nature which lies below his consciousness, and

(b) Repents more deeply for this depravity of nature which constitutes his inmost character and is inseparable from himself, than for what he merely feels or does.

In proof of these statements we appeal to the biographies and writings of those in all ages who have been by general consent regarded as most advanced in spiritual culture and discernment.

See Augustine, *Confessions*, bk. 10. On Luther's experience, see Martensen, *Dogmatics*, 389. Jonathan Edwards, *Autobiography*, in *Works*, 1: 25, 26. Thomas a Kempis, *Imitation of Christ*, Gould and Lincoln's ed., 142.

### 3. *Inferences.*

In the light of the preceding discussion we may properly estimate the elements of truth and of error in the common definition of sin as 'the voluntary transgression of known law.'

A. Not all sin is voluntary as being a distinct and conscious volition,—for evil disposition and state precede and cause evil volition, and evil disposition and state are themselves sin. All sin, however, is voluntary, as springing from those perverse affections and desires which constitute the evil state of the will. Will, therefore, is not to be regarded as simply the faculty of volitions, but as primarily the underlying determination of the whole being to a supreme end.

B. Deliberate intention to sin is an aggravation of transgression, but it is not essential to constitute any given act or feeling a sin. Those evil inclinations and impulses which rise unbidden and master the soul before it is well aware of their nature, are themselves violations of the divine law, and indications of an inward depravity which in the case of each individual is the chief and fountal transgression.

C. Knowledge of the sinfulness of an act or feeling is also an aggravation of transgression, but it is not essential to constitute it a sin. Moral blindness is the effect of transgression, and as inseparable from corrupt affections and desires, is itself condemned by the divine law.

D. Ability to fulfil the law is not essential to constitute the non-fulfilment sin. Inability to fulfil the law is a result of transgression, and as consisting not in an original deficiency of faculty but in a settled state of the affections and will, it is itself condemnable. Since the law presents the holiness of God as the only standard for the creature, ability to obey can never be the measure of obligation or the test of sin.

On the definition of sin, see Hodge, *Outlines of Theology*, 234, 235. Charles Hodge, *Syst. Theol.*, 2: 180-190. Julius Müller, *Doct. Sin*,



1: 40-72. Lawrence, Old School in N. E. Theol., in Bib. Sac., 20: 317-328. Nitzsch, Christian Doct., 216. Hase, Hutterns Redivivus, 11th ed., 162-164. Luthardt, Compendium der Dogmatik, 124-126. Versus Fairchild, Nature of Sin, in Bib. Sac., 25: 30-48, and Whedon, in Bib. Sac., 19: 251.

## II. THE ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLE OF SIN.

The definition of sin as lack of conformity to the divine law, does not exclude but rather necessitates an inquiry into the characterizing motive or impelling power which explains its existence and constitutes its guilt. Three views only require extended examination:—

### 1. *Sin as Sensuousness.*

This view regards sin as the necessary product of man's sensuous nature—a result of the soul's connection with a physical organism.

Schleiermacher, Der Christliche Glaube, 1: 361-364, Rothe, Dogmatik, 1: 300-302.

In refutation of this view it will be sufficient to urge the following considerations:—

A. It involves an assumption of the inherent evil of matter, at least so far as regards the substance of man's body. But this is either a form of dualism and may be met with the objections already brought against that system, or it implies that God, in being the author of man's physical organism, is also the responsible originator of human sin.

B. It rests upon an incomplete induction of facts, taking account of sin solely in its aspect of self-degradation, but ignoring the worse aspect of it as self-exaltation. Avarice, envy, pride, ambition, malice, cruelty, revenge, self-righteousness, unbelief, enmity to God, are none of them fleshly sins, and upon this principle are incapable of explanation.

C. It leads to absurd conclusions,—as for example, that asceticism by weakening the power of sense must weaken the power of sin; that man becomes less sinful as his senses fail with age; that disembodied spirits are necessarily holy.

D. Instead of explaining sin, this theory virtually denies its existence,—for if it arises from the original constitution of our being, reason may recognize it as misfortune, but conscience cannot attribute to it guilt.

E. It erroneously interprets Scripture. In passages like Rom. 7: 18—*ὄνκ οἰκέτ' ἐν ἐμοί, τουτ' ἔστιν ἐν τῇ σαρκί μου, αγαθόν.*—*σὰρξ* signifies, not man's body, but man's whole being when destitute of the Spirit of God. The Scriptures distinctly recognize the seat of sin as being in the soul itself, not in its physical organism. God does not tempt man, nor has he made man's nature to tempt him; (James 1: 13, 14).

Julius Müller, Doct. Sin, 1: 295-333, especially 321; Proof-texts, 19. Ernesti, Ursprung der Sünde, 1: 29-274. Neander, Planting and Training, 386, 428. Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 2: 132-147.

### 2. *Sin as Finiteness.*

This view explains sin as a necessary result of the limitations of man's finite being. As an incident of imperfect development, the fruit of ignorance and impotence, sin is not absolutely but only relatively evil—an element in human education and a means of progress.

Leibnitz, *Théodicée*, part 1, § 20, 31. Spinoza, *Ethics*, part 4, prop. 20.

We object to this theory, that

A. Like the sense-theory of sin, it contradicts both conscience and Scripture by denying human responsibility and by transferring the blame of sin from the creature to the Creator. This is to explain sin, again, by denying its existence.

B. It is inconsistent with known facts,—as for example, the following: Not all sins are negative sins of ignorance and infirmity; there are acts of positive malignity, conscious transgressions, willful and presumptuous choices of evil. Increased knowledge of the nature of sin does not of itself give strength to overcome it, but on the contrary, repeated acts of conscious transgression harden the heart in evil. Men of greatest mental powers are not of necessity the greatest saints, nor are the greatest sinners men of least strength of will and understanding.

C. It rests upon a pantheistic basis, as the sense-theory rests upon dualism. The moral is confounded with the physical; might is identified with right. Since sin is a necessary incident of finiteness and creatures can never be infinite, it follows that sin must be everlasting not only in the universe, but in each individual soul.

Müller, *Doct. Sin.*, 1: 271-295. Philippi, *Glaubenslehre*, 3: 123-131.

### 3. *Sin as Selfishness.*

We hold the essential principle of sin to be selfishness. By selfishness we mean not simply that exaggerated self-love which constitutes the antithesis of benevolence, but that choice of self as the supreme end which constitutes the antithesis of supreme love to God.

That selfishness is the essence of sin may be shown as follows:

A. Love to God is the essence of all virtue. The opposite to this, the choice of self as the supreme end, must therefore be the essence of sin.

We are to remember, however, that the love to God in which virtue consists, is love for that which is most characteristic and fundamental in God, namely, his holiness. It is not to be confounded with supreme regard for God's interests or for the good of being in general. Not mere benevolence, but love for God as holy, is the principle and source of holiness in man. Since the love of God required by the law is of this sort, it not only does not imply that love, in the sense of benevolence, is the essence of holiness in God,—it implies rather that holiness, or self-loving and self-affirming purity, is fundamental in the divine nature. From this self-loving and self-affirming purity, love properly so-called, or the self-communicating attribute, is to be carefully distinguished; (see page 64).

Hovey, *God with us*, 187-200. Hopkins, *Works*, 1: 235. F. W. Robertson, *Sermon I.*

B. All the different forms of sin can be shown to have their root in selfishness, while selfishness itself, considered as the choice of self as a supreme end, cannot be resolved into any simpler elements.

Selfishness may reveal itself in the elevation to supreme dominion of any one of man's natural appetites, desires or affections. Sensuality is selfishness in the form of inordinate appetite. Selfish desire takes the forms respectively of avarice, ambition, vanity, pride, according as it is set upon property, power, esteem, independence. Selfish affection is falsehood or malice, according as it hopes to make others its voluntary servants, or regards them as standing in its way; it is unbelief or enmity to God, according as it simply turns away from the truth and love of God, or conceives of God's holiness as positively resisting and punishing it.

Even in the nobler forms of unregenerate life, the principle of selfishness is to be regarded as manifesting itself in the preference of lower ends to that of God's proposing. Others are loved with idolatrous affection because these others are regarded as a part of self. That the selfish element is present even here, is evident upon considering that such affection does not seek the highest interest of its object, that it often ceases when unreturned, and that it sacrifices to its own gratification the claims of God and his law.

Julius Müller, *Doct. Sin.*, 1 : 147-182. Philippi, *Glaubenslehre*, 3: 5,6.

Baird, *Elohim Revealed*, 243-262. Stewart, *Active and Moral Powers*, 11-91. Hopkins, *Moral Science*, 86-156.

C. This view accords best with Scripture.

(a) The law requires love to God as its all-embracing requirement; (*Matt.* 22 : 37-39. *Rom.* 13 : 8-10. *Gal.* 5 : 14. *James* 2 : 8).

(b) The holiness of Christ consisted in this, that he sought not his own will or glory, but made God his supreme end; (*John* 5 : 30; 7 : 18. *Rom.* 15 : 3).

(c) The Christian is one who has ceased to live for self; (*Rom.* 14 : 7. *2 Cor.* 5 : 15. *Gal.* 2 : 20).

(d) The tempter's promise is a promise of selfish independence; (*Gen.* 3 : 5).

(e) The prodigal separates himself from the father and seeks his own interest and pleasure; (*Luke* 15 : 12, 13).

(f) The 'man of sin' illustrates the nature of sin, in 'opposing and exalting himself above all that is called God;' (*2 Thess.* 2 : 4).

Sin therefore is not merely a negative thing or an absence of love to God. It is a fundamental and positive choice or preference of self instead of God, as the object of affection and the supreme end of being. Instead of making God the centre of his life, surrendering himself unconditionally to God and possessing himself only in subordination to God's will, the sinner makes self the centre of his life, sets himself directly against God, and constitutes his own interest the supreme motive and his own will the supreme rule.

We may follow Dr. E. G. Robinson in saying that while sin as a state is unlikeness to God, as a principle is opposition to God, and as an act is transgression of God's law, the essence of it always and everywhere is selfishness. It is therefore not something external, or the result of compulsion from without,—it is a depravity of the affections and a perversion of the will, which constitutes man's inmost character.

## SECTION III. UNIVERSALITY OF SIN.

In showing that sin is universal in the human race, we divide our proof into two parts. In the first, we regard sin in its aspect as conscious violation of law; in the second, in its aspect as a bias of the nature to evil, prior to or underlying consciousness.

I. EVERY HUMAN BEING WHO HAS ARRIVED AT MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS, HAS COMMITTED ACTS OR CHERISHED DISPOSITIONS CONTRARY TO THE DIVINE LAW.

1. *Proof from Scripture.*

The universality of transgression is

A. Set forth in direct statements; (1 K. 8: 46. Ps. 143: 2. Prov. 20: 9. Eccl. 7: 20. Rom. 3: 9-12, 19, 20, 23. Gal. 3: 22. 1 John 1: 8; cf. Matt. 6: 12, 14; Luke 11: 13).

B. Implied in declarations of the universal need of atonement (Mark 16: 16. John 3: 16; 6: 51; 12: 47. Acts 4: 12), regeneration (John 3: 3, 5), and repentance (Acts 17: 30).

C. Shown from the condemnation resting upon all who do not accept Christ; (John 3: 18, 36: cf. 1 John 5: 19).

Passages like Matt. 9: 12, 13, Luke 10: 30-37, Acts 10: 35, Rom. 2: 14, seem at first sight to be inconsistent with the doctrine here enunciated. A closer examination, however, will show that in each case, the goodness supposed is either a merely imperfect and fancied goodness, or else a goodness resulting from the trust of a conscious sinner in God's method of salvation.

2. *Proof from history, observation, and the common judgment of mankind.*

A. History witnesses to the universality of sin, in her accounts of the universal prevalence of priesthood and sacrifice.

B. Every man knows himself to have come short of moral perfection, and in proportion to his experience of the world, recognizes the fact that every other man has come short of it also.

C. The common judgment of mankind declares that there is an element of selfishness in every human heart, and that every man is prone to some form of sin. This common judgment is expressed in the maxims: "no man is perfect"; "every man has his weak side" or "his price"; and every great name in literature has attested its truth.

See references in Luthardt, *Fundamental Truths*, 181-185, 393-397.

3. *Proof from Christian experience.*

A. In proportion to his spiritual progress does the Christian recognize evil dispositions within him, which but for divine grace might germinate and bring forth the most various forms of outward transgression.

See Goodwin's experience, in Baird, *Elohim Revealed*, 499.

B. Since those most enlightened by the Holy Spirit, recognize themselves as guilty of unnumbered violations of the divine law, the absence of any consciousness of sin on the part of unregenerate men must be regarded as proof that they are blinded by persistent transgression.

Julius Müller, *Doct. Sin.*, 2: 248-259. Edwards, *Works*, 2: 326. Shedd, *Sermons to the Natural Man*, 86, 87.

II. EVERY MEMBER OF THE HUMAN RACE WITHOUT EXCEPTION POSSESSES A CORRUPTED NATURE WHICH IS THE SOURCE OF ACTUAL SIN AND IS ITSELF SIN.

1. *Proof from Scripture.*

A. All men are declared to be by nature children of wrath; (Eph. 2: 3). Here 'nature' signifies something inborn and original, as distinguished from that which is subsequently acquired. The text implies that

(a) Sin is a nature, in the sense of a congenital depravity of the will.

(b) This nature is justly condemnable,—since God's wrath rests only upon that which deserves it.

(c) All men participate in this nature and in this consequent condemnation.

See Harless, *Commentary on Ephesians*, in loco.

B. Death, the penalty of sin, is visited even upon those who have never exercised a personal and conscious choice; (Rom. 5: 12, 14). This text implies that

(a) Sin exists in the case of infants prior to moral consciousness, and therefore in the nature, as distinguished from the personal activity.

(b) Since infants die, this visitation of the penalty of sin upon them marks the ill-desert of that nature which contains in itself, though undeveloped, the germs of actual transgression.

(c) It is therefore certain that a sinful and condemnable nature belongs to all mankind.

C. Sinful acts and dispositions are referred to, and explained by, a corrupt nature (Luke 6: 43-45; cf. Matt. 12: 34. Ps. 58: 3) which underlies consciousness (Ps. 19: 12), which man cannot change of his own power (Jer. 13: 23; Rom. 7: 24), which chiefly constitutes him a sinner before God (Ps. 51: 5, 6, 7. Jer. 17: 9), and which is the common heritage of the race; (Job 14: 4. John 3: 6).

2. *Proof from Reason.*

Three facts demand explanation:

A. The universal existence of sinful dispositions in every mind, and of sinful acts in every life.

B. The preponderating tendencies to evil, which necessitate the constant education of good impulses, while the bad grow of themselves.

C. The yielding of the will to temptation, and the actual violation of the divine law, in the case of every human being so soon as he reaches moral consciousness.

Reason seeks an underlying principle which will reduce these multitudinous phenomena to unity. As we are compelled to refer common physical and intellectual phenomena to a common physical and intellectual nature, so we are compelled to refer these common moral phenomena to a common moral nature, and to find in it the cause of this universal, spontaneous and all-controlling opposition to God and his law. The only possible solution of the problem is this, that the common nature of mankind is corrupt, or in

other words, that the human will, prior to the single volitions of the individual, is turned away from God and supremely set upon self-gratification. This unconscious and fundamental direction of the will, as the source of all actual sin, must itself be the sin par excellence,—and of this sin all mankind are partakers.

Chase's Edition of Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, Introd., xxv, xxvi, and 32. Hodge, Syst. Theol., 2: 231-238. Shedd, Discourses and Essays, 226-236. Julius Müller, Doct. Sin., 2: 259-307.

#### SECTION IV.—ORIGIN OF SIN.

With regard to the origin of this sinful nature which is common to the race, and which is the source of all actual transgressions, reason affords no light. The Scriptures, however, refer the origin of this nature to that free act of our first parents by which they turned away from God, corrupted themselves, and brought themselves under the penalties of the law.

##### I. THE SCRIPTURAL ACCOUNT IN GENESIS.

###### 1. *Its general character not mythical or allegorical, but historical.*

We adopt this view for the following reasons:—

A. There is no intimation in the account itself that it is not historical.

B. As part of a historical book, the presumption is that it is itself historical.

C. The later Scripture writers refer to it as veritable history even in its details; (John 8: 44. 2 Cor. 11: 3. Rev. 20: 2).

D. Particular features of the narrative, such as the placing of our first parents in a garden and the speaking of the tempter through a serpent-form, are incidents suitable to man's condition of innocent but untried childhood.

E. This view that the narrative is historical does not forbid our assuming that the trees of life and of knowledge were symbols of spiritual truths, while at the same time they were outward realities.

Boston Lectures for 1871: 80, 81. Versus Hase, Hutterus Redivivus, 164, 165, and Nitzsch, Christ. Doct., 218.

###### 2. *The course of the temptation and the resulting fall.*

The stages of the temptation appear to have been as follows:

A. An appeal on the part of Satan to innocent appetites, together with an implied suggestion that God was arbitrarily withholding the means of their gratification; (Gen. 3: 1).

The first sin was in Eve's isolating herself and regarding her own pleasure as a thing to be sought for a moment apart from God's will. This initial selfishness it was, which led her to listen to the tempter instead of rebuking him or flying from him, and to exaggerate the divine command in her response; (Gen. 3: 3).

B. A denial of the veracity of God on the part of the tempter, with a charge against the Almighty of jealousy and fraud in keeping his creatures in a position of ignorance and dependence; (Gen. 3: 4, 5).

This was followed, on the part of the woman, by positive unbelief and by a conscious and presumptuous cherishing of desire for the forbidden fruit, as a means of independence and knowledge. Thus unbelief, pride and lust all sprang from the self-isolating, self-seeking spirit, and fastened upon the means of gratifying it; (Gen. 3: 6).

C. The tempter needed no longer to urge his suit. Having poisoned the fountain, the stream would of necessity be evil. Since the heart and its desires had become corrupt, the inward disposition naturally manifested itself in act; (Gen. 3: 6—'did eat and gave also unto her husband with her'—who had been with her, and had shared her choice and longing).

Thus man fell inwardly, before the outward act of eating the forbidden fruit,—fell in that one fundamental determination whereby he made supreme choice of self instead of God. This sin of the inmost nature gave rise to sins of the desires, and sin of the desires led to the outward act of transgression; (James 1: 15—*ἡ ἐπιθυμία σου λαβόνσου τικτεῖ ἀμαρτίαν*).

Baird, *Elohim Revealed*, 388. Müller, *Doct. Sin*, 2: 381-385.

## II. DIFFICULTIES CONNECTED WITH THE FALL CONSIDERED AS THE PERSONAL ACT OF ADAM.

### 1. *How could a holy being fall?*

Here we must acknowledge that we cannot understand how the first unholy emotion could have found lodgment in a mind that was set supremely upon God, nor how temptation could have overcome a soul in which there were no unholy propensities to which it could appeal.

The mere power of choice does not explain the fact of an unholy choice. The fact of natural desire for sensuous and intellectual gratification does not explain how this desire came to be inordinate.

Nor does it throw light upon the matter to resolve this fall into a deception of our first parents by Satan. Their yielding to such deception presupposes distrust of God and alienation from him. Satan's fall, moreover, since it must have been uncaused by temptation from without, is more difficult to explain than Adam's fall.

But sin is an existing fact. God cannot be its author, either by creating man's nature so that sin was a necessary incident of its development, or by withdrawing a supernatural grace which was necessary to keep man holy. Reason therefore has no other recourse than to accept the Scripture doctrine that sin originated in man's free act of revolt from God. We accept the doctrine of the fall without comprehending the method of it. Reason cannot explain sin, because sin is essentially unreason.

### 2. *How could God justly permit Satanic temptation?*

We see in this permission not injustice but benevolence.

A. Since Satan fell without external temptation, it is probable that man's trial would have been substantially the same, even though there had been no Satan to tempt him.

B. In this case, however, man's fall would perhaps have been without what now constitutes its single mitigating circumstance. Self-originated sin would have made man himself a Satan; (Matt. 13: 28).

C. As in the conflict with temptation, it is an advantage to objectify evil under the image of corruptible flesh, so it is an advantage to meet it as embodied in a personal and seducing spirit.

D. Such temptation has in itself no tendency to lead the soul astray. If the soul be holy, temptation may only confirm it in virtue. Only the evil will, self-determined against God, can turn temptation into an occasion of ruin.

Birks, *Difficulties of Belief*, 101. Trench, *Studies in the Gospels*, 16–29. Baird, *Elohim Revealed*, 385–396.

3. *How could a penalty so great, be justly connected with disobedience to so slight a command?*

To this question we may reply:—

A. So slight a command presented the best test of the spirit of obedience.

B. The external command was not arbitrary or insignificant in its substance. It was a concrete presentation to the human will of God's claim to eminent domain or absolute ownership.

C. The sanction attached to the command shows that man was not left ignorant of its meaning or importance.

D. The act of disobedience was therefore the revelation of a will thoroughly corrupted and alienated from God—a will given over to ingratitude, unbelief, ambition and rebellion.

### III. CONSEQUENCES OF THE FALL—SO FAR AS RESPECTS ADAM.

1. *Death*. This death was two fold. It was partly

A. Physical death, or the separation of the soul from the body.

The seeds of death naturally implanted in man's constitution, began to develop themselves the moment that access to the tree of life was denied him. Man from that moment was a dying creature.—But this death was also and chiefly

B. Spiritual death, or the separation of the soul from God. In this are included

(a) Negatively, the loss of man's moral likeness to God, or that underlying tendency of his whole nature toward God, which constituted his original righteousness.

(b) Positively, the depraving of all those powers, which in their united action with reference to moral and religious truth, we call man's moral and religious nature,—or in other words, the blinding of his intellect, the corruption of his affections and the enslavement of his will.

In fine, man no longer made God the end of his life, but chose self instead. While he retained the power of self-determination in subordinate things, he lost that freedom which consisted in the power of choosing God as his ultimate aim, and became fettered by a fundamental inclination of his will toward evil. The intuitions of the reason were abnormally obscured, since these intuitions, so far as they are concerned with moral and religious truth, are conditioned upon a right state of the affections; and—as a necessary re-



sult of this obscuring of reason—conscience, which as the moral judiciary of the soul, decides upon the basis of the law given to it by reason, became perverse in its deliverances. Yet this inability to judge or act aright, since it was a moral inability springing ultimately from will, was itself hateful and condemnable.

Shedd, *Sermons to the Natural Man*, 202–230; esp. 205,

2. *Positive and formal exclusion from God's presence.* This included

A. The cessation of man's former familiar intercourse with God, and the setting up of outward barriers between man and his Maker; (cherubim and sacrifice).

B. Banishment from the garden where God had specially manifested his presence.

Eden was perhaps a spot reserved, as Adam's body had been, to show what a sinless world would be. This positive exclusion from God's presence, with the sorrow and pain which it involved, may have been intended to illustrate to man the nature of that eternal death from which he now needed to seek deliverance.

Edwards, *Works*, 2: 390–405. Hopkins, *Works*, 1: 206–246. Dwight, *Theology*, 1: 393–434. Watson, *Institutes*, 2: 19–42. Martensen, *Dogmatics*, 155–173. Van Oosterzee, *Dogmatics*, 402–412. Philippi, *Glaubenslehre*, 3: 61–73.

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#### SECTION V.—IMPUTATION OF SIN.

We have seen that all mankind are sinners, and that the transgression of our first parents, so far as respects the human race, was the first sin. We have still to consider the nature of the connection between Adam's sin and the depravity and condemnation of the race.

The Scriptures teach that the transgression of our first parents constituted their posterity sinners, so that Adam's sin is imputed, reckoned or charged to every member of the race of which he was the germ and head; (Rom. 5: 12–19; especially 19—*εἰς τῆς παρακοῆς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἁμαρτωλοὶ κατεστάθησαν οἱ πολλοί*).

Among the many attempted explanations of the Scriptural statements, the following are most worthy of attention.

#### I. THEORIES OF IMPUTATION.

##### 1. *The Pelagian Theory.*

Pelagius, a British monk, propounded his doctrines at Rome, 409. They were condemned by the Synod of Carthage, 412. Pelagianism, however, as opposed to Augustinism, designates a complete scheme of doctrine with regard to sin, of which Pelagius was the most thorough representative, although every feature of it cannot be ascribed to his authorship. Socinians and Unitarians are the more modern advocates of this general scheme.

According to this theory, every human soul is immediately created by God, and created as innocent, as free from depraved tendencies, and as perfectly able to obey God, as Adam was at his creation. The only effect of

Adam's sin upon his posterity is the effect of evil example; it has in no way corrupted human nature; the only corruption of human nature is that habit of sinning which each individual contracts by persistent transgression of known law. Adam's sin therefore injured only himself; the sin of Adam is imputed only to Adam—it is imputed in no sense to his descendants; God imputes to each of Adam's descendants only those acts of sin which he has personally and consciously committed. Men can be saved by the law as well as by the gospel, and some have actually obeyed God perfectly and have thus been saved. Physical death therefore is not the penalty of sin, but an original law of nature; Adam would have died whether he had sinned or not; in Rom. 5: 12, *εις πάντας ανθρώπους ὁ θάνατος ἐπέληθεν, ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἡμαρτων* signifies: 'all incurred eternal death by sinning after Adam's example.'

Of this theory we may say:

A. It has never been recognized as Scriptural, nor has it been formulated in confessions, by any branch of the Christian church. Held only sporadically and by individuals, it has ever been regarded by the church at large as heresy. This constitutes at least a presumption against its truth.

B. It contradicts Scripture in denying

- (a) That evil disposition and state, as well as evil acts, are sin.
- (b) That such evil disposition and state are inborn in all mankind.
- (c) That men universally are guilty of overt transgression so soon as they come to moral consciousness.
- (d) That no man is able without divine help to fulfil the law.
- (e) That all men without exception are dependent for salvation upon God's atoning, regenerating, sanctifying grace.
- (f) That man's present state of corruption, condemnation and death is the direct effect of Adam's transgression.

C. It rests upon false philosophical principles; as, for example,

- (a) That the human will is simply the faculty of volitions; whereas it is also and chiefly the faculty of self-determination to an ultimate end.
- (b) That the power of a contrary choice is essential to the existence of will; whereas the will fundamentally determined to self-gratification has this power only with respect to the subordinate choices by which its supreme determination is manifested and executed.
- (c) That ability is the measure of obligation;—a principle which would diminish the sinner's responsibility, just in proportion to his progress in sin.
- (d) That law consists only in positive enactment; whereas it is the demand of perfect harmony with God, inwrought into man's moral nature.
- (e) That each human soul is immediately created by God and holds no other relations to moral law than those which are individual; whereas all human souls are organically connected with each other, and together have a corporate relation to God's law, by virtue of their derivation from one common stock.

Wiggers, Augustinism and Pelagianism, 59. Schaff, Church History, 2: 783–856, and article in Bib. Sac., 5: 205–243. Sheldon, Sin and Redemption. Neander, Church History, 2: 564–625. Martensen, Dog-

matics, 354-362. Ellis, *Half Century of Unitarian Controversy*, 76. Shedd, *Hist. Doct.*, 2: 93-110. Hagenbach, *Hist. Doct.*, 1: 287, 296-310. Julius Müller, *Doct. Sin.*, 2: 37-44.

## 2. *The Arminian Theory.*

Arminius (1560-1609), Professor in the University of Leyden in South Holland, while formally accepting the doctrine of the Adamic unity of the race propounded both by Luther and Calvin, gave a very different interpretation to it—an interpretation which verged toward Semi-Pelagianism and the anthropology of the Greek Church. The Methodist body is the modern representative of this view.

According to this theory, all men, as a divinely appointed sequence of Adam's transgression, are naturally destitute of original righteousness, and are exposed to misery and death. By virtue of the infirmity propagated from Adam to all his descendants, mankind are wholly unable without divine help perfectly to obey God or to attain eternal life. This inability, however, is physical and intellectual but not voluntary. As matter of justice therefore, God bestows upon each individual from the first dawn of consciousness a special influence of the Holy Spirit, which is sufficient to counteract the effect of the inherited depravity and to make obedience possible, provided the human will coöperates, which it still has power to do. This gracious ability, so-called, is bestowed as a consequence of Christ's death for all men. The evil tendency and state may be called sin; but they do not in themselves involve guilt or punishment; still less are mankind accounted guilty of Adam's sin. God imputes to each man his inborn tendencies to evil, only when he consciously and voluntarily appropriates and ratifies these in spite of a power to the contrary specially communicated by divine grace. In Rom. 5: 12, *εις πάντας ανθρώπους ὁ θάνατος διηλθεν, ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἡμαρτον* signifies that physical and spiritual death is inflicted upon all men, not as the penalty of a common sin in Adam, but because, by divine decree, all suffer the consequences of that sin and because all personally consent to their inborn sinfulness by acts of transgression.

With regard to this theory we remark:

A. It is wholly extra-Scriptural in its assumptions

(a) That there is a universal gift of the Holy Spirit.

(b) That this gift remedies the general evil derived from Adam's fall.

(c) That without this gift man would not be responsible for being morally imperfect.

(d) That at the beginning of moral life, all men consciously appropriate their inborn tendencies to evil.

B. It contradicts Scripture in maintaining

(a) That inherited moral evil does not involve guilt.

(b) That the gift of the Spirit, and the regeneration of infants, are matters of justice.

(c) That physical death is not the just penalty of sin, but is a matter of arbitrary divine decree.

- C. It rests upon false philosophical principles, as for example,
- (a) That the will is simply the faculty of choices.
  - (b) That the power of a contrary choice is essential to will.
  - (c) That ability is the measure of obligation.
  - (d) That law condemns only volitional transgression.
  - (e) That man has no organic moral connection with the race.
- D. It furnishes no proper ground for human responsibility,—for unless the universality of sin and the universal need of a Savior be merely hypothetical, sinful action must proceed from inborn sinful tendencies by a uniform and necessary law, in which case power to the contrary has no existence and human responsibility for sinful action, according to the theory, must cease.

Bib. Sac., 19: 241; 20: 327, 328; 23: 206; 28: 779. Bib. Repos., 1831: 226–263. Hagenbach, *Hist. Doct.*, 2: 214–216. Shedd, *Hist. Doct.*, 2: 178–196. Baird, *Elohim Revealed*, 479–494. Julius Müller, *Doct. Sin*, 2: 320–326. Watson, *Institutes*, 2: 54. Whedon, *Com. on Rom.* 5: 12–19. McClintock and Strong, *Cyclopædia*, art.: Arminius.

### 3 *The New School Theory.*

This theory is called New School because of its recession from the old Puritan anthropology of which Edwards and Bellamy in the last century were the expounders. The New School theory is a general scheme built up by the successive labors of Hopkins, Emmons, Dwight, Taylor, and Finney. It is held at present by New School Presbyterians and by the larger part of the Congregational body.

According to this theory all men are born with a physical and moral constitution which predisposes them to sin, and all men do actually sin so soon as they come to moral consciousness. This vitiosity of nature may be called sinful because it uniformly leads to sin, but it is not itself sin, since nothing is to be properly denominated sin but the voluntary act of transgressing known law. God imputes to men only their own acts of personal transgression; he does not impute to them Adam's sin; neither original vitiosity nor physical death are penal inflictions; they are simply consequences which God has in his sovereignty ordained to mark his displeasure at Adam's transgression, and subject to which evils God immediately creates each human soul. In Rom. 5: 12, *εις πάντας ανθρώπους ὁ θάνατος διήλθεν, ἐφ' ἧ πάντες ἥμαρτον* signifies 'spiritual death passed on all men, because all men have actually and personally sinned.'

To this theory we object:

- A. It contradicts Scripture in maintaining or implying:
- (a) That sin consists solely in voluntary and conscious acts, and that the state which predisposes to acts of sin is not itself sin.
  - (b) That the vitiosity which predisposes to sin is a part of each man's nature as it proceeds from the creative hand of God.
  - (c) That physical death in the human race is not a penal consequence of Adam's transgression.

(*d*) That infants, before moral consciousness, do not need Christ's sacrifice to save them. Since they are innocent, no penalty rests upon them and none needs to be removed.

(*e*) That we are neither condemned upon the ground of actual inbeing in Adam, nor justified upon the ground of actual inbeing in Christ.

B. It rests upon false philosophical principles, as for example,

(*a*) That the will is merely the faculty of volitions.

(*b*) That natural ability is the measure of obligation.

(*c*) That law consists wholly in outward command.

(*d*) That the soul is immediately created by God.

(*e*) That man's relations to moral law are exclusively individual.

C. It impugns the justice of God.

(*a*) By regarding him as the direct creator of a vicious nature which infallibly leads every human being into actual transgression. To maintain that in consequence of Adam's act, God brings it about that all men become sinners, and that, not by virtue of inherent laws of propagation but by the direct creation in each case of a vicious nature, is to make God indirectly the author of sin.

(*b*) By representing him as the inflicter of suffering and death upon millions of human beings who in the present life do not come to moral consciousness and who are therefore, according to the theory, perfectly innocent. This is to make him visit Adam's sin on his posterity, while at the same time it denies that moral connection between Adam and his posterity which alone could make such visitation just.

(*c*) By holding that the probation which God appoints to men is a separate probation of each soul when it first comes to moral consciousness and is least qualified to decide aright. It is much more consonant with our ideas of the divine justice that the decision should have been made by the whole race in one whose nature was pure and who perfectly understood God's law, than that heaven and hell should have been determined for each of us by a decision made in our own inexperienced childhood, under the influence of a vitiated nature, and which none of us can remember.

D. Its limitation of responsibility to the evil volitions of the individual and the dispositions directly caused thereby, is inconsistent with the following facts:

(*a*) The volitions are inseparable from the nature which they manifest, and have moral quality only as they are connected with and proceed from holy or unholy affections. Hence the blame for wrong action terminates not upon the volition but upon the evil state of the will which produces it—that is, upon the evil state of the man himself.

(*b*) The uniformity of sinful action among men cannot be explained by the existence of a mere faculty of volitions. That men should uniformly choose may be thus explained, but that men should uniformly choose evil, requires us to postulate an evil tendency or state of the will itself, prior to these separate acts of choice. Upon this evil tendency or inborn determination to evil, since it is the real cause of actual sins, the blame of sin must rest.

(c) Power in the will to prevent the inborn vitiosity from developing itself is upon this theory a necessary condition of responsibility for actual sins. But the absolute uniformity of actual transgression is evidence that no such power exists. A natural ability that is never exercised and never manifests itself is a figment of the imagination. Upon this theory, therefore, there can be no responsibility at all.

Bib. Sac. 7: 552, 567; 8: 607-647; 20: 317, 462, 576-593. Baird *Elohim Revealed*, 488. Julius Müller, *Doct. Sin.*, 2: 326-328. Hodge, *Essays*, 571-633. Philippi, *Glaubenslehre*, 3: 61-73. Hagenbach, *Hist. Doct.*, 2: 435-448.

#### 4. *The Federal Theory.*

The federal theory, or theory of the covenants, had its origin with Cocceius (1603-1669), Professor at Leyden, but was more fully elaborated by Turretin (1623-1687). It has become a tenet of the Reformed as distinguished from the Lutheran church, and in this country it has its main advocates in the Princeton school of theologians, of whom Dr. Hodge is the representative.

According to this view, Adam was constituted by God's sovereign appointment the representative of the whole human race. With Adam as their representative, God entered into covenant, agreeing to bestow upon them eternal life on condition of his obedience, but making the penalty of his disobedience to be the corruption and death of all his posterity. In accordance with the terms of this covenant, since Adam sinned, God accounts all his descendants as sinners, and condemns them because of Adam's transgression. In execution of this sentence of condemnation, God immediately creates each soul of Adam's posterity with a corrupt and depraved nature, which infallibly leads to sin and which is itself sin. The theory is therefore a theory of the immediate imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, their corruption of nature not being the cause of that imputation, but the effect of it. In Rom. 5: 12, *εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους ὁ θάνατος διήλθεν, ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον* signifies: 'physical, spiritual and eternal death came to all, because all were regarded and treated as sinners.'

To this theory we object that

A. It is extra-Scriptural, there being no mention of such a covenant with Adam in the account of man's trial. The assumed allusion to Adam's apostasy in Hosea 6: 7, where the word 'covenant' is used, is too precarious and too obviously metaphorical to afford the basis for a scheme of imputation; (see Henderson, *Com. on Minor Prophets*, in loco). In Heb. 8: 8—*διαθήκην καινὴν*, there is suggested a contrast, not with an Adamic, but with the Mosaic covenant; (cf. verse 9).

B. It contradicts Scripture in making the first result of Adam's sin to be God's *regarding and treating* the race as sinners. The Scripture on the contrary declares that Adam's offence *constituted* us sinners; (Rom. 5: 19). We are not sinners simply because God regards and treats us as such, but God regards us as sinners because we are sinners. Death is said to have 'passed upon all men,' not because all were regarded and treated as sinners, but 'because all sinned;' (Rom. 5: 12—*πάντες ἥμαρτον*).

## C. It impugns the justice of God by implying

(a) That God holds men responsible for the violation of a covenant which they had no part in establishing. The assumed covenant is only a sovereign decree; the assumed justice only arbitrary will.

(b) That upon the basis of this covenant God accounts men as sinners who are not sinners. But God judges according to truth. His condemnations do not proceed upon a basis of legal fiction. He can regard as responsible for Adam's transgression, only those who in some real sense have been concerned and have had part in that transgression.

(c) That after accounting men to be sinners who are not sinners, God makes them sinners by immediately creating each human soul with a corrupt nature such as will correspond to his decree. This is not only to assume a false view of the origin of the soul, but also to make God directly the author of sin. Imputation of sin cannot precede and account for corruption,—on the contrary, corruption must precede and account for imputation.

Cocceius, *Summa Doctrinae de Foedere*, cap. 1, 5. Turretin, *Inst.*, loc. 9, quæst. 9. *Bib. Repertory*, 2: 435. *Bib. Sac.*, 20: 455-462, 577; 21: 85-108. Hodge, *Essays*, 49-86; *Syst. Theol.*, 2: 192-204. New Englander, 1868: 551-603. Birks, *Difficulties of Belief*, 141. Baird, *Elohim Revealed*, 305-334, 435-450, 544. Julius Müller, *Doct. Sin*, 2: 336.

5. *Theory of Mediate Imputation.*

This theory was first maintained by Placeus (1606-1655), Professor of Theology at Saumur in France. Placeus originally denied that Adam's sin was in any sense imputed to his posterity, but after his doctrine was condemned by the Synod of the French Reformed Church in 1645, he published the view which now bears his name.

According to this view, all men are born physically and morally depraved; this native depravity is the source of all actual sin and is itself sin; in strictness of speech it is this native depravity, and this only, which God imputes to men. This inborn sinfulness has descended by natural laws of propagation from Adam to all his posterity, and is the consequence, though not the penalty, of Adam's transgression. There is a sense, therefore, in which Adam's sin may be said to be imputed to his descendants—it is imputed not immediately, as if they had been in Adam or were so represented in him that it could be charged directly to them, corruption not intervening, but it is imputed mediately, through and on account of the intervening corruption which resulted from Adam's sin. As on the federal theory imputation is the cause of depravity, so on this theory depravity is the cause of imputation. In Rom. 5: 12, *εις πάντας ανθρώπους ὁ θάνατος διήλθεν, ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον* signifies 'death physical, spiritual and eternal passed upon all men, because all sinned by possessing a depraved nature.'

This view is exposed to the following objections:

A. It gives no explanation of man's responsibility for his inborn depravity. No explanation of this is possible, which does not regard man's depravity as having had its origin in a free personal act, either of the individual, or of collective human nature in its first father and head. But this participation of all men in Adam's sin, the theory expressly denies.

B. Since the origination of this corrupt nature cannot be charged to the account of man, man's inheritance of it must be regarded in the light of an arbitrary divine infliction—a conclusion which reflects upon the justice of God. Man is not only condemned for a sinfulness of which God is the author, but is condemned without any real probation either individual or collective.

C. It contradicts those passages of Scripture which refer the origin of human condemnation, as well as of human depravity, to the sin of our first parents, and which represent universal death, not as a matter of divine sovereignty, but as a judicial infliction of penalty upon all men for the sin of the race in Adam; (Rom. 5: 16, 18). It moreover does violence to the Scripture in its unnatural interpretation of *πάντες ἡμαρτων* in Rom. 5: 12—words which imply the oneness of the race with Adam, and the causative relation of Adam's sin to our guilt.

Placeus, *De Imputatione Primi Peccati Adami*. G. Payne, *Original Sin*. Cunningham, *Historical Theology*, 1: 496–639. Shedd, *Hist. Doctrine*, 2: 158. Baird, *Elohim Revealed*, 46, 47, 474–479, 504–507. Edwards, *Works*, 2: 482, 483. Julius Müller, *Doct. Sin*, 2: 331. Hodge, *Syst. Theol.*, 2: 205–214. Herzog, *Encyclopädie*, art.: Placeus.

#### 6. *Theory of Adam's Natural Headship.*

This theory was first elaborated by Augustine (354–430), the great opponent of Pelagius, although its central feature appears in the writings of Tertullian (died about 220), Hilary (350) and Ambrose (374). It is frequently designated as the Augustinian view of sin. It was the view held by the Reformers, Zwingle excepted. Its principal advocates in this country are Dr. Shedd and Dr. Baird.

It holds that God imputes the sin of Adam immediately to all his posterity in virtue of that organic unity of mankind by which the whole race at the time of Adam's transgression existed seminally in him as its head. The total life of humanity was then in Adam; the race as yet had its being only in him. Its essence was not yet individualized; its forces were not yet distributed; the powers which now exist in separate men were then unified and localized in Adam; Adam's will was yet the will of the species. In Adam's free act, the will of the race revolted from God and the nature of the race corrupted itself. The nature which we now possess is the same nature that corrupted itself in Adam—"not the same in kind merely but the same as flowing to us continuously from him." Adam's sin is imputed to us immediately, therefore, not as something foreign to us, but because it is ours, we and all other men having existed as one moral person in him, and as the result of that transgression, possessing a nature destitute of love to God and prone to evil.

We regard this theory of the natural headship of Adam as the most satisfactory of the theories mentioned, and as furnishing the most important help toward the understanding of the great problem of original sin. In its favor may be urged the following considerations:

A. It puts the most natural interpretation upon Rom. 5: 12–21. The great majority of commentators regard the words in verse 12: *εις πάντας ανθρώπους ὁ θάνατος διήλθεν, ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἡμαρτων* as signifying 'death passed upon



all men, because all sinned.' The death spoken of is, as the whole context shows, mainly though not exclusively physical. It has passed upon all—even upon those who have committed no conscious and personal transgression whereby to explain its infliction; (verse 14). The legal phraseology of the passage shows that this infliction is not a matter of sovereign decree, but of judicial penalty; (verses 14, 16, 18—νόμος, παράπτωμα, κρίμα ἐξ ἑνὸς εἰς κατάκριμα, δικάσιμα). As the explanation of this universal subjection to penalty, we are referred to Adam's sin. By that act (οὕτως—v. 12) death came to all men, because all [not have sinned, but] sinned; (πάντες ἡμαρτον—aorist of instantaneous past action. Cf. 1 Cor. 15: 22—ἐν τῷ Ἀδάμ πάντες ἀποθνήσκουσι. 2 Cor. 5: 14—εἰ εἰς ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀπέθανεν, ἄρα οἱ πάντες ἀπέθανον). See Commentaries of Meyer, Bengel, Olshausen, Philippi, Alford, Wordsworth, Lange.

B. It permits whatever of truth there may be in the federal theory and in the theory of mediate imputation to be combined with it, while neither of these latter theories can be justified to reason unless they are regarded as corollaries or accessories of the truth of Adam's natural headship. Only on this supposition of natural headship could God justly constitute Adam our representative, or hold us responsible for the depraved nature we have received from him. It moreover justifies God's ways, in postulating a real and a fair probation of our common nature as preliminary to imputation of sin—a truth which the theories just mentioned, in common with that of the New School, virtually deny—while it rests upon correct philosophical principles with regard to will, ability, law, and accepts the Scriptural representations of the nature of sin, the penal character of death, the origin of the soul, and the oneness of the race in the transgression.

C. While its fundamental presupposition—a determination of the will of each member of the race prior to his individual consciousness—is an hypothesis difficult in itself, it is an hypothesis which furnishes the key to many more difficulties than it suggests. Once allow that the race was one in its first ancestor and fell in him, and light is thrown on a problem otherwise insoluble—the problem of our accountability for a sinful nature which we have not personally and consciously originated. Since we cannot, with the three theories first mentioned, deny either of the terms of this problem—inborn depravity or accountability for it—we accept this solution as the best attainable.

D. We are to remember, however, that while this theory of the method of our union with Adam is merely a valuable hypothesis, the problem which it seeks to explain is, in both its terms, presented to us both by conscience and by Scripture. In connection with this problem a central fact is announced in Scripture, which we feel compelled to believe upon divine testimony, even though every attempted explanation should prove unsatisfactory. That central fact, which constitutes the substance of the Scripture doctrine of original sin, is simply this, that the sin of Adam is the immediate cause and ground of inborn depravity, guilt and condemnation to the whole human race.

Augustine, De Pec. Mer. et Rem., 3: 7—“In Adamo, omnes tunc peccaverunt, quando in ejus natura adhuc omnes ille unus fuerunt;” De

Civ. Dei, 13: 14—"Omnes enim fuimus in illo uno, quando omnes fuimus ille unus. \* \* \* \* Nondum erat nobis singillatim creata et distributa forma in qua singuli viveremus, sed jam natura erat seminalis ex qua propagaremur." Calvin, Institutes, book 2, ch. 1-3. Edwards, Original Sin, part 4, ch. 3. Shedd, on Original Sin, in Discourses and Essays, 218-271, and references, 261-263. Julius Müller, Doct. Sin, 2: 259-357. Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 3: 28-33, 204-230. Martensen, Dogmatics, 173-183. Hodge, Syst. Theol., 2: 157-164, 227-257. Auberlen, Div. Revelation, 175-180. Naville, Problem of Evil. Hanna on Resurrection, lect. 3. Murphy, Scientific Bases, 262, sq; cf. 101. Haven, in Bib. Sac., 20: 451-455. Baird, Elohim Revealed, 410-435, 451-460, 494. Birks, Difficulties of Belief, 135. Schaff, in Bib. Sac., 5: 230; and in Lange's Com., on Rom. 5: 12. Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk, 1: 269-400.

## II.—OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.

The doctrine of imputation, to which we have thus arrived, is met by its opponents with the following objections. In discussing them, we are to remember that a truth revealed in Scripture may have claims to our belief in spite of insoluble difficulties connected with it. Yet it is hoped that examination will show the objections in question to rest either upon false philosophical principles or upon misconceptions of the doctrine assailed.

A. That there can be no sin apart from and prior to consciousness.

This we deny. The larger part of men's evil dispositions and acts are imperfectly conscious, and of many such dispositions and acts the evil quality is not discerned at all. The objection rests upon the assumption that law is confined to published statutes or to standards formally recognized by its subjects. A profounder view of law as identical with the constituent principles of being, as binding the nature to conformity with the nature of God, as demanding right volitions only because these are manifestations of right affections, as having claims upon men in their corporate capacity, deprives this objection of all its force.

B. That man cannot be responsible for a sinful nature which he did not personally originate.

We reply that the objection ignores the testimony of conscience and of Scripture. These assert that we are responsible for what we are. The sinful nature is not something external to us but is our inmost selves. If man's original righteousness or the new affection implanted in regeneration have moral character, then the inborn tendency to evil has moral character; as the former are commendable, so the latter is condemnable.

C. That Adam's sin cannot be imputed to us, since we cannot repent of it.

The objection has plausibility only so long as we fail to distinguish between Adam's sin as the inward apostasy of the nature from God, and Adam's sin as the outward act of transgression which followed and manifested that apostasy. We cannot indeed repent of Adam's sin as our personal act or as Adam's personal act, but regarding his sin as the apostasy of

our common nature—an apostasy which manifests itself in our personal transgressions as it did in his, we can repent of it and do repent of it. In truth it is this nature, as self-corrupted and averse to God, for which the Christian most deeply repents.

D. That if we be responsible for Adam's sin, we must also be responsible for the sins of our immediate ancestors.

We reply that the apostasy of human nature could occur but once. It occurred in Adam before the eating of the forbidden fruit, and revealed itself in that eating. The subsequent sins of Adam and of our immediate ancestors are no longer acts which determine or change the nature—they only show what the nature is. We are therefore responsible only for that original apostasy which constituted the one and final revolt of the race from God, and for the personal depravity and disobedience which in the case of each of us has resulted therefrom.

E. That the organic unity of the race in the transgression is a thing so remote from common experience that the preaching of it neutralizes all appeals to the conscience.

But whatever of truth is in this objection is due to the self-isolating nature of sin. Men feel the unity of the family, the profession, the nation to which they belong, and just in proportion to the breadth of their sympathies and their experience of divine grace do they enter into Christ's feeling of unity with the race; (cf. Is. 6: 5. Lam. 3: 39-45. Ezra 9: 6. Neh. 1: 6). The fact that the self-contained and self-seeking recognize themselves as responsible only for their personal acts, should not prevent our pressing upon men's attention the more searching standards of the Scriptures. Only thus can the Christian find a solution for the dark problem of a corruption which is inborn yet condemnable; only thus can the unregenerate man be led to a full knowledge of the depth of his ruin and his absolute dependence upon God for salvation.

F. That if all moral consequences are properly penalties, sin considered as a sinful nature, must be the punishment of sin, considered as the act of our first parents.

But we reply that the impropriety of punishing sin with sin, vanishes when we consider that the sin which is punished is our own, equally with the sin with which we are punished. The objection is valid as against the federal theory or the theory of mediate imputation, but not as against the theory of Adam's natural headship. To deny that God through the operation of second causes may punish the act of transgression by the habit and tendency which result from it, is to ignore the facts of every-day life, as well as the statements of Scripture in which sin is represented as ever reproducing itself, and with each reproduction increasing its guilt and punishment; (Rom. 6: 19—*τῇ ἀνομίᾳ εἰς τὴν ἀνομίαν*. James 1: 15—*ἁμαρτία ἀποτελεσθεῖσα ἀποκίει θανάτου*).

G. That a constitution by which the sin of one individual involves the nature of all men who descend from him in guilt and condemnation, is contrary to God's justice.

We acknowledge that no human theory can fully solve the mystery of imputation. But we prefer to attribute God's dealings to justice rather

than to sovereignty. The following considerations, though partly hypothetical, may throw light upon the subject.

(a) A probation of our common nature in Adam, sinless as he was and with full knowledge of God's law, is more consistent with divine justice than a separate probation of each individual, with inexperience, inborn depravity and evil example, all favoring a decision against God.

(b) A constitution which made a common fall possible, may have been indispensable to any provision of a common salvation.

(c) Our chance for salvation as sinners under grace, may be better than it would have been as sinless Adams under law.

(d) A constitution which permitted oneness with the first Adam in the transgression cannot be unjust, since a like principle of oneness with Christ the second Adam, secures our salvation. Our ruin and our redemption were alike wrought out without personal act of ours. As all the natural life of humanity was in Adam, so all the spiritual life of humanity was in Christ. As our old nature was corrupted in Adam and propagated to us by physical generation, so our new nature was restored in Christ and communicated to us by the regenerating work of the Holy Spirit. If then we are justified upon the ground of our inbeing in Christ, we may in like manner be condemned upon the ground of our inbeing in Adam.

For replies to these and other objections, see Schaff, in *Bib Sac.*, 5: 230. Shedd, *Sermons to the Natural Man*, 266-284. Baird, *Elohim Revealed*, 507-509, 529-544. Birks, *Difficulties of Belief*, 134-138. Stahl, *Philosophie des Rechts*, quoted in Olshausen's *Com. on N. T.*, 3: 574. Edwards, *Original Sin*, in *Works*, 2: 473-510. Tennyson, *Vision of Sin*.

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#### SECTION VI.—CONSEQUENCES OF SIN TO ADAM'S POSTERITY.

As the result of Adam's transgression, all his posterity are born into the same state into which he fell. But since law is the all-comprehending demand of harmony with God, all moral consequences flowing from transgression are to be regarded as sanctions of law, or expressions of the divine displeasure through the constitution of things which he has established. Certain of these consequences, however, are earlier recognized than others and are of minor scope; it will therefore be useful to consider them under the three aspects of depravity, guilt and penalty.

##### I. DEPRAVITY.

By this we mean on the one hand, the lack of original righteousness or of holy affection toward God, and on the other hand, the corruption of the moral nature or bias toward evil. That such depravity exists has been abundantly shown both from Scripture and from reason, in our consideration of the universality of sin. Two questions only need detain us:

##### 1. *Depravity partial or total?*

The Scriptures represent human nature as totally depraved. The phrase 'total depravity,' however is liable to misinterpretation, and should not be used without explanation. By the total depravity of universal humanity we mean,

A. Negatively,—not that every sinner is

(a) Destitute of conscience,—for the existence of strong impulses to right, and of remorse for wrong doing, show that conscience is often keen; (John 8: 9).

(b) Devoid of all qualities pleasing to men, and useful when judged by a human standard,—for the existence of such qualities is recognized by Christ; (Mark 10: 21).

(c) Prone to every form of sin,—for certain forms of sin exclude certain others; (Mat. 23: 23. Rom. 2: 14).

(d) Intense as he can be in his selfishness and opposition to God,—for he becomes worse every day; (Gen. 15: 16).

B. Positively,—that every sinner is

(a) Totally destitute of that love to God which constitutes the fundamental and all-inclusive demand of the law; (John 5: 42).

(b) Supremely determined in his whole inward and outward life by a preference of self to God; (2 Tim. 3: 2).

(c) Possessed of an aversion to God, which, though sometimes latent, becomes active enmity, so soon as God's will comes into manifest conflict with his own; (Rom. 8: 7—*τὸ φρόνημα τῆς σαρκὸς ἐχθρα εἰς Θεόν*).

(d) Disordered and corrupted in every faculty—through this substitution of selfishness for supreme affection toward God; (Eph. 4: 18—*ἐσκοτισμένοι τῇ διανοίᾳ*. Tit. 1: 15—*μεμίανται ὁ νοῦς καὶ ἡ συνείδησις*. 2 Cor. 7: 1—*μολυσμοῦ σαρκὸς καὶ πνεύματος*. Heb. 3: 12—*καρδία πονηρὰ ἀπιστίας*).

(e) Credited with no thought, emotion or act of which divine holiness can fully approve; (Rom. 3: 9-18; 7: 18—*οὐκ οἰκεῖ ἐν ἐμοὶ ἀγαθόν*).

(f) Subject to a law of constant progress in depravity, which he has no recuperative energy to enable him successfully to resist; (Rom. 7: 23—*νόμος τῆς ἁμαρτίας*. 18—*τὸ δὲ κατεργάζεσθαι τὸ καλὸν οὐχ εὗρίσκω*).

Shedd, Discourses and Essays, 248. Baird, Elohim Revealed, 510-522.

Chalmers, Institutes, 1: 519-542. Cunningham, Historical Theology, 1: 516-531.

## 2. Ability or inability?

In opposition to the plenary ability taught by the Pelagians, the gracious ability of the Arminians, and the natural ability of the New School theologians, the Scriptures declare the total inability of the sinner to turn himself to God or to do that which is truly good in God's sight; (John 1: 12, 13; 3: 5; 6: 44; cf. 15: 4, 5. Rom. 7: 18, 24; 8: 7. 1 Cor. 2: 14. 2 Cor. 3: 5. Eph. 2: 1, 8-10. Heb. 11: 6).

This inability is natural in the sense of inborn;—it is not acquired by our personal act, but is congenital. It is not natural, however, as resulting from the loss of any essential faculty of human nature or from the original limitations of human nature as it came from the hand of the Creator. Human nature at its first creation was endowed with ability perfectly to keep the law of God. The inability to good which now characterizes human nature is an inability that results from sin and is itself sin.

We hold therefore to an inability that is both natural and moral,—moral as having its source in the self-corruption of man's moral nature and the

fundamental aversion of his will to God;—natural, as being inborn and as affecting the action of all his powers. For his inability in both these aspects of it, man is responsible.

To the use of the phrase ‘natural ability’ to designate merely the sinner’s possession of all the constituent faculties of human nature, we object upon the following grounds:

A. Since volitions exist and have moral character only as manifestations of moral affections, the absence of right affections renders right choices impossible. There can be no natural ability to right choice unless man may, by volition, change his affections from wrong to right—but this he cannot do, since he cannot separate even the first volition from the moral affections which control it and from which it springs. Natural ability to good involves not only a full complement of faculties, but also a bias of the affections and will toward God. Without this bias there is no possibility of right moral action, and where there is no such possibility, there can be no ability either natural or moral.

B. In addition to the psychological argument just mentioned, we may urge another from experience and observation. These testify that man is cognizant of no such ability. Since no man has ever yet by the exercise of his natural powers turned himself to God or done an act truly good in God’s sight, the existence of a natural ability to good is a pure assumption. There is no scientific warrant for inferring the existence of an ability, which has never manifested itself in a single instance since history began.

C. The practical evil attending the preaching of natural ability furnishes a strong argument against it. The Scriptures, in their declarations of the sinner’s inability and helplessness, aim to shut him up to sole dependence upon God for salvation. The doctrine of natural ability, assuring him that he is able at once to repent and turn to God, encourages delay by putting salvation at all times within his reach. If a single volition will secure it, he may be saved as easily to-morrow as to-day. The doctrine of inability presses men to immediate acceptance of God’s offers, lest the day of grace for them pass by.

It is to be borne in mind, however, that the denial to man of all ability, whether natural or moral, to turn himself to God or do that which is truly good in God’s sight, does not imply a denial of man’s power to order his external life in many particulars conformably to moral rules, or even to attain the praise of men for virtue. Man has still a range of freedom in acting out his nature. He may choose higher or lower forms of selfish action, and pursue these chosen courses with various degrees of selfish energy. Freedom of choice between these various methods of manifesting his nature is by no means incompatible with complete bondage of the will as respects spiritual things.

Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, 2: 257–277. Baird, *Elohim Revealed*, 523–528. Cunningham, *Historical Theology*, 1: 567–639. Calvin, *Institutes*, bk. 2, chap. 2. Westminster Confession, 16: 7.

## II. GUILT.

1. *Nature of guilt.*

By guilt we mean desert of punishment, or obligation to render satisfaction to God's justice for self-determined violation of law. The following remarks may serve both for proof and for explanation:

A. Guilt is incurred only through self-determined transgression either on the part of man's nature or person. We are guilty only of that sin which we have originated or have had part in originating. Guilt is not therefore mere liability to punishment, nor can there be such a thing as constructive guilt under the divine government. We are accounted guilty only for what we have done, either personally or in our first parents, and for what we are, in consequence of such doing; (Ez. 18: 20. John 9: 2, 3).

B. Every sin whether of nature or person, is an offence against God (Ps. 51: 4-6), an act or state of opposition to his will, which has for its first effect God's personal wrath (Ps. 7: 11. John 3: 18, 36), and which must be expiated either by punishment or by atonement; (Heb. 9: 22.) Not only does sin as unlikeness to divine purity, involve pollution,—it also, as antagonism to God's holy will, involves guilt. This guilt or obligation to satisfy the outraged holiness of God is explained in the New Testament by the terms debtor and debt; (Matt. 6: 12—*ὀφειλήματα*. Luke 13: 4—*ὀφειλέται*. Matt. 5: 21—*ἐνοχος ἔσται τῇ κρίσει*. Rom. 3: 19—*ἰπὸδικος τῷ Θεῷ*. 6: 23—*ὀφώνια*. Eph. 2: 3—*τέκνα ὀργῆς*).

C. Guilt, then, as an objective result of sin, is not to be confounded with the subjective consciousness of guilt. In the condemnation of conscience, God's condemnation partially and prophetically manifests itself; (1 John 3: 20—*μείζων ἔστιν ὁ Θεός*). But guilt is primarily a relation to God and only secondarily a relation to conscience. Progress in sin is marked by diminished sensitiveness of moral insight and feeling. As 'the greatest of sins is—to be conscious of none,' so guilt may be great just in proportion to the absence of consciousness of it; (Ps. 19: 12; 51: 6. Eph. 4: 18, 19—*ἀπηγηκότες*). There is no evidence, however, that the voice of conscience can be completely or finally silenced. The time for repentance may pass, but not the time for remorse.

Julius Müller, *Doctrine of Sin*, 1: 193-267. Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, 203-209. Thomasius, *Christi Person und Werk*, 1: 346. Baird, *Elohim Revealed*, 461-473. Delitzsch, *Bib. Psychologie*, 121-148.

2. *Degrees of Guilt.*

The Scriptures recognize different degrees of guilt as attaching to different kinds of sin. The variety of sacrifices under the Mosaic law, and the variety of awards in the judgment (Luke 12: 47, 48—*δαρήσεται πολλὰς, ὀλίγας*—*sc. πληγὰς*. Rom. 2: 6—*ἀποδώσει ἐκάστῳ κατὰ τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ*) are to be explained upon this principle.

Casuistry, however, has drawn many distinctions which lack Scriptural foundation. Such is the distinction between venial sins and mortal sins in the Roman Catholic Church;—every sin unpardoned being mortal, and all sins being venial, since Christ has died for all. Nor is the common distinc-

tion between sins of omission and sins of commission more valid, since the very omission is an act of commission; (Matt. 25: 45—*ὅτι ὅσον οὐκ ἐποιήσατε*. James 4:17—*μη ποιοῦντι, ἁμαρτία*).

The following distinctions are indicated in Scripture as involving different degrees of guilt:

A. Sin of nature, and personal transgression.

The former involves guilt (Eph. 2: 3), though not so great a guilt as that attaching to the personal transgression by which the sin of nature is reasserted. Although we have emphasized the reality of the guilt of inborn sin, because this truth is most contested, it is to be remembered that men reach a conviction of their native depravity only through a conviction of their personal transgressions. For this reason, by far the larger part of our preaching upon sin should consist in applications of the law of God to the acts and dispositions of men's lives. (See Ez. 18: 20. Matt. 19: 14; 23: 32).

B. Sins of ignorance, and sins of knowledge.

Here guilt is measured by the degree of light possessed, or in other words, by the opportunities of knowledge men have enjoyed, and the powers with which they have been naturally endowed. Genius and privilege increase responsibility. The heathen are guilty, but those to whom the oracles of God have been committed, are more guilty than they; (Matt. 10: 15. Luke 12: 47, 48; 23: 34. John 19: 11. Acts 17: 30—*ἰπερὸν*. Rom. 1: 32; 2: 12. 1 Tim. 1: 13, 15).

C. Sins of infirmity, and sins of presumption.

Here the guilt is measured by the energy of the evil will. Sin may be known to be sin, yet may be committed in haste or weakness. Though haste and weakness constitute a palliation of the offence which springs therefrom, yet they are themselves sins, as revealing an unbelieving and disordered heart. But of far greater guilt are those presumptuous choices of evil in which not weakness but strength of will is manifest; (Ps. 19: 12, 13. Is. 5: 18. Gal. 6: 1. 1 Tim. 5: 24).

D. Sin of incomplete, and sin of final obduracy.

Here the guilt is measured not by the objective sufficiency or insufficiency of divine grace, but by the degree of unreceptiveness into which sin has brought the soul. As the only sin unto death which is described in Scripture, is the sin against the Holy Ghost, we here consider the nature of that sin; (see Matt. 12: 31; cf. 1 John 5: 16; Heb. 10: 26).

The sin against the Holy Ghost is not to be regarded as an isolated act, but rather as the external symptom of a heart so radically and finally set against God that no power which God can consistently use will ever save it. The sin, therefore, can be only the culmination of a long course of self-hardening and self-depraving. He who has committed it must be either profoundly indifferent to his own condition, or actively and bitterly hostile to God; so that anxiety or fear on account of one's condition, are evidences that it has not been committed. The sin against the Holy Ghost cannot be forgiven, simply because the soul that has committed it has



ceased to be receptive of divine influences, even when those influences are exerted in the utmost strength which God has seen fit to employ in his spiritual administration.

Upon the general subject of kinds of sin and degrees of guilt, see Julius Müller, *Doct. Sin.*, 1: 193-267; 2: 403-430. Kahnis, *Dogmatik*, 3: 284, 298. Birks, *Difficulties of Belief*, 169-174. On the sin against the Holy Ghost, see Julius Müller, *Doct. Sin.*, 2: 425. Schaff, *Sin against the Holy Ghost*.

### III. PENALTY.

#### 1. *Idea of penalty.*

By penalty we mean that pain or loss which is directly or indirectly inflicted by the Lawgiver in vindication of his justice outraged by the violation of law. In this definition it is implied that

A. The natural consequences of transgression, although they constitute a part of the penalty of sin, do not exhaust that penalty. In all penalty there is a personal element—the holy wrath of the Lawgiver—which natural consequences but partially express.

B. The object of penalty is not the reformation of the offender or the ensuring of social or governmental safety. These ends may be incidentally secured through its infliction, but the great end of penalty is the vindication of the character of the Lawgiver. Penalty therefore is essentially a necessary reaction of the divine holiness against sin.

#### 2. *The actual penalty of sin.*

The one word in Scripture which designates the total penalty of sin, is death. Death, however, is twofold:

A. Physical death,—or the separation of the soul from the body, including all those temporal evils and sufferings which result from disturbance of the original harmony between body and soul, and which are the working of death in us. That physical death is a part of the penalty of sin, appears

##### (a) From Scripture.

This is the natural import of the threatening in Gen. 2: 17—'thou shalt surely die'; cf. 3: 19—'unto dust shalt thou return.' Allusions to this threat in the O. T. confirm this interpretation: Num. 16: 29—'visited after the visitation of all men,' where  $\gamma\rho\vartheta$  = judicial visitation or punishment; 27: 3—LXX.—*ἐὶ ἁμαρτίαν αὐτοῦ*. The prayer of Moses in Ps. 90: 7-9, 11, and the prayer of Hezekiah in Is. 38: 17, 18 recognize plainly the penal nature of death. The same doctrine is taught in the N. T., as for example, John 8: 44—*ἀνθρωποκτόνος ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*. Rom. 5:12—*ὁ θάνατος διήλθεν, ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον*. 14, 16—*κρίμα ἐξ ἑνὸς εἰς κατάκριμα*. 17—*τῷ τοῦ ἐνὸς παραπτώματι ὁ θάνατος*, where the judicial phraseology is to be noted; (cf. Rom. 1: 32). 6: 23—*ὁψώνια τῆς ἁμαρτίας, θάνατος*. 10—*Χριστὸς—τῇ ἁμαρτία ἀπέθανεν ἐφάπαξ*. 8: 3, 10—*εἰ δὲ Χριστὸς ἐν ὑμῖν, τὸ μὲν σῶμα νεκρὸν δι' ἁμαρτίαν*. These latter passages show that Christ submitted to physical death as the penalty of sin. 1 Cor. 15: 21, 22—*ἐν τῷ Ἀδὰμ πάντες ἀποθνήσκουσι*, where observe the antithesis between bodily death and bodily resurrection. 1 Pet. 4: 6—*κριθῶσι κατὰ ἀνθρώπους σαρκί*, where death is spoken of as God's judgment upon sin.

## (b) From reason.

The universal prevalence of suffering and death among rational creatures cannot be reconciled with the divine justice, except upon the supposition that it is a judicial infliction on account of a common sinfulness of nature belonging even to those who have not reached moral consciousness.

The objection that death existed in the animal creation before the fall may be answered by saying that but for the fact of man's sin, it would not have existed. We may believe that God arranged even the geologic history to correspond with the foreseen fact of human apostacy; (cf. Rom. 8: 20-23—where the creation is said to have been made subject to vanity by reason of man's sin).

The translation of Enoch and Elijah, and of the saints that remain at Christ's second coming, seems intended to teach us that death is not a necessary law of organized being, and to show what would have happened to Adam if he had been obedient. He was created a *σῶμα ψυχικόν, χαϊκόν*, but might have attained a higher being, the *σῶμα πνευματικόν, επουράνιον*, without the intervention of death. Sin, however, has turned the normal condition of things into the rare exception; (cf. 1 Cor. 15: 42-50). Since Christ endured death as the penalty of sin, death to the Christian becomes the gateway through which he enters into full communion with his Lord; (cf. John 14: 3. 1 Cor. 15: 54-57. 2 Cor. 5: 1-9. Phil. 1: 23).

B. Spiritual death,—or the separation of the soul from God, including all that pain of conscience, loss of peace and sorrow of spirit, which result from disturbance of the normal relation between the soul and God.

Although physical death is a part of the penalty of sin, it is by no means the chief part. The term death is frequently used in Scripture in a moral and spiritual sense, as denoting the absence of that which constitutes the true life of the soul, namely, the presence and favor of God; (Matt. 8: 22—*ἄφες τοὺς νεκροὺς θάψαι τοὺς ἑαυτῶν νεκροὺς*. Luke 15: 32—*ὁ ἀδελφός σου οὗτος νεκρὸς ἔνν*. John 5: 24—*μεταβέβηκεν ἐκ τοῦ θανάτου εἰς τὴν ζωὴν*. 8: 51—*θάνατον οὐ μὴ θεωρήσῃ*. Rom. 8: 13—*εἰ γὰρ κατὰ σάρκα ζῆτε, μέλλετε ἀποθνήσκειν*. Eph. 2: 1—*νεκροὺς τοῖς παραπτώμασι καὶ ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις*. 5: 14—*ἀνάστα ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν*. 1 Tim. 5: 6—*ξῶσα τέθνηκε*. James 5: 20—*σώσει ψυχὴν ἐκ θανάτου*. 1 John 3: 14—*ὁ μὴ ἀγαπῶν τὸν ἀδελφόν, μένει ἐν τῷ θανάτῳ*. Rev. 3: 1—*ζῆς καὶ νεκρὸς εἶ*).

It cannot be doubted that the penalty denounced in the garden and fallen upon the race, is primarily and mainly that death of the soul which consists in its separation from God. In this sense only, death was fully visited upon Adam in the day on which he ate the forbidden fruit; (Gen. 2: 17). In this sense only, death is escaped by the Christian; (John 11: 26). For this reason, in the parallel between Adam and Christ (Rom. 5: 12-21), the apostle passes from the thought of mere physical death in the early part of the passage to that of both physical and spiritual death at its close; (verse 21—*ὡςπερ ἐβασίλευσεν ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐν τῷ θανάτῳ, οὕτω καὶ ἡ χάρις βασιλεύσῃ εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον*—where eternal life is more than endless physical existence and death is more than death of the body).

Eternal death may be regarded as the culmination and completion of spiritual death, and as essentially consisting in the correspondence of the

outward condition with the inward state of the evil soul; (Acts 1: 25—*πορευ-θῆναι εἰς τὸν τόπον τὸν ἰδίον*). It would seem to be inaugurated by some peculiar repellant energy of the divine holiness (Matt. 25: 41—*πορεύεσθε ἀπ' ἐμοῦ, οἱ κατηραμένοι*. 2 Thess. 1: 9—*ὀκνην τίσουσιν, ὀλεθρον αἰώνιον, ἀπὸ προσώπου τοῦ Κυρίου*) and to involve positive retribution visited by a personal God upon both the body and the soul of the evil doer; (Matt. 10: 28.—*δυνάμενον καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα ἀπολέσαι*. Heb. 10: 31—*φοβερὸν τὸ ἐμπροσθεν εἰς χεῖρας Θεοῦ ξῶντος*. Rev. 14: 11—*ὁ καπνὸς τοῦ βασανισμοῦ αὐτῶν ἀναβαίνει εἰς αἰῶνας αἰώνων*).

On the general subject of the penalty of sin, see Julius Müller, Doct. Sin, 1: 245 sq.; 2: 286-397. Baird, Elohim Revealed, 263-279. Bushnell, Nature and the Supernatural, 194-219. Krabbe, Lehre von der Sünde und vom Tode. Weisse, in Studien und Kritiken, 1836: 371.

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SECTION VII.—THE SALVATION OF INFANTS.

The views which have been presented with regard to inborn depravity and the reaction of divine holiness against it, suggest the question whether infants dying before arriving at moral consciousness are saved, and if so, in what way. To this question we reply as follows:

1. Infants are in a state of sin, need to be regenerated, and can be saved only through Christ; (Job 14: 4. Ps. 51: 5. John 3: 6. Rom. 5: 14. Eph. 2: 3. Cf. Matt. 19: 14—*ἄφετε τὰ παιδία καὶ μὴ κολύβετε αὐτὰ ἐλθεῖν πρός με*—‘to me whom they need as a Savior’).

2. Yet as compared with those who have personally transgressed, they are recognized as possessed of a relative innocence and of a submissiveness and trustfulness which may serve to illustrate the graces of Christian character; (Deut. 1: 39. Jonah 4: 11. Rom. 9: 11—*μηδὲ πραξάντων τὴ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν*. Matt. 18: 3, 4—*ἐάν μὴ στραφῆτε καὶ γένησθε ὡς τὰ παιδία*).

3. For this reason they are the objects of special divine compassion and care, and through the grace of Christ are certain of salvation; (Matt. 18: 5, 6, 10; 19: 14—*τῶν γὰρ τούτων ἐστὶν ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν*—‘the kingdom of saved sinners.’)

4. The descriptions of God’s merciful provision, as coëxtensive with the ruin of the fall, also lead us to believe that those who die in infancy receive salvation through Christ as certainly as they inherit sin from Adam; (John 3: 16—*οὕτω γὰρ ἠγάπησεν ὁ Θεὸς τὸν κόσμον*. Rom. 5: 14, 19-21—*σὺ δὲ ἐπλεόνασεν ἡ ἁμαρτία, ὑπερεπερίσσευσεν ἡ χάρις*).

5. The condition of salvation for adults is personal faith. Infants are incapable of fulfilling this condition. Since Christ has died for all, we have reason to believe that provision is made for their reception of Christ in some other way; (2 Cor. 5: 15—*ὑπὲρ παντῶν ἀπέθανεν*. Mark 16: 16—*ὁ πιστεύσας καὶ βαπτισθεὶς, σωθήσεται*).

6. At the final judgment, personal conduct is made the test of character. But infants are incapable of personal transgression. We have reason, therefore, to believe that they will be among the saved, since this rule of decision will not apply to them; (Matt. 25: 45—*ἐφ’ ὅσον οὐχ ἐποιήσατε*. Rom. 2: 6—*ὡς ἀποδώσει ἕκαστῳ κατὰ τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ*).

7. Since there is no evidence that children dying in infancy are regenerated prior to death, either with or without the use of external means, it seems most probable that the work of regeneration may be performed by the Spirit in connection with the infant soul's first view of Christ in the other world. As the remains of natural depravity in the Christian are eradicated not by death, but at death, through the sight of Christ and union with him, so the first moment of consciousness for the infant may be coincident with a view of Christ the Savior, which accomplishes the entire sanctification of its nature; (cf. 2 Cor. 3: 18—*τὴν δόξαν Κυρίου κατοπτριζόμενοι, τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα μεταμορφούμεθα.* 1 John 3: 2—*ὅμοιοι αὐτῷ ἐσόμεθα, ὅτι ὁψόμεθα αὐτὸν καθὼς ἐστί.*)

While, in the nature of things and by the express declarations of Scripture, we are precluded from extending this doctrine of regeneration at death to any who have committed personal sins, we are nevertheless warranted in the conclusion, that certain and great as is the guilt of original sin, no human soul is eternally condemned solely for this sin of nature, but that on the other hand, all who have not consciously and wilfully transgressed are made partakers of Christ's salvation.

Ridgeley, Body of Divinity, 1: 422-425. Hodge, Syst. Theol., 1: 26, 27.

## PART VI.

### SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION THROUGH THE WORK OF CHRIST AND OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.

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#### CHAPTER I.

##### CHRISTOLOGY, OR THE REDEMPTION WROUGHT BY CHRIST.

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###### SECTION I.—HISTORICAL PREPARATION FOR REDEMPTION.

Since God had from eternity determined to redeem mankind, the history of the race from the time of the fall to the coming of Christ was providentially arranged to prepare the way for this redemption. This preparation was two-fold :

I. **NEGATIVE PREPARATION**, in the history of the heathen world. This showed,

1. The true nature of sin, and the depth of spiritual ignorance and of moral depravity to which the race, left to itself, must fall.
2. The powerlessness of human nature to preserve or regain an adequate knowledge of God, or to deliver itself from sin by philosophy or art.

Tholuck, on Nature and Moral Influence of Heathenism, in *Bib. Repos.*, 1832: 80, 246, 441. Döllinger, *Gentile and Jew*. DePressensé, *Religions before Christ*. Max Müller, *Science of Religion*, 1-128. Cocker, *Christianity and Greek Philosophy*. Ackermann, *Christian Element in Plato*. Farrar, *Seekers after God*.

II. **POSITIVE PREPARATION**, in the history of Israel.

A single people was separated from all others from the time of Abraham and was educated in three great truths:

1. The majesty of God, in his unity, omnipotence and holiness.
2. The sinfulness of man, and his moral helplessness.
3. The certainty of a coming salvation.

This education from the time of Moses was conducted by the use of three principal agencies:

A. **Law**. The Mosaic legislation

(a) By its theophanies and miracles, cultivated faith in a personal and almighty God and Judge.

(b) By its commands and threatenings, wakened the sense of sin.

(c) By its priestly and sacrificial system, inspired hope of some way of pardon and access to God.

B. Prophecy. This was of two kinds:

(a) Verbal,—beginning with the protevangelium in the garden, and extending to within four hundred years of the coming of Christ.

(b) Typical,—in persons, as Adam, Melchisedek, Joseph, Moses, Joshua, David, Solomon, Jonah; and in acts, as Isaac's sacrifice and Moses lifting up the serpent in the wilderness.

C. Judgment. Repeated divine chastisements for idolatry culminated in the overthrow of the kingdom and the captivity of the Jews. The exile had two principal effects:

(a) Religious,—in giving monotheism firm root in the heart of the people, and in leading to the establishment of the synagogue-system by which monotheism was thereafter preserved and propagated.

(b) Civil,—in converting the Jews from an agricultural to a trading people, scattering them among all nations, and finally imbuing them with the spirit of Roman law and organization.

Thus a people was made ready to receive the gospel and to propagate it throughout the world, at the very time when the world had become conscious of its needs, and through its greatest philosophers and poets was expressing its longings for deliverance.

Döllinger, *Gentile and Jew*, 2: 291-419. Martensen, *Dogmatics*, 224-236. Hengstenberg, *Christology of the O. T.* Smith, *Prophecy a Preparation for Christ.* Van Oosterzee, *Dogmatics*, 458-485. Fairbairn, *Typology.* MacWhorter, *Jahveh Christ.* Kurtz, *Christliche Religionslehre*, 114. Edwards, *History of Redemption*, in *Works*, 1: 297-395. Walker, *Philosophy of the Plan of Salvation.* Conybeare and Howson, *Life and Epistles of St. Paul*, 1: 1-37. Luthardt, *Fundamental Truths*, 257-281. Schaff, *Hist. Christian Ch.*, 1: 32-49. Butler's *Analogy*, Bohn's ed., 228-238. Bushnell, *Vicarious Sac.*, 63-66. Max Müller, *Science Language*, 2: 443.

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## SECTION II.—THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

The redemption of mankind from sin was to be effected through a Mediator who should unite in himself both the human nature and the divine, in order that he might reconcile God to man and man to God. To facilitate an understanding of the Scriptural doctrine under consideration, it will be desirable at the outset to present a brief

### I. HISTORICAL SURVEY OF VIEWS RESPECTING THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

1. *The Ebionites* (עביונים — 'poor'; A. D. 107?) denied the reality of Christ's divine nature and held him to be merely man, whether naturally or supernaturally conceived. This man, however, held a peculiar relation to God, in that, from the time of his baptism, an unmeasured fulness of the divine Spirit rested upon him. Ebionism was simply Judaism within the pale of the Christian church, and its denial of Christ's godhood was occasioned by the apparent incompatibility of this doctrine with monotheism.

Dorner, *History Doctrine Person of Christ*, A. 1: 187-217. Reuss, *Hist. Christ. Theol.*, 1: 100-107. Schaff, *Church History*, 1: 212-215.

2. *The Docetæ* (δοκέω—'to seem,' 'to appear'; A. D. 70–170) like most of the Gnostics in the second century and the Manichees in the third, denied the reality of Christ's human body. This view was the logical sequence of their assumption of the inherent evil of matter. If matter is evil and Christ was pure, then Christ's human body must have been merely phantasmal. Docetism was simply pagan philosophy introduced into the church.

Dorner, A. 1: 218–252. Neander, Church History, 1: 387.

3. *The Arians* (Arius condemned at Nice, 325) denied the integrity of the divine nature in Christ. They regarded the Logos who united himself to humanity in Jesus Christ, not as possessed of absolute godhood, but as the first and highest of created beings. This view originated in a misinterpretation of the Scriptural accounts of Christ's state of humiliation, and in mistaking temporary subordination for original and permanent inequality.

Dorner, A. 2: 227–244. Herzog, Encyclopædie, art.: Arianismus.

4. *The Apollinarians* (Apollinaris condemned at Constantinople, 381) denied the integrity of Christ's human nature. According to this view, Christ had no human *νοῦς* or *πνεῦμα*, other than that which was furnished by the divine nature. Christ had only the human *σῶμα* and *ψυχή*,—the place of the human *νοῦς* or *πνεῦμα* was filled by the divine Logos. Apollinarianism is an attempt to construe the doctrine of Christ's person in the forms of the Platonic trichotomy.

Dorner, A. 2: 352–399. Shedd, History of Doctrine, 1: 394.

5. *The Nestorians* (Nestorius removed from the Patriarchate of Constantinople, 431) denied the real union between the divine and the human natures in Christ, making it rather a moral than an organic one. They refused therefore to attribute to the resultant unity the attributes of each nature, and regarded Christ as a man in very near relation to God. Thus they virtually held to two natures and two persons, instead of two natures in one person.

Dorner, B. 1: 53–79. Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 4: 210.

6. *The Eutychians* (condemned at Chalcedon, 451) denied the distinction and coexistence of the two natures, and held to a mingling of both into one, which constituted a *tertium quid* or third nature. Since in this case the divine must overpower the human, it follows that the human was really absorbed into or transmuted into the divine, although the divine was not in all respects the same after the union, that it was before. Hence the Eutychians were often called Monophysites, because they virtually reduced the two natures to one.

Dorner, B. 1: 83–93. Guericke, Church History, 1: 356–360.

The foregoing survey would seem to show that history had exhausted the possibilities of heresy, and that the future denials of the doctrine of Christ's person must be, in essence, forms of the views already mentioned. All controversies with regard to the person of Christ must of necessity hinge upon one of three points: first, the reality of the two natures; secondly, the integrity of the two natures; thirdly, the union of the two natures in one person. Of these points, Ebionism and Docetism deny the reality of the

natures; Arianism and Apollinarism deny their integrity; while Nestorianism and Eutychianism deny their proper union. In opposition to all these errors,

7. *The Orthodox doctrine* (promulgated at Chalcedon, 451) holds that in the one person Jesus Christ there are two natures, a human nature and a divine nature, each in its completeness and integrity, and that these two natures are organically and indissolubly united, yet so that no third nature is formed thereby. In brief, to use the antiquated dictum, orthodox doctrine forbids us either to divide the person or to confound the natures.

Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 4: 189, sq. Dorner, History of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ, B. 1: 93-119.

That this doctrine is Scriptural and rational we have yet to show. We may most easily arrange our proofs by reducing the three points mentioned to two, namely: first, the reality and integrity of the two natures; secondly, the union of the two natures in one person.

## II. THE TWO NATURES OF CHRIST,—THEIR REALITY AND INTEGRITY.

### 1. *The Humanity of Christ.*

A. Its Reality. This may be shown as follows :

(a) He expressly called himself and was called 'man'; (John 8: 40. Acts 2: 22. Rom. 5: 15. 1 Cor. 15: 21. 1 Tim. 2: 5. Cf. the genealogies in Matt. 1 and Luke 3; the phrase 'Son of man,' e. g., in Matt. 20: 28; and the term 'flesh' = human nature, in John 1: 14 and 1 John 4: 2).

(b) He possessed the essential elements of human nature as at present constituted, a material body and a rational soul; (Matt. 26: 38; John 12: 27—*ψυχή*. John 11: 33—*πνεῦμα*. Matt. 26: 26—*σῶμα*. 28—*αἷμα*. Luke 24: 39—*σάρκα καὶ ὀστέα*. Heb. 2: 14—*σαρκὸς καὶ αἱματος*. Cf. 1 John 1: 1-3).

(c) He was moved by the instinctive principles and he exercised the active powers which belong to a normal and developed humanity; (Matt. 4: 2—hunger; 8: 24—sleep; John 4: 6—weariness; 19: 28—thirst; Matt. 9: 36—compassion; Mark 10: 21—love; John 11: 33—groaning; 35—weeping; Mark 3: 5—anger; Heb. 5: 7—anxiety and fear; Matt. 14: 23—prayer).

(d) He was subject to the ordinary laws of human development both in body and soul; (Luke 2: 40—grew and waxed strong in spirit; 46—asked questions; 52—grew in wisdom and stature. Heb. 2: 10—made perfect through sufferings; 18—suffered being tempted; 5: 8—learned obedience. Cf. Gal. 4: 4; Heb. 2: 10).

(e) He suffered and died; (Luke 22: 44—bloody sweat; John 19: 30—*παρέδωκε τὸ πνεῦμα*. 34—*ἐξήλθεν αἷμα καὶ ὕδωρ*).

Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 4: 408.

B. Its Integrity. We here use the term integrity to signify not merely completeness but perfection. Christ's human nature was

(a) Supernaturally conceived; (Luke 1: 35). "He had no earthly father; his birth was a creative act of God, breaking through the chain of human generation."

Julius Müller, Proof-texts, 29.



(b) Free from all taint of sin, whether original or actual; (Luke 1: 35—*τὸ γεννώμενον ἁγίον*. 2: 52. John 8: 46; 14: 30—*ἐν ἐμοὶ οὐκ ἔχει οὐδέν*. Rom. 8: 3—*ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας*. 2 Cor. 5: 21—*τὸν γὰρ μὴ γνόνητα ἁμαρτίαν*. Heb. 4: 15; 7: 26, 27; 9: 14. 1 Pet. 1: 19; 2: 21, 22. 1 John 3: 5, 7).

Ullmann, Sinlessness of Jesus. Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk, 2: 7-17. Schaff, Person of Christ, 51-72.

(c) Ideal human nature,—furnishing the pattern which man is progressively to realize; (Psalm 8: 4-8; cf. Heb. 2: 6-10. 1 Cor. 15: 45, 49. 2 Cor. 3: 18. Phil. 3: 21. Col. 1: 18. 1 Pet. 2: 21. 1 John 3: 3. This seems indicated in the phrase 'Son of man'—John 5: 27; cf. Dan. 7: 13, and Com. of Pusey, in loco).

F. W. Robertson, Sermon on the Glory of the Divine Son. Wilberforce, Incarnation, 22-99. Ebrard, Dogmatik, 2: 25. Moorhouse, Nature and Revelation, 37. Tennyson, Introduction to In Memoriam. Farrar, Life of Christ, 1: 148-154; 2: excursus IV. Tyler, in Bib. Sac., 22: 51, 620.

(d) A human nature germinal and capable of self-communication,—so constituting him the spiritual head and beginning of a new race; (Isa. 53: 10. John 5: 21—*οὐδὲ θέλει ζωοποιεῖ*. 15: 1; 17: 2—*ἔδωκε αὐτοῖς ζωὴν αἰώνιον*. 1 Cor. 15: 45—*ὁ ἔσχατος Ἀδάμ εἰς πνεῦμα ζωοποιούν*. Eph. 5: 23—*κεφαλὴ τῆς ἐκκλησίας*. Col. 1: 18—*ἀρχὴ*. Heb. 2: 13—*ἐγὼ καὶ τὰ παιδία*. Rev. 22: 16—*ρίζα καὶ τὸ γένος Δαβὶδ*).

Wilberforce, Incarnation, 227-241.

The passages thus reviewed abundantly confute the Docetic denial of Christ's veritable human body, and the Apollinarian denial of Christ's veritable human soul. More than this, they establish the reality and integrity of Christ's human nature, as possessed of all the elements, faculties and powers essential to humanity.

## 2. *The Deity of Christ.*

The reality and integrity of Christ's divine nature have been sufficiently proved in a former chapter of these lectures; (see pages 72-80). We need only refer to the evidence there given, that, during his earthly ministry, Christ not only

(a) Possessed a knowledge of his own deity (John 3: 13—*ὁ ὢν ἐν τῇ οὐρανῷ*. 8: 58—*πρὶν Ἀβραὰμ γενέσθαι, ἐγὼ εἰμι*. 10: 30—*ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ Πατήρ ἐν ἐσμεν*. 14: 9, 10—*ὁ ἑώρακώς ἐμὲ, ἑώρακε τὸν Πατέρα*) but also

(b) Exercised divine attributes and prerogatives; (John 2: 25—*ἐγίνωσκε τί ἦν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ*. Mark 4: 39—*εἶπε τῇ θαλάσῃ, Σιώπα, πεοίμωσο*. Matt. 9: 6—*ἔξουσιαν ἔχει ἀφιέναι ἁμαρτίας*. Cf. Mark 2: 7).

But this is to say, in other words, that there were in Christ a knowledge and a power such as belong only to God. The passages cited furnish a refutation of both the Ebionite denial of the reality, and the Arian denial of the integrity of the divine nature in Christ.

## III. THE UNION OF THE TWO NATURES IN ONE PERSON.

Distinctly as the Scriptures represent Jesus Christ to have been possessed of a divine nature and of a human nature, each unaltered in essence and undivested of its normal attributes and powers, they with equal distinctness represent Jesus Christ as a single undivided personality in whom these two natures are vitally and inseparably united, so that he is properly, not God and man, but the God-man. The two natures are bound together not by the moral tie of friendship nor by the spiritual tie which links the believer to his Lord, but by a bond unique and inscrutable, which constitutes them one person with a single consciousness and will, this consciousness and will including within their possible range both the human nature and the divine,

1. *Proof of this Union.*

A. Christ uniformly speaks of himself, and is spoken of, as a single person. There is no interchange of 'I' and 'thou' between the human and the divine natures, such as we find between the persons of the Trinity; (John 17: 23). Christ never uses the plural number in referring to himself, unless it be in John 3: 11—*ὁ οὐδαμὲν λαλοῦμεν*, and even here, 'we' is more probably used as inclusive of the disciples. 1 John 4: 2—*ἐν σαρκὶ ἐληλυθότα* is supplemented by John 1: 14—*σὰρξ ἐγένετο*, and these texts together assure us that Christ so came in human nature, as to make that nature an element in his single personality.

B. The attributes and powers of both natures are ascribed to the one Christ, and conversely the works and dignities of the one Christ are ascribed to either of the natures, in a way inexplicable except upon the principle that these two natures are organically and indissolubly united in a single person; (examples of the former usage are Rom. 1: 3 and 1 Pet. 3: 18; of the latter, 1 Tim. 2: 5 and Heb. 1: 2, 3). Hence we can say on the one hand, that the God-man existed before Abraham, yet was born in the reign of Augustus Caesar, and that Jesus Christ wept, was weary, suffered, died, yet is the same yesterday, to-day and forever;—on the other hand, that a divine Saviour redeemed us upon the cross, and that the human Christ is present with his people even to the end of the world; (Eph. 1: 23; 4: 10. Matt 28: 20).

C. The constant Scriptural representations of the infinite value of Christ's atonement and of the union of the human race with God which has been secured in him, are intelligible only when Christ is regarded not as a man of God, but as the God-man, in whom the two natures are so united that what each does has the value of both; (1 John 2: 2; Eph. 2: 16-18, 21, 22; 2 Pet. 1: 4).

D. It corroborates this view to remember that the universal Christian consciousness recognizes in Christ a single and undivided personality, and expresses this recognition in its services of song and prayer.

The foregoing proof of the union of a perfect human nature and of a perfect divine nature in the single person of Jesus Christ, suffices to refute both the Nestorian separation of the natures and the Eutychian confound-

ing of them. Certain modern forms of stating the doctrine of this union however—forms of statement into which there enter some of the misconceptions already noticed—need a brief examination before we proceed to our own attempt at elucidation.

For Lutheran view of this union and its results in the communion of natures, see Hase, *Hutterus Redivivus*, 11th ed., 195–197; Thomasius, *Christi Person und Werk*, 2: 24, 25. For Reformed view, see Turretin, loc. 13, quaest. 8. Hodge, *Syst. Theol.*, 2: 387–397, 407–418.

## 2. *Modern misrepresentations of this union.*

A. The theory that the humanity in Christ is a contracted and metamorphosed deity,—in other words, that the divine Logos reduced himself to the condition and limits of human nature and thus literally became a human soul.

This theory is held in slightly varying forms by the German Gess, Hofmann and Ebrard, and by the American Beecher and Crosby. It differs from Apollinarism in that it does not necessarily presuppose a trichotomous view of man's nature. While Apollinarism, however, denied the human origin only of Christ's *πνεῦμα*, this theory extends the denial to his entire immaterial being, his body alone being derived from the Virgin.

Gess, *Scripture Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, and synopsis of his view by Reubelt, in *Bib. Sac.*, 1870: 1–32. Hofmann, *Schriftbeweis*, 1: 234–241; 2: 20. Ebrard, *Dogmatik*, 2: 144–151, and in Herzog, *Encyclopädie*, art.: *Jesus Christ, der Gottmensch*. H. W. Beecher, *Life of Jesus the Christ*, chap. 3. Howard Crosby, in *Bap. Quarterly*, 1870: 350–363. Goodwin, *Christ and Humanity*. On Dr. Watts' view of a pre-existent humanity of Christ, see *Bib. Sac.*, 1875: 421.

Against this theory we urge the following objections:

(a) It rests upon a false interpretation of the passage John 1: 14—*ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο*. The word *σὰρξ* here has its common New Testament meaning. It designates neither soul nor body alone, but human nature in its totality; (cf. John 3: 6—*τὸ γεγεννημένον ἐκ τῆς σαρκὸς, σὰρξ ἐστὶ*. Rom. 7: 18—*οὐκ ὀκεῖ ἐν ἐμοί, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ σαρκί μου, ἁγαθόν*). That *ἐγένετο* does not imply a transmutation of the *λόγος* into human nature or into a human soul is evident from *ἐσκήνωσεν* which follows—an allusion to the Shechinah of the Mosaic tabernacle, and from the parallel passage 1 John 4: 2—*ἐν σαρκὶ ἐληλυθότα*, where we are taught not only the oneness of Christ's person but the distinctness of the constituent natures.

(b) It contradicts the two great classes of Scripture passages already referred to, which assert on the one hand the divine knowledge and power of Christ and his consciousness of oneness with the Father, and on the other hand the completeness of his human nature and its derivation from the stock of Israel and the seed of Abraham: (Matt. 1: 1–16. Heb. 2: 16). Thus it denies both the true humanity and the true deity of Christ.

(c) It is inconsistent with the Scriptural representations of God's immutability, in maintaining that the Logos gives up the attributes of godhead and his place and office as second person of the Trinity, in order to contract

himself into the limits of humanity. Since attribute and substance are correlative terms, it is impossible to hold that the substance of God is in Christ, so long as he does not possess divine attributes. The only exit from this difficulty is through the pantheistic hypothesis that God and man are not two but one in essence. To pantheism, therefore, this theory actually tends.

(d) It is destructive of the whole Scriptural scheme of salvation, in that it renders impossible any experience of human nature on the part of the divine,—for when God becomes man he ceases to be God; in that it renders impossible any sufficient atonement on the part of human nature,—for mere humanity even though its essence be a contracted and dormant deity, is not capable of a suffering which shall have infinite value; in that it renders impossible any proper union of the human race with God in the person of Jesus Christ,—for where true deity and true humanity are both absent, there can be no union between the two.

Hovey, *God with us*, 62–69. Philippi, *Glaubenslehre*, 4: 386–408. Biedermann, *Christliche Dogmatik*, 356–359. Dorner, *Unveränderlichkeit Gottes*, in *Jahrbuch für deutsche Theologie*, 1: 361; 2: 440; 3: 579. Hodge, *Syst. Theol.*, 2: 430–440.

B. Theory of a union between the divine and the human natures which is not completed by the incarnating act, but is accomplished by a gradual communication of the fulness of the divine Logos to the man Christ Jesus. This communication is mediated by the human consciousness of Jesus. Before the human consciousness begins, the personality of the Logos is not yet divine-human. The personal union completes itself only gradually, as the human consciousness is sufficiently developed to appropriate the divine. This view is held by Dorner and Rothe.

Dorner, *History Doctrine Person of Christ*, 5: 248–261; *Outlines of Theology*, in *Princeton Review*, 1873: 71–87. Rothe, *Dogmatik*, 2: 49–182; and in *Bib. Sac.*, 27: 386.

This view is objectionable for the following reasons:—

(a) The Scripture plainly teaches that that which was born of Mary was as completely Son of God as Son of man (Luke 1: 35—*τὸ γεννόμενον ἄγιον κληθήσεται υἱὸς Θεοῦ*), and that in the incarnating act, and not at his resurrection Jesus Christ became the God-man; (Phil. 2: 7—*μορφῆν δούλου λαβὼν, ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος*). But this theory virtually teaches the birth of a man who subsequently and gradually became the God-man, by consciously appropriating the Logos to whom he has sustained ethical relations.

(b) Since consciousness and will belong to personality as distinguished from nature, the hypothesis of a mutual, conscious and voluntary appropriation of divinity by humanity and of humanity by divinity during the earthly life of Christ, is but a more subtle form of the Nestorian doctrine of a double personality. It follows, moreover, that as these two personalities do not become absolutely one until the resurrection, the death of the man Christ Jesus to whom the Logos has not yet fully united himself, cannot possess an infinite atoning efficacy.

(c) While this theory asserts a final complete union of God and man in Jesus Christ, it renders this union far more difficult to reason, by holding it to be a merging of two persons in one, rather than a union of two natures in one person. We have seen, moreover, that the Scripture gives no countenance to the doctrine of a double personality during the earthly life of Christ. The God-man never says: "I and the Logos are one;" "he that hath seen me hath seen the Logos;" "the Logos is greater than I;" "I go to the Logos." In the absence of all Scripture evidence in favor of this theory, we must regard the rational and dogmatic arguments against it as conclusive.

Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 4: 364-380. Thomasius, *Christi Person und Werk*, 2: 68-70, 80-92, 193-195. Liebner, in *Jahrbuch für deutsche Theologie*, 3: 349-366. Biedermann, *Dogmatik*, 351-353. Hodge, *Syst. Theol.*, 2: 428-430.

### 3. *The real nature of this union.*

A. While the Scriptures represent the person of Christ as the crowning mystery of the Christian scheme (Matt. 11: 27. Col. 1: 27. 1 Tim. 3: 16), they incite us to its study; (John 17: 3; 20: 27; cf. Luke 24: 39. Phil. 3-8, 10). This is the more needful, since Christ is not only the central point of Christianity, but is Christianity itself—the embodied reconciliation and union between man and God. The following remarks are offered, not as fully explaining, but only as in some respects relieving, the difficulties of the problem.

B. The union of the two natures in Christ's person is necessarily inscrutable, because there are no analogies to it in our experience. Attempts to illustrate it on the one hand from the union and yet the distinctness of soul and body, of iron and heat, and on the other hand from the union and yet the distinctness of Christ and the believer, of the divine Son and the Father, are one-sided and become utterly misleading, if they are regarded as furnishing a rationale of the union and not simply a means of repelling objection. The first two illustrations mentioned above lack the essential element of two natures to make them complete: soul and body are not two natures but one, nor are iron and heat two substances. The last two illustrations mentioned above lack the element of single personality: Christ and the believer are two persons, not one, even as the Son and the Father are not one person but two.

Blunt, *Dict. Doct. and Hist. Theology*, art.: Hypostasis. Sartorius, *Person and Work of Christ*, 27-65. Wilberforce, *Incarnation*, 39-77. Luthardt, *Fund. Truths*, 281-334.

C. The possibility of the union of deity and humanity in one person is grounded in the original creation of man in the divine image. Man's kinship to God, in other words, his possession of a rational and spiritual nature, is the condition of incarnation. Brute-life is incapable of union with God. But human nature is capable of the divine, in the sense not only that it lives, moves and has its being in God, but that God may unite himself indissolubly to it and endue it with divine powers, while yet it remains all the more truly human. Since the moral image of God in human nature has

been lost by sin, Christ, the perfect image of God after which man was originally made, restores that lost image by uniting himself to humanity and filling it with his divine life and love; (2 Pet. 1: 4).

Talbot, in *Bap. Quar.*, 1868: 129. Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, 270.

D. This possession of two natures does not involve a double personality in the God-man, for the reason that the Logos takes into union with himself not an individual man with already developed personality, but human nature which has had no separate existence before its union with the divine. Christ's human nature is impersonal, in the sense that it attains self-consciousness and self-determination only in the personality of the God-man. Here it is important to mark the distinction between nature and person. Nature is substance possessed in common. The persons of the Trinity have one nature. There is a common nature of mankind. Person is nature separately subsisting, with powers of consciousness and will. Since the human nature of Christ has not and never had a separate subsistence, it is impersonal, and the Logos in the God-man furnishes the principle of personality. It is equally important to observe that self-consciousness and self-determination do not belong to nature as such, but only to personality. For this reason Christ has not two consciousnesses and two wills, but a single consciousness and a single will. This consciousness and will moreover is never simply human, but is always theanthropic, an activity of the one personality which unites in itself the human and the divine; (Mark 13: 32. Luke 22: 42).

For the theory of two consciousnesses and two wills, see Philippi, *Glaubenslehre*, 4: 129, 234. Kahnis, *Dogmatik*, 2: 314. Ridgeley, *Body of Divinity*, 1: 476. Hodge, *Syst. Theol.*, 2: 378-391. Per contra, see Hovey, *God with us*, 66. Porter, *Human Intellect*, 626. Schaff, *Church Hist.*, 1: 757; 3: 751. Calderwood, *Moral Philosophy*, 12-14. Wilberforce, *Incarnation*, 148-169. Van Oosterzee, *Dogmatics*, 512-518.

E. The union of the divine and the human natures makes the latter possessed of the powers belonging to the former; in other words, the attributes of the divine nature are imparted to the human without passing over into its essence—so that the human Christ even on earth had power to be, to know, and to do, as God. That this power was latent or was only rarely manifested, was the result of the self chosen state of humiliation upon which the God-man had entered. In this state of humiliation, the communication of the contents of his divine nature to the human was mediated by the Holy Spirit. The God-man in his servant-form knew and taught and performed only what the Spirit permitted and directed; (Matt. 3: 16. John 3: 34. Acts 10: 38. Heb. 9: 14). But when thus permitted, he knew, taught and performed, not like the prophets by power communicated from without, but by virtue of his own inner divine energy; (Matt. 17: 2; 28: 20. Mark 5: 39. Luke 5: 20, 21. John 2: 11, 24, 25; 3: 13; 20: 19).

Philippi, *Glaubenslehre*, 4: 131, sq. Robins, in *Bib. Sac.*, Oct., 1874: 615. Wilberforce, *Incarnation*, 208-241.

F. This communion of the natures was such that although the divine nature in itself is incapable of ignorance, weakness, temptation, suffering or death, the one person Jesus Christ was capable of these by virtue of the union of the divine nature with a human nature in him. As the human Saviour can exercise divine attributes, not in virtue of his humanity alone, but derivatively by virtue of his possession of a divine nature, so the divine Saviour can suffer and be ignorant as man, not in his divine nature, but derivatively by virtue of his possession of a human nature. We may illustrate this from the connection between body and soul. The soul suffers pain from its union with the body, of which apart from the body it would be incapable. So the God-man, although in his divine nature impassible, was capable through his union with humanity, of absolutely infinite suffering.

Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 4: 300, sq. Lawrence, in Bib. Sac., 24: 41. Schöberlein, in Jahrbuch für d. Theol., 1871: 459-501.

G. The union of two natures in one person is necessary to constitute Jesus Christ a proper mediator between man and God. His two-fold nature gives him fellowship with both parties, since it involves an equal dignity with God and at the same time a perfect sympathy with man; (Heb. 2: 17, 18; 4: 15, 16). This two-fold nature, moreover, enables him to present to both God and man proper terms of reconciliation: being man, he can make atonement for man,—being God, his atonement has infinite value; while both his divinity and his humanity combine to move the hearts of offenders and constrain them to submission and love; (1 Tim. 2: 5. Heb. 7: 25).

Wilberforce, Incarnation, 170-208.

H. The union of humanity with deity in the person of Christ is indissoluble and eternal. Unlike the avatars of the East, the incarnation was a permanent assumption of human nature by the second person of the Trinity. In the ascension of Christ, glorified humanity has attained the throne of the universe. By his Spirit, this same divine-human Saviour is omnipresent to secure the progress of his kingdom. The final subjection of the Son to the Father, alluded to in 1 Cor. 15: 28, cannot be other than the complete return of the Son to his original relation to the Father, since, according to John 17: 5, Christ is again to possess the glory which he had with the Father before the world was. (Cf. Heb. 1: 8; 7: 24, 25).

On the general subject of this union, see Herzog, Encyclopädie, art.: Christologie. Barrows, in Bib. Sac., 10: 765; 26: 83. See also Bib. Sac., 17: 535. John Owen, Person of Christ, in Works, 1: 223. Hooker, Ecel. Polity, book V: chap. 51-56. Boyce, in Bap. Quar., 1870: 385. Shedd, Hist. Doct., 1: 403, sq. Hovey, God with us, 61-88. Plumtre, Christ and Christendom, Appendix.

## SECTION III.—THE TWO STATES OF CHRIST.

## I. THE STATE OF HUMILIATION.

1. *The nature of this humiliation.*

We may dismiss as unworthy of serious notice the views that it consisted essentially in

A. The union of the Logos with human nature,—for this union with human nature continues in the state of exaltation.

B. The outward trials and privations of Christ's human life,—for this view casts reproach upon poverty, and ignores the power of the soul to rise superior to its outward circumstances.

We may devote more attention to the theory

C. That the Logos, although retaining his divine self-consciousness and his immanent attributes of holiness, love and truth, surrendered his relative attributes of omniscience, omnipotence and omnipresence, in order to take to himself veritable human nature. According to this view there are two natures in Christ, indeed, but neither of these natures is infinite. Thomasius and Delitzsch are advocates of this theory.

Thomasius, *Christi Person und Werk*, 2: 233–255, 542–550. Delitzsch, *Biblische Psychologie*, 323–333.

We object to this view that

(a) It contradicts the Scriptures already referred to, in which Christ asserts his divine knowledge and power. Divinity, it is said, can give up its world-functions, for it existed without these before creation. But to give up divine attributes is to give up the substance of Godhead. Nor is it a sufficient reply to say that only the relative attributes are given up, while the immanent which chiefly characterize the Godhead are retained, for the immanent necessarily involve the relative, as the greater involve the less.

Hase, *Hutterus, Redivivus*, 11th ed., 217, note. Dorner, in *Jahrbuch für deutsche Theologie*, 1: 397–408. Liebner, in *Jahrbuch*, 3: 349–356.

(b) Since the Logos in uniting himself to a human soul, reduces himself to the condition and limitations of a human soul, the theory is virtually a theory of the coëxistence of two human souls in Christ. But the union of two finite souls is more difficult to explain than the union of a finite and an infinite, since there can be in the former case no intelligent guidance and control of the human element by the divine.

Hovey, *God with us*, 68.

(c) This theory fails to secure its end of making comprehensible the human development of Jesus, for even though divested of the relative attributes of Godhood, the Logos still retains his divine self-consciousness together with his immanent attributes of holiness, love and truth. This is as difficult to reconcile with a purely natural human development as the possession of the relative divine attributes would be. The theory logically leads to a further denial of the possession of any divine attributes or of any divine consciousness at all on the part of Christ, and merges itself in the view of Gess and Beecher, that the Godhead of the Logos is actually transformed into a human soul.

Kahnis, *Dogmatik*, 3: 343.



D. The true view we conceive to be that the humiliation of Christ consisted

(a) In that act of the preëxistent Logos by which he gave up his divine glory with the Father in order to take a servant-form. In this act he resigned not the possession, nor yet entirely the use, but rather the independent exercise of the divine attributes; (John 17: 5. Phil. 2: 6, 7. 2 Cor. 8: 9).

(b) In the submission of the Logos to the control of the Holy Spirit and the limitations of his Messianic mission, in his communication of the divine fulness to the human nature which he had taken into union with himself; (Acts 1: 2; 10: 38. Heb. 9: 14).

(c) In the continuous surrender on the part of the God-man, so far as his human nature was concerned, of the exercise of those divine powers with which it was endowed by virtue of its union with the divine, and in the voluntary acceptance which followed upon this, of temptation, suffering and death; (Matt. 26: 53. John 10: 18. Phil. 2: 8).

Each of these elements of the doctrine has its own Scriptural support. We must therefore regard the humiliation of Christ, not as consisting in a single act, but as involving a continuous self-renunciation, which began with the Kenosis of the Logos in becoming man, and which culminated in the self-subjection of the God-man to the death of the cross. In Phil. 2: 6-8, the most explicit of the passages cited, the subject of the sentence is at first (verses 6, 7) Christ Jesus regarded as the preëxistent Logos; subsequently (verse 8) this same Christ Jesus, regarded as incarnate. This change in the subject is indicated by the contrast between *μορφῇ θεοῦ* (verse 6) and *μορφῇ δουλοῦ* (verse 7), as well as by the participles *λαβών* and *γενόμενος* (verse 7) and *ἐیرهθεῖς* (verse 8). It is asserted, then, that the preëxistent Logos, 'although subsisting in the form of God, did not regard his equality with God as a thing to be forcibly retained, but emptied himself by taking the form of a servant, (that is), by being made in the likeness of men. And being found in outward condition as a man, he (the incarnate Son of God, yet further) humbled himself, by becoming obedient unto death, even the death of the cross;' (verse 8).

Here notice that what the Logos divested himself of in becoming man, is not the substance of his Godhead, but the 'form of God' in which this substance was manifested. This 'form of God' can be only that independent exercise of the powers and prerogatives of Deity, which constitutes 'his equality with God.' This he surrenders in the act of 'taking the form of a servant'—or becoming subordinate, as man. (Here other Scriptures complete the view by their representations of the controlling influence of the Holy Spirit in the earthly life of Christ.) The phrases 'made in the likeness of men' and 'found in outward condition as a man' are used to intimate, not that Jesus Christ was not really man, but that he was God as well as man, and therefore free from the sin which clings to man; (cf. Rom. 8: 3—*ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας*). Finally, this one person, now God and man united, submits himself, consciously and voluntarily, to the humiliation of an ignominious death.

On the interpretation of Phil. 2: 6-11, see Com. of Neander, Meyer, Lange, Ellicott and Lightfoot. On the general subject of the Kenosis of the Logos, see Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 4: 138-150, 386-475. Pope, Person of Christ, 23. Bodemeyer, Lehre von der Kenosis. South, Sermons, 2: 9. Baird, Elohim Revealed, 585. Sartorius, Person and Work of Christ, 39. Hodge, Syst. Theol., 2: 610-625. On the question whether Christ would have become man, had there been no sin, see Julius Müller, Dogmat. Abhandlungen, 66-126. Van Osterzee, Dogmatics, 512-526, 543-558.

## 2. *The stages of Christ's humiliation.*

We may distinguish

A. That act of the preincarnate Logos, by which in becoming man, he gave up the independent exercise of the divine attributes.

B. His submission to the common laws which regulate the origin of souls from a preëxisting sinful stock, in taking his human nature from the virgin—a human nature which only the miraculous conception rendered pure.

C. His subjection to the limitations involved in a human growth and development, reaching the consciousness of his sonship at his twelfth year, and working no miracles till after the baptism.

D. The subordination of himself, in state, knowledge, teaching and acts, to the control of the Holy Spirit, so living not independently but as a servant.

E. His subjection, as connected with a sinful race, to temptation and suffering, and finally to the death which constituted the penalty of the law.

## II. THE STATE OF EXALTATION.

### 1. *The nature of this exaltation.*

It consisted essentially in

A. A resumption, on the part of the Logos, of his independent exercise of divine attributes.

B. The withdrawal, on the part of the Logos, of all limitations in his communication of the divine fulness to the human nature of Christ.

C. The corresponding exercise, on the part of the human nature, of those powers which belonged to it by virtue of its union with the divine.

### 2. *The stages of Christ's exaltation.*

A. The quickening and resurrection.

Both Lutherans and Romanists distinguish between these two, making the former precede and the latter follow, Christ's 'preaching to the spirits in prison.' These views rest upon a misinterpretation of 1 Pet. 3: 18-20. Lutherans teach that Christ descended into hell to proclaim his triumph to evil spirits. But this is to give *ἐκήρυξεν* the unusual sense of proclaiming his triumph, instead of his gospel. Romanists teach that Christ entered the underworld to preach to Old Testament saints, that they might be saved. But the passage speaks only of the disobedient; it cannot be pressed into the support of a sacramental theory of the salvation of Old Testament be-

lievers. The passage does not assert a descent of Christ into the world of spirits, but only a work of the preincarnate Logos in offering salvation through Noah to the world then about to perish.

Cowles, in *Bib. Sac.*, 1875: 401. Hodge, *Syst. Theol.*, 2: 616-622.

B. The ascension and sitting at the right hand of God.

As the resurrection proclaimed Christ to men as the perfected and glorified man, the conqueror of sin and lord of death, the ascension proclaimed him to the universe as the reinstated God, the possessor of universal dominion, the omnipresent object of worship and hearer of prayer. *Dextra Dei ubique est.* (Matt. 28: 18-20. Mark 16: 19. Acts 7: 56. 2 Cor. 13: 4. Eph. 1: 23; 4: 10).

Philippi, *Glaubenslehre*, 4: 184-189. Van Oosterzee, *Dogmatics*, 558-576.

#### SECTION IV.—THE OFFICES OF CHRIST.

The Scriptures represent Christ's offices as three in number,—prophetic, priestly and kingly. Although these terms are derived from concrete human relations, they express perfectly distinct ideas. The prophet, the priest and the king, of the Old Testament, were detached but designed prefigurations of him who should combine all these various activities in himself, and should furnish the ideal reality of which they were the imperfect symbols; (cf. 1 Cor. 1: 30).

Van Oosterzee, *Dogmatics*, 583-586. Archer Butler, *Sermons*, 1: 314.

#### I. THE PROPHETIC OFFICE OF CHRIST.

##### 1. *The nature of Christ's prophetic work.*

Here we must avoid the narrow interpretation which would make the prophet a mere foreteller of future events. He was rather an inspired interpreter or revealer of the divine will, a medium of communication between God and men; (*προφήτης* = not foreteller, but forteller. Cf. Gen. 20: 7,—of Abraham; Ps. 105: 15, of the patriarchs; Matt. 11: 9,—of John the Baptist; 1 Cor. 12: 28; Eph. 2: 20; 3: 5—of N. T. expounders of Scripture).

Stanley, *Jewish Church*, 1: 491.

The prophet commonly united three methods of fulfilling his office,—those of teaching, predicting, and miracle-working. In all these respects Jesus Christ did the work of a prophet; (Deut. 18: 15; cf. Acts 3: 22; 7: 37. Matt. 13: 57. Luke 13: 33. John 6: 14). He taught (Matt. 5-7), he uttered predictions (Matt. 24 and 25), he wrought miracles (Matt. 8 and 9), while in his person, his life, his work and his death, he revealed the Father; (John 8: 26; 14: 9; 17: 8).

##### 2. *Stages of Christ's prophetic work.*

These are four, namely:

A. The preparatory work of the Logos in enlightening mankind before the time of Christ's advent in the flesh. All preliminary religious knowl-

edge, whether within or without the bounds of the chosen people, is from Christ, the revealer of God; (John 1: 9; Heb. 12: 24-26; Luke 11: 49; cf. Matt. 23: 34).

B. The earthly ministry of Christ incarnate. In his earthly ministry Christ showed himself the prophet par excellence. While he submitted, like the Old Testament prophets, to the direction of the Holy Spirit, unlike them, he found the sources of all knowledge and power within himself. The word of God did not come to him—he was himself the Word; (John 8: 28, 58; cf. Jer. 2: 1. Matt. 26: 53. John 10: 18).

Martensen, Christian Dogmatics, 295-301.

C. The guidance and teaching of his church on earth since his ascension. Christ's prophetic activity is continued through the preaching of his apostles and ministers, and by the enlightening influences of his Holy Spirit; (John 16: 12, 13. Acts 1: 1—*ἤρξατο διδάσκειν*). The apostles unfolded the germs of doctrine put into their hands by Christ. The church is, in a derivative sense, a prophetic institution established to teach the world by its preaching and its ordinances. But Christians are prophets only as being proclaimers of Christ's teaching; (Num. 11: 29. Joel 2: 28).

D. Christ's final revelation of the Father to his saints in glory; (John 16: 25; 17: 24, 26).

Philippi, Glaubenslehre, IV., part 2: 24-27.

## II. THE PRIESTLY OFFICE OF CHRIST.

The priest was a person divinely appointed to transact with God on man's behalf. He fulfilled his office, first by offering sacrifice, and secondly by making intercession. In both these respects Christ is priest; (Heb. 7: 24-28).

### 1. *Christ's Sacrificial Work, or the Doctrine of the Atonement.*

The Scriptures teach that Christ obeyed and suffered in our stead to satisfy an immanent demand of the divine holiness and thus remove an obstacle in the divine mind to the pardon and restoration of the guilty.

#### A. Scripture Methods of Representing the Atonement.

(a) As a *provision originating in God's love*, and manifesting this love to the universe; (John 3: 16. Rom. 5: 8; 8: 32. Eph. 2: 4-7. 1 John 4: 9, 10).

(b) As an *example* of disinterested love, to secure our deliverance from selfishness; (Luke 9: 22-24. 2 Cor. 5: 15. Gal. 1: 4. Eph. 5: 25-27. Col. 1: 21. Tit. 2: 14. Heb. 12: 2. 1 Pet. 2: 21-24). In these passages, Christ's death is referred to as a source of moral stimulus to men.

(c) As a *ransom*, paid to free us from the bondage of sin; (Matt. 20: 28—*λύτρον ἀντὶ πολλῶν*. 26: 28—*περὶ πολλῶν ἐκχυνόμενον εἰς ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν*. 1 Tim. 2: 6—*ὁ δόξ ἐαυτὸν ἀντίλυτρον ὑπὲρ πάντων*. 2 Pet. 2: 1—*τὸν ἀγοράσαντα αὐτοὺς δεσπότην ἁρνούμενοι*).

(d) As a *penalty*, borne in order to rescue the guilty; (Rom. 4: 25—*παραδόθη διὰ τὰ παραπτώματα ἡμῶν*. 8: 3. 1 Cor. 15: 3. 2 Cor. 5: 21—*ὑπὲρ*

ἡμῶν ἀμαρτίαν ἐποίησεν—δικαιοσύνη. Gal. 1: 4; 3: 13—γενόμενος ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν κατὰρα. cf. Deut. 21: 23. Heb. 9: 28—εἰς τὸ πολλῶν ἀνευρεκεῖν ἀμαρτίας. cf. Lev. 5: 17; 24: 15; Num. 14: 34; Lam. 5: 7. In Matt. 8: 17—τὰς νόσους ἐβάστασεν= typical removals of sin; see Alford, in loco).

(e) As an *exhibition of God's righteousness*, necessary to the vindication of his procedure in the pardon and restoration of sinners; (Rom. 3: 24–26—εἰς ἐνδείξιν τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ. Cf. Heb. 9: 15—θανάτου γενομένου εἰς ἀπολύτρωσιν). Here we are taught that Christ's atonement is that which enables God, in consistency with his righteousness, to pardon and save sinners.

(f) As a *substitution*, of Christ's obedience and sufferings for ours; (Luke 22: 37—μετὰ ἀνθρώπων ἐλογίσθη. Cf. Lev. 16: 21; Is. 53: 5, 6. John 10: 11. Rom. 5: 6–8, 19; cf. Matt. 3: 15; 5: 17; Gal. 4: 4; Phil. 2: 8; 3: 9; Heb. 10: 7. 1 Pet. 3: 18—δικαίως ὑπὲρ ἀδίκων. For the use of ὑπὲρ with substitutionary meaning, see Philem. 13; 2 Cor. 5: 20).

(g) As a *sin-offering*, presented on behalf of transgressors; (John 1: 29—ἀμνὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ. Cf. Is. 53: 7–12. 1 Cor. 5: 7—τὸ πάσχα ἡμῶν ἐτύθη Χριστός. Cf. Deut. 16: 2–6. Eph. 5: 2—προσφορὰν καὶ θυσίαν. Heb. 9: 12–14, 22–26. 1 John 1: 7. 1 Pet. 1: 18–21—αἵματι ὡς ἀμνοῦ ἀμώμου. Rev. 5: 9).

(h) As a *propitiation*, which satisfies the demands of violated holiness; (Rom. 3–25—ἰλαστήριον, sc. θῦμα or ἱερίον=propitiatory sacrifice—εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν δίκαιον καὶ δικαιούντα. Heb. 2: 17. 1 John 2: 2; 4: 10—ἰλασμόν. Cf. Gen. 32: 20, LXX., and Prov. 16: 14, LXX.).

(i) As a work of *priestly mediation*, which reconciles God to men; (Heb. 9: 11, 12. Rom. 5: 9–11. 2 Cor. 5: 18, 19. Eph. 2: 16; cf. verses 12, 13, 19. In these latter passages, the term 'reconciliation'—καταλλάσσω or διαλλάσσω—has its usual sense of removing enmity, not from the offending, but from the offended party; (cf. 1 Sam. 29: 4; Matt. 5: 23, 24).

On Scripture proofs, see Crawford, *Atonement*, 1: 1–193. Dale, *Atonement*, 65–256. Philippi, *Glaubenslehre*, IV. part 2: 243–342. Smeaton, *Our Lord's, and the Apostles' Doctrine of Atonement*.

An examination of the passages referred to shows that while the forms in which the atoning work of Christ is described are in part derived from moral, commercial and legal relations, the prevailing language is that of sacrifice. A correct view of the atonement must therefore be grounded upon a proper interpretation of

B. The Institution of Sacrifice, especially as found in the Mosaic system.

We may dismiss as untenable, on the one hand, the theory that sacrifice is essentially the presentation of a gift (Hofmann, Baring-Gould) or a feast (Spencer) to the Deity; and on the other hand the theory that sacrifice is a symbol of renewed fellowship (Keil) or of the grateful offering to God of the whole life and being of the worshipper (Bähr).

Hofmann, *Schriftbeweis*, II. part 1: 214–294. Baring-Gould, *Origin and Devel. of Relig. Belief*, 368–390. Spencer, *De Legibus Hebraeorum*. Keil, *Bib. Archäologie*, Sec. 43, 47. Bähr, *Symbolik des Mosaischen Cultus*, 2: 196, 269; also, synopsis of Bähr's view in *Bib. Sac.*, Oct. 1870: 593; Jan., 1871: 171.

Neither of these theories can explain the fact that the sacrifice is a bloody offering, involving the suffering and death of the victim, and brought not by the simply grateful, but by the conscience-stricken soul. The true import of the sacrifice, as is abundantly evident from both heathen and Jewish sources, embraced two elements, namely:

(a) Satisfaction to offended Deity, or propitiation offered to violated holiness; and

(b) Substitution of suffering and death on the part of the innocent, for the deserved punishment of the guilty.

Combining these two ideas, we have as the total import of the sacrifice: satisfaction by substitution. The bloody sacrifice among the heathen expressed the consciousness that sin involved guilt; that guilt exposed man to the righteous wrath of God; that without expiation of that guilt, there was no forgiveness.

Nägelsbach, *Nachhomerische Theologie*, 338, sq., and Stahl, *Christliche Philosophie*, 146; quoted in Luthardt, *Compendium der Dogmatik*, 170.

In considering the exact purport and efficacy of the Mosaic sacrifices, we must distinguish between their theocratical and their spiritual offices. They were, on the one hand, the appointed means whereby the offender could be restored to the outward place and privileges as member of the theocracy, which he had forfeited by neglect or transgression, and they accomplished this purpose irrespectively of the temper and spirit with which they were offered. On the other hand, they were symbolic of the vicarious sufferings and death of Christ, and obtained forgiveness and acceptance with God, only as they were offered in true penitence and with faith in God's method of salvation; (Heb. 9: 13, 14; 10: 3, 4).

Thus the Old Testament sacrifices, when rightly offered, involved a consciousness of sin on the part of the worshipper, the bringing of a victim to atone for the sin, the laying of the hand of the offerer upon the victim's head, the confession of sin by the offerer, the slaying of the beast, the sprinkling or pouring out of the blood upon the altar, and the consequent forgiveness of the sin and acceptance of the worshipper; (Lev. 1: 4; 4: 20, 31, 35; 5: 10, 16; 6: 7; 17: 11; cf. Job. 42: 7-9). The sin-offering and the scape-goat of the great day of atonement symbolized yet more distinctly the two elementary ideas of sacrifice, namely, satisfaction and substitution, together with the consequent removal of guilt from those on whose behalf the sacrifice was offered; (Lev. 16: 1-34. Cf. Gen. 22: 13; Ex. 32: 30-32; Deut. 21: 1-9; Is. 53: 1-12).

Fairbairn, *Typology*, 1: 209-223. Smeaton, *Apostles' Doctrine of Atonement*, 25-53. Kurtz, *Sacrificial Worship of O. T.*, 120. Crawford on *Atonement*, 197-278. Candlish on *Atonement*, 123-142. Weber, *vom Zorne Gottes*, 161-180. See on passages in Leviticus, the Com. of Knobel, in *Exeg. Handb. d. Alt. Test.*

It is not essential to this view to maintain that a formal divine institution of the rite of sacrifice at man's expulsion from Eden can be proved from Scripture. Like the family and the state, sacrifice may, without such formal inculcation, possess divine sanction, and be ordained of God. The

well-nigh universal prevalence of sacrifice, however, together with the fact that its nature as a bloody offering seems to preclude man's own invention of it, combines with certain Scripture intimations, to favor the view that it was a primitive divine appointment; (Heb. 11: 4—*πίστει πλείονα θυσίαν* Ἀβελ. Gen. 4: 4; 8: 20; cf. 3: 21). From the time of Moses, there can be no question as to its divine authority.

The New Testament assumes and presupposes the Old Testament doctrine of sacrifice. The sacrificial language in which its descriptions of Christ's work are clothed, cannot be explained as an accommodation to Jewish methods of thought, since this terminology was in large part in common use among the heathen, and Paul used it more than any other of the apostles in his dealing with the Gentiles. To deny to it its Old Testament meaning, when used by New Testament writers to describe the work of Christ, is to deny any proper inspiration both in the Mosaic appointment of sacrifices and in the apostolic interpretations of them.

We must therefore maintain, as the result of a simple induction of Scripture facts, that the death of Christ is a vicarious offering, provided by God's love for the purpose of satisfying an internal demand of the divine holiness, and of removing an obstacle in the divine mind to the renewal and pardon of sinners.

### C. Theories of the Atonement.

#### 1st. The Socinian, or Example Theory of the Atonement.

This theory holds that subjective sinfulness is the sole barrier between man and God. Not God but only man needs to be reconciled. The only method of reconciliation is to better man's moral condition. This can be effected by man's own will through repentance and reformation. The death of Christ is but the death of a noble martyr. He redeems us, only as his human example of faithfulness to truth and duty has a powerful influence upon our moral improvement. This fact the apostles, either consciously or unconsciously, clothed in the language of the Greek and Jewish sacrifices.

This theory was fully elaborated by Laelius Socinus and Faustus Socinus of Poland, in the 16th century. Its modern advocates are found in the Unitarian body.

Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum, 1: 566-600. Martineau, *Studies of Christianity*, 83-176. Sheldon, *Sin and Redemption*, 146-210. J. F. Clarke, *Orthodoxy, Its Truths and Errors*, 235-265. Ellis, *Unitarianism and Orthodoxy*.

To this theory we make the following objections:—

(a) It is based upon false philosophical principles,—as, for example, that will is merely the faculty of volitions; that the foundation of virtue is in utility; that law is an expression of arbitrary will; that penalty is a means of reforming the offender; that righteousness in either God or man is only a manifestation of benevolence.

(b) It is a natural outgrowth from the Pelagian view of sin, and logically necessitates a curtailment or surrender of every other characteristic doctrine of Christianity—inspiration, the deity of Christ, justification, regeneration, and eternal retribution.

(c) It contradicts the Scripture teachings that sin involves objective guilt as well as subjective defilement; that the holiness of God must punish sin; that the atonement was a bearing of the punishment of sin for men; and that this vicarious bearing of punishment was necessary on the part of God, to make possible the showing of favor to the guilty.

(d) It furnishes no proper explanation of the sufferings and death of Christ. The unmartyrlike anguish cannot be accounted for, and the forsaking by the Father cannot be justified, upon the hypothesis that Christ died as a mere witness to truth. If Christ's sufferings were not propitiatory, they neither furnish us with a perfect example, nor constitute a manifestation of the love of God.

(e) The influence of Christ's example is neither declared in Scripture nor found in Christian experience to be the chief result secured by his death. Mere example is but a new preaching of the law, which repels and condemns. The cross has power to lead men to holiness, only as it first shows a satisfaction made for their sins. Accordingly, most of the passages which represent Christ as an example, also contain references to his propitiatory work.

(f) This theory contradicts the whole tenor of the New Testament in making the life and not the death of Christ the most significant and important feature of his work. The constant allusions to the death of Christ as the source of our salvation, as well as the symbolism of the ordinances, cannot be explained upon a theory which regards Christ as a mere example and considers his sufferings as incidents rather than essentials of his work.

Crawford, *Atonement*, 279-296. Philippi, *Glaubenslehre*, IV. part 2: 156-180. Shedd, *Hist. Doctrine*, 2: 376-386.

## 2nd. The Bushnellian, or Moral-influence Theory of the Atonement.

This holds, like the Socinian, that there is no principle of the divine nature which is propitiated by Christ's death, but that this death is a manifestation of the love of God, suffering in and with the sins of his creatures. Christ's atonement, therefore, is the merely natural consequence of his taking human nature upon him, and is a suffering, not of penalty in man's stead, but of the combined woes and griefs which the living of a human life involves. This atonement has effect, not to satisfy divine justice, but to so reveal divine love, as to soften human hearts and lead them to repentance; in other words, Christ's sufferings were necessary, not in order to remove an obstacle to the pardon of sinners which exists in the mind of God, but in order to convince sinners that there exists no such obstacle. This theory, for substance, has been advocated by Bushnell, Robertson, Maurice, Campbell, and Young.

Bushnell, *Vicarious Sacrifice; Forgiveness and Law*. Robertson (F. W.), *Sermons*, 1: 163-178. Maurice, on *Sacrifice*, 209; *Theol. Essays*, 141, 228. Campbell, *Atonement*, 129-191. Young, *Life and Light of Men*, 283-313.

To this theory we object as follows:—

(a) While it embraces a valuable element of truth, namely, the moral influence upon men of the sufferings of the God-man, it is false by de-



fect, in that it substitutes a subordinate effect of the atonement for its chief aim, and yet unfairly appropriates the name vicarious, which belongs only to the latter. Suffering with the sinner is by no means suffering in his stead.

(b) It rests upon false philosophical principles,—as that righteousness is identical with benevolence, instead of conditioning it; that God is subject to an eternal law of love, instead of being himself the source of all law; that the aim of penalty is the reformation of the offender.

(c) It contradicts the plain teachings of Scripture that the atonement is necessary not simply to reveal God's love but to satisfy his justice; that Christ's sufferings are propitiatory and penal; and that the human conscience needs to be propitiated by Christ's sacrifice, before it can feel the moral influence of his sufferings.

(d) It can be maintained only by wresting from their obvious meaning those passages of Scripture which speak of Christ as suffering for our sins; which represent his blood as accomplishing something for us in heaven, when presented there by our intercessor; which declare forgiveness to be a remitting of past offences upon the ground of Christ's death; and which describe justification as a pronouncing, not a making just.

(e) This theory would confine the influence of the atonement to those who have heard of it, thus excluding patriarchs and heathen. But the Scriptures represent Christ as being the Savior of all men, in the sense of securing for them grace, which but for his atoning work, could never have been bestowed consistently with the divine holiness.

Hovey, *God with us*, 181-271. Crawford, *Atonement*, 297-366. *Theol. Eclectic*, 4: 364-409.

### 3rd. The Grotian, or Governmental Theory of the Atonement.

This theory holds that the atonement is a satisfaction not to any internal principle of the divine nature but to the necessities of government. God's government of the universe cannot be maintained nor can the divine law preserve its authority over its subjects, unless the pardon of offenders is accompanied by some exhibition of the high estimate which God sets upon his law, and the heinous guilt of violating it. Such an exhibition of divine regard for the law is furnished in the sufferings and death of Christ. Christ does not suffer the precise penalty of the law, but God graciously accepts his suffering as a substitute for the penalty. This bearing of substituted suffering on the part of Christ gives the divine law such hold upon the consciences and hearts of men, that God can pardon the guilty upon their repentance, without detriment to the interests of his government.

The author of this theory was Hugo Grotius, the Dutch jurist and theologian; (1583-1645). The theory is characteristic of the New England theology, and is generally held by those who accept the New School view of sin.

Grotius, *Defensio Fidei Catholicae de Satisfactione*, in *Works*, 4: 297-338. Wardlaw, *Systematic Theology*, 2: 358-395. Albert Barnes, on *Atonement*. *Discourses and Treatises on the Atonement*, edited by Prof. Park.

To this theory we urge the following objections:—

(a) While it contains a valuable element of truth, namely, that the sufferings and death of Christ secure the interests of God's government, it is false by defect, in substituting for the chief aim of the atonement one which is only subordinate and incidental.

(b) It rests upon false philosophical principles,—as that utility is the ground of moral obligation; that law is an expression of the will, rather than of the nature of God; that the aim of penalty is to deter from the commission of offences; and that righteousness is resolvable into benevolence.

(c) It ignores and virtually denies that immanent holiness of God, of which the law with its threatened penalties, and the human conscience with its demand for punishment, are only finite reflections. There is something back of government,—if the atonement satisfies government, it must be by satisfying that justice of God of which government is an expression.

(d) It makes that to be an exhibition of justice which is not an exercise of justice; the atonement being, according to this theory, not an execution of law, but an exhibition of regard for law, which will make it safe to pardon the violators of law. Such a merely scenic representation can inspire respect for law, only so long as the essential unreality of it is unsuspected.

(e) The intensity of Christ's sufferings in the garden and on the cross is inexplicable upon the theory that the atonement was a histrionic exhibition of God's regard for his government, and can be explained only upon the view that Christ actually endured the wrath of God against human sin.

(f) The actual power of the atonement over the human conscience and heart is due, not to its exhibiting God's regard for law, but to its exhibiting an actual execution of law, and an actual satisfaction of violated holiness made by Christ in the sinner's stead.

(g) The theory contradicts all those passages of Scripture which represent the atonement as necessary; as propitiating God himself; as being a revelation of God's righteousness; as being an execution of the penalty of the law; as making salvation a matter of debt to the believer, on the ground of what Christ has done; as actually purging our sins, instead of making that purging possible; as not simply assuring the sinner that God may now pardon him on account of what Christ has done, but that Christ has actually wrought out a complete salvation, and will bestow it upon all who come to him.

Shedd, *Hist. Doctrine*, 2: 347–369. Crawford, *Atonement*, 367. Cunningham, *Hist. Theol.*, 2: 355. Princeton Essays, 1st Series, 259–292. S. H. Tyng, *Christian Pastor*.

#### 4th. The Irvingian Theory, or Theory of a Subjective Atonement.

This holds that in his incarnation Christ took human nature as it was in Adam, not before the fall but after the fall,—human nature therefore with its inborn corruption and predisposition to moral evil; that notwithstanding the possession of this tainted and condemned nature, Christ, through the power of the Holy Spirit or of his divine nature, not only kept his human nature from manifesting itself in any actual or personal sin, but gradually

purified it through struggle and suffering, until in his death he completely extirpated its original depravity and reunited it to God. This subjective purification of human nature in the person of Jesus Christ constitutes his atonement, and men are saved not by any objective propitiation, but only by becoming through faith partakers of Christ's new humanity.

This theory was elaborated by Edward Irving, of London (1792-1834), and it has been held, in substance, by Menken and Dippel in Germany.

Irving, *Collected Works*, 5: 9-398. *Life of Irving*, by Mrs. Oliphant. Menken, *Schriften*, 3: 279-404; 6: 351, sq. For other references, see Hagenbach, *Hist. Doct.*, 2: 496-498.

To this theory we offer the following objections:—

(a) While it embraces an important element of truth, namely, the fact of a new humanity in Christ of which all believers become partakers, it is chargeable with serious error in denying the objective atonement which makes the subjective application possible.

(b) It rests upon false fundamental principles,—as that law is identical with the natural order of the universe, and as such, is an exhaustive expression of the will and nature of God; that sin is merely a power of moral evil within the soul, instead of also involving an objective guilt and desert of punishment; that penalty is the mere reaction of law against the transgressor instead of being also the revelation of a personal wrath against sin; that the evil taint of human nature can be extirpated by suffering its natural consequences—penalty in this way reforming the transgressor.

(c) It contradicts the express and implicit representations of Scripture with regard to Christ's freedom from all taint of hereditary sin; misrepresents his life as a growing consciousness of the underlying corruption of his human nature, which culminated at Gethsemane and Calvary; and denies the truth of his own statements, when it declares that he must have died for his own sinfulness, even though none were to be saved thereby.

(d) It makes the active obedience of Christ and the subjective purification of his human nature to be the chief features of his work, while the Scriptures make his death and passive bearing of penalty the centre of all, and ever regard him as an innocent being vicariously bearing the punishment of the guilty.

(e) It necessitates the surrender of the doctrine of justification as a merely declaratory act of God; and requires such a view of the divine holiness expressed only through the order of nature, as can be maintained only upon principles of Pantheism.

*Princeton Review*, April, 1863: 207. *Christian Review*, 28: 234, sq. Ullmann, *Sinlessness of Christ*, 219-232.

##### 5th. The Anselmic, or Commercial Theory of the Atonement.

This theory holds that sin is a violation of the divine honor or majesty, and as committed against an infinite being, deserves an infinite punishment; that the majesty of God requires him to execute punishment, while the love of God pleads for the sparing of the guilty; that this conflict of divine

attributes is eternally reconciled by the voluntary sacrifice of the God-man, who bears by virtue of the dignity of his person the intensively infinite punishment of sin, which must have been otherwise suffered extensively and eternally by sinners; that this suffering of the God-man presents to the divine majesty an exact equivalent for the deserved sufferings of the elect; and that as the result of this satisfaction of the divine claims, the elect sinners are pardoned and regenerated.

This view was first broached by Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109) as a substitute for the earlier patristic view that Christ's death was a ransom paid to Satan, to deliver sinners from his power. It is held by many Scotch theologians, and in this country, by the Princeton School.

Anselm, *Cur Deus Homo*; translated in *Bib. Sac.*, 11: 729; 12: 52.  
Symington, Candlish, Martin, Smeaton, on Atonement. Hodge, *Syst. Theol.*, 2: 470-540. Alexander (A. A.), on Atonement.

To this theory we make the following objections:—

(a) While it contains a valuable element of truth, in its representation of the atonement as satisfying a principle of the divine nature, it conceives of this principle in too formal and external a manner—making the idea of the divine honor or majesty more prominent than that of the divine holiness in which the divine honor and majesty are grounded.

(b) In its eagerness to maintain the atoning efficacy of Christ's passive obedience, the active obedience, quite as clearly expressed in Scripture, is well-nigh lost sight of.

(c) It allows disproportionate weight to those passages of Scripture which represent the atonement under commercial analogies, as a debt or ransom, to the exclusion of those which describe it as an ethical fact, whose value is to be estimated not quantitatively, but qualitatively.

(d) It represents the atonement as having reference only to the elect, and ignores the Scripture declarations that Christ died for all.

(e) It is defective in holding to merely an external transfer of the merit of Christ's work, while it does not clearly state the internal ground of that transfer in the union of the believer with Christ.

Philippi, *Glaubenslehre*, IV. part 2: 70, sq. Baur, *Dogmengeschichte*, 2: 417, sq. Shedd, *Hist. Doctrine*, 2: 273-286. Dale, *Atonement*, 279-292.

#### 6th. The Ethical Theory of the Atonement.

This holds that the necessity of an atonement is grounded in the holiness of God. There is an ethical principle in the divine nature, which demands that sin shall be punished. Aside from its results, sin is essentially ill-deserving. As we who are made in God's image mark our growth in purity by the increasing quickness with which we detect impurity, and by the increasing hatred which we feel toward it, so infinite purity is a consuming fire to all iniquity. As there is an ethical demand in our natures that not only others' wickedness but our own wickedness be visited with punishment, and a keen conscience cannot rest till it has made satisfaction to justice for its misdeeds, so there is an ethical demand of God's nature that penalty follow sin.

Punishment is the constitutional reaction of God's being against moral evil—the self-assertion of infinite holiness against its antagonist and would-be destroyer. In God this demand is devoid of all passion, and is consistent with infinite benevolence. It is a demand that cannot be evaded, since the holiness from which it springs is unchanging. The atonement is therefore a satisfaction of the ethical demand of the divine nature by the substitution of Christ's penal sufferings for the punishment of the guilty.

This substitution is unknown to mere law, and above and beyond the powers of law. It is an operation of grace. Grace however does not violate or suspend law, but takes it up into itself and fulfils it. The righteousness of law is maintained, in that the source of all law, the judge and punisher, himself voluntarily submits to bear the penalty and bears it in the human nature that has sinned.

Thus the atonement answers the ethical demand of the divine nature that sin be punished if the offender is to go free. The interests of the divine government are secured as a first subordinate result of this satisfaction to God himself of whose nature the government is an expression; while as a second subordinate result, provision is made for the needs of human nature—on the one hand the need of an objective satisfaction to its ethical demand of punishment for sin, and on the other the need of a manifestation of divine love and mercy that will affect the heart and move it to repentance.

In favor of the substitutionary or ethical view of the atonement we may urge the following considerations:

(a) It rests upon correct philosophical principles with regard to the nature of will, law, sin, penalty, righteousness.

(b) It combines in itself all the valuable elements in the theories before mentioned, while it avoids their inconsistencies by showing the deeper principle upon which each of these elements is based.

(c) It most fully meets the requirements of Scripture, (Acts 17 : 3. Luke 24: 26), by holding that the necessity of the atonement is absolute, since it rests upon the demands of immanent holiness, the fundamental attribute of God.

(d) It furnishes the only proper explanation of the sacrificial language of the New Testament, and of the sacrificial rites of the Old, considered as prophetic of Christ's atoning work.

(e) It alone gives proper place to the death of Christ as the central feature of his work,—set forth in the ordinances, and of chief power in Christian experience.

(f) It gives us the only means of understanding the sufferings of Christ in the garden and on the cross, or of reconciling them with the divine justice.

(g) As no other theory does, this view satisfies the ethical demand of human nature; pacifies the convicted conscience; assures the sinner that he may find instant salvation in Christ; and so makes possible a new life of holiness, while at the same time it furnishes the highest incentives to such a life.

Shedd, Discourses and Essays, 272-324; Philosophy of History, 65-69.

Dale on Atonement, 265-440. Magee, Atonement and Sacrifice, 1: 27, 53,

253. Philippi, Glaubenslehre, IV. part 2: 27-114. Weber, vom Zorne Gottes, 214-334. Owen, Dissertation on Divine Justice, chap. II., in Works, 10: 500-512. Farrar, Science and Theology, 157, sq. Moorhouse, Nature and Revelation, 60-86. Edwards, Works, 4: 140, sq. Hopkins, Works, 1: 319-363. Schöberlein, in Studien and Kritiken, 1845: 267-318; 1847: 7-70; and in Herzog, Encyclopädie, art.: Versöhnung. Jahrbuch für d. Theol., 3: 713; 8: 213. Wallace, Representative Responsibility. Macdonnell, Donnellan Lectures on Atonement, 115-214. Luthardt, Saving Truths, 146-155. Baird, Elohim Revealed, 605-637. Lawrence, in Bib. Sac., 20: 332-339.

#### D. The Extent of the Atonement.

The Scriptures represent the atonement as having been made for all men, and as sufficient for the salvation of all. Not the atonement therefore is limited, but the application of the atonement through the work of the Holy Spirit.

Upon this principle of an universal atonement, but a special application of it to the elect, we must interpret such passages as Eph. 1: 4, 7. 2 Tim. 1: 9, 10. John 17: 9, 20, 24. 2 Pet. 2: 1. 1 John 2: 2. 1 Tim. 2: 6; 4: 10. Tit. 2: 11.

If it be asked in what sense Christ is the Saviour of all men, we reply,

(a) That the atonement of Christ secures for all men a delay in the execution of the sentence against sin, and a space for repentance, together with a continuance of the common blessings of life which have been forfeited by transgression.

(b) That the atonement of Christ has made objective provision for the salvation of all, by removing from the divine mind every obstacle to the pardon and restoration of sinners, except their wilful opposition to God and refusal to turn to him.

(c) That the atonement of Christ has procured for all men the powerful incentives to repentance presented in the cross, and the combined agency of the Christian church and of the Holy Spirit, by which these incentives are brought to bear upon them.

Christ is specially the Saviour of those who believe, in that he exerts a special power of his Spirit to procure their acceptance of his salvation. This is not however a part of his work of atonement; it is the application of the atonement, and as such is hereafter to be considered.

Jenkyn, Extent of the Atonement. E. D. Griffin, Extent of the Atonement.

#### E. Objections to the Doctrine of Atonement.

(a) That a God who does not pardon sin without atonement, must lack either omnipotence or love.

We answer on the one hand, that God's omnipotence is the revelation of his nature, and not a matter of arbitrary will; and on the other hand, that God's love is ever exercised consistently with his fundamental attribute of holiness, so that while holiness demands the sacrifice, love provides it.

(b) That satisfaction and forgiveness are mutually exclusive.

We answer, that since it is not a third party but the Judge himself who makes satisfaction to his own violated holiness, forgiveness is still optional, and may be offered upon terms agreeable to himself. The objection is valid against a merely commercial view of the atonement, not against a moral view of it.

(c) That there can be no real propitiation, since the Judge and the sacrifice are one.

We answer that this objection ignores the existence of personal relations within the divine nature, and the fact that the God-man is distinguishable from God. The satisfaction is grounded in the distinction of persons in the Godhead, while the love in which it originates belongs to the unity of the divine essence.

(d) That the suffering of the innocent for the guilty is not an execution of justice, but an act of manifest injustice.

We answer that this is true only upon the supposition that the Son bears the penalty of our sins not voluntarily but compulsorily,—a hypothesis contrary to Scripture and to fact.

(e) That there can be no transfer of punishment or merit, since these are personal.

We answer that the idea of representation and suretyship is common in human society and government, and that such representation and suretyship are inevitable wherever there is community of life between the innocent and the guilty.

(f) That remorse, as a part of the penalty of sin, could not have been suffered by Christ.

We answer, on the one hand, that it may not be essential to the idea of penalty that Christ should have borne the identical pangs which the lost would have endured; and on the other hand, that we do not know how completely a perfectly holy being, possessed of superhuman knowledge and love, might have felt even the pangs of remorse for the condition of that humanity of which he was the central conscience and heart.

(g) That the sufferings of Christ as finite in time do not constitute a satisfaction to the infinite demands of the law.

We answer that the infinite dignity of the sufferer constitutes his sufferings a full equivalent in the eye of infinite justice.

(h) That if Christ's passive obedience made satisfaction to the divine justice, then his active obedience was superfluous.

We answer that the active obedience and the passive obedience are inseparable. The latter is essential to the former, and both are needed to secure for the sinner, on the one hand, pardon, and on the other, that which goes beyond pardon, namely restoration to the divine favor. The objection holds only against a superficial and external view of the atonement.

(i) That the doctrine is immoral in its practical tendencies, since Christ's obedience takes the place of ours and renders ours unnecessary.

We answer that the objection ignores not only the method by which the

benefits of the atonement are appropriated, namely repentance and faith, but also the regenerating and sanctifying power bestowed upon all who believe. Faith in the atonement does not induce license, but "works by love and purifies the heart."

(j) That if the atonement requires faith as its complement, then it does not in itself furnish a complete satisfaction to God's justice.

We answer that faith is not the ground of our acceptance with God, as the atonement is, and so is not a work at all,—faith is only the medium of appropriation. We are saved not by faith but through faith.

For answers to these and other objections, see Philippi, *Glaubenslehre*, IV. part 2: 156–180. Crawford, *Atonement*, 383–468. Hodge, *Syst. Theol.*, 2: 527–543. Baird, *Elohim Revealed*, 623, sq. Owen on *Justification*, chap. VIII., in *Works*, 5: 175–204.

## 2. *Christ's Intercessory Work.*

The Priesthood of Christ does not cease with his work of atonement but continues forever; (Heb. 7: 23–28.) In the presence of God he fulfils the second office of the priest, namely that of intercession.

### A. The nature of Christ's Intercession.

This is not to be conceived of either as an external and vocal petitioning, nor as a mere figure of speech for the natural and continuous influence of his sacrifice; but rather as a special activity of Christ in securing, upon the ground of that sacrifice, whatever of blessing comes to men, whether that blessing be temporal or spiritual; (1 John 2: 1. Rom. 8: 34. Heb. 7: 25; 9: 24).

### B. Objects of Christ's Intercession.

We may distinguish between :

(a) That general intercession which secures to all men certain temporal benefits of his atoning work (Isaiah 53: 12. Luke 23: 34), and

(b) That special intercession which secures the divine acceptance of the persons of believers, and the divine bestowment of all gifts needful for their salvation; (Matt. 18: 19, 20. Luke 22: 32. John 14: 16; 17: 9. Acts 2: 33. Eph. 1: 6; 2: 18; 3: 12. Heb. 2: 17, 18; 4: 15, 16. 1 Pet. 2: 5. Rev. 5: 6; 7: 16, 17).

### C. Relation of Christ's Intercession to that of the Holy Ghost.

The Holy Spirit is an advocate within us, teaching us what to pray for as we ought; Christ is an advocate in heaven, securing from the Father the answer of our prayers. Thus the work of Christ and of the Holy Spirit are complements to each other and parts of one whole; (John 14: 26. Rom. 8: 26; cf. 1 John 2: 1).

### D. Relation of Christ's Intercession to that of saints.

All true intercession is either directly or indirectly the intercession of Christ. Christians are organs of Christ's Spirit. To suppose Christ in us to offer prayer to one of his saints, instead of directly to the Father, is to blaspheme Christ, and utterly misconceive the nature of prayer.



## III. THE KINGLY OFFICE OF CHRIST.

This is to be distinguished from the sovereignty which Christ originally possessed in virtue of his divine nature. Christ's Kingship is the sovereignty of the divine-human Redeemer, which belonged to him of right from the moment of his birth, but which was fully exercised only from the time of his entrance upon the estate of exaltation. By virtue of this kingly office, Christ rules all things in heaven and earth for the glory of God and the execution of God's purpose of salvation.

(a) With respect to the universe at large, Christ's kingdom is a kingdom of power. He upholds, governs and judges the world.

(b) With respect to his militant church, it is a kingdom of grace. He founds, legislates for, administers, defends and augments his church on earth.

(c) With respect to his church triumphant, it is a kingdom of glory; he rewards his redeemed people with the full revelation of himself, upon the completion of his kingdom in the resurrection and the judgment; (Ps. 2: 6, 7; 8: 6; cf. Heb. 2: 8. Matt. 25: 31, 34; 28: 18. Luke 2: 11; 19: 38. John 17: 24; 18: 37. Rom. 8: 28. Eph. 1: 22. Heb. 1: 8. 1 Pet. 3: 22. 2 Pet. 1: 11).

Philippi, Glaubenslehre, IV. part 2: 342-351. Van Oosterzee, Dogmatics, 586, sq. Garbett, Christ as Prophet, Priest and King, 2: 243-438. J. M. Mason, Sermon on Messiah's Throne, in Works, 3: 241-275.

## CHAPTER II.

### THE RECONCILIATION OF MAN TO GOD, OR THE APPLICATION OF REDEMPTION THROUGH THE WORK OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.

#### SECTION I.—THE APPLICATION OF CHRIST'S REDEMPTION IN ITS PREPARATION.

In this section we treat of Election and Calling; Section Second being devoted to the Application of Christ's Redemption in its Actual Beginning—namely, in Regeneration, Conversion, Union with Christ and Justification; while Section Third has for its subject the Application of Christ's Redemption in its Continuation—namely, in Sanctification and Perseverance.

See Julius Müller, *Proof-texts*, 35, from which this arrangement is taken.

In treating Election and Calling as applications of Christ's redemption, we imply that they are, in God's decree, logically subsequent to that redemption. In this we hold the Sublapsarian view, as distinguished from the Supralapsarianism of Calvin and Beza, which regarded the decree of individual salvation as preceding in the order of thought, the decree to permit the fall. In this latter scheme, the order of decrees is as follows:—1. the decree to save certain and to reprobate others; 2. the decree to create both those who are to be saved and those who are to be reprobated; 3. the decree to permit both the former and the latter to fall; 4. the decree to provide salvation only for the former, that is, for the elect.

But the Scriptures teach that men as sinners, and not men irrespective of their sins, are the objects of God's saving grace in Christ; (John 15: 19. Rom. 11: 5, 7. Eph. 1: 4-6. 1 Pet. 1: 2). Condemnation moreover is an act, not of sovereignty, but of justice, and is grounded in the guilt of the condemned; (Rom. 2: 6-11. 2 Thess. 1: 5-10). The true order of the decrees is therefore as follows:—1. the decree to create; 2. the decree to permit the fall; 3. the decree to provide a salvation in Christ sufficient for the needs of all; 4. the decree to secure the actual acceptance of this salvation on the part of some—or in other words, the decree of Election.

Those Sublapsarians who hold the Anselmic view of a limited Atonement, make the decrees 3. and 4. just mentioned, exchange places,—the decree of election thus preceding the decree to provide redemption. The Scriptural reasons for preferring the order here given, have been already indicated in our treatment of the Extent of the Atonement; (page 194).

Calvin, *Institutes*, book III., chap. 21-24. Hodge, *Outlines of Theology*, 174-185. Hase, *Hutterus Redivivus*, 11th Ed., 180-183. Van Oosterzee, *Dogmatics*, 446-458.

## I. ELECTION.

Election is that eternal act of God, by which in his sovereign pleasure and on account of no foreseen merit in them, he chooses certain out of the number of sinful men to be the recipients of the special grace of his Spirit, and so to be made voluntary partakers of Christ's salvation.

1. *Proof of the Doctrine of Election.*

## A. From Scripture.

See John 10: 26; Acts 13: 48; Rom. 8: 28-30—foreknew=‘to regard, to make an object of attention and care; by implication, to make choice of for one's self and admit to near and intimate relationship; cf. Amos 3: 2; James 2: 23; and especially Conant on Gen. 18: 19. See also Rom. 9: 11-15; Eph. 1: 4, 11; 2: 7-10. In this last passage, however, the neuter *τούτο* (verse 8) refers, not to ‘faith,’ but to ‘salvation.’ But faith is elsewhere represented as having its source in God; cf. John 6: 44, 65; Acts 15: 9; Rom. 12: 3; 1 Cor. 12: 9; Phil. 2: 13; Col. 2: 12—*πίστεως τῆς ἐνεργείας τοῦ Θεοῦ*, 2 Thess. 1: 11—*ἔργον πίστεως*, and 2 Tim. 1: 9.

These passages furnish a conclusive refutation

(a) Of the Lutheran view that election is simply God's determination from eternity to provide an objective salvation for universal humanity; and

(b) Of the Arminian view that election is God's determination from eternity to save certain individuals upon the ground of their foreseen faith.

## B. From Reason.

(a) What God does, he has eternally purposed to do. Since he bestows special regenerating grace on some, he must have eternally purposed to bestow it—in other words, must have chosen them to eternal life. Thus the doctrine of election is only a special application of the doctrine of decrees; (see pages 86-91).

(b) This purpose cannot be conditioned upon any merit or faith of those who are chosen, since there is no such merit—faith itself being God's gift and foreordained by him.

(c) The depravity of the human will is such, that without this decree to bestow special divine influences upon some, all without exception would have rejected Christ's salvation after it was offered to them, and so all without exception must have perished. Election therefore may be viewed as a necessary consequence of God's decree to provide an objective Redemption.

2. *Objections to the Doctrine of Election.*

A. It is unjust to those who are not included in this purpose of salvation.

Answer:—That any should be saved, is matter of pure grace, and those who are not included in this purpose of salvation suffer only the due reward of their deeds. There is therefore no injustice in God's election. We may better praise God that he saves any, than charge him with injustice because he saves so few.

B. It represents God as partial in his dealings and a respecter of persons.

Answer:—Since there is nothing in men that determines God's choice of one rather than of another, the objection is invalid. It would equally apply

to God's selection of certain nations as Israel, and certain individuals as Cyrus, to be recipients of special temporal gifts; (Ps. 44: 3. 1 Cor. 4: 7).

C. It represents God as arbitrary.

Answer:—It represents God not as arbitrary, but as exercising the free choice of a wise and sovereign will, in ways and for reasons which are inscrutable to us. To deny the possibility of such choice is to deny God's personality. To deny that God has reasons for his choice is to deny his wisdom. The doctrine of election finds these reasons not in men but in God.

D. It tends to immorality, by representing men's salvation as independent of their own obedience.

Answer:—The objection ignores the fact that the salvation of believers is ordained only in connection with their regeneration and sanctification as means; and that the certainty of final triumph is the strongest incentive to strenuous conflict with sin.

E. It inspires pride in those who think themselves elect.

Answer:—This is possible only in the case of those who pervert the doctrine. On the contrary, its proper influence is to humble men. Those who exalt themselves above others, upon the ground that they are special favorites of God, have reason to question their election.

F. It discourages effort for the salvation of the impenitent, whether on their own part or on the part of others.

Answer:—Since it is a secret decree, it cannot hinder or discourage such effort. On the other hand it is a ground of encouragement, and so a stimulus to effort—for without election, it is certain that all would be lost; (cf. Acts 18: 10). While it humbles the sinner so that he is willing to cry for mercy, it encourages him also, by showing him that some will be saved, and (since election and faith are inseparably connected) that he will be saved, if he will only believe. While it makes the Christian feel entirely dependent on God's power in his efforts for the impenitent, it leads him to say with Paul that he "endures all things for the elect's sakes, that they may attain the salvation that is in Christ Jesus with eternal glory;" (2 Tim. 2: 10).

G. The decree of election implies a decree of reprobation.

Answer:—The decree of reprobation is not a positive decree like that of election, but a permissive decree to leave the sinner to his self-chosen rebellion and its natural consequences of punishment; (Rom. 9: 22. 2 Tim. 2: 20. 1 Pet. 2: 8. Jude 4).

On the general subject of Election, see Ridgely, Works, 1: 261-324; esp. 322. Mozley on Predestination. Edwards, Works, 2: 527, sq. Van Oosterzee, Dogmatics, 446-458. Martensen, Dogmatics, 362-382.

## II. CALLING.

Calling is that act of God by which men are invited to accept, by faith, the salvation provided by Christ. The Scriptures distinguish between

1. *The general, or external call* to all men through God's providence, word and Spirit; (Is. 45: 22; 55: 6; 65: 12. Ez. 33: 11. Matt. 11: 28; 22: 3. Mark 16: 15. John 12: 32. Rev. 3: 20).

2. *The special, efficacious call* of the Holy Spirit to the elect; (Luke 14: 23. Rom. 1: 6, 7; 8: 30; 11: 29. 1 Cor. 1: 26. Phil. 3: 14. Eph. 1: 18. 1 Thess. 2: 12. 2 Thess. 2: 14. 2 Tim. 1: 9. Heb. 3: 1. 2 Pet. 1: 10).

Two questions only need special consideration:—

A. Is God's general call sincere?

This is denied upon the ground that such sincerity is incompatible, first, with the inability of the sinner to obey; and secondly, with the design of God to bestow only upon the elect, the special grace without which they will not obey.

(a) To the first objection we reply, that since this inability is not a physical, but a moral inability, consisting simply in the settled perversity of an evil will, there can be no insincerity in offering salvation to all who are willing to receive it, especially when the offer is in itself a proper motive to obedience.

(b) To the second we reply, that the objection, if true, would equally hold against God's foreknowledge. The sincerity of God's general call is no more inconsistent with his determination that some shall be permitted to reject it, than it is with his foreknowledge that some will reject it,

Hodge, Syst. Theol., 2: 643.

B. Is God's special call irresistible?

We prefer to say that this special call is efficacious—that is, that it infallibly accomplishes its purpose of leading the sinner to the acceptance of salvation. This implies two things:—

(a) That the operation of God is not an outward constraint upon the human will, but that it accords with the laws of our mental constitution. We reject the term irresistible, as implying a coercion and compulsion which is foreign to the nature of God's working in the soul; (Ps. 110: 3. Phil. 2: 13).

(b) That the operation of God is the originating cause of that new disposition of the affections, and that new activity of the will, by which the sinner accepts Christ. The cause is not in the response of the will to the presentation of motives by God, nor in any mere coöperation of the will of man with the will of God, but to an almighty act of God in the will of man, by which its freedom to choose God as its end is restored and rightly exercised; (John 1: 12, 13). For further discussion of the subject, see, in the next section, the remarks on Regeneration—with which this efficacious call is identical.

Andrew Fuller, Works, 2: 373, 513; 3: 807. Robert Hall, Works, 3: 75. Gill, Body of Divinity, 2: 121-130.

SECTION II.—THE APPLICATION OF CHRIST'S REDEMPTION  
IN ITS ACTUAL BEGINNING.

Under this head we treat of Regeneration, Conversion (embracing Repentance and Faith), Union with Christ, and Justification. Much confusion and error have arisen from conceiving these as occurring in chronological order. The order is logical, not chronological. Regeneration and conversion are but the divine and the human sides or aspects of the same fact, although regeneration has logical precedence, and man turns only as God turns him. So, too, the moment of a sinner's regeneration and conversion is also the moment of his union with Christ and his justification, although only as he believes, is he united to Christ, and only as he is united to Christ, is he justified.

I. REGENERATION.

Regeneration is that act of God by which, through the truth as a means, the governing disposition of the soul is made holy.

1. *Scripture Representations.*

A. Regeneration is a change indispensable to the salvation of the sinner; (John 3: 7. Gal. 6: 15. Cf. Heb. 12: 14; Eph. 2: 3; Rom. 3: 11; John 6: 44, 65; Jer. 13: 23).

B. It is a change in the inmost principle of life; (John 3: 3; 5: 21. Rom. 6: 13. 2 Cor. 5: 17. Eph. 2: 1; 5: 14).

C. It is a change in the heart, or governing disposition; (Matt. 12: 33, 35; 15: 19. Acts 16: 14. Rom. 6: 17; 10: 10. Cf. Ps. 51: 10; Jer. 31: 33; Ez. 11: 19).

D. It is a change in the moral relations of the soul; (Eph. 2: 5; 4: 24. Col. 1: 13).

E. It is a change wrought through the truth as a means; (James 1: 18. 1 Pet. 1: 23. 2 Pet. 1: 4. Cf. Jer. 23: 29; John 15: 3; Eph. 6: 17; Heb. 4: 12; 1 Pet. 2: 9).

F. It is an instantaneous change; (John 5: 24. Cf. Mat. 6: 24).

G. It is a change secretly wrought, inscrutable, and known only in its results; (John 3: 8. Cf. Phil. 2: 12, 13; 2 Pet. 1: 10).

H. It is a change wrought by God; (John 1: 13; 3: 5. Eph. 1: 19, 20; 2: 10. 1 Pet. 1: 3. Cf. 1 Cor. 3: 6, 7; 2 Cor. 10: 4).

On the Scripture Representations, see E. D. Griffin, *Divine Efficiency*, 117-164.

2. *Necessity of Regeneration.*

That all men without exception need to be changed in moral character, is manifest, not only from Scripture passages already cited, but from the following rational considerations:—

A. Holiness, or conformity to the fundamental moral attribute of God, is the indispensable condition of securing the divine favor, of attaining peace of conscience, and of preparing the soul for the associations and employments of the blest.

B. The condition of universal humanity as by nature depraved, and when arrived at moral consciousness, as guilty of actual transgression, is precisely the opposite of that holiness without which the soul cannot exist in normal relation to God, to self, or to holy beings.

C. A radical internal change is therefore requisite in every human soul—a change in that which constitutes its character. Holiness cannot be attained, as the Pantheist claims, by a merely natural growth or development, since man's natural tendencies are wholly in the direction of selfishness. There must be a reversal of his inmost dispositions and principles of action, if he is to see the kingdom of God.

Anderson, *Regeneration*, 51–88.

### 3. *The Efficient Cause of Regeneration.*

Three views only need be considered,—all others are modifications of these. The first view puts the efficient cause of regeneration in the human will; the second, in the truth considered as a system of motives; the third, in the immediate agency of the Holy Spirit.

A. The human will, as the efficient cause of regeneration.

This view takes two forms, according as the will is regarded as acting apart from, or in conjunction with, special influences of the truth applied by God. Pelagians hold the former; Arminians the latter.

(a) To the Pelagian view that regeneration is solely the act of man, and is identical with self-reformation, we object that the depravity of the sinner's will, since it consists in a fixed state of the affections which determines the character of all the volitions, amounts to a moral inability. Without a renewal of the affections from which all moral action springs, man will not choose holiness nor accept salvation.

J. S. Mill, *Autobiography*, 132–142. Henslow, *Evolution*, 134.

(b) To the Arminian view that regeneration is the act of man, coöperating with divine influences applied through the truth (synergistic theory), we object that no beginning of holiness is in this way conceivable. For so long as man's selfish and perverse affections are unchanged, no choosing God is possible but such as proceeds from supreme desire for one's own interest and happiness. But the man thus supremely bent on self-gratification cannot see in God or his service anything productive of happiness, or if he could see in them anything of advantage, his choice of God and his service from such a motive would not be a holy choice, and therefore could not be a beginning of holiness.

On the Arminian view, see *Bib. Sac.*, 19: 265, 266. For modification of this view, see N. W. Taylor, *Revealed Theology*, 389–406. Review of Taylor and Fitch, by E. D. Griffin, *Divine Efficiency*, 13–54.

B. The truth, as the efficient cause of regeneration.

According to this view, the truth as a system of motives is the direct and immediate cause of the change from unholiness to holiness. This view is objectionable for two reasons:—

(a) It erroneously regards motives as wholly external to the mind that is influenced by them. This is to conceive of them as mechanically constraining the will, and is indistinguishable from necessitarianism. On the contrary, motives are compounded of external presentations and internal dispositions. It is the soul's affections which render certain suggestions attractive and others repugnant to us. In brief, the heart makes the motive.

(b) Only as truth is loved, therefore, can it be a motive to holiness. But we have seen that the aversion of the sinner to God is such that the truth is hated instead of loved, and a thing that is hated, is hated more intensely, the more distinctly it is seen. Hence no mere power of the truth can be regarded as the efficient cause of regeneration.

E. D. Griffin, *Divine Efficiency*, 105-116, 203-221,

C. The immediate agency of the Holy Spirit, as the efficient cause of regeneration.

In ascribing to the Holy Spirit the authorship of regeneration, we do not affirm that the divine Spirit accomplishes his work without any accompanying instrumentality. We simply assert that the power which regenerates is the power of God, and that although conjoined with the use of means, there is a direct operation of this power upon the sinner's heart which changes its moral character. We add two remarks by way of further explanation :—

(a) The scriptural assertions of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit and of his mighty power in the soul, forbid us to regard the divine Spirit in regeneration as coming in contact not with the soul, but only with the truth. Since truth is simply what is, there can be no change wrought in the truth. The phrases: "to energize the truth," "to intensify the truth," "to illuminate the truth," have no proper meaning, since even God cannot make the truth more true. If any change is wrought, it must be wrought, not in the truth, but in the soul. For, still further,

(b) Even if truth could be thus energized, intensified, illuminated, there would still be needed a change in the moral disposition before the soul could recognize its beauty or be affected by it. No mere increase of light can enable a blind man to see,—the disease of the eye must first be cured before external objects are visible. So God's work in regeneration must be performed within the soul itself. Over and above all influence of the truth, there must be a direct influence of the Holy Spirit upon the heart. Although wrought in conjunction with the presentation of truth to the intellect, regeneration differs from moral suasion in being an immediate act of God.

For the view that truth is 'energized' or 'intensified' by the Holy Spirit, see Phelps, *New Birth*, 61: 121; Walker, *Philosophy of Plan of Salvation*, chap. 18. Per contra, see E. D. Griffin, *Divine Efficiency*, 73-116; Anderson, *Regeneration*, 123-168; Edwards, *Works*, 2: 547-597; Chalmers, *Lectures on Romans*, chap. 1; Payne, *Divine Sovereignty*, lect. 23; Hodge, *Syst. Theol.* 3: 3-37.



#### 4. *The Instrumentality used in Regeneration.*

A. Romanists hold that regeneration is accomplished through the instrumentality of baptism. With them the standards of the English Church, and most Lutherans and Disciples (Campbellites) agree. To this view we urge the following objections:—

(a) The Scriptures represent baptism to be not the means but only the sign of regeneration, and therefore to presuppose and follow regeneration. For this reason only believers—that is, persons giving credible evidence of being regenerate—were baptized; (Acts 8: 12). Not external baptism, but the conscientious turning of the soul to God which baptism symbolizes, saves us; (1 Pet. 3: 21—*συνειδήσεως ἀγαθῆς ἐπερώτημα*). Texts like John 3: 5, Acts 2: 38, Col. 2: 12, Tit. 3: 5, are to be explained upon the principle that regeneration the inward change, and baptism the outward sign of that change, were regarded as only different sides or aspects of the same fact, and either side or aspect might therefore be described in terms derived from the other. For further explanation, see under the head of Baptism.

(b) Upon this view there is a striking incongruity between the nature of the change to be wrought and the means employed to produce it. The change is a spiritual one, but the means are physical. It is far more rational to suppose that in changing the character of intelligent beings, God uses means which have relation to their intelligence. The view we are considering is part and parcel of a general scheme of mechanical rather than moral salvation, and is more consistent with a materialistic than with a spiritual philosophy.

B. The Scriptural view is that regeneration is accomplished through the instrumentality of the truth. Although the Holy Spirit does not in any way illuminate the truth, he does illuminate the mind, so that it can perceive the truth (Eph. 1: 17, 18), and in conjunction with this appeal to man's rational nature through the truth, he works a change of man's inner disposition. Two inferences may be drawn:—

(a) Man is not properly passive at the time of his regeneration. Although the efficient power is divine, man is not therefore unconscious, nor is he a mere machine moved by God's fingers. On the other hand his whole moral nature, under God's working, is alive and active. We reject the 'exercise system,' which regards God as the direct author of all man's thoughts, feelings and volitions, not only in its general tenor, but in its special application to regeneration.

(b) This activity of man's mind in regeneration, is activity in view of the truth. In all God's regenerating work, the exercise of his power is connected with the use of truth as a means. Here we perceive the link between the activity of man and the efficiency of God. Only as the sinner's mind is brought into contact with the truth, does God exert his regenerating power. Christian work is successful only as it "commends the truth to every man's conscience;" (2 Cor. 4: 2).

For denial of instrumentality of truth in regeneration, see Pierce, in *Bap. Quar.*, Jan., 1872: 52. Per contra, see Anderson, *Regeneration*, 89-122. For the 'Exercise System,' see Emmons, *Works*, 4: 339-411; Hagenbach, *Hist. Doctrine*, 2: 439.

5. *The Nature of the Change wrought in Regeneration.*

A. It is a change in which the governing disposition is made holy. This implies that

(a) It is not a change in the substance of either body or soul. Regeneration is not a physical change. There is no physical seed or germ implanted in man's nature. Regeneration does not add to or subtract from the number of man's intellectual, emotional or voluntary faculties. But regeneration is the giving of a new direction or tendency to powers of affection which man possessed before. Man had the faculty of love before, but his love was supremely set on self. In regeneration the direction of that faculty is changed and his love is now set supremely upon God.

(b) Regeneration involves an enlightenment of the understanding and a rectification of the volitions. But it seems most consonant with Scripture and with a correct psychology, to regard these changes as immediate and necessary consequences of the change of disposition already mentioned, rather than as the primary and central facts in regeneration. The taste for truth logically precedes perception of the truth, and love for God logically precedes obedience to God—indeed, without love no obedience is possible. Reverse the lever of affection and this moral locomotive, without further change, will move away from sin, and toward truth and God.

(c) It is objected indeed that we know only of mental substance and of mental acts, and that the new disposition or state just mentioned, since it is not an act, must be regarded as a new substance and so lack all moral quality. But we reply that besides substance, and acts, there are habits, tendencies, proclivities, some of them native and some of them acquired. They are voluntary and have moral character. If we can by repeated acts originate sinful tendencies, God can surely originate in us holy tendencies. Such holy tendencies formed a part of the nature of Adam as he came from the hand of God. As the result of the fall we are born with tendencies toward evil for which we are responsible. Regeneration is a restoration of the original tendencies toward God which were lost by the fall. Such holy tendencies (tastes, dispositions, affections) are not only not unmoral—they are the only possible springs of right moral action. Only in the restoration of them does man become truly free.

Hodge, *Essays and Reviews*, 1-48. Owen on Holy Spirit, in *Works*, 3: 297-336. Charnock on Regeneration. Andrew Fuller, *Works*, 2: 461-471, 512-560; 3: 796. Edwards on Religious Affections, in *Works*, 3: 1-21. Bellamy, *Works*, 2: 502. Dwight, *Works*, 2: 418. Woods, *Works*, 3: 1-21. Anderson, *Regeneration*, 21-50.

B. It is an instantaneous change, in a region of the soul below consciousness, and is therefore known only in its results.

(a) It is an instantaneous change. Regeneration is not a gradual work. Although there may be a gradual work of God's providence and Spirit preparing the change, and a gradual recognition of it after it has taken place, there must be an instant of time when, under the influence of God's Spirit, the disposition of the soul just before hostile to God, is changed to love. Any other view assumes an intermediate state of indecision which has no moral character at all.

(b) This change takes place in a region of the soul below consciousness.

It is by no means true that God's work in regeneration is always recognized by the subject of it. On the other hand, it is never directly perceived at all. The working of God in the human soul, since it contravenes no law of man's being, but rather puts him in the full and normal possession of his own powers, is secret and inscrutable. Although man is conscious, he is not conscious of God's regenerating agency.

(c) This change however, is recognized, indirectly, in its results.

At the moment of regeneration, the soul is conscious only of the truth and of its own exercises with reference to it. That God is the author of its new affection is an inference from the new character of the exercises which it prompts. The human side or aspect of regeneration is Conversion. This, and the Sanctification which follows it (including the special gifts of the Holy Spirit), are the sole evidences in any particular case that regeneration is an accomplished fact.

On evidences of regeneration, see Anderson, *Regeneration*, 169-214, 229-295. Woods, *Works*, 3: 44-55.

## II. CONVERSION.

Conversion is that voluntary change in the mind of the sinner in which he turns, on the one hand, from sin, and on the other hand, to Christ. The former or negative element in conversion, namely, the turning from sin, we denominate repentance. The latter or positive element in conversion, namely, the turning to Christ, we denominate faith.

Andrew Fuller, *Works*, 1: 666. Luthardt, *Compendium der Dogmatik*, 3rd ed., 202-206.

Conversion is the human side or aspect of that fundamental spiritual change, which, as viewed from the divine side, we call regeneration. It is simply man's turning. The Scriptures recognize the voluntary activity of the human soul in this change as distinctly as they recognize the causative agency of God. While God turns men to himself (Ps. 85: 4; Cant. 1: 4; Jer. 31: 18; Lam. 5: 21), men are exhorted to turn themselves to God (Prov. 1: 23; Is. 31: 6; 59: 20. Ez. 14: 6; 18: 32; 33: 9, 11. Joel 12: 12-14). While God is represented as the author of the new heart and the new spirit (Ps. 51: 10. Ez. 11: 19; 36: 26) men are commanded to make for themselves a new heart and a new spirit (Ez. 18: 31; 2 Cor. 7: 1; cf. Phil. 2: 12).

This twofold method of representation can be explained only when we remember that man's powers may be interpenetrated and quickened by the divine, not only without destroying man's freedom, but with the result of making man for the first time truly free. Since the relation between the divine and the human activity is not one of chronological succession, man is never to wait for God's working. If he is ever regenerated it must be in and through a movement of his own will, in which he turns to God as an constrainedly and with as little consciousness of God's operation upon him, as if no such operation of God were involved in the change. And in preaching, we are to press upon men the claims of God and their duty of immediate submission to Christ, with the certainty that they who do so submit, will subsequently recognize this new and holy activity of their own wills as due to a working within them of divine power; (cf. Ps. 110: 3).

From the fact that the word 'conversion' means simply a 'turning,' every turning of the Christian from sin, subsequent to the first, may, in a subordinate sense, be denominated a conversion; (Luke 22: 32). Since regeneration is not complete sanctification, and the change of governing disposition is not identical with complete purification of the nature, such subsequent turnings from sin are necessary consequences and evidences of the first; (cf. John 13: 10). But they do not, like the first, imply a change in the governing disposition—they are rather new manifestations of a disposition already changed. For this reason, conversion proper, like the regeneration of which it is the obverse side, can occur but once. The phrase 'second conversion,' even if does not imply radical misconception of the nature of conversion, is misleading. We prefer therefore to describe these subsequent experiences not by the term 'conversion,' but by such phrases as 'breaking off, forsaking, returning from, neglects or transgressions,' and 'coming back to Christ, trusting anew in him.' It is with repentance and faith, as elements in that first and radical change by which the soul enters upon a state of salvation, that we have now to do.

### 1. *Repentance.*

We may analyze repentance into three constituents, each succeeding term of which includes and implies the one preceding:—

A. An intellectual element,—recognition of sin as involving personal guilt, defilement and helplessness; (Ps. 51: 3, 7, 11). If unaccompanied by the following elements, this recognition may manifest itself in fear of punishment, although as yet there is no hatred of sin. This element is indicated in the Scripture phrase *ἐπίγνωσις ἁμαρτίας* (Rom. 4: 20; cf. 1: 32).

B. An emotional element,—sorrow for sin as committed against goodness and justice, and therefore hateful to God, and hateful in itself; (Ps. 51: 1, 2, 10, 13–15). This element of repentance is indicated in the Scripture word *μεταμέλομαι*. If accompanied by the following elements, it is a *λύπη κατὰ Θεόν*. If not so accompanied, it is a *λύπη τοῦ κοσμοῦ*=remorse and despair; (Mat. 27: 3; Luke 18: 23; 2 Cor. 7: 9, 10).

C. A voluntary element,—inward turning from sin and disposition to seek pardon and cleansing; (Ps. 51: 5, 7, 10. Jer. 25: 5). This includes and implies the two preceding elements, and is therefore the most important aspect of repentance. It is indicated in the Scripture term *μετανοία* (Acts 2: 38. Rom. 2: 4).

In broad distinction from the Scriptural doctrine, we find the Romanist view, which regards the three elements of repentance as the following: 1. Contrition; 2. Confession; 3. Satisfaction. Of these, contrition is the only element properly belonging to repentance, yet from this contrition the Romanist excludes all sorrow for sin of nature. Confession is confession to the priest, and satisfaction is the sinner's own doing of outward penance, as a temporal and symbolic submission and reparation to violated law. This view is false and pernicious, in that it confounds repentance with its outward fruits, conceives of it as exercised rather toward the church than toward God, and regards it a meritorious ground, instead of a mere condition of pardon.

In further explanation of the Scripture representations, we remark :—

(a) That repentance in each and all of its aspects, is wholly an inward act, not to be confounded with the change of life which proceeds from it.

True repentance is indeed manifested and evidenced by confession of sin before God (Luke 18: 13), and by reparation for wrongs done to men (Luke 19: 8). But these do not constitute repentance,—they are rather fruits of repentance. Between repentance and ‘fruit meet for repentance,’ Scripture plainly distinguishes; (Mat. 3: 8).

(b) That repentance is only a negative condition, and not a positive means of salvation.

This is evident from the fact that repentance is no more than the sinner’s present duty, and can furnish no offset to the claims of the law on account of past transgression. The truly penitent man feels that his repentance has no merit. Apart from the positive element of conversion, namely, faith in Christ, it would be only sorrow for guilt unremoved. This very sorrow, moreover, is not the mere product of human will, but is the gift of God; (Acts 5: 31; 11: 18. 2 Tim. 2: 25).

(c) That true repentance, however, never exists except in conjunction with faith.

Sorrow for sin, not simply on account of its evil consequences to the transgressor, but on account of its intrinsic hatefulness as opposed to divine holiness and love, is practically impossible without some confidence in God’s mercy. It is the cross which first makes us truly penitent; (cf. John 12: 32, 33). Hence all true preaching of repentance is implicitly a preaching of faith (Mat. 3: 1–12; cf. Acts 19: 4), and repentance toward God involves faith in the Lord Jesus Christ (Acts 20: 21; Luke 15: 10, 24; 19: 8, 9; cf. Gal. 3: 7).

(d) That conversely, wherever there is true faith, there is true repentance also.

Since repentance and faith are but different sides or aspects of the same act of turning, faith is as inseparable from repentance as repentance is from faith. That must be an unreal faith where there is no repentance, just as that must be an unreal repentance where there is no faith. Yet because the one aspect of his change is more prominent in the mind of the convert than the other, we are not hastily to conclude that the other is absent. Only that degree of conviction of sin is essential to salvation, which carries with it a forsaking of sin and a trustful surrender to Christ; (2 Cor. 7: 10).

Anderson on Regeneration, 279–288. Bp. Ossory, Nature and Effects of Faith, 40–48, 311–318. Woods, Works, 3: 68–78. Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 5: 1–10, 208–246. Luthardt, Compendium, 3rd ed., 206–208. Hodge, Outlines of Theology, 375–381. Alexander, Evidences of Christianity, 47–60. Crawford on Atonement, 433–439.

## 2. Faith.

We may analyze faith also into three constituents, each succeeding term of which includes and implies the preceding :—

A. An intellectual element (notitia),—recognition of the truth of God's revelation, or of the objective reality of the salvation provided by Christ (John 2: 23, 24; cf. 3: 2. James 2: 19).

This includes not only a historical belief in the facts of the Scripture, but an intellectual belief in the doctrine taught therein as to man's sinfulness and dependence upon Christ.

B. An emotional element (assensus),—assent to the revelation of God's power and grace in Jesus Christ, as applicable to the present needs of the soul; (Mat. 13: 20, 21; cf. Ps. 106: 12; Is. 58: 2; Ez. 33: 31, 32; John 5: 35).

Those in whom this awakening of the sensibilities is unaccompanied by the fundamental decision of the will which constitutes the next element of faith, may seem to themselves, and for a time may appear to others, to have accepted Christ. Saving faith, however, includes also

C. A voluntary element (fiducia),—trust in Christ as Lord and Savior; or, in other words—to distinguish its two aspects:—

(a) Surrender of the soul, as guilty and defiled, to Christ's governance (Matt. 11: 28. John 8: 12; 14: 1. Acts 16: 31); together with

(b) Reception and appropriation of Christ, as the source of pardon and spiritual life; (John 1: 12; 4: 14; 6: 53; 20: 31. Eph. 3: 17. Heb. 11: 1. Rev. 3: 20).

Corresponding to the distinction between a merely external and a truly saving faith is a varied usage of cases and prepositions with πιστεύω. External faith believes Christ (accusative—John 5: 46). Saving faith believes in or upon Christ—(εἰς, Acts 20: 21; ἐν, 1 Tim. 3: 13), and these prepositions are not used when trust in a human being is spoken of.

The passages already referred to, refute the view of the Romanist, that saving faith is simply implicit assent to the doctrines of the church; and the view of the Disciple or Campbellite, that faith is merely intellectual belief in the truth, on the presentation of evidence.

“True faith,” says Luther, “is that assured trust and firm assent of heart, by which Christ is laid hold of—so that Christ is the object of faith. Yet he is not merely the object of faith, but in the very faith, so to speak, Christ is present. Faith lays hold of Christ and grasps him as a present possession, just as the ring holds the jewel.”

“Faith,” says Edwards, “includes the whole act of union to Christ as a Savior. The entire active uniting of the soul, or the whole of what is called coming to Christ and receiving of him, is called faith in the Scripture.”

In further explanation of the Scripture representations, we remark:—

(a) That faith is an act of the affections and will as truly as it is an act of the intellect.

It has been claimed that faith and unbelief are purely intellectual states, which are necessarily determined by the facts at any given time presented to the mind, and that they are for this reason as destitute of moral quality and as far from being matters of obligation, as are our instinctive feelings of

pleasure and pain. But this view unwarrantably isolates the intellect, and ignores the fact that in all moral subjects, the state of the affections and will affects the judgments of the mind with regard to truth. In the intellectual act the whole moral nature expresses itself. Since the tastes determine the opinions, faith is a moral act, and men are responsible for not believing; (John 3: 18-20; 5: 40; 16: 9).

(b) That faith is not chronologically subsequent to regeneration, but is its accompaniment.

As the soul's appropriation of Christ and his salvation, it is not the result of an accomplished renewal, but rather the medium through which that renewal is effected. Otherwise it would follow that one who had not yet believed (i. e., received Christ) might still be regenerate, whereas the Scripture represents the privilege of sonship as granted only to believers; (John 1: 12-14. Gal. 3: 26).

(c) That the object of saving faith is, in general, the whole truth of God so far as it is objectively revealed or made known to the soul; but, in particular, the person and work of Jesus Christ, which constitute the centre and substance of God's revelation; (Acts 17: 18. 1 Cor. 1: 23. Col. 1: 27. Rev. 19: 10).

The patriarchs, though they had no knowledge of a personal Christ, were saved by believing in God so far as God had revealed himself to them, and whoever among the heathen are saved, must in like manner be saved by casting themselves as helpless sinners upon God's plan of mercy dimly shadowed forth in nature and providence. But such faith, even among the patriarchs and heathen, is implicitly a faith in Christ, and would become explicit and conscious trust and submission, whenever Christ were made known to them; (Acts 4: 12; 10: 31, 44; 16: 31).

For instances of apparently regenerated heathen, see Godet on John 7: 17, note; and Life of Brainard, by Edwards, 173-175.

(d) That the ground of faith is the external word of promise. The ground of assurance, on the other hand, is the inward witness of the Spirit that we fulfill the conditions of the promise; (Rom. 4: 20, 21; 8: 16. Eph. 1: 13. 1 John 4: 13; 5: 10).

True faith is therefore possible without assurance of salvation. But if Alexander's view were correct, that the object of saving faith is the proposition: "God, for Christ's sake, now looks with reconciling love on me, a sinner," no one could believe, without being at the same time assured that he was a saved person. Upon the true view, that the object of saving faith is not a proposition, but a person, we can perceive not only the simplicity of faith, but the possibility of faith even where the soul is destitute of assurance or of joy.

(e) That faith necessarily leads to good works, since it embraces the whole truth of God so far as made known, and appropriates Christ not only as an external Savior, but as an internal sanctifying power; (Heb. 7: 16. Gal. 5: 6).

Good works are the proper evidence of faith. The faith which does not lead men to act upon the commands and promises of Christ, or in other words, does not lead to obedience, is called in Scripture a 'dead,' that is, an unreal faith. Such faith is not saving, since it lacks the voluntary element—actual appropriation of Christ; (James 2: 14-26).

(f) That faith, as characteristically the inward act of reception, is not to be confounded with love or obedience, its fruit.

Faith is, in the Scriptures, called a work, only in the sense that man's active powers are engaged in it. It is a work which God requires, yet which God enables man to perform; (John 6: 29—*ἔργον τοῦ Θεοῦ*. cf. Rom. 1: 17—*δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ*). As the gift of God and as the mere taking of undeserved mercy, it is expressly excluded from the category of works upon the basis of which man may claim salvation; (Rom. 3: 28; 4: 4, 5, 16). It is not the act of a full soul bestowing, but the act of an empty soul receiving. Although this reception is prompted by a drawing of heart toward God inwrought by the Holy Spirit, this drawing of heart is not yet a conscious and developed love,—such love is the result of faith; (Gal. 5: 6). Obedience can be rendered only after faith has laid hold of Christ and with him has obtained the spirit of obedience; (Rom. 1: 5—*ἰπακοὴν πίστεως*= 'obedience resulting from faith'). Hence faith is not the procuring cause of salvation, but is only the instrumental cause. The procuring cause is the Christ, whom faith embraces.

(g) That faith is susceptible of increase.

This is evident whether we consider it from the human or from the divine side. As an act of man it has an intellectual, an emotional and a voluntary element, each of which is capable of growth. As a work of God in the soul of man, it can receive through the presentation of the truth and the quickening agency of the Holy Spirit, continually new accessions of knowledge, sensibility and active energy. Such increase of faith, therefore, we are to seek, both by resolute exercise of our own powers, and above all, by direct application to the source of faith in God; (Luke 17: 5).

Köstlin, *Die Lehre von dem Glauben*, 13-85, 301-341, and in *Jahrb. f. d. Theol.* 4: 177, sq. *Belief, What Is It?*, 150-179, 290-298. Romaine on *Faith*, 9-89. Alexander, *Discourses on Faith*, 63-118. Bishop of Ossory, *Nature and Effects of Faith*, 1-40. Venn, *Characteristics of Belief*, *Introd.* Luther, *Com. on Galatians*, 1: 191, 247, quoted in Thomasius, *III.* 2: 183. Edwards, *Works*, 4: 71-73; 2: 601-641.

### III. UNION WITH CHRIST.

The Scriptures declare that, by faith, there is constituted a union of the soul with Christ different in kind from God's natural and providential concursus with all spirits (Acts 17: 28), as well as from all unions of mere association or sympathy, moral likeness or moral influence,—a union of life, in which the human spirit, while then most truly possessing its own individuality and personal distinctness, is interpenetrated and energized by the



Spirit of Christ, is made inscrutably but indissolubly one with him, and so becomes a member and partaker of that new humanity of which he is the head.

1. *Scripture Representations of this Union.*

A. Figurative teaching. It is illustrated:—

(a) From the union of a building and its foundation; (Eph. 2: 20–22. 1 Pet. 2: 4–6. Cf. Ps. 118: 22; Is. 28: 16).

(b) From the union between husband and wife; (Rom. 7: 4. 2 Cor. 11: 2. Eph. 5: 31, 32. Rev. 19: 7; 22: 17. Cf. Isa. 54: 5; Jer. 3: 20; Hos. 2: 2–5; and Song of Solomon).

(c) From the union between the vine and its branches; (John 15: 1–10. Rom. 6: 5; 11: 17–24. Col. 2: 6, 7).

(d) From the union between the members and the head of the body; (1 Cor. 6: 15, 19; 12: 12. Eph. 1: 22, 23; 4: 15, 16; 5: 30).

(e) From the union of the race with the source of its life in Adam; (Rom. 5: 12–19. 1 Cor. 15: 22–49).

B. Direct statements.

(a) The believer is said to be in Christ; (John 14: 20. Rom. 6: 11; 8: 1. 2 Cor. 5: 17. Eph. 1: 4; 2: 13).

(b) Christ is said to be in the believer; (John 14: 20. Rom. 8: 9; cf. 10. Gal. 2: 20).

(c) The Father and the Son dwell in the believer; (John 14: 23; cf. 10. Eph. 3: 17. 1 John 4: 16).

(d) The believer has life by partaking of Christ, as Christ has life by partaking of the Father; (John 6: 53, 56, 57. 1 Cor. 10: 16, 17. 1 John 1: 3. In the last two passages, *κοινωνία* = 'participation').

(e) All believers are one in Christ, as Christ is one with God; (John 17: 21, 22).

(f) The believer is made partaker of the divine nature; (2 Pet. 1: 4).

(g) The believer is made one spirit with the Lord; (1 Cor. 6: 17).

2. *Nature of this Union.*

A. Negatively. It is not

(a) A merely natural union, like that of God with all human spirits—as held by rationalists; nor

(b) A merely moral union,—as held by Socinians and Arminians; nor

(c) A union which destroys the distinct personality and subsistence of either Christ or the human spirit,—as held by many of the Mystics; nor

(d) A union mediated and conditioned by participation of the sacraments of the church,—as held by Romanists, Lutherans and High-Church Episcopalians; but

B. Positively, it is

(a) An organic union, in which we become members of Christ and partakers of his humanity; (Eph. 5: 30).

(b) A vital union, in which Christ's life becomes the dominating principle within us; (Gal. 2: 20. Col. 3: 3, 4).

(c) A spiritual union, that is, a union not of natural but of spiritual life; (Rom. 8: 9, 10).

(d) A union mediated, not by sacraments, since sacraments presuppose it as already existing, but solely by faith; (Eph. 3: 17).

(e) An indissoluble union; (Matt. 28: 20. John 10: 28. Rom. 8: 35, 39. 1 Thess. 4: 14, 17).

(f) An inscrutable union; mystical, however, only in the sense of surpassing in its intimacy and value any other union of souls which we know; (Eph. 5: 32. Col. 1: 27).

Baird, *Elohim Revealed*, 601. Wilberforce, *Incarnation*, 208-272; *New Birth of Man's Nature*, 1-30.

### 3. *Consequences of this Union.*

A. As respects Christ.

(a) It involves him in all the legal liabilities of those with whom he is thus united. As virtually constituting one person with them, Christ bears the penalty of their sins and makes satisfaction to the divine justice; (1 Cor. 12: 12. Eph. 5: 23-30. Heb. 2: 14).

Baird, *Elohim Revealed*, 607-610. Owen, on *Justification*, chap. 8. Boston, on the *Covenant of Grace*, chap. 2.

(b) It gives him fellowship with believers in all their labors, temptations and sufferings; (Phil. 4: 13. Heb. 4: 15; cf. Isa. 63: 9).

B. As respects the believer.

(a) It gives to him the legal standing and rights of Christ. As Christ's union with us involves atonement, so our union with Christ involves justification. The believer is entitled to take for his own all that Christ is and all that Christ has done, and this because he has within him that new life of humanity which suffered in Christ's death and rose from the grave in Christ's resurrection,—in other words, because he is virtually one person with his Redeemer; (Acts 13: 39. Rom. 6: 8; 7: 4; 8: 1, 17. 1 Cor. 1: 30; 3: 22; 6: 11. 2 Cor. 5: 14, 21. Gal. 2: 20. Eph. 1: 4, 6; 2: 5, 6. Phil. 3: 9. 2 Tim. 2: 11.) In Christ the believer is prophet (Luke 12: 12. 1 John 2: 20), priest (1 Pet. 2: 5. Rev. 20: 6), and king (1 Pet. 2: 9. Rev. 3: 21; 5: 10).

(b) It secures to the believer the transforming, assimilating power of Christ's life—first, for the soul (John 1: 16. Rom. 8: 10. 1 Cor. 15: 45. Phil. 2: 5. 1 John 3: 2); secondly, for the body—sanctifying it in the present (1 Cor. 6: 17, 19), and in the future, raising it up in the likeness of Christ's glorified body (Rom. 8: 11. 1 Cor. 15: 49. Phil. 3: 21).

(c) It leads to the believer's fellowship with Christ's whole experience on earth; (Phil. 3: 10. Col. 1: 24. 1 Pet. 4: 13).

(d) It secures the spiritual unity and fellowship of all believers; (John 17: 21. 1 Cor. 10: 17. Eph. 2: 14-18).

(e) It furnishes a basis for the eternal fellowship of heaven; (1 Thess. 4: 17. Heb. 12: 23. Rev. 21 and 22).

We append a few statements with regard to this union and its consequences, from noted names in theology and in the church:—

Luther: "By faith thou art so glued to Christ that of thee and him there becomes as it were one person, so that with confidence thou canst say: 'I am Christ—that is, Christ's righteousness, victory, etc., are mine;' and Christ in turn can say: 'I am that sinner—that is, his sins, his death, etc., are mine, because he clings to me and I to him, for we have been joined through faith into one flesh and bone.'"

Calvin: "I attribute the highest importance to the connection between the head and the members; to the inhabitation of Christ in our hearts; in a word, to the mystical union by which we enjoy him, so that being made ours, he makes us partakers of the blessings with which he is furnished."

Edwards: "Faith is the soul's active uniting with Christ. God sees fit that in order to a union's being established between two intelligent active beings, there should be the mutual act of both, that each should receive the other as entirely joining themselves to one another."

Andrew Fuller: "I have no doubt that the imputation of Christ's righteousness presupposes a union with him; since there is no perceivable fitness in bestowing benefits on one for another's sake, where there is no union or relation between."

Pascal, *Thoughts*, Eng. trans., 429. Hodge, *Outlines*, 369. Baird, *Elohim Revealed*, 590-617. Edwards, *Works*, 4: 66, 69, 70. Upham, *Divine Union; Interior Life; Life of Madame Guyon, and Fenelon*. Schöberlein, in *Studien und Kritiken*, 1847: 7-69. Tillotson, *Sermons*, 3: 307. Trench, *Studies in Gospels*, 284, and *Christ the True Vine*, in *Hulsean Lectures*. Hooker, *Ecel. Polity*, book 5, ch. 56. Andrew Fuller, *Works*, 2: 685. Calvin, *Institutes*, 1: 660. A. J. Gordon, *In Christ*. For other references, see *Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk*, 3: 325.

#### IV. JUSTIFICATION.

##### 1. *Definition of Justification.*

By justification we mean that judicial act of God by which, on account of Christ to whom the sinner is united by faith, he declares that sinner to be no longer exposed to the penalty of the law, but to be restored to his favor.

Justification, as thus defined, is therefore a declarative act, as distinguished from an efficient act; an act of God external to the sinner, as distinguished from an act within the sinner's nature and changing that nature; a judicial act as distinguished from a sovereign act; an act based upon and logically presupposing the sinner's union with Christ, as distinguished from an act which causes and is followed by that union with Christ.

2. *Proof of the Doctrine of Justification.*

## A. Scripture proofs of the doctrine as a whole.

See Rom. 1: 17; 3: 24-30; 4: 5. Gal. 3: 11. Eph. 1: 7. Heb. 11: 4, 7. Cf. Gen. 15: 6; Isa. 7: 9; 28: 16; Hab. 2: 4.

## B. Scripture use of the special words translated 'justify' and 'justification.'

In the Septuagint and in the New Testament,

(a) *δικαίω*—uniformly, or with only a single exception, signifies not to make righteous, but to declare just, or free from guilt and exposure to punishment; Ex. 23: 7. Deut. 25: 1. Job 27: 5. Ps. 143: 2. Prov. 17: 15. Isa. 5: 23; 50: 8; 53: 11. The only O. T. passage where this meaning is questionable, is Dan. 12: 3. But even here, the proper translation is, in all probability, not 'they that turn many to righteousness,' but 'they that justify many,' i. e., cause many to be justified. For the Hiphil force of the verb, see Girdlestone, O. T. Syn. 257, 258, and Delitzsch on Is. 53: 11. Cf. James 5: 19, 20.

Matt. 12: 37. Luke 7: 29; 10: 29; 16: 15; 18: 14; cf. 13. Rom. 4: 6-8; cf. Ps. 32: 1, 2. Rom. 5: 18, 19; 8: 33, 34. 2 Cor. 5: 19, 21. In Rom. 6: 7—*ὁ γὰρ ἀποθανὼν δεδικαίωται ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας*—'he that once died with Christ was acquitted from the service of sin considered as a penalty.' In 1 Cor. 4: 4—*οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔμαυτῷ σίνοῖδα. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τούτῳ δεδικαίωμαι*—'I am conscious of no fault, but that does not in itself make certain God's acquittal as respects this particular charge.' The usage of the Epistle of James does not contradict this—the doctrine of James is that we are justified only by such faith as brings forth good works; "he uses the word exclusively in a judicial sense; he combats a mistaken view of *πίστις*, not a mistaken view of *δικαίω*,"—see James 2: 21, 23, 24, and Cremer, N. T. Lexicon, Eng. trans., 182, 183. The only N. T. passage where this meaning is questionable, is Rev. 22: 11; but here Alford, with *α*, *α* and *β*, reads *δικαιοσύνην ποιησάτω*.

(b) *δικαίωσις*—is the act, in process, of declaring a man just,—that is, acquitted from guilt and restored to the divine favor; (Rom. 4: 25; 5: 18).

(c) *δικαίωμα*—is the act, as already accomplished, of declaring a man just,—that is, no longer exposed to penalty but restored to God's favor; (Rom. 5: 16, 18; cf. 1 Tim. 3: 16). Hence in other connections, *δικαίωμα* has the meaning of statute, legal decision, act of justice; (Luke 1: 6. Rom. 2: 26. Heb. 9: 1).

(d) *δικαιοσύνη*—is the state of one justified or declared just. Rom. 8: 10. 1 Cor. 1: 30. In Rom. 10: 3, Paul inveighs against *τὴν ἰδίαν δικαιοσύνην* as insufficient and false, and in its place would put *τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ δικαιοσύνην*—that is, a *δικαιοσύνη* which God not only requires but provides, which is not only acceptable to God but proceeds from God and is appropriated by faith,—hence called *δικαιοσύνη πίστεως* or *ἐκ πίστεως*. "The primary signification of the word in Paul's writings is therefore that state of the believer which is called forth by God's act of acquittal—the state of the believer as justified," that is, freed from punishment and restored to the divine favor.

See Cremer, N. T. Lexicon, Eng. trans., 174.

Since this state of acquittal is accompanied by changes in the character and conduct, *δικαιωσίνη* comes to mean, secondarily, the moral condition of the believer as resulting from this acquittal and inseparably connected with it; (Rom. 14: 17. 2 Cor. 5: 21). This righteousness arising from justification becomes a principle of action; (Mat. 3: 15. Acts 10: 35. Rom. 6: 13, 18). The term, however, never loses its implication of a justifying act upon which this principle of action is based.

It is worthy of special observation, that, in the passages cited above, the terms 'justify' and 'justification' are contrasted, not with the process of depraving or corrupting, but with the outward act of condemning; and that the expressions used to explain and illustrate them are all derived, not from the inward operation of purifying the soul or infusing into it righteousness, but from the procedure of courts in their judgments, or of offended persons in their forgiveness of offenders. We conclude that these terms, wherever they have reference to the sinner's relation to God, signify a declarative and judicial act of God, external to the sinner, and not an efficient and sovereign act of God changing the sinner's nature and making him subjectively righteous.

On these Scripture terms, see Bp. of Ossory, *Nature and Effects of Faith*, 436-496. Lange, *Com. on Rom. 3: 24*. Buchanan on *Justification*, 226-249. Per contra, see Knox, *Remains*; Newman, *Lectures on Justification*, 68-143.

### 3. *Elements of Justification.*

These are two:—

#### A. Remission of punishment.

God acquits the ungodly who believe in Christ and declares them just. This is not to declare them innocent—that would be a judgment contrary to truth. It is a declaration that the demands of the law have been satisfied with regard to them, and that they are now free from its condemnation; (Rom. 4: 5).

This acquittal, in so far as it is the act of God as judge or executive, administering law, may be denominated pardon; (Mic. 7: 18—Eng. version.) In so far as it is the act of God as a father personally injured and grieved by sin, yet showing grace to the sinner, it is denominated forgiveness; (Ps. 130: 4—Eng. version).

The declaration that the sinner is no longer exposed to the penalty of law, has its ground not in any satisfaction of the law's demand on the part of the sinner himself, but solely in the bearing of the penalty by Christ to whom the sinner is united by faith. Justification, in its first element, therefore, is that act by which God, for the sake of Christ, acquits the transgressor and suffers him to go free.

#### B. Restoration to favor.

Justification is more than remission or acquittal. These would leave the sinner simply in the position of a discharged criminal,—law requires a positive righteousness also. Besides deliverance from punishment, justification im-

plies God's treatment of the sinner as if he were, and had been, personally righteous. The justified person receives not only remission of penalty, but the rewards promised to obedience; (Luke 15: 22-24; Rom. 5: 1, 2. 1 Cor. 1: 30. 2 Cor. 5: 21. Gal. 3: 6. Eph. 2: 7; 3: 12. Phil. 3: 8, 9. Col. 1: 22. Tit. 3: 4-7. Rev. 19: 8).

This restoration to favor, viewed in its aspect as the renewal of a broken friendship, is denominated reconciliation; viewed in its aspect as a renewal of the soul's true relation to God as a father, it is denominated adoption; (John 1: 12. Rom. 5: 11. Gal. 4: 5. Eph. 1: 5. Cf. Rom. 8: 23).

The declaration that the sinner is restored to God's favor, has its ground not in the sinner's personal character or conduct, but solely in the obedience and righteousness of Christ, to whom the sinner is united by faith. Thus Christ's work is the procuring cause of our justification in both its elements. As we are acquitted on account of Christ's suffering of the penalty of the law, so on account of Christ's obedience we receive the rewards of law; (John 20: 31).

Quenstedt, 3: 524. Philippi, Active Obedience of Christ.

#### 4. *Relation of Justification to God's Law and Holiness.*

A. Justification has been shown to be a forensic term. A man may indeed be conceived of as just in either of two senses:—

(a) As just in moral character—that is, absolutely holy in nature, disposition and conduct.

(b) As just in relation to law—or as free from all obligation to suffer penalty, and as entitled to the rewards of obedience.

So too a man may be conceived of as justified, in either of two senses:—

(a) Made just in moral character.

(b) Made just in his relation to law.

But the Scriptures declare that there does not exist on earth a just man in the first of these senses; (Eccl. 7: 20). Even in those who are renewed in moral character and united to Christ, there is a remnant of moral depravity.

If there be any such thing as a just man therefore, he must be just, not in the sense of possessing an unspotted holiness, but in the sense of being delivered from the penalty of law and made partaker of its rewards. If there be any such thing as justification, it must be not an act of God which renders the sinner absolutely holy, but an act of God which declares the sinner to be free from legal penalties and entitled to legal rewards.

B. The difficult feature of justification is the declaration on the part of God, that a sinner whose remaining sinfulness seems to necessitate the vindictive reaction of God's holiness against him, is yet free from such reaction of holiness as is expressed in the penalties of the law.

The fact is to be accepted on the testimony of Scripture. If this testimony be not accepted, there is no deliverance from the condemnation of law. But the difficulty of conceiving of God's declaring the sinner no longer exposed to legal penalty is relieved, if not removed, by the threefold consideration:—

(a) That Christ has endured the penalties of the law in the sinner's stead; (Gal. 3: 13).

(b) That the sinner is so united to Christ, that Christ's life already constitutes the dominating principle within him (Gal. 2: 20); and

(c) That this life of Christ is a power in the soul which will gradually, but infallibly, extirpate all remaining depravity, until the whole physical and moral nature is perfectly conformed to the divine holiness; (Phil. 3: 21; Col. 3: 1-4).

Philippi, Glaubenslehre, V. 1: 201-208.

5. *Relation of Justification to Union with Christ and the Work of the Spirit.*

A. Since the sinner at the moment of justification is not yet completely transformed in character, we have seen that God can declare him just, not on account of what he is in himself, but only on account of what Christ is. The ground of justification is therefore:—

(a) Not, as the Romanists hold, a new righteousness and love infused into us and now constituting our moral character;

(b) Nor, as Oslander taught, the essential righteousness of Christ's divine nature, which has become ours by faith; but

(c) The satisfaction and obedience of Christ, as the head of a new humanity, and as embracing in himself all believers as his members.

As Adam's sin is imputed to us, not because Adam is in us, but because we were in Adam, so Christ's righteousness is imputed to us, not because Christ is in us, but because we are in Christ—that is, joined by faith to one whose righteousness and life are infinitely greater than our power to appropriate or contain. In this sense we may say that we are justified through a Christ outside of us, as we are sanctified through a Christ within us. "The justification of the believer is no other than his being admitted to communion in, or participation of, this head and surety of all believers;" (1 Tim. 3: 16. Acts 13: 39; Rom. 4: 25).

Edwards, Works, 4: 66. Hodge, Outlines, 384-388, 392. Baird, Elohim Revealed, 448.

B. The relation of justification to regeneration and sanctification, moreover, delivers it from the charges of externality and immorality. God does not justify ungodly men in their ungodliness. He pronounces them just, only as they are united to Christ, who is absolutely just, and who, by his Spirit, can make them just, not only in the eye of the law, but in moral character. The very faith by which the sinner receives Christ, is an act in which he ratifies all that Christ has done, and accepts God's judgment against sin as his own; (John 16: 11).

Justification is possible, therefore, because it is always accompanied by regeneration and union with Christ and is followed by sanctification. But this is a very different thing from the Romanist confounding of justification and sanctification, as different stages of the same process of making the

sinner actually holy. It holds fast to the Scripture distinction between justification as a declarative act of God, and regeneration and sanctification as those efficient acts of God by which justification is accompanied and followed.

Girdlestone, O. T. Synonyms, 104, note.

6. *Relation of Justification to Faith.*

A. We are justified by faith, rather than by love or by any other grace:—

(a) Not because faith is itself a work of obedience by which we merit justification,—for this would be a doctrine of justification by works;

(b) Nor because faith is accepted as an equivalent of obedience,—for there is no equivalent except the perfect obedience of Christ;

(c) Nor because faith is the germ from which obedience may spring hereafter,—for it is not the faith which accepts, but the Christ who is accepted, that renders such obedience possible; but

(d) Because faith, and not repentance or love or hope, is the medium or instrument by which we receive Christ and are united to him. Hence we are never said to be justified *διὰ πίστεως*—on account of faith, but only *διὰ πίστεως*—through faith, or *ἐκ πίστεως*—by faith. Or to express the same truth in other words, while the grace of God is the efficient cause of justification, and the obedience and sufferings of Christ are the meritorious or procuring cause, faith is the mediate or instrumental cause. “Faith justifies, because faith includes the whole act of union to Christ as a Savior. It is not the nature of any other graces or virtues directly to close with Christ as a mediator, any further than they enter into the constitution of justifying faith, and do belong to its nature.”

Edwards, Works, 4: 69–73.

B. Since the ground of justification is only Christ, to whom we are united by faith, the justified person has peace. If it were anything in ourselves, our peace must needs be proportioned to our holiness.

The practical effect of the Romanist mingling of works with faith, as a joint ground of justification, is to render all assurance of salvation impossible. (Council of Trent, 9th chap.: “Every man, by reason of his own weakness and defects, must be in fear and anxiety about his state of grace. Nor can any one know with infallible certainty of faith that he has received forgiveness of God.”) But since justification is an instantaneous act of God, complete at the moment of the sinner’s first believing, it has no degrees. Weak faith justifies as perfectly as strong faith, although since justification is a secret act of God, weak faith does not give so strong assurance of salvation.

Foundations of our Faith, 216.

C. Justification is instantaneous, complete and final; instantaneous, since otherwise there would be an interval during which the soul was neither approved nor condemned by God (Mat. 6: 24); complete, since the soul united to Christ by faith, becomes partaker of his complete satisfaction to the demands of law (Col. 2: 10); and final, since this union with Christ is indissoluble; (John 10: 28–30).



As there are many acts of sin in the life of the Christian, so there are many acts of pardon following them. But all these acts of pardon are virtually implied in that first act by which he was finally and forever justified; as also successive acts of repentance and faith after such sins, are virtually implied in that first repentance and faith which logically preceded justification.

Edwards, Works, 4: 104.

7. *Advice to Inquirers demanded by a Scriptural view of Justification.*

A. Where conviction of sin is yet lacking, our aim should be to show the sinner that he is under God's condemnation for his past sins and that no future obedience can ever secure his justification, since this obedience even though perfect, could not atone for the past, and even if it could, he is unable without God's help to render it.

B. Where conviction of sin already exists, our aim should be, not, in the first instance, to secure the performance of external religious duties such as prayer or Scripture-reading or uniting with the church, but to induce the sinner as his first and all-inclusive duty to accept Christ as his only and sufficient sacrifice and Savior, and, committing himself and the matter of his salvation entirely to Christ's hands, to manifest this trust and submission by entering at once upon a life of obedience to Christ's commands.

Edwards, Works, 4: 64-132. Buchanan on Justification, 250-411. Herzog, Encyclopädie, art. : Rechtfertigung. Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk, 3: 193-200. Moehler, Symbolism, 79-190. Newman, Lectures on Justification, 253-345. Owen on Justification, in Works, vol. 5. Ritschl, Christian Doctrine of Justification, 121-226. Bp. of Ossory, Nature and Effects of Faith, 49-152. Hodge, Syst. Theol., 3: 114-212.

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SECTION III.—THE APPLICATION OF CHRIST'S REDEMPTION  
IN ITS CONTINUATION.

Under this head we treat of Sanctification and of Perseverance. These two are but the divine and the human sides of the same fact, and bear to each other a similar relation to that which exists between Regeneration and Conversion.

I. SANCTIFICATION.

1. *Definition of Sanctification.*

Sanctification is that continuous operation of the Holy Spirit, by which the holy disposition imparted in regeneration is strengthened and confirmed.

This definition implies:

A. That although in regeneration the governing disposition of the soul is made holy, there still remain tendencies to evil which are unsubdued; (John 13: 10).

B. That the existence in the believer of these two opposing principles, gives rise to a conflict which lasts through life; (Gal. 5: 17).

C. That in this conflict, the Holy Spirit enables the Christian, through increasing faith, more fully and consciously to appropriate Christ, and thus progressively to make conquest of the remaining sinfulness of his nature. (Rom. 8: 13, 14. 1 Cor. 6: 11).

2. *Explanations and Scripture Proof.*

A. Sanctification is the work of God; (1 Thess. 5: 23. Jude 1).

B. It is a continuous process; (Phil. 1: 6; 3: 15. Col. 3: 9, 10).

C. It is distinguished from regeneration as growth from birth, or as the strengthening of a holy disposition from the original impartation of it; (Eph. 4: 15. 1 Thess. 3: 12. 2 Pet. 3: 18).

D. The operation of God reveals itself in, and is accompanied by, intelligent and voluntary activity of the believer in the discovery and mortification of sinful desires and in the bringing of the whole being into obedience to Christ and conformity to the standards of his word; (John 17: 17. 2 Cor. 10: 5. Phil. 2: 12, 13).

E. The agency through which God effects the sanctification of the believer is the indwelling Spirit of Christ; (John 14: 17, 18; 15: 3-5. Rom. 8: 9, 10; 15: 16. 1 Cor. 1: 2, 30; 6: 19. 2 Cor. 3: 18. Col. 1: 27-29. 2 Tim. 1: 14).

F. The mediate or instrumental cause of sanctification, as of justification, is faith; (Acts 15: 9. Rom. 1: 17).

G. The object of this faith is Christ himself, as the head of a new humanity and the source of truth and life to those united to him; (2 Cor. 3: 18. Eph. 4: 13).

H. Though the weakest faith perfectly justifies, the degree of sanctification is measured by the strength of the Christian's faith and the persistence with which he apprehends Christ in the various relations which the Scriptures declare him to sustain to us; (Matt. 9: 29. Luke 17: 5. Rom. 1: 17; 7: 1; 13: 14. Eph. 4: 24).

I. From the lack of persistence in using the means appointed for Christian growth—such as the word of God, prayer, association with other believers, and personal effort for the conversion of the ungodly—sanctification does not always proceed in regular and unbroken course, and it is never completed in this life; (Phil. 3: 12. 1 John 1: 8).

J. Sanctification both of the soul and of the body of the believer is completed in the life to come—that of the former at death, that of the latter at the resurrection; (Phil. 3: 21. Col. 3: 4. Heb. 12: 23. 1 John 3: 2. Jude 24. Rev. 14: 5).

3. *Erroneous Views refuted by these Scripture Passages.*

A. The Antinomian,—which holds that since Christ's obedience and sufferings have satisfied the demands of the law, the believer is free from obligation to observe it.

To this view we urge the following objections:—

(a) That since the law is a transcript of the holiness of God, its demands as a moral rule are unchanging. Only as a system of penalty and a method of salvation, is the law abolished in Christ's death; (Mat. 5: 17-19. Rom. 10: 4. 2 Cor. 3: 13. Col. 2: 14).

(b) That the union between Christ and the believer secures not only the bearing of the penalty of the law by Christ, but also the impartation of Christ's spirit of obedience to the believer—in other words brings him into communion with Christ's work and leads him to ratify it in his own experience; (Rom. 8: 9, 10. Gal. 5: 24. 1 John 1: 6; 3: 6).

(c) That the freedom from the law of which the Scriptures speak, is therefore simply that freedom from the constraint and bondage of the law, which characterizes those who have become one with Christ by faith; (Rom. 3: 8, 31; 6: 14, 15, 22; 8: 4. Gal. 5: 1).

B. The Perfectionist,—which holds that the Christian may, in this life, become perfectly free from sin.

In reply it will be sufficient to observe:—

(a) That the theory rests upon false conceptions:—

First, of the law—as a sliding-scale of requirement graduated to the moral condition of creatures, instead of being the unchangeable reflection of God's holiness.

Secondly, of sin—as consisting only in voluntary acts, instead of embracing also those dispositions and states of the soul which are not conformed to the divine holiness.

Thirdly, of the human will—as able to choose God supremely and persistently at every moment of life, and to fulfil at every moment the obligations resting upon it, instead of being corrupted and enslaved by the fall.

(b) That the theory finds no support in, but rather is distinctly contradicted by, Scripture.

First, the Scriptures never assert or imply that the Christian may in this life live without sin—passages like 1 John 3: 6, if interpreted consistently with the context, setting forth either the ideal standard of Christian living, or the actual state of the believer so far as respects his new nature.

Secondly, the apostolic admonitions to the Corinthians and Hebrews show that no such state of complete sanctification had been generally attained by the Christians of the first century; (cf. Rom. 8: 24).

Thirdly, there is express record of sin committed by the most perfect characters of Scripture—as Noah, Abraham, Job, David, Peter.

Fourthly, the word *τελειος*, as applied to spiritual conditions already attained, can fairly be held to signify only a relative perfection, equivalent to sincere piety or maturity of Christian judgment; (1 Cor. 2: 6. Phil. 3: 15).

Fifthly, the Scriptures distinctly deny that any man on earth lives without sin; (1 K. 8: 46. 2 Chron. 6: 36. Eccles. 7: 20. 1 John 1: 8).

(c) That the theory is disproved by the testimony of Christian experience.

In exact proportion to the soul's advance in holiness, does it shrink from claiming that holiness has been already attained, and humble itself before God for its remaining apathy, ingratitude and unbelief; (Phil. 3: 12-14).

Perfectionism is best met by proper statements of the nature of the law and of sin. While we thus rebuke spiritual pride, however, we should be equally careful to point out the inseparable connection between justification and sanctification, and their equal importance as together making up the biblical idea of salvation. While we show no favor to those who would make sanctification a sudden and paroxysmal act of the human will, we should hold forth the holiness of God as the standard of attainment, and the faith in a Christ of infinite fulness, as the medium through which that standard is to be gradually but certainly realized in us; (2 Cor. 3: 18).

For statements of the Perfectionist view, see Peck, *Christian Perfection*; Mahan, *Christian Perfection*, and art. in *Biblical Repos.*, 2nd Series, Vol. IV, Oct., 1840: 408-428; Finney, *Systematic Theology*, 586-766. Per contra, see *Princeton Essays*, 1st Series, 335-365; Hodge, *Syst. Theol.*, 3: 213-258; Snodgrass, *Scriptural Doctrine of Sanctification*; Calvin, *Institutes*, III. 11: 6. *Bib. Repos.*, 2nd Series, Vol. I, Jan., 1839: 44-58, and Vol. II, July, 1839: 143-166; Woods, *Works*, 4: 465-523. Van Oosterzee, *Christian Dogmatics*, 657-662. John Owen, *Works*, 3: 366-651; 6: 1-313.

## II. PERSEVERANCE.

The Scriptures declare that in virtue of the original purpose and continuous operation of God, all who are united to Christ by faith will infallibly continue in a state of grace and finally attain to everlasting life. This voluntary continuance on the part of the Christian, in faith and well-doing, we call perseverance.

Perseverance is therefore the human side or aspect of that spiritual process, which, as viewed from the divine side, we call sanctification. It is not a mere natural consequence of conversion, but involves a constant activity of the human will from the moment of conversion to the end of life.

### 1. *Proof of the Doctrine of Perseverance.*

A. From Scripture; (John 10: 28, 29; 17: 11. Rom. 11: 29. 1 Cor. 13: 7—*πάντα ὑπομένει*, cf. 13. Phil. 1: 6. 2 Thess. 3: 3. 2 Tim. 1: 12. 1 Pet. 1: 5. Jude 24. Rev. 3: 10).

## B. From Reason.

(a) It is a necessary inference from other doctrines—such as election, regeneration, union with Christ, justification, sanctification.

(b) It accords with analogy—God's preserving care being needed by, and being granted to, his spiritual, as well as his natural creation.

(c) It is implied in all assurance of salvation—since this assurance is given by the Holy Spirit, and is based not upon the known strength of human resolution, but upon the purpose and operation of God.

2. *Objections to the Doctrine of Perseverance.*

These objections are urged chiefly by Arminians and by Romanists.

A. That it is inconsistent with human freedom. Answer:—It is no more so than is the doctrine of Election or of Decrees.

B. That it tends to immorality. Answer:—This cannot be, since the doctrine declares that God will save men by securing their perseverance in holiness; (1 Pet. 1: 2. 2 Pet. 1: 10).

C. That it leads to indolence. Answer:—This a perversion of the doctrine, continuously possible only to the unregenerate,—since to the regenerate, certainty of success is the strongest incentive to activity in the conflict with sin; (1 John 5: 4).

D. That the Scripture commands to persevere and warnings against apostasy, show that certain, even of the regenerate, will fall away. Answer:—

(a) They show that some, who are apparently regenerate, will fall away; (1 John 2: 19).

(b) They show that the truly regenerate, and those who are only apparently so, are not certainly distinguishable in this life; (Mal. 3: 18. Mat. 14: 25, 47. Rom. 9: 6. Rev. 3: 1).

(c) They show the fearful consequences of rejecting Christ, to those who have enjoyed special divine influences, but who are only apparently regenerate; (Heb. 10: 26).

(d) They show what the fate of the truly regenerate would be, in case they should not persevere; (Heb. 6: 4).

(e) They show that the perseverance of the truly regenerate may be secured by these very commands and warnings; but

(f) They do not show that it is certain or possible that any truly regenerate person will fall away.

E. That we have actual examples of such apostasy. We answer:—

(a) Such are either men once outwardly reformed, like Judas and Annanias, but never renewed in heart; or

(b) They are regenerate men, who, like David and Peter, have fallen into temporary sin, from which they will, before death, be reclaimed by God's discipline.

Edwards, Works, 3: 509-532; 4: 104. Ridgeley, Body of Divinity, 2: 164-194. John Owen, Works, Vol. 11. Woods, Works, 3: 221-246.

Van Oosterzee, Christian Dogmatics, 662-666.

## PART VII.

### ECCLESIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH.

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#### CHAPTER I.

##### THE CONSTITUTION OF THE CHURCH.

###### I. DEFINITION OF THE CHURCH.

The church of Christ, in its largest signification, is the whole company of regenerate persons in all times and ages, in heaven and on earth; (Mat. 16: 18. Eph. 1: 22, 23; 3: 10; 5: 24, 25. Col. 1: 18. Heb. 12: 23). In this sense, the church is identical with the spiritual kingdom of God,—both signify that redeemed humanity, in which God in Christ exercises actual spiritual dominion; (John 3: 3, 5).

Cremer, *Lexicon N. T.*, Eng. trans., 113, 114, 331. Jacob, *Ecc. Polity of N. T.*, 12.

The Scriptures, however, distinguish between this invisible or universal church, and the individual church, in which the universal church takes local and temporal form, and in which the idea of the church as a whole is concretely exhibited.

The individual church may be defined as that smaller company of regenerate persons who in any given community unite themselves voluntarily together in accordance with Christ's laws, for the purpose of securing the complete establishment of his kingdom in themselves and in the world; (Mat. 18: 17. Acts 14: 23. Rom. 16: 5. 1 Cor. 1: 2; 4: 17. 1 Thess. 2: 14).

Besides these two significations of the term church, there are properly in the New Testament no others. The word *ἐκκλησία* is indeed used in Acts 7: 38; 19: 32, 39, 41; Heb. 2: 12, to designate a popular assembly, but since this is a secular use of the term, it does not here concern us. In certain passages, as for example, Acts 9: 31 (*ἐκκλησία*, sing., *ἑκκλησία*), 1 Cor. 12: 28, Phil. 3: 6 and 1 Tim. 3: 15, *ἐκκλησία* appears to be used either as a generic or as a collective term, to denote simply the body of independent local churches existing in a given region or at a given epoch. But since there is no evidence that these churches were bound together in any outward organization, this use of the term *ἐκκλησία* cannot be regarded as adding any new sense to those of "the universal church," and "the local church" already mentioned.

On the meaning of *ἐκκλησία*, see Cremer, *Lex. N. T.*, 329. Trench, *Syn. N. T.*, 1: 18. Girdlestone, *Syn. O. T.*, 367. Curtis, *Progress Baptist Principles*, 301. Dexter, *Congregationalism*, 25. Dagg, *Church Order*, 100-120. Robinson, *N. T. Lexicon*, sub voce.

The prevailing usage of the N. T. gives to the term *ἐκκλησία* the second of these two significations. It is this local church only which has definite and temporal existence, and of this alone we henceforth treat. Our definition of the individual church implies the two following particulars:—

1. *The church, like the family and the state, is an institution of divine appointment.* This is plain :

A. From its relation to the church universal, as its concrete embodiment.

B. From the fact that its necessity is grounded in the social and religious nature of man.

C. From the Scripture—as for example, Christ's command in Matt. 18: 17, and the designation 'church of God', applied to individual churches; (1 Cor. 1: 2).

2. *The church, unlike the family and the state, is a voluntary society.*

A. This results from the fact that the local church is the outward expression of that rational and free life in Christ which characterizes the church as a whole. In this it differs from those other organizations of divine appointment, entrance into which is not optional. Membership in the church is not hereditary or compulsory.

B. The doctrine of the church, as thus defined, is a necessary outgrowth of the doctrine of regeneration. As this fundamental spiritual change is mediated not by outward appliances, but by inward and conscious reception of Christ and his truth, union with the church logically follows, not precedes, the soul's spiritual union with Christ.

## II. ORGANIZATION OF THE CHURCH.

### 1. *The fact of organization.*

That there was organization in the N. T. church, is abundantly shown from its stated meetings (Acts 20: 7. Heb. 10: 25), elections (Acts 1: 23-26; 6: 5, 6), officers (Phil. 1: 1); from the designations of its ministers (Acts 20: 17, 28), together with the recognized authority of the minister and of the church (Mat. 18: 17. 1 Pet. 5: 2); from its discipline (1 Cor. 5: 4, 5, 13), contributions (Rom. 15: 26. 1 Cor. 16: 1, 2), letters of commendation (Acts 18: 27. 2 Cor. 3: 1), registers of widows (1 Tim. 5: 9; cf. Acts 6: 1), uniform customs (1 Cor. 11: 16), ordinances (Acts 2: 41. 1 Cor. 11: 23-26); from the order enjoined and observed (1 Cor. 14: 40. Col. 2: 5), the qualifications for membership (Mat. 28: 19. Acts 2: 47), the common work of the whole body (Phil. 2: 30).

As indicative of a developed organization in the N. T. church, of which only the germ existed before Christ's death, it is important to notice the progress in names from the gospels to the epistles. In the gospels, the word "disciples" is the common designation of Christ's followers, but it is not once found in the epistles. In the epistles, there are only "saints," "brethren," "churches."

A consideration of the facts here referred to is sufficient to evince the unscriptural nature of two modern theories of the church:—

A. The theory that the church is an exclusively spiritual body, destitute of all formal organization, and bound together only by the mutual relation of each believer to his indwelling Lord.

The church, upon this view, so far as outward bonds are concerned, is only an aggregation of isolated units. Those believers who chance to gather at a particular place, or to live at a particular time, constitute the church of that place or time. This view is held by the Friends and by the Plymouth Brethren. It ignores the tendencies to organization inherent in human nature, confounds the visible with the invisible church, and is directly opposed to the Scripture representations of the visible church as comprehending some who are not true believers; (Acts 5: 1-11. Phil. 4: 18; cf. Mat. 13: 47-50).

See quotations in Fish, *Ecclesiology*, 314-316. Per contra, see Plymouth Brethrenism Unveiled, 79-143. Dagg, *Church Order*, 80-83.

B. The theory that the form of church organization is not definitely prescribed in the New Testament, but is a matter of expediency, each body of believers being permitted to adopt that method of organization which best suits its circumstances and condition.

The view under consideration seems in some respects to be favored by Neander, and is often regarded as incidental to his larger conception of church history as a progressive development. But a proper theory of development does not exclude the idea of a church organization already complete in all essential particulars before the close of the inspired canon, so that the record of it may constitute a providential example of binding authority upon all subsequent ages. The view mentioned exaggerates the differences of practice between the N. T. churches, underestimates the need of divine direction as to methods of church union, and admits a principle of 'church powers' which may be historically shown to be subversive of the very existence of the church as a spiritual body.

Neander, *Church History*, 1: 179-190. Hitchcock, in *Presbyterian Review*, 1868: 265.

## 2. *The nature of this organization.*

The nature of any organization may be determined by asking, first: who constitute its members? secondly: for what object has it been formed? and, thirdly: what are the laws which regulate its operations?

Wayland, *Principles and Practices of Baptists*.

A. They only can properly be members of the local church, who have previously become members of the church universal—or, in other words, have become regenerate persons; (Acts 2: 47; 5: 14. 1 Cor. 1: 2). From this limitation of membership to regenerate persons, certain results follow:—



(a) Since each member bears supreme allegiance to Christ, the church as a body must recognize Christ as the only lawgiver. The relation of the individual Christian to the church does not supersede, but furthers and expresses his relation to Christ.

(b) Since each regenerate man recognizes in every other a brother in Christ, the several members are upon a footing of absolute equality; (Mat. 23: 8-10).

(c) Since each local church is directly subject to Christ, there is no jurisdiction of one church over another, but all are on an equal footing and all are independent of interference or control by the civil power.

B. The sole object of the local church is the glory of God, in the complete establishment of his kingdom, both in the hearts of believers and in the world. This object is to be promoted:—

(a) By united worship,—including prayer and religious instruction (Heb. 10: 25);

(b) By mutual watch-care and exhortation (1 Thess. 5: 11. Heb. 3: 13); and

(c) By common labors for the reclamation of the impenitent world; (2 Cor. 8: 5).

C. The law of the church is simply the will of Christ, as expressed in the Scriptures and interpreted by the Holy Spirit. This law respects:—

(a) The qualifications for membership.

These are regeneration and baptism, i. e., spiritual new birth and ritual new birth; the surrender of the inward and of the outward life to Christ; the spiritual entrance into communion with Christ's death and resurrection, and the formal profession of this to the world, by being buried with Christ and rising with him in baptism.

(b) The duties imposed on members.

In discovering the will of Christ from the Scriptures, each member has the right of private judgment, being directly responsible to Christ for his use of the means of knowledge, and for his obedience to Christ's commands when these are known.

Dagg, Church Order, 74-99. Curtis, on Communion, 1-61.

C. *The genesis of this organization.*

(a) The church existed in germ before the day of Pentecost,—otherwise there would have been nothing to which those converted upon that day could have been "added;" (Acts 2: 47). Among the apostles, regenerate as they were, united to Christ by faith and in that faith baptized (Acts 19: 4), under Christ's instruction and engaged in common work for him, there were already the beginnings of organization. There was a treasurer of the body (John 13: 29), and as a body they celebrated for the first time the Lord's Supper (Mat. 26: 26-29). To all intents and purposes they constituted a church,

although the church was not yet fully equipped for its work by the outpouring of the Spirit (Acts 2), and by the appointment of pastors and deacons. The church existed without officers, as in the first days succeeding Pentecost.

Fish, Ecclesiology, 11-14.

(b) That provision for these offices was made gradually as exigencies arose, is natural when we consider that the church immediately after Christ's ascension was under the tutelage of inspired apostles, and was to be prepared by a process of education for independence and self-government. As doctrine was communicated gradually yet infallibly through the oral and written teaching of the apostles, so we are warranted in believing that the church was gradually but infallibly guided to the adoption of Christ's own plan of church organization and of Christian work. The same promise of the Spirit which renders the New Testament an unerring and sufficient rule of faith, renders it also an unerring and sufficient rule of practice for the church in all places and times; (John 16: 12-16. 1 Cor. 14: 37).

On the question how far the apostles, in the organization of the church, availed themselves of the synagogue as a model, see Neander, Planting and Training, 28-34.

(c) Any number of believers may therefore constitute themselves into a Christian church by adopting for their rule of faith and practice Christ's law as laid down in the New Testament, and by associating themselves together, in accordance with it, for his worship and service. It is important, where practicable, that a council of churches be previously called to advise the brethren proposing this union, as to the desirableness of constituting a new and distinct local body, and if it be found desirable, to recognize them, after its formation, as being a church of Christ. But such action of a council, however valuable as affording ground for the fellowship of other churches, is not constitutive, but is simply declaratory, and without such action, the body of believers alluded to, if formed after N. T. example, may be notwithstanding, a true church of Christ. Still further, a band of converts, among the heathen or providentially precluded from access to existing churches, might rightfully appoint one of their number to baptize the rest and then might organize, *de novo*, a New Testament church.

### III. GOVERNMENT OF THE CHURCH.

#### 1. *Nature of this government in general.*

It is evident from the direct relation of each member of the church, and so of the church as a whole, to Christ as sovereign and lawgiver, that the government of the church, so far as regards the source of authority, is an absolute monarchy.

In ascertaining the will of Christ, however, and in applying his commands to providential exigencies, the Holy Spirit enlightens one member through the counsel of another, and as the result of combined deliberation, guides the whole body to right conclusions. This work of the Spirit is the foundation of the Scripture injunctions to unity. This unity, since it is a unity of the Spirit, is not an enforced, but an intelligent and willing unity.

While Christ is sole king, therefore, the government of the church, so far as regards the interpretation and execution of his will by the body, is an absolute democracy, in which the whole body of members is intrusted with the duty and responsibility of carrying out the laws of Christ as expressed in his word.

A. Proof that the government of the church is democratic or congregational.

(a) From the duty of the whole church to preserve unity in its action; (Rom. 12: 16. 1 Cor. 1: 10. 2 Cor. 13: 11. Eph. 4: 3. Phil. 1: 27. 1 Pet. 3: 8).

(b) From the responsibility of the whole church for maintaining pure doctrine and practice; (1 Tim. 3: 15. Jude 3. Rev. 2 and 3).

(c) From the committing of the ordinances to the charge of the whole church to observe and guard. As the church expresses truth in her teaching, so she is to express it in symbol through the ordinances; (Matt. 28: 19; cf. Luke 24: 33 and Acts 1: 15. 1 Cor. 11: 2; cf. 23, 24).

Curtis, Progress of Baptist Principles, 299. Robinson, Harmony of Gospels, Notes, § 170.

(d) From the election, by the whole church, of its own officers and delegates; (Acts 1: 23, 26; 6: 3, 5; 15: 2, 4, 22, 23, 30. 2 Cor. 8: 19. In Acts 14: 23, the literal interpretation of *χειροτονήσαντες* is not to be pressed. In Titus 1: 5, "when Paul empowers Titus to set presiding officers over the communities, this circumstance decides nothing as to the mode of choice, nor is a choice by the community itself thereby necessarily excluded").

Neander, Church History, 1: 189. Guericke, Church History, 1: 110.

Dexter, Congregationalism, 138. On Acts 14: 23, see Commentaries of Barnes, Alexander, Hackett. Baumgarten, Apostolic History, 1: 456.

(e) From the power of the whole church to exercise discipline; (Matt. 18: 17. 1 Cor. 5: 3—5, 13. 2 Cor. 2: 6, 7; 7: 11. 2 Thess. 3: 6, 14, 15). Passages which show the right of the whole body to exclude, show also the right of the whole body to admit members.

Coleman, Manual on Prelacy and Ritualism, 87—125.

B. Erroneous views as to church government refuted by the foregoing passages.

(a) The world-church theory, or the Romanist view.

This holds that all local churches are subject to the supreme authority of the bishop of Rome, as the successor of Peter and the infallible vicegerent of Christ, and as thus united, constitute the one and only church of Christ on earth. We reply:—

First,—Christ gave no such supreme authority to Peter. Matt. 16: 18 simply refers to the personal position of Peter as first confessor of Christ and preacher of his name to Jews and Gentiles. Hence other apostles also constituted the foundation; (Eph. 2: 20. Rev. 21: 14). On one occasion

the counsel of James was regarded as of equal weight with that of Peter (Acts 15: 7-30), while on another occasion Peter was rebuked by Paul (Gal. 2: 11), and Peter calls himself only a fellow-elder; (1 Pet. 5: 1).

Secondly,—If Peter had such authority given him, there is no evidence that he had power to transmit it to others.

Thirdly,—There is no conclusive evidence that Peter ever was at Rome, much less that he was bishop of Rome.

Fourthly,—There is no evidence that he really did so appoint the bishops of Rome as his successors.

Fifthly,—If he did so appoint the bishops of Rome, the evidence of continuous succession since that time is lacking.

Sixthly,—There is abundant evidence that a hierarchical form of church government is corrupting to the church and dishonoring to Christ.

Coleman, *Manual on Prelacy and Ritualism*, 265-274. Park, in *Bib. Sac.*, 2: 451.

(b) The national-church theory, or the theory of provincial or national churches.

This holds that all members of the church in any province or nation are bound together in provincial or national organization, and that this organization has jurisdiction over the local churches. We reply:—

First,—The theory has no support in the Scriptures. There is no evidence that the word *ἐκκλησία* in the New Testament ever means a national church organization. 1 Cor. 12: 28, Phil. 3: 6, and 1 Tim. 3: 15, may be more naturally interpreted as referring to the generic church. In Acts 9: 31, *ἐκκλησία* is a mere generalization for the local churches then and there existing, and implies no sort of organization among them.

Jacob, *Ecclesiastical Polity of the N. T.*, 9.

Progress to episcopacy is thus described by Lightfoot:—"In the time of Ignatius, the bishop, then *primus inter pares*, was regarded only as a centre of unity; in the time of Irenæus, as a depositary of primitive truth; in the time of Cyprian, as absolute vicegerent of Christ in things spiritual."

Lightfoot on *Christian Ministry*, in Appendix to *Com. on Philippians*, 179-267.

Secondly,—It is contradicted by the intercourse which the New Testament churches held with each other as independent bodies,—for example, at the council of Jerusalem; (Acts 15).

Thirdly,—It has no practical advantages over the Congregational polity, but rather tends to formality, division, and the extinction of the principles of self-government and direct responsibility to Christ.

Jacob, *Ecc. Polity of N. T.*, 130. Dexter, *Congregationalism*, 236.

Fourthly,—It is inconsistent with itself, in binding a professedly spiritual church by formal and geographical lines.

Fifthly,—It logically leads to the theory of Romanism. If two churches need a superior authority to control them and settle their differences, then two countries and two hemispheres need a common ecclesiastical government,—and a world-church, under one visible head, is Romanism.

Coleman, *Manual on Prelacy and Ritualism*, 128–264.

## 2. *Officers of the Church.*

A. The number of offices in the church is two:—

(a) The office of bishop, presbyter or pastor.

(b) The office of deacon.

Dexter, *Congregationalism*, 77–98. Dagg, *Church Order*, 241–266.

That the appellations bishop, presbyter, and pastor designate the same office and order of persons, may be shown from Acts 20: 28—*ἐπισκόπους ποιμαίνειν*, cf. 17—*πρεσβυτέρους*. Phil. 1: 1. 1 Tim. 3: 1, 8. Titus 1: 5, 7. 1 Pet. 5: 1, 2—*πρεσβυτέρος . . . παρακαλῶ ὁ συμπρεσβύτερος . . . ποιμάνετε πόλιμον . . . ἐπισκοποῦντες*.

Conybeare and Howson: “The terms bishop and elder are used in the New Testament as equivalent,—the former denoting (as its meaning of overseer implies) the duties, the latter the rank, of the office.” See passages quoted in Giessler, *Church History*, 1: 90, note 1—as for example, Jerome: “*Apud veteres iidem episcopi et presbyteri, quia illud nomen dignitatis est, hoc aetatis. Idem est ergo presbyter qui episcopus.*”

The only plausible objection to the identity of the presbyter and the bishop, is that first suggested by Calvin, on the ground of 1 Tim. 5: 17. But this text only shows that the one office of presbyter or bishop involved two kinds of labor, and that certain presbyters or bishops were more successful in one kind than in the other. That gifts of teaching and ruling belonged to the same individual, is clear from Acts 20: 28–31; Heb. 13: 7; 1 Tim. 3: 2—*ἐπίσκοπον διδασκικόν*.

Dexter, *Congregationalism*, 114. Jacob, *Ecl. Polity of N. T.*, 56.

Olshausen, on 1 Tim. 5: 17. Wilson, *Primitive Government of Christian Churches*. Hackett, on Acts 14: 23.

In certain of the N. T. churches, there appears to have been a plurality of elders; (Acts 20: 17. Phil. 1: 1. Tit. 1: 5). There is, however, no evidence that the number of these was uniform, or that the plurality which frequently existed was due to any other cause than the size of the churches for which these elders cared. The N. T. example, while it permits the multiplication of assistant pastors according to need, does not require a plural eldership in every case, nor does it render this eldership, where it exists, of coördinate authority with the church.

Per contra, see Fish, *Ecclesiology*, 229–249.

B. The duties belonging to these offices.

(a) The pastor, bishop, or elder is,—first, a spiritual teacher, in public and private (Acts 20: 35. 1 Thess. 5: 12. Heb. 13: 7, 17); secondly,—adminis-

trator of the ordinances (Matt. 28: 19. 1 Cor. 1: 16); thirdly,—superintendent of the discipline (1 Tim. 5: 17, and 3: 5), as well as presiding officer at meetings of the church.

Dexter, Congregationalism, 155, 157. Samson, in Madison Avenue Lectures, 261–288. Jacob, Eccl. Polity of N. T., 99. Wayland, Apostolic Ministry.

(b) The deacon is helper to the pastor and the church, in both spiritual and temporal things; first,—relieving the pastor of external labors, informing him of the condition and wants of the church, and forming a bond of union between pastor and people; and secondly,—helping the church by relieving the poor and sick, and ministering in an informal way to the church's spiritual needs, as well as performing certain external duties connected with the service of the sanctuary; (Acts 6: 1–4—*διακονεῖν τραπεζαίαις*. Cf. 8–10; Rom. 16: 1; 1 Cor. 12: 28—*ἀντιλήψεις*).

See Robinson, N. T. Lexicon, *ἀντιλήψεις*. Dexter, Congregationalism, 69, 132. Baptist Quarterly, 1869: 40. Williams, The Deaconship.

### C. Ordination of officers.

#### (a) What is ordination?

Ordination is the setting apart of a person divinely called to a work of special ministration in the church. It does not involve the communication of power—it is simply a recognition of powers previously conferred by God, and a consequent formal authorization, on the part of the church, to exercise the gifts already bestowed. This recognition and authorization may be expressed simply in the vote in which the candidate is chosen to his office, or may be accompanied by a special service of admonition, prayer and the laying-on of hands.

Licensure simply commends a man to the churches as fitted to preach. Ordination recognizes him as set apart to the work of preaching and administering ordinances, in some particular church or in some designated field of labor, as representative of the church.

Of his call to the ministry, the candidate himself is to be first persuaded; (1 Cor. 9: 16. 1 Tim. 1: 12); but, secondly, the church must be persuaded also, before he can have authority to minister among them; (1 Tim. 3: 2–7; 4: 14. Titus 1: 6–9).

Ordination is the act of the church, not the act of a privileged class in the church, as the eldership has sometimes wrongly been regarded, nor yet the act of other churches, assembled by their representatives in council. No ecclesiastical authority higher than that of the local church is recognized in the New Testament. This authority however has its limits, and since the church has no authority outside of its own body, the candidate for ordination should be a member of the ordaining church.

#### (b) Who are to ordain?

Since each church is bound to recognize the presence of the Spirit in other rightly constituted churches, and its own decisions, in like manner, are to be recognized by others, it is desirable, in ordination, as in all important steps affecting other churches, that advice be taken before the candidate is in-

ducted into office, and that other churches be called to sit with it in council, and if thought best, assist in setting the candidate apart for the ministry.

It is always to be remembered, however, that the power to ordain rests with the church, and that the church may proceed without a council, or even against the decision of the council. Such ordination, of course, would give authority only within the bounds of the individual church. Where no immediate exception is taken to the decision of the council, that decision is to be regarded as virtually the decision of the church by which it was called.

In so far as ordination is an act performed by the local church with the advice and assistance of other rightly constituted churches, it is justly regarded as giving formal permission to exercise gifts and administer ordinances within the bounds of such churches. Ordination is not therefore to be repeated upon the transfer of the minister's pastoral relation from one church to another. In every case, however, where a minister from a body of Christians not scripturally constituted, assumes the pastoral relation in a rightly organized church, there is peculiar propriety in that act of formal recognition and authorization which is called ordination.

Wayland, *Principles and Practices of Baptists*, 114. Dexter, *Congregationalism*, 136, 145, 146, 150, 151. Per contra, see Fish, *Ecclesiology*, 365-399.

### 3. *Discipline of the Church.*

#### A. Kinds of discipline.

Discipline is of two sorts, according as offences are private or public.

(a) Private offences are to be dealt with according to the rule in Matt. 18: 15-17.

(b) Public offences are to be dealt with according to the rule in 1 Cor. 5: 4, 5, 13, and 2 Thess. 3: 6.

#### B. Relation of the pastor to discipline.

(a) He has no original authority,

(b) But is the organ of the church, and

(c) Superintendent of its labors for its own purification and for the reclamation of offenders; and therefore

(d) May best do the work of discipline, not directly, by constituting himself a special policeman or detective, but indirectly, by securing proper labor on the part of the deacons or brethren of the church.

A more full discussion of this subject is relegated to the department of Pastoral Theology.

Savage, *Church Discipline, Formative and Corrective*. Dagg, *Church Order*, 268-274.

## IV. RELATION OF LOCAL CHURCHES TO EACH OTHER.

1. *The general nature of this relation is that of fellowship between equals.* Notice here:—

A. The absolute equality of the churches.

No church or council of churches, no association or convention or society, can relieve any single church of its direct responsibility to Christ, or assume control of its action.

B. The fraternal fellowship and coöperation of the churches.

No church can properly ignore or disregard the existence or work of other churches around it. Every other church is presumptively possessed of the Spirit in equal measure with itself. There must therefore be sympathy and mutual furtherance of each other's welfare, among churches, as among individual Christians. Upon this principle are based letters of dismission, recognition of the pastors of other churches, and all associational unions or other unions for common Christian work.

2. *This fellowship involves the duty of special consultation with regard to matters affecting the common interest.*

A. The duty of seeking advice.

Since the order and good repute of each is valuable to all others, cases of grave importance and difficulty in internal discipline, as well as the question of ordaining members to the ministry, should be submitted to a council of churches called for the purpose.

B. The duty of taking advice.

For the same reason, each church should show readiness to receive admonition from others. So long as this is in the nature of friendly reminder that the church is guilty of defects from the doctrine or practice enjoined by Christ, the mutual acceptance of whose commands is the basis of all church fellowship, no church can justly refuse to have such defects pointed out, or to consider the scripturalness of its own proceeding.

Such admonition or advice, however, coming from a single church or from a council of churches, is not of itself of binding authority. It is simply in the nature of moral suasion. The church receiving it, has still to compare it with Christ's laws. The ultimate decision rests entirely with the church so advised, or asking advice.

3. *This fellowship may be broken by manifest departures from the faith or practice of the Scriptures, on the part of any church.*

In such case, duty to Christ requires the churches whose labors to reclaim a sister church from error have proved unavailing, to withdraw their fellowship from it, until such time as the erring church shall return to the path of duty. In this regard, the law which applies to individuals applies to churches, and the polity of New Testament is Congregational rather than Independent.

Dexter, Congregationalism, 2, 3, 61-64. Davidson, Eccl. Polity of the N. T. On the general subject of the church, see Hodge, Essays, 201; The Church,—a collection of essays by Luthardt, Kahnis, etc. Hooker, Ecclesiastical Polity. Flint, Christ's Kingdom on Earth, 53-82.



## CHAPTER II.

### THE ORDINANCES OF THE CHURCH.

By the ordinances we mean those outward rites which Christ has appointed to be administered in his church as visible signs of the saving truth of the gospel. They are signs, in that they vividly express this truth and confirm it to the believer.

In contrast with this characteristically Protestant view, the Romanist regards the ordinances as actually conferring grace and producing holiness. Instead of being the external manifestation of a preceding union with Christ, they are the physical means of constituting and maintaining this union. With the Romanist in this particular, sacramentalists of every name substantially agree.

The Papal church holds to seven sacraments or ordinances:—ordination, confirmation, matrimony, extreme unction, penance, baptism and the eucharist. The ordinances prescribed in the N. T., however, are two and only two, viz:—Baptism and the Lord's Supper.

#### I. BAPTISM.

Christian Baptism is the immersion of a believer in water in token of his previous entrance into the communion of Christ's death and resurrection—or in other words, in token of his regeneration through union with Christ.

##### 1. *Baptism an Ordinance of Christ.*

A. Proof that Christ instituted an external rite called baptism.

(a) From the words of the great commission; (Mat. 28: 19. Mark 16: 16).

(b) From the injunctions of the apostles; (Acts 2: 38).

(c) From the fact that the members of the New Testament churches were baptized believers; (Rom. 6: 3-5. Col. 2: 11, 12).

(d) From the universal practice of such a rite in Christian churches of subsequent times.

B. This external rite intended by Christ to be of universal and perpetual obligation.

(a) Christ recognized John the Baptist's commission to baptize as derived immediately from heaven; (Mat. 21: 25; cf. John 1: 19-28). There is no evidence that proselyte baptism existed among the Jews before the time of John.

See Schneckenburger, *Proselytentaufe*. Stuart, in *Bib. Repos.*, 1833: 338-355. Toy, in *Baptist Quarterly*, July 1872: 301-332.

(b) In his own submission to John's baptism, Christ gave testimony to the binding obligation of the ordinance; (Mat. 3: 13-17). John's baptism was essentially Christian baptism (Acts 19: 4), although the full significance of it was not understood until after Jesus' death and resurrection; (Mat. 20: 17-23. Luke 12: 50. Rom. 6: 3-6).

Versus Robert Hall, Works, 1: 367-399.

(c) In continuing the practice of baptism, through his disciples (John 4: 1, 2), and in enjoining it upon them as part of a work which was to last to the end of the world (Mat. 28: 19, 20), Christ manifestly adopted and appointed baptism as the invariable law of his church.

(d) The analogy of the ordinance of the Lord's supper also leads to the conclusion that baptism is to be observed, as an authoritative memorial of Christ and his truth, until his second coming; (1 Cor. 11: 26).

(e) There is no intimation whatever that the command of baptism is limited or to be limited in its application—that it has been or ever is to be repealed; and until some evidence of such limitation or repeal is produced, the statute must be regarded as universally binding.

Pepper, in *Madison Avenue Lectures*, 85-114. Dagg, *Church Order*, 9-21.

## 2. *The Mode of Baptism.*

This is immersion and immersion only. This appears from the following considerations:—

A. The command to baptize is a command to immerse. We show this:—

(a) From the meaning of the original word βαπτίζω. That this is to immerse, appears:—

First,—from the usage of Greek writers—including the church fathers, when they do not speak of the Christian rite, and the authors of the Greek version of the Old Testament.

Stuart, in *Bib. Repos.*, 1833: 313. *Greek Lexicons of Liddell and Scott*, and *Sophocles*, sub voce. Conant, *Appendix to Bible Union version of Matthew*, 1-64. Broadus on *Immersion*, 57, note.

Secondly,—every passage where the word occurs in the New Testament either requires or allows the meaning 'immerse;' (Mat. 3: 6-11; cf. 2 Kings 5: 14. Mark 1: 5, 9; 7: 3, 4. Luke 11: 38; cf. Sirac 31: 25, and Judith 12: 7. Acts 2: 41; 16: 33).

Cremer, *N. T. Lexicon*, sub voce. Ingham, *Handbook of Baptism*, 373. Watson, quoted in *Annot. Par. Bible*, 1126. Samson, on *Water-supply of Jerusalem*, pub. by Am. Bap. Pub. Soc. Curtis, *Prog. of Bap. Prin.*, 160, 161. On Scripture passages, see *Com. of Meyer*.

Thirdly,—the absence of any use of the word in the passive voice with 'water' as its subject, confirms our conclusion that its meaning is "to immerse." Water is never said to be baptized upon a man.

(b) From the use of the verb βαπτίζω with prepositions:—

First,—with εἰς; (Mark 1: 9—where Ἰορδάνην is the element into which the person passes in the act of being baptized).

Secondly,—with *ἐν*; (Mark 1: 5, 8; cf. Matt. 3: 11. John 1: 26, 31, 33; cf. Acts 2: 2, 4). In these texts, *ἐν* is to be taken, not instrumentally, but as indicating the element in which the immersion takes place.

See Meyer, Com. on Mat. 3: 11.

(c) From circumstances attending the administration of the ordinance; (Mark 1: 10—*ἀναβαίνων ἐκ τοῦ ἕδατος*—Tischendorf and Tregelles. John 3: 23—*ἵδματα πολλὰ*. Acts 8: 38, 39—*κατέβησαν εἰς τὸ ἕδωρ*—*ἀνέβησαν ἐκ τοῦ ἕδατος*).

(d) From figurative allusions to the ordinance; (Mark 10: 38. Luke 12: 50. Rom. 6: 4. 1 Cor. 10: 2. Col. 2: 12. Heb. 10: 22. 1 Pet. 3: 20, 21).

Trench, N. T. Syn., 216, 217. Conybeare and Howson, on Rom. 6: 3.

(e) From the testimony of church history as to the practice of the early church.

Coleman, Christ. Antiq., 275. Stuart, in Bib. Repos., 1833: 355–363. Neander, Church Hist., 1: 310.

(f) From the doctrine and practice of the Greek church.

Broadus on Immersion, 18. De Stourdza, quoted in Conant on Mat., appendix, 99.

The prevailing usage of any word determines the sense it bears when found in a command of Christ. We have seen, not only that the prevailing usage of the Greek language determines the meaning of the word baptize to be ‘immerse,’ but that this is its fundamental, constant and only meaning. The original command to baptize is therefore a command to immerse.

For the view that sprinkling or pouring constitutes valid baptism, see Hall, Mode of Baptism; and especially Dale, Classic, Judaic, Christic and Patristic Baptism. Per contra, see Review of Dale, by Kendrick, in Baptist Quarterly, 1869: 129. Also Hovey, in Baptist Quarterly, April, 1875, and Wayland, Principles and Practices of Baptists, 85. Carson, Noel, Judson and Pengilly, on Baptism.

B. No church has the right to modify or dispense with this command of Christ. This is plain:—

(a) From the nature of the church. Notice:—

First,—that besides the local church, no other visible church of Christ is known to the New Testament.

Secondly,—that the local church is not a legislative, but is simply an executive body. Only the authority which originally imposed its laws, can amend or abrogate them.

Thirdly,—that the local church cannot delegate to any organization or council of churches any power which it does not itself rightfully possess.

Fourthly,—that the opposite principle puts the church above the Scriptures and above Christ, and would sanction all the usurpations of Rome.

(b) From the nature of the command:—

First,—as forming a part, not only of the law, but of the fundamental law, of the church of Christ. The power claimed for a church to change it, is not only legislative but constitutional.

Secondly,—as expressing the wisdom of the Lawgiver. Power to change the command can be claimed for the church, only on the ground that Christ has failed to adapt the ordinance to changing circumstances, and has made obedience to it unnecessarily difficult and humiliating.

Thirdly,—as providing in immersion the only adequate symbol of those saving truths of the gospel, which both of the ordinances have it for their office to set forth, and without which they become empty ceremonies and forms. In other words, the church has no right to change the method of administering the ordinance, because such a change vacates the ordinance of its essential meaning. As this argument, however, is of such vital importance, we present it more fully, in a special discussion of the Symbolism of Baptism.

For advocacy of the church's right to modify the form of an ordinance, see Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, in *Works*, 1: 333-849. Per contra, see Curtis, *Progress of Baptist Principles*, 234-245.

### 3. *The Symbolism of Baptism.*

Baptism symbolizes the previous entrance of the believer into the communion of Christ's death and resurrection—or in other words, regeneration through union with Christ; (Rom. 6: 2-6. Gal. 3: 27. Col. 2: 12. 1 Pet. 3: 21. Cf. Mat. 3: 16; Luke 12: 50; John 3: 5; Rom. 7: 4; 8: 17; Gal. 2: 19, 20; Phil. 3: 10; Col. 3: 1, 3; 2 Tim. 2: 11).

Boardman, in *Madison Avenue Lectures*, 115-135.

A. Expansion of this statement as to the symbolism of baptism. These passages show that baptism is a symbol:—

- (a) Of the death and resurrection of Christ.
- (b) Of the purpose of that death and resurrection—namely, to atone for sin and to deliver sinners from its penalty and power.
- (c) Of the accomplishment of that purpose in the person baptized—who thus professes his death to sin and resurrection to spiritual life.
- (d) Of the method in which that purpose is accomplished,—by union with Christ, receiving him, and giving one's self to him by faith.
- (e) Of the death and resurrection of the body—which will complete the work of Christ in us, and which Christ's death and resurrection assure to all his members; (Rom. 6: 5—*σύνσφύτοι*).

Calvin, on Acts 8: 38. Conybeare and Howson, on Rom. 6: 4.

B. Inferences from the passages referred to:—

- (a) The central truth set forth by baptism is the death and resurrection of Christ—and our own death and resurrection only as connected with that.
- (b) The correlative truth of the believer's death and resurrection, set forth in baptism, implies:—

First,—confession of sin and humiliation on account of it, as deserving of death.

Secondly,—declaration of Christ's death for sin and of the believer's acceptance of Christ's substitutionary work.

Thirdly,—acknowledgment that the soul has become partaker of Christ's life, and now lives only in and for him.

(c) Baptism symbolizes purification, but purification in a peculiar and divine way—namely, through the death of Christ and the entrance of the soul into communion with that death. The radical defect of sprinkling or pouring, as a mode of administering the ordinance, is that it does not point to Christ's death as the procuring cause of our purification.

(d) In baptism, we show forth the Lord's death as the original source of holiness and life in our souls, just as in the Lord's Supper we show forth the Lord's death as the source of all nourishment and strength, after this life of holiness has been once begun. As the Lord's Supper symbolizes the sanctifying power of Jesus' death, so baptism symbolizes its regenerating power.

(e) There are two reasons, therefore, why nothing but immersion will satisfy the design of the ordinance:—

First,—because nothing else can symbolize the radical nature of the change effected in regeneration—a change from spiritual death to spiritual life.

Secondly,—because nothing else can set forth the fact that this change is due to the entrance of the soul into communion with the death and resurrection of Christ.

(f) To substitute anything for baptism, which excludes all symbolic reference to the death of Christ, is to destroy the ordinance, just as substituting for the broken bread and poured out wine of the communion, some form of administration which leaves out all reference to the death of Christ, would be to destroy the Lord's Supper and to celebrate an ordinance of human invention.

See Ebrard's view of Baptism, in *Baptist Quarterly*, 1869: 257, and in *Olshausen's Com. on N. T.*, 1: 270; 3: 594.

#### 4. *The Subjects of Baptism.*

The proper subjects of baptism are those only who give credible evidence that they have been regenerated by the Holy Spirit—or, in other words, have entered by faith into the communion of Christ's death and resurrection.

Robins, in *Madison Avenue Lectures*, 136-159.

A. Proof that only persons giving evidence of being regenerated are proper subjects of baptism:—

(a) From the command and example of Christ and his apostles.

First,—those only are to be baptized, who have previously been made disciples (Mat. 28: 19—*μαθητεύσατε*. Acts 2: 41).

Secondly,—those only are to be baptized, who have previously repented and believed; (Mat. 3: 1, 2, 5, 6. Acts 2: 37, 38; 8: 12; 18: 8; 19: 4).

(b) From the nature of the church—as a company of regenerate persons; (John 3: 5. Rom. 6: 13).

(c) From the symbolism of the ordinance—as declaring a previous spiritual change in him who submits to it; (Acts 10: 48. Rom. 6: 2–5.).

Wayland, Principles and Practices of Baptists, 93.

B. Inferences from the fact that only persons giving evidence of being regenerate are proper subjects of baptism:—

(a) Since only those who give credible evidence of regeneration are proper subjects of baptism, baptism cannot be the means of regeneration. It is the appointed sign, but is never the condition, of the forgiveness of sins.

Passages like Mat. 3: 11, Mark 1: 4, 16: 16, John 3: 5, Acts 2: 38; 22: 16, Eph. 5: 26, Titus 3: 5, 6 and Heb. 10: 22, 23, are to be explained as particular instances “of the general fact that, in Scripture language, a single part of a complex action, and even that part of it which is most obvious to the senses, is often mentioned for the whole of it, and thus, in this case, the whole of the solemn transaction is designated by the external symbol.” In other words, the entire change internal and external, spiritual and ritual, is referred to in language belonging strictly only to the outward aspect of it. So the other ordinance is referred to by simply naming the visible “breaking of bread,” and the whole transaction of the ordination of ministers is termed the “imposition of hands;” (Acts 2: 42. 1 Tim. 4: 14).

Jacob, Eccl. Polity of N. T., 255, 256. Bap. Quarterly, 1872: 214.

On F. W. Robertson's view of Baptismal Regeneration, see Gordon, in Bap. Quarterly, 1869: 405.

(b) As the profession of a spiritual change already wrought, baptism is primarily the act, not of the administrator, but of the person baptized.

Upon the person newly regenerate, the command of Christ first terminates,—only upon his giving evidence of the change within him, does it become the duty of the church to see that he has opportunity to follow Christ in baptism. Since baptism is primarily the act of the convert, no lack of qualification on the part of the administrator invalidates the baptism, so long as the proper outward act is performed, with intent on the part of the person baptized to express the fact of a preceding spiritual renewal; (Acts 2: 37, 38).

(c) As intrusted with the administration of the ordinances, however, the church is on its part to require of all candidates for baptism, credible evidence of regeneration.

This follows from the nature of the church and its duty to maintain its own existence as an institution of Christ. The church which cannot restrict admission to its membership to such as are like itself in character and aims, must soon cease to be a church, by becoming indistinguishable from the world. The duty of the church to gain credible evidence of regeneration in the case of every person admitted to the body, involves its right to require of candidates, in addition to a profession of faith with the lips, some satisfactory proof that this profession is accompanied by change in the conduct. The kind and amount of evidence which would have justified the reception of a candidate in times of persecution, may not now constitute a sufficient proof of change of heart.

(d) As the outward expression of the inward change by which the believer enters into the kingdom of God, baptism is the first, in point of time, of all outward duties.

Regeneration and baptism, although not holding to each other the relation of effect and cause, are both regarded in the New Testament as essential to the restoration of man's right relations to God and to his people. They properly constitute parts of one whole, and are not to be unnecessarily separated. Baptism should follow regeneration with the least possible delay, after the candidate and the church have gained evidence that a spiritual change has been accomplished within him. No other duty and no other ordinance can properly precede it.

(e) Since regeneration is a work accomplished once for all, the baptism which symbolizes this regeneration is not to be repeated.

Even where the persuasion exists on the part of the candidate, that at the time of baptism he was mistaken in thinking himself regenerated, the ordinance is not to be administered again, so long as it has once been submitted to, with honest intent, as a profession of faith in Christ. We argue this from the absence of any reference to second baptisms in the New Testament, and from the grave practical difficulties attending the opposite view. In Acts 19: 1-5, we have an instance, not of rebaptism, but of the baptism for the first time of certain persons who had been wrongly taught with regard to the nature of John the Baptist's doctrine, and so had ignorantly submitted to an outward rite which had in it no reference to Jesus Christ and expressed no faith in him as a Savior. This was not John's baptism, nor was it in any sense true baptism. For this reason Paul commanded them to be "baptized in the name of the Lord Jesus."

Brooks, in Baptist Quarterly, Apr., 1867, art.: Rebaptism.

(f) So long as the mode and the subjects are such as Christ has enjoined, mere accessories are matters of individual judgment.

The use of natural rather than of artificial baptisteries is not to be elevated into an essential. The formula of baptism prescribed by Christ is not "into the name of the Father, and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost," as Wayland maintained, but rather "in the name, etc.," as in Mat. 10: 41; 18: 20.

Conant, Notes on Mat., 171. Dagg, Church Order, 13-73. Ingham, Subjects of Baptism.

### C. Infant Baptism.

This we reject and reprehend for the following reasons:—

(a) Infant baptism is without warrant, either express or implied, in the Scriptures.

First,—there is no express command that infants should be baptized.

Secondly,—there is no clear example of the baptism of infants.

Thirdly,—the passages held to imply infant baptism, contain, when fairly interpreted, no reference to such a practice. In Matt. 19: 14, none would have 'forbidden,' if Jesus and his disciples had been in the habit of baptiz-

ing infants. From Acts 16:15; cf. 40, and Acts 16:33; cf. 34, Neander says that we cannot infer infant baptism. For 1 Cor. 16:15 shows that the whole family of Stephanas, baptized by Paul, were adults; (1 Cor. 1:16). It is impossible to suppose a whole heathen household baptized upon the faith of its head. As to 1 Cor. 7:14, Jacobi calls this text "a sure testimony against infant baptism, since Paul would certainly have referred to the baptism of children as a proof of their holiness, if infant baptism had been practised." Moreover, this passage would, in that case, equally teach the baptism of the unconverted husband of a believing wife. It plainly proves that the children of Christian parents were no more baptized, and had no closer connection with the Christian church, than the unbelieving partners of Christians.

Kendrick, in *Christian Review*, Apr., 1863. Neander's view, in *Kitto*, *Bib. Cyclopædia*, art.: Baptism. Curtis, *Prog. of Bap. Prin.*, 96. Wayland, *Principles and Practices of Baptists*, 125. Jacob, *Ecl. Polity of N. T.*, 270-275.

(b) Infant baptism is expressly contradicted:—

First,—by the Scriptural prerequisites of faith and repentance, as signs of regeneration. In the great commission, Matthew speaks of baptizing disciples, and Mark of baptizing believers, but infants are neither of these.

Secondly,—by the Scriptural symbolism of the ordinance. As we should not bury a person before his death, so we should not symbolically bury a person by baptism, until he has in spirit died to sin.

Thirdly,—by the Scriptural constitution of the church. The church is a company of persons whose union with one another presupposes and expresses a previous conscious and voluntary union of each with Jesus Christ. But of this conscious and voluntary union with Christ, infants are not capable.

Fourthly,—by the Scriptural prerequisites for participation in the Lord's supper. Participation in the Lord's supper is the right only of those who can "discern the the Lord's body;" (1 Cor. 11:29). No reason can be assigned for restricting to intelligent communicants the ordinance of the supper, which would not equally restrict to intelligent believers the ordinance of baptism.

(c) The rise of infant baptism in the history of the church is due to sacramental conceptions of Christianity, so that all arguments in its favor from the writings of the first three centuries are equally arguments for baptismal regeneration.

*Christian Review*, Jan., 1851. Neander, *Church Hist.*, 1: 311, 313. Coleman, *Christian Antiquities*, 258-260. Arnold, in *Baptist Quarterly*, 1869: 32. Hovey, in *Baptist Quarterly*, 1871: 75.

(d) The reasoning by which it is supported is unscriptural, unsound and dangerous in its tendency.

First,—in assuming the power of the church to modify or abrogate a command of Christ. This has been sufficiently answered above.

Secondly,—in maintaining that infant baptism takes the place of circumcision under the Abrahamic covenant. To this we reply that the view



contradicts the New Testament idea of the church, by making it a hereditary body, in which fleshly birth, and not the new birth, qualifies for membership. "As the national Israel typified the spiritual Israel, so the circumcision which immediately followed, not preceded, natural birth, bids us baptize children, not before, but after spiritual birth."

Pepper, in *Baptist Quarterly*, April, 1867. Palmer, in *Baptist Quarterly*, 1871: 314.

Thirdly,—in declaring that baptism belongs to the infant because of an organic connection of the child with the parent, which permits the latter to stand for the former and to make profession of faith for it—faith already existing germinally in the child by virtue of this organic union, and certain for this same reason to be developed as the child grows to maturity. "A law of organic connection as regards character subsisting between the parent and the child—such a connection as induces the conviction that the character of the one is actually included in the character of the other, as the seed is formed in the capsule."

See this view elaborated in Bushnell, *Christian Nurture*, 90–223.

We object to this view that it unwarrantably confounds the personality of the child with that of the parent; practically ignores the necessity of the Holy Spirit's regenerating influences in the case of children of Christian parents; and presumes in such children a gracious state which facts conclusively show not to exist.

Bunsen, *Hippolytus and his Times*, 179, 211. Curtis, *Progress of Baptist Principles*, 262.

(e) The lack of agreement among pedobaptists as to the warrant for infant baptism and as to the relation of baptized infants to the church, together with the manifest decline of the practice itself, are arguments against it.

The propriety of infant baptism is variously argued upon the ground of "natural innocence, inherited depravity, and federal holiness; because of the infant's own character, the parents' piety, and the church's faith; for the reason that the child is an heir of salvation already, and in order to make it such." "No settled opinion on infant baptism and on Christian nurture has ever been attained to."

Bushnell, *Christian Nurture*, 9–89. *Bib. Sac.*, 1872: 665.

(f) The evil effects of infant baptism:—

First,—in forestalling the voluntary act of the child baptized, and thus practically preventing his personal obedience to Christ's commands.

Secondly,—in inducing superstitious confidence in an outward rite as possessed of regenerating efficacy.

Thirdly,—in obscuring and corrupting Christian truth with regard to the sufficiency of Scripture, the connection of the ordinances, and the inconsistency of an impenitent life with church membership.

Fourthly,—in destroying the church as a spiritual body, by merging it in the nation and the world.

Fifthly,—in putting into the place of Christ's command a commandment of men, and so admitting the essential principle of all heresy, schism, and false religion.

Arnold, in Madison Avenue Lectures, 160-182. Curtis, Progress of Baptist Principles, 274, 275. Westminster Confession, 28: 6. Dagg, Church Order, 144-202.

## II. THE LORD'S SUPPER.

The Lord's Supper is that outward rite in which the assembled church eats bread broken, and drinks wine poured forth by its appointed representative, in token of its constant dependence on the once crucified, now risen Savior assource of its spiritual life—or in other words, in token of that abiding communion of Christ's death and resurrection, through which the life begun in regeneration is sustained and perfected.

Weston, in Madison Avenue Lectures, 183-195. Dagg, Church Order, 203-214.

### 1. *The Lord's Supper an Ordinance instituted by Christ.*

A. Christ appointed an outward rite to be observed by his disciples in remembrance of his death; (Luke 22: 19. 1 Cor. 11: 24, 25). It was to be observed after his death,—only after his death could it completely fulfil its purpose as a feast of commemoration.

B. From the apostolic injunction with regard to its celebration in the church until Christ's second coming (1 Cor. 11: 26; cf. Mat. 26: 29; Mark 14: 25), we infer that it was the original intention of our Lord to institute a rite of perpetual and universal obligation.

C. The uniform practice of the N. T. churches, and the celebration of such a rite in subsequent ages by almost all churches professing to be Christian, is best explained upon the supposition that the Lord's supper is an ordinance established by Christ himself; (Acts 2: 42, 46; 20: 7. 1 Cor. 10: 16).

### 2. *The Mode of Administering the Lord's Supper.*

A. The elements are bread and wine.

B. The communion is of both kinds.

C. The partaking of these elements is of a festal nature.

D. The communion is a festival of commemoration—not simply bringing Christ to our remembrance, but making proclamation of his death to the world; (1 Cor. 11: 24, 26).

E. It is to be celebrated by the assembled church; (Acts 20: 7. 1 Cor. 11: 18, 20, 22, 33, 34). It is not a solitary observance on the part of individuals. No "showing forth" is possible except in company. In Acts 2: 46, we have *oikos*, not *oikia*, and *oikos* is not a private house, but a 'worship-room'; (cf. Acts 5: 42; 8: 3; Rom. 16: 5; Titus 1: 11).

Jacob, Eccl. Polity of N. T., 191-194.

F. The responsibility of seeing that the ordinance is properly administered, rests with the church as a body, and the pastor is, in this matter, the proper representative and organ of the church. In cases of extreme exigency, however, as where the church has no pastor and no ordained minister can be secured, it is competent for the church to appoint one from its own number to administer the ordinance.

G. The frequency with which the Lord's supper is to be administered is not indicated either by the N. T. precept or by uniform N. T. example. We have instances both of its daily and of its weekly observance; (Acts 2: 46; 20: 7). With respect to this, as well as with respect to the accessories of the ordinance, the church is to exercise a sound discretion.

### 3. *The Symbolism of the Lord's Supper.*

The Lord's Supper sets forth, in general, the death of Christ as the sustaining power of the believer's life.

A. Expansion of this statement.

(a) It symbolizes the death of Christ for our sins; (1 Cor. 11: 26).

(b) It symbolizes our personal appropriation of the benefits of that death; (1 Cor. 11: 24).

(c) It symbolizes the method of this appropriation through union with Christ himself; (1 Cor. 10: 16).

(d) It symbolizes the continuous dependence of the believer for all spiritual life, upon the once crucified, now living Savior, to whom he is thus united; (cf. John 6: 53).

(e) It symbolizes the sanctification of the Christian through a spiritual reproduction in him of the death and resurrection of his Lord; (Rom. 8: 10. Phil. 3: 10).

(f) It symbolizes the consequent union of Christians in Christ, their head; (1 Cor. 10: 17).

(g) It symbolizes the coming joy and perfection of the kingdom of God; (Luke 22: 18; cf. 1 Cor. 11: 26).

Moss, in *Madison Avenue Lectures*, 176-216.

B. Inferences from this statement.

(a) The connection between the Lord's supper and baptism consists in this, that they both and equally are symbols of the death of Christ. In baptism, we show forth the death of Christ as the procuring cause of our new birth into the kingdom of God. In the Lord's supper, we show forth the death of Christ as the sustaining power of our spiritual life after it has once begun. In the one, we honor the sanctifying power of the death of Christ, as in the other we honor its regenerating power. Thus both are parts of one whole—setting before us Christ's death for men in its two great purposes and results.

(b) The Lord's supper is to be often repeated—as symbolizing Christ's constant nourishment of the soul, whose new birth was signified in baptism.

(c) The Lord's supper, like baptism, is the symbol of a previous state of grace. It has in itself no regenerating and no sanctifying power, but is the symbol by which the relation of the believer to Christ, his sanctifier, is vividly expressed and strongly confirmed.

(d) The blessing received from participation, is therefore dependent upon, and proportioned to, the faith of the communicant.

(e) The Lord's supper expresses primarily the fellowship of the believer, not with his brethren, but with Christ, his Lord.

Jacob, *Eecl. Polity of N. T.*, 285.

#### 4. *Erroneous Views of the Lord's Supper.*

A. The Romanist view,—that the bread and wine are changed by priestly consecration into the very body and blood of Christ; that this consecration is a new offering of Christ's sacrifice; and that, by a physical partaking of the elements, the communicant receives saving grace from God. To this doctrine of 'transubstantiation,' we reply:—

First,—It rests upon a false interpretation of Scripture. In Mat. 26: 26, 'this is my body' means: 'this is the symbol of my body.' Since Christ was with the disciples in visible form at the institution of the supper, he could not have intended them to recognize the bread as being his literal body. "The body of Christ is present in the bread, just as it had been in the passover-lamb, of which the bread took the place;" (John 6: 53 contains no reference to the Lord's supper, although it describes the spiritual union with Christ, which the supper symbolizes; cf. 63. In 1 Cor. 10: 16, 17, *κοινωνία τοῦ σώματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ* is a figurative expression for the spiritual partaking of Christ. In Mark 8: 33, we are not to infer that Peter was actually 'Satan,' nor does 1 Cor. 12: 12 prove that we are all Christs. Cf. Gen. 41: 26; 1 Cor. 10: 4).

Secondly,—It contradicts the evidence of the senses, as well as of all scientific tests that can be applied. If we cannot trust our senses as to the unchanged material qualities of bread and wine, we cannot trust them when they report to us the words of Christ.

Thirdly,—It involves the denial of the completeness of Christ's past sacrifice, and the assumption that a human priest can repeat or add to the atonement made by Christ once for all; (Heb. 9: 28—*ἀπαξ προσερχθείς*). The Lord's supper is never called a sacrifice, nor are altars, priests or consecrations ever spoken of, in the New Testament. The priests of the old dispensation are expressly contrasted with the ministers of the new. The former 'ministered about holy things,' i. e. performed sacred rites and waited at the altar, but the latter 'preach the gospel;' (1 Cor. 9: 13, 14).

Fourthly,—It destroys Christianity by externalizing it. Romanists make all other service a mere appendage to the communion. Physical and magical salvation is not Christianity but is essential paganism.

Fifthly,—It is idolatrous, since it enjoins the worship of a material thing as divine.

Calvin, *Institutes*, 2: 585-602.

B. The Lutheran and High Church view,—that the communicant, in partaking of the consecrated elements, eats the veritable body and drinks the veritable blood of Christ in and with the bread and wine, although the elements themselves do not cease to be material. To this doctrine of ‘consubstantiation,’ we object:—

° First,—That the view is not required by Scripture. All the passages cited in its support may be better interpreted as referring to partaking of the elements as symbols. If Christ’s body be ubiquitous, as this theory holds, we partake of it at every meal as really as at the Lord’s supper.

Secondly,—That the view is inseparable from a general sacramental system of which it forms a part. In imposing physical and material conditions of receiving Christ, it contradicts the doctrine of justification only by faith; changes the ordinance from a sign into a means of salvation; involves the necessity of a sacerdotal order for the sake of properly consecrating the elements; and logically tends to the Romanist conclusions of ritualism and idolatry.

Thirdly,—That it holds each communicant to be a partaker of Christ’s veritable body and blood, whether he be a believer or not—the result, in the absence of faith, being condemnation instead of salvation. Thus the whole character of the ordinance, is changed from a festival occasion to one of mystery and fear, and the whole gospel method of salvation is obscured.

For the view here combated, see Gerhard, X : 352, 397; Pusey, Tract No. 90, of the Tractarian Series; Wilberforce, *New Birth*; Nevins, *Mystical Presence*. Per contra, see Calvin, *Institutes*, 2: 525–584; and E. G. Robinson, in *Baptist Quarterly*, 1869: 85–109.

##### 5. *Prerequisites to Participation in the Lord’s Supper.*

A. There are prerequisites. This we argue from the fact:—

First,—that Christ enjoined the celebration of the supper, not upon the world at large, but only upon his disciples.

Secondly,—that the apostolic injunctions to Christians, to separate themselves from certain of their number, imply a limitation of the Lord’s supper to a narrower body, even among professed believers.

Thirdly,—that the analogy of baptism, as belonging only to a specified class of persons, leads us to believe that the same is true of the Lord’s supper.

B. The prerequisites are those only which are expressly or implicitly laid down by Christ and his apostles.

(a) The church, as possessing executive but not legislative power, is charged with the duty, not of framing rules for the administering and guarding of the ordinance, but of discovering and applying the rules given it in the New Testament. No church has a right to establish any terms of communion,—it is responsible only for making known the terms established by Christ and his apostles.

(b) These terms, however, are to be ascertained, not only from the injunctions, but also from the precedents, of the New Testament. Since the apostles were inspired, New Testament precedent is the “common law” of the church.

C. On examining the New Testament, we find that the prerequisites to participation in the Lord's supper are four, namely:—

First,—Regeneration.

The Lord's supper is the outward expression of a life in the believer, nourished and sustained by the life of Christ. It cannot therefore be partaken of, by one who is 'dead in trespasses and sins.' We give no food to a corpse. The Lord's supper was never offered by the apostles to unbelievers. On the contrary the injunction that each communicant 'examine himself' implies that faith, which will enable the communicant to 'discern the Lord's body,' is a prerequisite to participation; (1 Cor. 11: 27-29).

Edwards, on Qualifications for Full Communion, in Works, 1: 81.

Secondly,—Baptism.

In proof that baptism is a prerequisite to the Lord's supper, we urge the following considerations:—

(a) The ordinance of baptism was instituted and administered long before the supper; (Mat. 21: 25).

(b) The apostles who first celebrated it had, in all probability, been baptized; (Acts 1: 21, 22; 19: 1-5).

(c) The command of Christ fixes the place of baptism as first in order after discipleship; (Mat. 28: 19).

(d) All the recorded cases show this to have been the order observed by the first Christians and sanctioned by the apostles; (Acts 2: 41, 46; 8: 12; 10: 47, 48; 22: 16).

(e) The symbolism of the ordinances requires that baptism should precede the Lord's supper. The order of the facts signified must be expressed in the order of the ordinances which signify them—else the world is taught that sanctification may take place without regeneration. Birth must come before sustenance—'nascimur, pascimur.' To enjoy ceremonial privileges, there must be ceremonial qualifications. As none but the circumcised could eat the passover, so before eating with the Christian family, must come adoption into the Christian family.

(f) The standards of all evangelical denominations, with unimportant exceptions, confirm the view that this is the natural interpretation of the Scripture requirements respecting the order of the ordinances.

Curtis, Progress of Baptist Principles, 304.

(g) The practical results of the opposite view are convincing proof that the order here insisted on is the order of nature as well as of Scripture. The admission of unbaptized persons to the communion, tends always to, and has frequently resulted in, the disuse of baptism itself, the obscuring of the truth which it symbolizes, the transformation of scripturally constituted churches into bodies organized after methods of human invention, and the complete destruction of both church and ordinances as Christ originally constituted them.

Arnold, Terms of Communion, 76. Curtis, Progress of Bap. Principles, 296-298.

Thirdly,—Church membership.

(a) The Lord's supper is a church ordinance, observed by churches of Christ as such; (Acts 2: 46, 47; 20: 7. 1 Cor. 11: 18, 22). For this reason, membership in the church naturally precedes communion. Since communion is a family rite, the participant should first be member of the family.

See Com. of Meyer, on Acts 2: 46.

(b) The Lord's supper is a symbol of church fellowship; (1 Cor. 10: 17). Excommunication implies nothing, if it does not imply exclusion from the communion. If the supper is simply communion of the individual with Christ, then the church has no right to exclude any from it.

Arnold, Terms of Communion, 36.

Fourthly,—An orderly walk; (1 Cor. 5: 9-11. 2 Thess. 3: 6).

Disorderly walking we may, with Arnold, class under four heads:—

(a) Immoral conduct; (1 Cor. 5: 1-13).

(b) Disobedience to the commands of Christ; (1 Cor. 14: 37. 2 Thess. 1: 1; 3: 7-11, 14).

Since baptism is a command of Christ, we cannot properly commune with the unbaptized. To admit such to the Lord's supper is to withhold protest against a plain disobedience to Christ's commands, and to that extent to countenance such disobedience.

(c) Heresy; (Titus 3: 10; cf. Acts 20: 30).

Since pedobaptists hold and propagate false doctrine with regard to the church and its ordinances—doctrine which endangers the spirituality of the church, the sufficiency of the Scriptures and the lordship of Christ, we cannot properly admit them to the Lord's supper. To admit them, or to partake with them, would be to treat falsehood as if it were truth.

(d) Schism; (Rom. 16: 17).

Since pedobaptists, by their teaching and practice, draw away many from scripturally constituted churches—thus dividing true believers from each other and weakening the bodies organized after the model of the New Testament,—it is imperative upon us to separate ourselves from them, so far as regards that communion at the Lord's table which is the sign of church fellowship.

Arnold, Terms of Communion, 73.

D. The local church is the judge whether these prerequisites are fulfilled in the case of persons desiring to partake of the Lord's supper. This is evident, from the following considerations:—

First,—the command to observe the ordinance was given, not to individuals, but to a company.

Secondly,—obedience to this command is not an individual act, but is the joint act of many.

Thirdly,—the regular observance of the Lord's supper cannot be secured, nor the qualifications of persons desiring to participate in it be scrutinized, unless some distinct organized body is charged with this responsibility.

Fourthly,—the only organized body known to the New Testament is the local church, and this is the only body, of any sort, competent to have charge of the ordinances.

Fifthly,—the New Testament accounts indicate that the Lord's supper was observed only at regular, appointed meetings of local churches, and was observed by these churches as regularly organized bodies; (Acts 20: 7. 1 Cor. 11: 18, 20, 22, 33).

Sixthly,—since the duty of examining the qualifications of candidates for baptism and for membership is vested in the local church, and is essential to its distinct existence, the analogy of the ordinances would lead us to believe that the scrutiny of qualifications for participation in the Lord's supper rests with the same body.

Sarles, and Anderson, in *Madison Avenue Lectures*, 217-242, 243-260.

#### E. Special objections to open communion.

The advocates of this view claim that baptism, as not being an indispensable term of salvation, cannot properly be made an indispensable term of communion. In addition to what has already been said, we reply:—

(a) This view is contrary to the belief and practice of all but an insignificant fragment of organized Christendom.

(b) It assumes an unscriptural inequality between the two ordinances. The Lord's supper holds no higher rank in Scripture than does baptism. The obligation to commune is no more binding than the obligation to profess faith by being baptized. Open communion, however, treats baptism as if it were optional, while it insists upon communion as indispensable.

(c) It tends to do away with baptism altogether. If the highest privilege of church membership may be enjoyed without baptism, baptism loses its place and importance as the initiatory ordinance of the church.

(d) It tends to do away with all discipline. When Christians offend, the church must withdraw its fellowship from them. But upon the principle of open communion, such withdrawal is impossible, since the Lord's supper, the highest expression of church fellowship, is open to every person who regards himself as a Christian.

(e) It tends to do away with the visible church altogether. For no visible church is possible unless some sign of membership be required, in addition to the signs of membership in the invisible church. Open communion logically leads to open church membership, and a church membership open to all without reference to the qualifications required in Scripture, or without examination on the part of the church as to the existence of these qualifications in those who unite with it, is virtually an identification of the church with the world, and without protest from scripturally constituted bodies, would finally result in its actual extinction.

The aim of this discussion has been accomplished, if we have correctly presented the subject of the Lord's supper in its doctrinal relations and significance. We resign to the department of Pastoral Theology, the



consideration of the practical objections to the Scriptural view, which are raised by the advocates of open communion. These have to do, not so much with the exposition, as with the application of the doctrine.

For the open communion view, see Robert Hall, Works, 1: 285; John M. Mason, Works, 1: 3-369; Princeton Review, Oct. 1850; Bib. Sac., 21: 449; 24: 482; 25: 401; Spirit of the Pilgrims, 6: 103, 142. Per contra, see Arnold, Terms of Communion, 82; Hovey, in Bib. Sac., 1862: 133; Pepper, in Baptist Quarterly, 1867: 216; Curtis, on Communion, 292; also, Progress of Baptist Principles, 285; Howell, Terms of Communion; Williams, The Lord's Supper; Theodosia Earnest,—pub. by Am. Bap. Pub. Soc.

## PART VIII.

### ESCHATOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF FINAL THINGS.

Neither the individual Christian character, nor the Christian church as a whole, attains its destined perfection in this life; (Rom. 8: 24). This perfection is reached in the world to come; (1 Cor. 13: 10). As preparing the way for the kingdom of God in its completeness, certain events are to take place, such as death, Christ's second coming, the resurrection of the body, the general judgment. As stages in the future condition of men, there is to be an intermediate and an ultimate state, both for the righteous and for the wicked. We discuss these events and states in what appears, from Scripture, to be the order of their occurrence.

For treatment of the whole subject of Eschatology, see Luthardt, *Lehre von den letzten Dingen*. Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, 3: 713-880.

#### I. DEATH PHYSICAL.

Physical death is the separation of the soul from the body. We distinguish it from spiritual death, or the separation of the soul from God (Is. 59: 2. Rom. 7: 24. Eph. 2: 1), and from the second death, or the banishment from God and final misery of the reunited soul and body of the wicked; (Rev. 2: 11; 20: 14).

Although physical death falls upon the unbeliever as the original penalty of sin, to all who are united to Christ it loses its aspect of penalty, and becomes a means of discipline and of entrance into eternal life; (Ps. 116: 15. Rom. 8: 10; 14: 8. 1 Cor. 3: 22; 15: 56. 1 Pet. 4: 6. Cf. Rom. 1: 18; Heb. 12: 5-11).

To neither saint nor sinner is death a cessation of being. This we maintain against the advocates of annihilation:—

##### 1. *Upon rational grounds.*

A. The soul is simple, not compounded. Death, in matter, is the separation of parts. But in the soul there are no parts to be separated. Therefore it cannot cease to exist. The opposite can be argued only on principles of materialism. This is the metaphysical argument.

B. Man, as an intellectual, moral and religious being, does not attain the end of his existence on earth. His development is imperfect here. Divine wisdom will not leave its work incomplete. There must be a hereafter for the full growth of man's powers and for the satisfaction of his aspirations. This is the teleological argument.

C. Man is not adequately rewarded or punished in this world. The guilty conscience demands a state after death, for punishment. Our sense of justice leads us to believe that God's moral administration will be vindicated in a life to come. This may be called the ethical argument.

D. The popular belief of all nations and ages shows that the idea of immortality is natural to the human mind. This may be called the historical argument.

Hase, *Hutterus Redivivus*, 276. Bartlett, *Life and Death Eternal*, preface. Luthardt, *Compendium der Dogmatik*, 289. Tennyson, *Two Voices*. Wordsworth, *Intimations of Immortality*. Alger, *Critical History of Doctrine of Future Life*, especially Catalogue by Ezra Abbot, in the Appendix, of Works relating to the Nature, Origin and Destiny of the Soul.

## 2. *Upon Scriptural grounds.*

A. The account of man's creation, and the subsequent allusions to it in Scripture, show that while the body was made corruptible and subject to death, the soul was made in the image of God, incorruptible and immortal; (Gen. 1: 26, 27; 2: 7; 3: 22, 23. Eccl. 12: 7. Zech. 12: 1. Mat. 10: 28. Acts 7: 59. 1 Cor. 15: 45, 46. 2 Cor. 12: 2).

B. The account of the curse in Genesis, and the subsequent allusions to it in Scripture, show that while the death then incurred includes the dissolution of the body, it does not include cessation of being on the part of the soul, but only designates that state of the soul which is the opposite of true life, viz: a state of banishment from God, of unholiness and of misery; (Gen. 2: 17; cf. 3: 8, 16-19, 22-24. Mat. 8: 22; 25: 41-46. Luke 15: 32. John 5: 24; 6: 47, 53, 63; 8: 51. Rom. 5: 21; 8: 13. Eph. 2: 1; 5: 14. 1 Tim. 5: 6. James 5: 20. 1 John 3: 14. Rev. 3: 1).

C. The Scriptural expressions, held by annihilationists to imply cessation of being on the part of the wicked, are used not only in connections where they cannot bear this meaning (Esther 4: 16), but in connections where they imply the opposite; (Gen. 6: 11; 34: 30. Ps. 119: 176. Isa. 49: 17; 57: 1, 2. Dan. 9: 26. Mat. 10: 6, 39, 42. Acts 13: 41; cf. Mat. 6: 16. 1 Cor. 3: 17. 2 Cor. 7: 2. 2 Thess. 1: 9).

D. The passages held to prove the annihilation of the wicked at death, cannot have this meaning, since the Scriptures foretell a resurrection of the unjust as well as of the just, and a second death, or a misery of the reunited soul and body, in the case of the wicked; (Acts 24: 15. Rev. 2: 11; 20: 14, 15; 21: 8).

E. The words used in Scripture to denote the place of departed spirits, as well as the allusions to their condition, show that death, to the writers of the Old and the New Testaments, although it was the termination of man's earthly existence, was not an extinction of his being or his consciousness; (Gen. 25: 8; 35: 29; 49: 29, 33. Num. 20: 24. Job 3: 13, 19; 7: 9; 14: 22.

Ez. 32: 21. Luke 16: 23.  $\text{לָשׁוּב}$  either from  $\text{לָשׁוּב}$ , to press, and = 'the shut-up or constrained place'; or from  $\text{לָשׁוּב}$ , to be at rest or quiet, and = 'the resting place.'  $\text{אֲדֹמָה}$  = not 'hell,' but 'the unseen world,' conceived by the Greeks, as a shadowy, but not as an unconscious, state of being).

F. The argument of annihilationists is based upon the literalizing of a particular class of terms in Scripture, which the Jewish belief in a conscious existence after death shows to have been used in a metaphorical sense. That a belief in the immortality of the soul existed among the Jews is abundantly evident: from the knowledge of a future state possessed by the Egyptians (Acts 7: 22); from the accounts of the translation of Enoch and of Elijah (Gen. 5: 24; cf. Heb. 11: 5. 2 K. 2: 11); from the invocation of the dead which was practised, although forbidden by the law (1 Sam. 28: 7-14; cf. Lev. 20: 27; Deut. 18: 10, 11); from allusions in the O. T. to resurrection, future retribution, and life beyond the grave (Job 19: 25, 27. Ps. 16: 9-11. Is. 26: 19. Ez. 37: 1-14. Dan. 12: 2, 3, 13); and from distinct declarations of such faith by Philo and Josephus, as well as by the writers of the N. T.; (Mat. 22: 31, 32. Acts 23: 6; 26: 6-8. Heb. 11: 13-16).

G. The most impressive and conclusive of all proofs of immortality, however, is afforded in the resurrection of Jesus Christ—a work accomplished by his own power, and demonstrating that his spirit lived after its separation from the body; (John 2: 19, 20; 10: 17, 18). By coming back from the tomb, he proves that death is not annihilation; (2 Tim. 1: 10).

For the annihilation theory, see Hudson, Debt and Grace, and Christ Our Life; also Dobney, Future Punishment. Per contra, see Hovcy, State of the Impenitent Dead, 1-27. Luthardt, Compendium der Dogmatik, 289-292. Delitzsch, Bib. Psychologie, 397-407. Herzog, Encyclopädie, art. : Tod. Bartlett, Life and Death Eternal, 189-358. Josephus, Antiquities, XVIII: 1: 3; Wars of the Jews, II: 8: 10-14. Girdlestone, O. T. Syn., 447. Estes, Christian Doctrine of the Soul. On the second death, see Trench, Epistles to the Seven Churches, 151.

## II. THE INTERMEDIATE STATE.

The Scriptures affirm the conscious existence of both the righteous and the wicked, after death, and prior to the resurrection. In the intermediate state the soul is without a body, yet this state is for the righteous a state of conscious joy, and for the wicked a state of conscious suffering.

### 1. *Of the righteous, it is declared:—*

A. That the soul of the believer, at its separation from the body, enters the presence of Christ; (2 Cor. 5: 1-9; cf. 2 Tim. 4: 18).

B. That the spirits of departed believers are with God; (Heb. 12: 23; cf. Eccl. 12: 7).

C. That believers at death enter paradise; (Luke 23: 42, 43; cf. 2 Cor. 12: 4. Rev. 2: 7; cf. Gen. 2: 8).

D. That their state immediately after death, is greatly to be preferred to that of faithful and successful labor for Christ here; (Phil. 1: 21-24).

Edwards the younger, Works, 2: 530, 531. Hovey, Impenitent Dead, 61.

E. That departed saints are truly alive; (Mat. 22: 31, 32; cf. John 11: 26; 1 Thess. 5: 10; Rom. 8: 10).

F. That they are at rest and blessed; (Rev. 6: 9-11; 14: 13).

2. *Of the wicked, it is declared:—*

A. That they are in prison—that is, under constraint and guard; (1 Pet. 3: 19—*φυλακῆ*).

B. That they are in torment, or conscious suffering; (Luke 16: 23; *ἐν βασάνοις*).

C. That they are under punishment; (2 Pet. 2: 9—*κολλάζομενους*).

The passages cited, enable us properly to estimate two opposite errors. They refute, on the one hand, the view:—

(a) That the souls of both righteous and wicked sleep between death and the resurrection.

This view is based upon the assumption that the possession of a physical organism is indispensable to activity and consciousness—an assumption which the existence of a God who is pure spirit (John 4: 24), shows to be erroneous. Although the departed are characterized as ‘spirits’ (Ecc. 12: 7. Acts 7: 59. Heb. 12: 23. 1 Pet. 3: 19), there is nothing in this ‘absence from the body’ (2 Cor. 5: 8) inconsistent with the activity and consciousness ascribed to them in the Scriptures above referred to. When the dead are spoken of as ‘sleeping’ (Dan. 12: 2. Mat. 9: 24. John 11: 11. 1 Cor. 11: 30; 15: 51. 1 Thess. 4: 14; 5: 10), we are to regard this as simply the language of appearance, and as literally applicable only to the body. The passages first cited refute on the other hand, the view:—

(b) That the suffering of the intermediate state is purgatorial.

According to the doctrine of the Roman Catholic church, “all who die at peace with the church but are not perfect, pass into purgatory.” Here they make satisfaction for the sins committed after baptism, by suffering a longer or shorter time, according to the degree of their guilt. The church on earth, however, has power, by prayers and the sacrifice of the mass, to shorten these sufferings or to remit them altogether. But we urge, in reply, that the passages referring to suffering in the intermediate state, give no indication that any true believer is subject to this suffering, or that the church has any power to relieve from the consequences of sin, either in this world or in the world to come. God only can forgive, and the church is empowered simply to declare, that, upon the fulfilment of the appointed conditions of repentance and faith, he does actually forgive. This theory, moreover, is inconsistent with any proper view of the completeness of Christ’s satisfaction (Gal. 2: 21. Heb. 9: 28), of justification through faith alone (Rom. 3: 28), and of the condition after death, of both righteous and

wicked, as determined in this life; (Ecc. 11: 3. Mat. 25: 10. Luke 16: 26. Heb. 9: 27. Rev. 22: 11).

We close our whole discussion of this subject with a single, but an important remark—this namely, that while the Scriptures represent the intermediate state to be one of conscious joy to the righteous, and of conscious pain to the wicked, they also represent this state to be one of incompleteness. The perfect joy of the saints, and the utter misery of the wicked, begin only with the resurrection and general judgment; (2 Cor. 5: 3, 4; cf. Rom. 8: 23 and Phil. 3: 11. 2 Pet. 2: 9. Rev. 6: 10).

Bib. Sac., 13: 153. Christian Review, 20: 381. Methodist Review, 34: 240. Herzog, Encyclopädie, art.: Hades. Stuart, Essays on Future Punishment. Whately, Future State. Neander, Planting and Training, 482–484. Delitzsch, Bib. Psychologie, 407–448. For Romanist doctrine, see Perrone, Praelationes Theologicae, 2: 391–420. Per contra, see Hodge, Systematic Theology, 3: 743–770.

### III. THE SECOND COMING OF CHRIST.

While the Scriptures represent great events in the history of the individual Christian, like death, and great events in the history of the church, like the outpouring of the Spirit at Pentecost and the destruction of Jerusalem, as comings of Christ for deliverance or judgment (Mat. 24: 23, 27, 34; 16: 28. John 14: 3, 18. Rev. 3: 20), they also declare that these partial and typical comings shall be concluded by a final, triumphant return of Christ, to punish the wicked and to complete the salvation of his people; (Mat. 24: 30, 31; 25: 31. Acts 1: 11. 1 Thess. 4: 16. 2 Thess. 1: 7, 10. Heb. 9: 28. Rev. 1: 7).

#### 1. *The nature of this coming.*

Although without doubt accompanied in the case of the regenerate, by inward and invisible influences of the Holy Spirit, the second advent is to be outward and visible. This we argue:—

A. From the objects to be secured by Christ's return. These are partly external; (Rom. 8: 19–23). Nature and the body are both to be glorified. These external changes may well be accompanied by a visible manifestation of Him who 'makes all things new;' (Rev. 21: 5).

B. From the Scriptural comparison of the manner of Christ's return with the manner of his departure; (Acts 1: 11—see Com. of Hackett, in loco:—"ὄν τρόπον=visibly, and in the air. The expression is never employed to affirm merely the certainty of one event as compared with another. The assertion that the meaning is simply, that, as Christ had departed, so also he would return, is contradicted by every passage in which the phrase occurs; cf. Acts 7: 28; Mat. 23: 37; Luke 13: 34; 2 Tim. 3: 8.").

C. From the analogy of his first coming. If this was a literal and visible coming, we may expect the second coming to be literal and visible also.

## 2. *The time of Christ's coming.*

Although Christ's prophecy of this event, in the twenty-fifth chapter of Matthew, so connects it with the destruction of Jerusalem that the apostles and the early Christians seem to have hoped for its occurrence during their lifetime (1 Cor. 15: 51. 1 Thess. 4: 17. 2 Tim. 4: 8. James 5: 7. 1 Pet. 4: 7. 1 John 2: 18), yet neither Christ nor the apostles definitely taught when the end should be, but rather declared the knowledge of it to be reserved in the counsels of God, that men might ever recognize it as possibly at hand, and so might live in the attitude of constant expectation.

Hence we find in immediate connection with many of these predictions of the end, a reference to intervening events and to the eternity of God, which shows that the prophecies themselves are expressed in a large way which befits the greatness of the divine plans; (Mat. 24: 36. Mark 13: 32. Acts 1: 7. 1 Cor. 10: 11; 16: 22. Phil. 4: 5. 2 Thess. 2: 1-3. James 5: 8, 9. 2 Pet. 3: 3-12—*προσδοκῶντες καὶ σπεύδοντες τὴν παρουσίαν.* Rev. 1: 3; 22: 12, 20).

In this we discern a striking parallel between the predictions of Christ's first, and the predictions of his second advent. In both cases the event was more distant and more grand, than those imagined to whom the prophecies first came. Under both dispensations, patient waiting for Christ was intended to discipline the faith and to enlarge the conceptions of God's true servants. The fact that every age since Christ ascended has had its Chiliasts and Second Adventists, should turn our thoughts away from curious and fruitless prying into the time of Christ's coming, and set us at immediate and constant endeavor to be ready, at whatsoever hour he may appear.

## 3. *The precursors of Christ's coming.*

A. Through the preaching of the gospel in all the world, the kingdom of Christ is steadily to enlarge its boundaries until Jews and Gentiles alike become possessed of its blessings, and a millennial period is introduced in which Christianity generally prevails throughout the earth; (Dan. 2: 44, 45. Mat. 13: 31, 32; 24: 14. Rom. 11: 25, 26. Rev. 20: 1-6).

B. There will be a corresponding development of evil, both extensive and intensive, whose true character shall be manifest not only in deceiving many professed followers of Christ, and in persecuting true believers, but in constituting a personal antichrist its representative and object of worship. This rapid growth shall continue until the millennium, during which, evil, in the person of its chief, shall be temporarily restrained; (Mat. 13: 30, 38; 24: 5, 11, 12, 24. Luke 21: 12. 2 Thess. 2: 1-10. Rev. 20: 2, 3).

C. At the close of this millennial period, evil shall again be permitted to exert its utmost power, in a final conflict with righteousness. This spiritual struggle, moreover, shall be accompanied and symbolized by political convulsions, and by fearful indications of desolation in the natural world; (Mat. 24: 29. Luke 21: 8-25).

4. *Relation of Christ's second coming to the millennium.*

The Scripture foretells a period, called in the language of prophecy "a thousand years," when Satan shall be restrained and the saints shall reign with Christ on the earth. A comparison of the passages bearing on this subject, leads us to the conclusion that this millennial blessedness and dominion is prior to the second advent. One passage only seems at first sight to teach the contrary, viz: Rev. 20: 1-10. But this supports the theory of a premillennial advent, only when the passage is interpreted with the barest literalness. A better view of its meaning will be gained, by considering:—

A. That it constitutes a part, and confessedly an obscure part, of one of the most figurative books of Scripture, and therefore ought to be interpreted by the plainer statements of the other Scriptures.

B. That the other Scriptures contain nothing with regard to a resurrection of the righteous which is widely separated in time from that of the wicked, but rather declare distinctly that the second coming of Christ is immediately connected, both with the resurrection of the just and the unjust, and with the general judgment; (Mat. 16: 27; 25: 31-33. John 5: 29. 2 Cor. 5: 10. 2 Thess. 1: 6-10. 2 Pet. 3: 7-13. Rev. 20: 11-15).

C. That the literal interpretation of the passage—holding, as it does, to a resurrection of bodies of flesh and blood, and to a reign of the risen saints in the flesh and in the world as at present constituted—is inconsistent with other Scriptural declarations with regard to the spiritual nature of the resurrection-body and of the coming reign of Christ; (1 Cor. 15: 44, 50).

D. That the literal interpretation is generally and naturally connected with the expectation of a gradual and necessary decline of Christ's kingdom upon earth, until Christ comes to bind Satan and to introduce the millennium. This view not only contradicts such passages as Dan. 2: 35, and Mat. 13: 31, 32, but it begets a passive and hopeless endurance of evil, whereas the Scriptures enjoin a constant and aggressive warfare against it, upon the very ground that God's power shall assure to the church a gradual but constant progress in the face of it, even to the time of the end.

E. We may therefore best interpret Rev. 20: 1-10, as teaching, in highly figurative language, not a preliminary resurrection of the body in the case of departed saints, but a period in the later days of the church militant, when, under special influence of the Holy Ghost, the spirit of the martyrs shall appear again, true religion be greatly quickened and revived, and the members of Christ's churches become so conscious of their strength in Christ, that they shall, to an extent unknown before, triumph over the powers of evil both within and without. So the spirit of Elijah appeared again in John the Baptist; (Mal. 4: 5; cf. Mat. 11: 14). The fact that only the spirit of sacrifice and faith is to be revived, is figuratively indicated in the phrase: 'The rest of the dead lived not again until the thousand years were finished.' Since resurrection, like the coming of Christ and the judgment, is twofold, first, spiritual (the raising of the soul to spiritual life), and secondly, physical (the raising of the body from the grave), the words in Rev. 20: 15—'this is the first resurrection,' seem intended distinctly to pre-



clude the literal interpretation we are combating. In short, we hold that Rev. 20: 1-10 does not describe the events commonly called the second advent and resurrection, but rather describes great spiritual changes in the later history of the church, which are typical of, and preliminary to, the second advent and the resurrection, and therefore, after the prophetic method, are foretold in language literally applicable only to those final events themselves.

For a fuller elaboration of this view, see Brown, on the Second Advent, 206-259, and Hodge, Outlines of Theology, 447-453. On the general subject, see Kendrick, in Baptist Quarterly, Jan., 1870. New Englander, 1874: 356. Neander, Planting and Training, 526, 527. Bib. Sac., 15: 381, 625; 17: 111. Cowles, Dissertation on Premillennial Advent, in Com. on Jeremiah and Ezekiel. Bampton Lectures for 1854, on the Millennium. Weiss, Premillennial Advent of Christ. Fairbairn on Prophecy, 432-480. Woods, Works, 3: 267. Seelye, on Christian Missions, 94-127. Crosby, Second Advent. For advocacy of the premillennial advent, see Elliott, Horae Apocalypticae; William Kelly, The Second Advent of Christ Premillennial; Taylor, Voice of the Church on the Coming and Kingdom of the Redeemer.

#### IV. THE RESURRECTION.

While the Scriptures describe the impartation of new life to the soul in regeneration as a spiritual resurrection (John 5: 24-27, especially 25. Rom. 6: 4. Eph. 2: 1, 5; 5: 14. Phil. 3: 10. Col. 2: 12, 13. Cf. Is. 26: 19; Ez. 37: 1-14), they also declare that at the second coming of Christ, there shall be a resurrection of the body, and a reunion of the body to the soul from which, during the intermediate state, it has been separated. Both the just and the unjust shall have part in the resurrection. To the just, it shall be a resurrection unto life, and the body shall be a body like Christ's—a body fitted for the uses of the sanctified spirit. To the unjust, it shall be a resurrection unto condemnation, and analogy would seem to indicate that here also, the outward form will fitly represent the inward state of the soul. Those who are living at Christ's coming, shall receive spiritual bodies without passing through death. As the body after corruption and dissolution, so the outward world after destruction by fire, shall be rehabilitated and fitted for the abode of saints; (John 5: 28-30. Acts 24: 15. 1 Cor. 15: 12-58. Phil. 3: 21. 1 Thess. 4: 14-16. 2 Pet. 3: 7-13. Rev. 20: 13).

Upon the subject of the resurrection, our positive information is derived wholly from the word of God. Further discussion of it may be most naturally arranged in a series of answers to objections. The objections commonly urged against the doctrine as above propounded, may be reduced to two:—

1. *The exegetical objection*,—that it rests upon a literalizing of metaphorical language, and has no sufficient support in Scripture. To this we answer:—

A. That though the phrase 'resurrection of the body' does not occur in the New Testament, the passages which describe the event, indicate a

physical, as distinguished from a spiritual change; (John 5: 28. Phil. 3: 21. 1 Thess. 4: 13-17).

The phrase 'spiritual body' (1 Cor. 15: 44), is a contradiction in terms, if it be understood as signifying 'a body which is simple spirit.' It can only be interpreted as meaning a material organism, perfectly adapted to be the outward expression and vehicle of the purified soul. The purely spiritual interpretation is, moreover, expressly excluded by the apostolic denial that 'the resurrection is past already;' (2 Tim. 2: 18).

B. That the redemption of Christ is declared to include the body as well as the soul; (Rom. 8: 23. 1 Cor. 6: 13-20).

The indwelling of the Holy Ghost has put such honor upon the frail mortal tenement which he has made his temple, that God will not permit even this wholly to perish; (Rom. 8: 11—*διὰ τὸ ἐνοικοῦν αὐτοῦ Πνεῦμα ἐν ὑμῖν*, i. e., because of his indwelling Spirit, God will raise up the mortal body). It is this belief which forms the basis of Christian care for the dead.

C. That the nature of Christ's resurrection, as literal and physical, determines the nature of the resurrection in the case of believers; (Luke 24: 39. John 20: 27).

As, in the case of Christ, the same body that was laid in the tomb was raised again, although possessed of new and surprising powers, so the Scriptures intimate, not simply that the saints shall have bodies, but that these bodies shall be in some proper sense an outgrowth or transformation of the very bodies that slept in the dust; (Dan. 12: 2. 1 Cor. 15: 53, 54). The denial of the resurrection of the body in the case of believers, leads naturally to a denial of the reality of Christ's resurrection; (1 Cor. 15: 13).

B. That the accompanying events, as the second coming and the judgment, since they are themselves literal, imply that the resurrection is also literal.

2. *The scientific objection.* This is threefold:—

A. That a resurrection of the particles which compose the body at death, is impossible, since they enter into new combinations, and not unfrequently become parts of other bodies which the doctrine holds to be raised at the same time.

We reply, that the Scripture not only does not compel us to hold, but it distinctly denies, that all the particles which exist in the body at death are present in the resurrection-body; (1 Cor. 15: 37—*οὐ τὸ σῶμα τὸ γενησόμενον*, 50). The Scripture seems only to intimate a certain physical connection between the new and the old, although the nature of this connection is not revealed. That divine care may preserve some particle or principle of the worn-out frame, to be the germ of the new, cannot be denied upon scientific grounds.

B. That a resurrection-body developed from some such particle or principle of the present body, cannot be recognized by the inhabiting soul, nor by other witnessing spirits, as the same with that which was laid in the grave.

To this we reply that bodily identity does not consist in absolute sameness of particles during the whole history of the body, but in the organizing force, which, even in the flux and displacement of physical particles, makes the old the basis of the new, and binds both together in the unity of a single consciousness. In our recognition of friends, moreover, we are not wholly dependent, even in this world, upon our perception of bodily form, and we have reason to believe that in the future state, there may be methods of communication far more direct and intuitive than those with which we are familiar here; (Cf. Mat. 17: 3, 4).

C. That a material organism can only be regarded as a hindrance to the free activity of the spirit, and that the assumption of such an organism by the soul, which, during the intermediate state, had been separated from the body, would indicate a decline in dignity and power, rather than a progress.

We reply that we cannot estimate the powers and capacities of matter, when brought by God into complete subjection to the spirit. The bodies of the saints may be more ethereal than the air, and capable of swifter motion than the light, and yet be material in their substance. That the soul clothed with its spiritual body, will have more exalted powers and enjoy a more complete felicity, than would be possible while it maintained a purely spiritual existence, is evident from the fact that Paul represents the culmination of the soul's blessedness as occurring, not at death, but at the resurrection of the body; (Rom. 8: 23. 2 Cor. 5: 2-4. Phil. 3: 11).

Porter, *Human Intellect*, 631. McCosh, *Intuitions*, 213. Hase, *Huterus Redivivus*, 280. Ebrard, *Dogmatik*, 2: 226-234. Hanna, *The Resurrection*, 28. *Baptist Quarterly*, Oct., 1867. Moorhouse, *Nature and Revelation*, 87-112. Fuller, *Works*, 3: 291. Neander, *Planting and Training*, 479-487, 524-526. Goulburn, *Bampton Lectures for 1850, on the Resurrection*. Boston, *Fourfold State*, in *Works*, 8: 271-289. *Unseen Universe*, 33. Naville, *La Vie Eternelle*, 253, 254. Delitzsch, *Bib. Psychologie*, 453-463. Per contra, see *Baptist Quarterly*, Oct., 1868, and Apr., 1870; *New Englander*, Apr., 1874. Crosby, *Second Advent*.

## V. THE LAST JUDGMENT.

While the Scriptures represent all punishment of individual transgressors and all manifestations of God's vindicatory justice in the history of nations, as acts or processes of judgment (Ps. 9: 7. Isa. 26: 9. Mat. 16: 27. John 3: 17-19; 9: 39; 12: 31), they also intimate that these temporal judgments are only partial and imperfect, and that they are therefore to be concluded with a final and complete vindication of God's righteousness. This will be accomplished by making known to the universe the characters of all men, and by awarding to them corresponding destinies; (Mat. 25: 31-46. Acts 17: 31. Rom. 2: 16. 2 Cor. 5: 10. Heb. 9: 27, 28. Rev. 20: 12).

From these passages, we are warranted in drawing the following conclusions with regard to the final judgment:—

1. *The nature of the final judgment.*

The final judgment is not a spiritual, invisible, endless process, identical with God's providence in history, but is an outward and visible event, occurring at a definite period in the future. This we argue from the following considerations:—

A. The accompaniments of the judgment, such as the second coming of Christ, the resurrection, and the outward changes of the earth, are events which have an outward and visible, as well as an inward and spiritual aspect. We are compelled to interpret the predictions of the last judgment upon the same principle.

B. God's justice, in the historical and imperfect work of judgment needs a final outward judgment as its vindication. "Otherwise man is a Tantalus—longing, but never satisfied," and God's justice, of which his outward administration is the expression, can only be regarded as approximate.

2. *The object of the final judgment.*

The object of the final judgment is not the ascertainment, but the manifestation, of character, and the assignment of outward condition corresponding to it.

A. To the omniscient Judge, the condition of all moral creatures is already and fully known. The last day will be only 'the *revelation* of the righteous judgment of God'; (Rom. 2: 5).

B. In the nature of man, there are evidences and preparations for this final disclosure. Among these may be mentioned, the law of memory by which the soul preserves the record of its acts, both good and evil (Luke 16: 25); the law of conscience, by which men involuntarily anticipate punishment for their own sins (Rom. 2: 15, Heb. 10: 27); the law of character, by which every thought and deed makes indelible impress upon the moral nature; (Heb. 3: 8, 15).

C. Single acts and words, therefore, are to be brought into the judgment only as indications of the moral condition of the soul. This manifestation of all hearts will vindicate not only God's past dealings, but his determination of future destinies; (Matt. 12: 36. Luke 12: 2-9. John 3: 18. 2 Cor. 5: 10).

3. *The Judge, in the final judgment.*

God, in the person of Jesus Christ, is to be the judge. Though God is the judge of all (Heb. 12: 23), yet this judicial activity is exercised through Christ, at the last day, as well as in the present state; (John 5: 22, 27). This, for three reasons:—

A. Christ's human nature enables men to understand both the law and the love of God, and so makes intelligible the grounds on which judgment is passed.

B. The perfect human nature of Christ, united as it is to the divine, ensures all that is needful in true judgment, viz: that it be both merciful and just.

C. Human nature, sitting upon the throne of judgment, will afford convincing proof that Christ has received the reward of his sufferings, and that humanity has been perfectly redeemed. The saints shall 'judge the world,' only as they are one with Christ; (Matt. 19: 28. Luke 22: 29, 30. 1 Cor. 6: 2, 3. Rev. 3: 21).

4. *The subjects of the last judgment.*

The persons upon whose characters and conduct this judgment shall be passed, are of two great classes:—

A. All men—each possessed of body as well as soul,—the dead having been raised, and the living having been changed; (1 Cor. 15: 51, 52. 1 Thess. 4: 16, 17).

B. All evil angels (2 Pet. 2: 4. Jude 6),—good angels appearing only as attendants and ministers of the Judge; (Matt. 13: 41, 42; 25: 31).

5. *The grounds of judgment.* These will be two in number:—

A. The law of God—as made known in conscience and in Scripture; (John 12: 48. Rom. 2: 12).

B. The grace of Christ (Rev. 20: 12),—those whose names are found "written in the book of life" being approved, simply because of their union with Christ and participation in his righteousness. Their good works shall be brought into judgment only as proofs of this relation to the Redeemer. Those not found 'written in the book of life,' will be judged by the law of God, as God has made it known to each individual.

Hodge, *Outlines of Theology*, 456, 457. Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, 465, 466. Neander, *Planting and Training*, 524–526. Edwards, *Works*, 2: 499–500; 4: 202–225.

VI. THE FINAL STATES OF THE RIGHTEOUS AND OF THE WICKED.

1. *Of the righteous.*

The final state of the righteous is described as eternal life (Mat. 25: 46), glory (2 Cor. 4: 17), rest (Heb. 4: 9), knowledge (1 Cor. 13: 8–10), holiness (Rev. 21: 27), service (Rev. 22: 3), worship (Rev. 19: 1), society (Heb. 12: 23), communion with God (Rev. 21: 3).

Summing up all these, we may say that it is the fulness and perfection of holy life, in communion with God and with other sanctified spirits. Although there will be degrees of blessedness and honor, proportioned to the capacity and fidelity of each soul (Luke 19: 17, 19. 1 Cor. 3: 14, 15), each shall receive as great a measure of reward as it can contain (1 Cor. 2: 9), and this final state, once entered upon, shall be unchanging in kind and endless in duration; (Rev. 3: 12; 22: 15).

Two questions present themselves:—

A. Is heaven a place, as well as a state? This has been maintained, upon the ground that the presence of Christ's human body is essential to heaven, and that this body must be confined to place.

We answer that, since deity and humanity are indissolubly united in Christ's single person, it is difficult to consider Christ's body as limited to place, without vacating his person of its divinity. We prefer to say, therefore, that if heaven be a place as well as a state, it is the place where Christ manifests his glory to the saints, not on account of any limitations to which he is subject, but on account of the limitations to which we are subject by reason of our finite natures. Though there may be such a place of Christ's special manifestation to his people, our ruling conception of heaven must be that of a state of holy communion with God.

B. Is this earth to be the heaven of the saints? We answer:—

First,—that the earth is to be purified by fire, and perhaps prepared to be the abode of the saints—although this last is not rendered certain by the Scriptures; (Rom. 8: 19–23. 2 Pet. 3: 5–13. Rev. 21: 1).

Secondly,—that this fitting-up of the earth for man's abode, even if it were declared in Scripture, would not render it certain that the saints are to be confined to these narrow limits; (John 14: 2). It seems rather to be intimated that the effect of Christ's work will be to bring the redeemed into union and intercourse with other orders of intelligences, from communion with whom they are now shut out by sin; (Eph. 1: 10. Col. 1: 20).

Kendrick, in Baptist Quarterly, Jan., 1870.

## 2. *Of the wicked.*

The final state of the wicked is described under the figures of everlasting fire (Mat. 25: 41), the bottomless pit (Rev. 9: 2), outer darkness (Mat. 8: 12), torment (Rev. 14: 10, 11), everlasting punishment (Mat. 25: 46), wrath of God (Rom. 2: 5), second death (Rev. 21: 8), everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord; (2 Thess. 1: 9).

Summing up all, we may say, that it is the loss of all good, whether physical or spiritual, and the misery of an evil conscience banished from God and from the society of the holy, and dwelling under God's positive curse forever.

Here we are to remember, as in the case of the final state of the righteous, that the decisive and controlling element is not the outward, but the inward. If hell be a place, it is only that the outward may correspond to the inward. If there be outward torments, it is only because these will be fit, though subordinate accompaniments of the inward state of the soul. The doctrine of eternal punishment, however, is met with the following objections:—

A. That it rests upon a misinterpretation of Scripture, since the words *αἰών* and *αἰώνιος* do not necessarily imply eternal duration. We reply:—

(a) If these words do not imply eternal duration, there are no words in the Greek language, that have this meaning.

(b) In the majority of Scripture passages where they occur, this is unmissably their signification. They are used to express the eternal duration

of God (1 Tim. 1: 17. Heb. 9: 14. Rev. 1: 18), and the endlessness of the future happiness of the saints; (Mat. 19: 29. John 6: 54, 57, 58. 2 Cor. 9: 9.)

(c) The fact that the same word is used, in Mat. 25: 46, to describe both the sufferings of the wicked and the happiness of the righteous, shows that the misery of the lost is eternal, in the same sense as the life of God, or the blessedness of the saved; (Cf. the use of *αἰδιος*, from *αἰετ*, in Rom. 1: 20, and Jude 6).

See Meyer, Com. on Mat. 24: 46. Per contra, see De Quincey, Theological Essays, 1: 127-146.

B. That the Scriptures teach an ultimate restoration of all human beings. This is maintained by appeal to such passages as Mat. 19: 28; Acts 3: 21; 1 Cor. 15: 26; 2 Pet. 3: 7. We reply:—

(a) These passages, as obscure, are to be interpreted in the light of those plainer ones which we have already cited. Thus interpreted, they foretell only the absolute triumph of the divine kingdom, and the subjection of all evil to God.

(b) The advocates of universal restoration are commonly the most strenuous defenders of the inalienable freedom of the human will to make choices contrary to all the motives which are or can be brought to bear upon it. As a matter of fact, we find in this world, that men choose sin in spite of infinite motives to the contrary. Upon the theory of human freedom just mentioned, no motives which God can use will certainly accomplish the salvation of all moral creatures. The soul which resists Christ here, may resist him forever.

(c) Upon the more correct view of the will which we have advocated, the case is equally hopeless. Upon this view the sinful soul is free simply to act out its nature. It is, in the next world, indeed, subjected to suffering. But suffering has in itself no reforming power. Unless accompanied by special renewing influences of the Holy Spirit, it only hardens and embitters the soul. We have no Scripture evidence that such influences of the Spirit are exerted, after death, upon the still impenitent, but abundant evidence on the contrary, that the moral condition in which death finds men, is their condition forever.

(d) The declaration as to Judas, in Acts 1: 19, could not be true upon the hypothesis of a final restoration. If at any time, even after the lapse of ages, Judas be redeemed, his subsequent infinite duration of blessedness must outweigh all the finite suffering through which he has passed. The Scripture statement that 'it were better for that man, if he had never been born,' must be regarded as a refutation of the theory of universal restoration.

C. That the Scriptures teach the annihilation of the wicked. We have already furnished material for a sufficient answer to this objection, by showing that, neither for the wicked nor for the righteous, is death a cessation of being, but that, on the contrary, the wicked enter at death upon a state of

conscious suffering, which the resurrection and the judgment only augment and render permanent. Another form of this objection, however, holds that the Scriptures teach a gradual weakening of the powers of the wicked, as the natural result of sin, so that they gradually cease to be. We reply:—

(a) That moral evil does not, in this present life, seem to be incompatible with a constant growth of the intellectual powers, at least in certain directions.

(b) If this theory were true, the greater the sin, the speedier would be the relief from punishment.

(c) Upon this view, as upon any theory of annihilation, future punishment is an act of grace, rather than an act of judgment.

D. That eternal punishment is inconsistent with the justice of God, since human sins differ in their degrees of ill-desert, and no sin of a finite creature can be infinite. We reply:—

(a) That so long as moral creatures are opposed to God, they deserve punishment. Since we cannot measure the power of the depraved will to resist God, we cannot deny the possibility of endless sinning. But it is just in God to visit endless sinning with endless punishment. Not the punishing, but the not-punishing, would impugn his justice.

(b) That as there are degrees of human guilt, so future punishment may admit of degrees, and yet, in all these degrees, be infinite in duration. The Scriptures recognize such degrees in future punishment; (Luke 12: 47, 48. Rev. 20: 12, 13).

(c) We know the enormity of sin, only by God's own declarations with regard to it, and by the sacrifice which he has made to redeem us from it. As committed against an infinite God, and as having in itself infinite possibilities of evil, it may in itself be infinite, and may deserve infinite punishment. Hell, as well as the cross, indicates God's estimate of sin.

E. That eternal punishment is inconsistent with the benevolence of God, which will not inflict punishment upon his creatures, except as a means of attaining some higher good. We reply:—

(a) God is not only benevolent, but holy, and holiness is his ruling attribute. The vindication of God's holiness is the primary and sufficient object of punishment. This constitutes a good which fully justifies the infliction.

(b) In this life, God's justice does involve his creatures in sufferings which are of no advantage to the individuals who suffer. If this be a fact here, it may be a fact hereafter.

(c) The benevolence of God, as concerned for the general good of the universe, requires the execution of the full penalty of the law, upon all who reject Christ's salvation. The Scriptures intimate that God's treatment of human sin is matter of instruction to all moral beings. The self-chosen ruin of the few may be the salvation of the many.



F. That the doctrine of eternal punishment repels men, and that the preaching of it is a hindrance to the success of the Gospel. We reply:—

(a) If the doctrine be true and clearly taught in Scripture, no fear of consequences to ourselves or to others can absolve us from the duty of preaching it. The minister of Christ is under obligation to preach the whole truth of God—if he does this, God will care for the results; (Ez. 2: 7; 3: 11, 18).

(b) All preaching which ignores the doctrine of eternal punishment, just so far lowers the holiness of God of which eternal punishment is an expression, and degrades the work of Christ which was needful to save us from it. The success of such preaching can be but temporary, and must be followed by a disastrous reaction toward rationalism and immorality.

(c) The fear of future punishment, though not the highest motive, is yet a proper motive, for the renunciation of sin and the turning to Christ. It must therefore be appealed to, in the hope that the seeking of salvation which begins in fear of God's anger, may end in the service of faith and love; (Luke 12: 4, 5. Jude 23).

(d) In preaching this doctrine, while we grant that the material images used in Scripture to set forth the sufferings of the lost are to be spiritually and not literally interpreted, we should still insist that the misery of the soul which eternally hates God, is greater than the physical pains which are used to symbolize it. Although a hard and mechanical statement of the truth may only awaken opposition, a solemn and feeling presentation of it, upon proper occasions, and in its due relation to the work of Christ and the offers of the gospel, cannot fail to accomplish God's purpose in preaching, and to be the means of saving some who hear; (Acts 20: 31. 2 Cor. 2: 14-17; 5: 11. 1 Tim. 4: 16).

Hodge, *Outlines of Theology*, 459-468. Angus, *Future Punishment*. Jackson, *Bampton Lectures for 1875, on the Doctrine of Retribution*. Dexter, *Verdict of Reason*. George, *Universalism not of the Bible*. Murphy, *Scientific Bases of Faith*, 310, 319, 464. For the theory of Restoration, see Jukes, *Restitution of all Things*; Birks, *Victory of Divine Goodness*. Delitzsch, *Bib. Psychologie*, 469-476.



















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